Results for 'volitions'

114 found
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  1. Volition and the Readiness Potential.Gilberto Gomes - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76.
    1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological (...)
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  2. Volition and Allied Causal Concepts.Avi Sion - 2004 - Geneva, Switzerland: CreateSpace & Kindle; Lulu..
    Volition and Allied Causal Concepts is a work of aetiology and metapsychology. Aetiology is the branch of philosophy and logic devoted to the study of causality (the cause-effect relation) in all its forms; and metapsychology is the study of the basic concepts common to all psychological discourse, most of which are causal. Volition (or free will) is to be distinguished from causation and natural spontaneity. The latter categories, i.e. deterministic causality and its negation, have been treated in a separate work, (...)
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  3.  26
    Gradations of Volition in St. Anselm's Philosophical Psychology: An Essay in Honor of Father Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.Robert Allen - manuscript
    I demonstrate here that St. Anselm’s account of free will fits neatly into an Aristotelian conceptual framework. Aristotle’s four causes are first aligned with Anselm’s four senses of ‘will’. The volitional hierarchy Anselm’s definition of free will entails is then detailed, culminating in its reconciliation with Eudemonism. The Beatific Vision, as summum bonum, is shown to be the apex of that series of perfections. I conclude by explicating Anselm’s teleological understanding of sin by reference to his semantic recapitulation of Aristotle’s (...)
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  4. A Role for Volition and Attention in the Generation of New Brain Circuitry. Toward a Neurobiology of Mental Force.Jeffrey M. Schwartz - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):115-142.
    Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a commonly occurring neuropsychiatric condition characterized by bothersome intrusive thoughts and urges that frequently lead to repetitive dysfunctional behaviours such as excessive handwashing. There are well-documented alterations in cerebral function which appear to be closely related to the manifestation of these symptoms. Controlled studies of cognitive-behavioural therapy techniques utilizing the active refocusing of attention away from the intrusive phenomena of OCD and onto adaptive alternative activities have demonstrated both significant improvements in clinical symptoms and systematic changes in (...)
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  5.  58
    Gradations of Volition: An Essay in Honor of Father Joseph Owens CSsR.Robert Allen - manuscript
    I demonstrate here that St. Anselm”s understanding of free will fits neatly into an Aristotelian conceptual framework. Aristotle”s four causes are first aligned with Anselm”s four senses of “will”. The volitional hierarchy Anselm”s definition of free will entails is then detailed, culminating in its reconciliation with Eudaimonism. The summum bonum turns out to be the apex of that series of actualizations or perfections. I conclude by explicating Anselm’s teleological understanding of sin by reference to his analog of Aristotle’s essence-accident distinction.
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  6.  1
    Meaning, God, Volition, and Art: How Rightness and the Fringe Bring It All Together.Bruce Mangan - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):154-176.
    This paper investigates how global coherence is represented in consciousness. It summarizes various lines of research that I have developed over the last twenty years, employing a method that intersects phenomenological with bio-functional analysis. The phenomenological analysis derives from William James's treatment of the fringe, especially a component feeling he called 'right direction'and I call 'rightness'. My bio-functional analysis centres on the limitations of consciousness, and the design strategies that have evolved to finesse these limitations. I argue that fringe phenomenology, (...)
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  7. Ability and Volitional Incapacity.Nicholas Southwood & Pablo Gilabert - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (3):1-8.
    The conditional analysis of ability faces familiar counterexamples involving cases of volitional incapacity. An interesting response to the problem of volitional incapacity is to try to explain away the responses elicited by such counterexamples by distinguishing between what we are able to do and what we are able to bring ourselves to do. We argue that this error-theoretic response fails. Either it succeeds in solving the problem of volitional incapacity at the cost of making the conditional analysis vulnerable to obvious (...)
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  8.  59
    Forgiveness as a Volitional Commitment.Kathryn J. Norlock - manuscript
    (Forthcoming in Routledge Handbook of Forgiveness, edited by Glen Pettigrove and Robert Enright) This chapter discusses forgiveness conceived as primarily a volitional commitment, rather than an emotional transformation. As a commitment, forgiveness is distal, involving moral agency over time, and can take the form of a speech act or a chosen attitude. The purpose can be a commitment to repair or restore relationships with wrongdoers for their sake or the sake of the relationship, usually by forswearing one’s hostile attitudes toward (...)
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  9.  26
    Gradations of Volition in St. Anselm's Philosophical Psychology: An Essay in Honor of Father Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.Robert Allen - manuscript
    I demonstrate here that St. Anselm’s account of free will fits neatly into an Aristotelian conceptual framework. Aristotle’s four causes are first aligned with Anselm’s four senses of ‘will’. The volitional hierarchy Anselm’s definition of free will entails is then detailed, culminating in its reconciliation with Eudemonism. The Beatific Vision, as summum bonum, is shown to be the apex of that series of perfections. I conclude by explicating Anselm’s teleological understanding of sin by reference to his semantic recapitulation of Aristotle’s (...)
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  10.  25
    Gradations of Volition in St. Anselm's Philosophical Psychology: An Essay in Honor of Father Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.Robert Allen - manuscript
    I demonstrate here that St. Anselm’s account of free will fits neatly into an Aristotelian conceptual framework. Aristotle’s four causes are first aligned with Anselm’s four senses of ‘will’. The volitional hierarchy Anselm’s definition of free will entails is then detailed, culminating in its reconciliation with Eudemonism. The Beatific Vision, as summum bonum, is shown to be the apex of that series of perfections. I conclude by explicating Anselm’s teleological understanding of sin by reference to his semantic recapitulation of Aristotle’s (...)
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  11. Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity.Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - In Michael O'Rourke (ed.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.
    The central question of the branch of metaethics we may call philosophical moral psychology concerns the nature or essence of moral judgment: what is it to think that something is right or wrong, good or bad, obligatory or forbidden? One datum in this inquiry is that sincerely held moral views appear to influence conduct: on the whole, people do not engage in behaviours they genuinely consider base or evil, sometimes even when they would stand to benefit from it personally. Moral (...)
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  12. Anticipating the Ultimate Innovation, Volitional Evolution: Can It Not Be Promoted or Attempted Responsibly?Lantz Fleming Miller - 2015 - Journal of Responsible Innovation 2 (3):280-300.
    Theaspirationforvolitionalevolution,orhumanevolutiondirectedbyhumansthemselves,has increased in philosophical, scientific, technical, and commercial literature. The prospect of shaping the very being who is the consumer of all other innovations offers great commercial potential, one to which all other innovations would in effect be subservient. Actually an amalgam of projected technical/commercial developments, this prospective innovation has practical and ethical ramifications. However, because it is often discussed in a scientific way (specifically that of evolutionary theory), it first calls for examination in terms of common scientific approaches to (...)
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  13. Blame as a Volitional Activity.Neal Tognazzini - manuscript
    Blame is fascinating yet elusive, and it is both of these things because it is so complex. It seems to have a cognitive aspect (the belief that someone has done wrong, perhaps), but it also seems to have an emotional aspect (resentment at being disrespected, perhaps). And then of course there is the outside-of-the-head aspect of blame, which manifests itself in rebukes and reprimands, accusations and distrust, cold shoulders and estrangement. Still, accounts of blame that identify it with beliefs or (...)
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  14.  65
    What is Kantian Gesinnung? On the Priority of Volition Over Metaphysics and Psychology in Kant’s Religion.Stephen R. Palmquist - 2015 - Kantian Review 22 (2):235-264.
    Kant’s enigmatic term, “Gesinnung”, baffles many readers of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Detailed analysis of Kant’s theory of Gesinnung, covering all 169 occurrences of cognate words in Religion, clarifies its role in his theories of both general moral decision-making and specifically religious conversion. Whereas the convention of translating “Gesinnung” as “disposition” reinforces a tendency to interpret key Kantian theories metaphysically, and Pluhar’s translation as “attitude” has psychological connotations, this study demonstrates that Kantian Gesinnung is volitional, referring to (...)
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  15.  31
    Critique of Volitional Theory of Action.Neeti Singh - 2017 - Daarshanika Anugoonja 1 (11):159–165.
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  16. Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions.Ulrich Diehl - 2012 - Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and (...)
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  17. The Courage of Conviction.Sarah K. Paul - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):1-23.
    Is there a sense in which we exercise direct volitional control over our beliefs? Most agree that there is not, but discussions tend to focus on control in forming a belief. The focus here is on sustaining a belief over time in the face of ‘epistemic temptation’ to abandon it. It is argued that we do have a capacity for ‘doxastic self-control’ over time that is partly volitional in nature, and that its exercise is rationally permissible.
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  18. Hume and the Metaphysics of Agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):87-112.
    I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human agency is untenable, unduly skeptical, (...)
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  19.  28
    Self-Contradictions of the Will: Reply to Jens Timmermann.Pauline Kleingeld - 2021 - Kant-Studien 112 (4):611-622.
    In this article, I reply to Jens Timmermann’s critical discussion of my essay “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”. I first consider Timmermann’s reasons for rejecting my interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law. I argue that the self-contradiction relevant to determining a maxim’s moral status should not be sought in the imagined world in which the maxim is a universal law. I then discuss Timmermann’s suggestion that something like a volitional self-contradiction is found within the will of the (...)
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  20. Quand Vouloir, c'est Faire [How to Do Things with Wants].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In R. Clot-Goudard (Dir.), L'Explication de L'Action. Analyses Contemporaines, Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage N°30, Paris, Vrin 30.
    This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to bring about what we want. -/- I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains EFFECTIVITY (...)
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  21.  84
    Power and Agency. [REVIEW]Robert Allen - manuscript
    E.J. Lowe attempts to meld elements of volitionalism and agent causalism in his recent essay on philosophy of action, Personal Agency. United in the belief that our mental states are inefficacious when it comes to producing volitions, agent causalists disagree over just how to formulate an alternative understanding of mental agency. We exercise self-control so as to appropriate objects of reactive attitudes by being the ultimate sources of our behavior- here they concur. But the precise nature of the relation (...)
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  22. Friendly Superintelligent AI: All You Need is Love.Michael Prinzing - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), The Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Berlin: Springer. pp. 288-301.
    There is a non-trivial chance that sometime in the (perhaps somewhat distant) future, someone will build an artificial general intelligence that will surpass human-level cognitive proficiency and go on to become "superintelligent", vastly outperforming humans. The advent of superintelligent AI has great potential, for good or ill. It is therefore imperative that we find a way to ensure-long before one arrives-that any superintelligence we build will consistently act in ways congenial to our interests. This is a very difficult challenge in (...)
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  23.  92
    Answerability, Blameworthiness, and History.Daniel Miller - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):469-486.
    This paper focuses on a non-volitional account that has received a good deal of attention recently, Angela Smith's rational relations view. I argue that without historical conditions on blameworthiness for the non-voluntary non-volitionist accounts like Smith’s are (i) vulnerable to manipulation cases and (ii) fail to make sufficient room for the distinction between badness and blameworthiness. Towards the end of the paper I propose conditions aimed to supplement these deficiencies. The conditions that I propose are tailored to suit non-volitional accounts (...)
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  24. The Part Played by Value in the Modification of Open Into Attractive Possibilities.Robert Welsh Jordan - 1997 - In Lester Embree & James G. Hart (eds.), Phenomenology of Values and Valuing. Springer. pp. 81-94.
    Moral value as it was understood by Nicolai Hartmann and by Max Scheler belongs uniquely to volitions or willings, to dispositions to will and to persons as beings capable of willing. Moreover, as understood in this paper as well as by Hartmann, Scheler, and Husserl, every volition necessarily involves if not actual valuings then reference to retained valuings and potential valuings as well as to cognitive mental phenomena. As used here, the terms 'volition' and 'willing' denote mental traits, such (...)
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  25.  36
    Community and Communication: From the Communication of Separated Consciousnesses to the Plurality of Communicating Persons.Ion Copoeru - 2005 - Topos 11 (2).
    The Husserlian concept of intersubjectivity has been criticized for the fact that it belongs exclusively to a philosophy of representation and to a solipsistic consciousness. In this conceptual framework, the other (ego) appears to be constituted by a singular ego through the synthesis of the series of its appearances (perceptive or imaginative representations) and by extrapolation (transposition) of its own “sphere of originality”. For this theory of constitution seemed to be essentially related to the concept of objective representation that post-Husserlian (...)
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  26. A Case for Removing Confederate Monuments.Travis Timmerman - 2020 - In Bob Fischer (ed.), Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues that Divide Us. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 513-522.
    A particularly important, pressing, philosophical question concerns whether Confederate monuments ought to be removed. More precisely, one may wonder whether a certain group, viz. the relevant government officials and members of the public who together can remove the Confederate monuments, are morally obligated to (of their own volition) remove them. Unfortunately, academic philosophers have largely ignored this question. This paper aims to help rectify this oversight by moral philosophers. In it, I argue that people have a moral obligation to remove (...)
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  27. Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility.David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
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  28. What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
    Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent’s psychological and volitional capacities. Much (...)
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  29. Control, Attitudes, and Accountability.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    It seems that we can be directly accountable for our reasons-responsive attitudes—e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions. Yet, we rarely, if ever, have volitional control over such attitudes, volitional control being the sort of control that we exert over our intentional actions. This presents a trilemma: (Horn 1) deny that we can be directly accountable for our reasons-responsive attitudes, (Horn 2) deny that φ’s being under our control is necessary for our being directly accountable for φ-ing, or (Horn 3) deny (...)
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  30. Making Sense of the Mental Universe.Bernardo Kastrup - 2017 - Philosophy and Cosmology 19 (1):33-49.
    In 2005, an essay was published in Nature asserting that the universe is mental and that we must abandon our tendency to conceptualize observations as things. Since then, experiments have confirmed that — as predicted by quantum mechanics — reality is contextual, which contradicts at least intuitive formulations of realism and corroborates the hypothesis of a mental universe. Yet, to give this hypothesis a coherent rendering, one must explain how a mental universe can — at least in principle — accommodate (...)
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  31. Functional Integration and the Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):315-328.
    Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that (...)
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  32. Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
    In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...)
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  33.  99
    Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection.Robert J. Hartman - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):45-64.
    Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. (...)
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  34. The Significance of Boredom: A Sartrean Reading.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - In Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge.
    By examining boredom through the lens of Sartre’s account of the emotions, I argue for the significance of boredom. Boredom matters, I show, for it is both informative and regulatory of one’s behavior: it informs one of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation; and, at the same time, owing to its affective, cognitive, and volitional character, boredom motivates the pursuit of a new goal when the current goal ceases to be satisfactory, attractive, or meaningful. In the absent of boredom, one (...)
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  35. Autism: The Micro-Movement Perspective.Elizabeth B. Torres, Maria Brincker, Robert W. Isenhower, Polina Yanovich, Kimberly Stigler, John I. Nurnberger, Dimitri N. Metaxas & Jorge V. Jose - 2013 - Frontiers Integrated Neuroscience 7 (32).
    The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic (...)
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  36. Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as a Natural Science.Gary Hatfield - 1995 - In Christopher Fox, Roy Porter & Robert Wokler (eds.), Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth Century Domains. University of California Press. pp. 184–231.
    Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul, conceived as an animating power that included vital, sensory, and rational functions. C. Wolff restricted the term " psychology " to sensory, cognitive, and volitional functions and placed the science under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Near the middle of the eighteenth century, Krueger, Godart, and Bonnet proposed approaching the mind with the techniques of the new natural science. At nearly the same time, Scottish thinkers (...)
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  37. Care, Death, and Time in Heidegger and Frankfurt.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 225-241.
    Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of human identity is care. Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are finite beings related to our own impending death, and both argue that caring has a distinctive, circular and non-instantaneous, temporal structure. In this paper, I explore the way Heidegger and Frankfurt each understand the relations among care, death, and time, and I argue for the superiority of Heideggerian version of this (...)
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  38. Addiction and Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Mental conflict not always amounts to weakness of will. Irresistible motives not always speak of addiction. This book proposes an integrated account of what singles out these phenomena: addiction and weakness of will are both forms of secondary akrasia. By integrating these two phenomena into a classical conception of akrasia as poor resolution of an unnecessary conflict – valuing without intending while intending without valuing – the book makes an original contribution to central issues in moral psychology and philosophy of (...)
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  39. On the Nature of Obsessions and Compulsions.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - In David S. Baldwin & Brian E. Leonard (eds.), Modern trends in pharmacopsychiatry - Anxiety Disorders. Karger. pp. 1-15.
    In this chapter we give an overview of current and historical conceptions of the nature of obsessions and compulsions. We discuss some open questions pertaining to the primacy of the affective, volitional or affective nature of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Furthermore, we add some phenomenological suggestions of our own. In particular, we point to the patients’ need for absolute certainty and the lack of trust underlying this need. Building on insights from Wittgenstein, we argue that the kind of certainty the patients (...)
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  40. Meditation and Mental Freedom: A Buddhist Theory of Free Will.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 17:166-212.
    I argue for a possible Buddhist theory of free will that combines Frankfurt's hierarchical analysis of meta-volitional/volitional accord with elements of the Buddhist eightfold path that prescribe that Buddhist aspirants cultivate meta-volitional wills that promote the mental freedom that culminates in enlightenment, as well as a causal/functional analysis of how Buddhist meditative methodology not only plausibly makes that possible, but in ways that may be applied to undermine Galen Strawson's impossibility argument, along with most of the other major arguments for (...)
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  41. Modes of Introspective Access: A Pluralist Approach.Adriana Renero - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):823-844.
    Several contemporary philosophical theories of introspection have been offered, yet each faces a number of difficulties in providing an explanation of the exact nature of introspection. I contrast the inner-sense view that argues for a causal awareness with the acquaintance view that argues for a non-causal or direct awareness. After critically examining the inner-sense and the acquaintance views, I claim that these two views are complementary and not mutually exclusive, and that both perspectives, conceived of as modes of introspective access, (...)
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  42.  57
    Creativity, Spontaneity, and Merit.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Alex King & Christy Mag Uidhir (eds.), Philosophy and Art: New Essays at the Intersection. Oxford University Press.
    Common sense has it that some of the greatest achievements that are to our credit are creative, whether artistic or otherwise. But standard theories of achievement and merit struggle to explain them, since the praiseworthiness of creative achievements isn’t grounded in effort, quality of will, disclosing the agent’s values, or even reasons-responsiveness. I argue that it’s distinctive of artistic or quasi-artistic creative activity that it is guided by what I call aspirational aims, which are formulated in terms of evaluative predicates (...)
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  43. The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of Behavior.Hyman Steven - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):8-11.
    There continues to be a debate on whether addiction is best understood as a brain disease or a moral condition. This debate, which may influence both the stigma attached to addiction and access to treatment, is often motivated by the question of whether and to what extent we can justly hold addicted individuals responsible for their actions. In fact, there is substantial evidence for a disease model, but the disease model per se does not resolve the question of voluntary control. (...)
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  44.  48
    Free Will? What’s That?Marco Masi - manuscript
    The question of whether we have free will is a longstanding philosophical debate that has led to divided fronts and interpretations. The first ambiguity arises due to a misconception about the relation between causal determinism, as formulated in classical physics, and the notion of free will, which, once clarified, undermines not only compatibilism but also naïve formulations of libertarianism. We show that either one maintains a material monistic physical causal determinism and must give up free will, or one must give (...)
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  45. Epistemic Identities.Linda Martín Alcoff - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):128-137.
    This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?
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  46.  52
    Not a Sailor in His Ship: Descartes on Bodily Awareness.Colin Chamberlain - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness.
    Despite his reputation for neglecting the body, Descartes develops a systematic account of bodily awareness. He holds that in bodily awareness each of us feels intimately connected to our body. We experience this body as inescapable, as infused with bodily sensations and volitions, and as a special object of concern. This multifaceted experience plays an ambivalent role in Descartes’s philosophy. Bodily awareness is epistemically dangerous. It tempts us to falsely judge that we cannot exist apart from our bodies. But (...)
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  47. Locke on the Power to Suspend.Julie Walsh - 2014 - Locke Studies 14:121-157.
    My aim in this paper is to determine how Locke understands suspension and the role it plays in his view of human liberty. To this end I, 1) discuss the deficiencies of the first edition version of ‘Of Power’ and why Locke needed to include the ability to suspend in the second edition, then 2) analyze Locke’s definitions of the power to suspend with a focus on his use of the terms ‘source’, ‘hinge’, and ‘inlet’ to describe the power. I (...)
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  48. Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law.Pauline Kleingeld - 2017 - Kant-Studien 108 (1):89-115.
    Kant’s most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant's view is standardly summarized as requiring the 'universalizability' of one's maxims and described in terms of the distinction between 'contradictions in conception' and 'contradictions in the will'. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, I (...)
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  49. Leibniz's Passionate Knowledge.Markku Roinila - 2016 - Blityri (1/2 2015):75-85.
    In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.” -/- This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy (...)
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  50. Mental Disorders Involve Limits on Control, Not Extreme Preferences.Chandra Sripada - forthcoming - In Matt King & Joshua May (eds.), Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford University Press.
    According to a standard picture of agency, a person’s actions always reflect what they most desire, and many theorists extend this model to mental illness. In this chapter, I pin down exactly where this “volitional” view goes wrong. The key is to recognize that human motivational architecture involves a regulatory control structure: we have both spontaneous states (e.g., automatically-elicited thoughts and action tendencies, etc.) as well as regulatory mechanisms that allow us to suppress or modulate these spontaneous states. Our regulatory (...)
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