The text “Language and Social Reality” is translated here from the work of John R. Searle: The Construction of Social Reality (The Free Press: New York, 1995. Chapter 3: Language and Social Reality. pp. 59–78.

Part 1 of this exchange consists in a critique by Smith of Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality focusing on Searle’s use of the formula ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Smith argues that this formula works well for social objects such as dollar bills and presidents where the corresponding X terms (pieces of paper, human beings) are easy to identify. In cases such as debts and prices and money in a bank's computers, however, the formula fails, (...) because these are cases of what he calls ‘free-standing Y terms’, since there is here no X which can count as the corresponding Y. In his response in Part 2, Searle argues that Smith’s critique rests on three misunderstandings: 1. in wrongly presupposing that Searle is trying to analyze the nature of what he calls “social objects”, rather than of social facts; 2. in thinking that the counts as formula is intended as a definition, rather than as a mere mnemonic; and 3. in neglecting the naturalism of Searle’s account. (shrink)

Psikoloji, nörobiyoloji, felsefe ve diğer pek çok disiplinde benliğe ilişkin çok sayıda farklı problemler var. Nörobiyolojide, çalışılan benlik problemlerinin pek çoğunun patolojinin çeşitli formlarıyla ilgili olduğu izlenimine sahibim –dürüstlükteki sorunlar, tutarlılık veya benliğin işlevi. Bu patolojiler hakkında söyleyecek hiçbir şeyim yok çünkü neredeyse onlar hakkında hiçbir şey bilmiyorum. Ben bu patolojilere yalnızca ayrık-beyin hastaları gibi doğrudan benliğin problemleriyle ilgiliyseler değineceğim.

John Searle has proposed one of the most influential contemporary accounts of social ontology. According to Searle, institutional facts are created by the collective assignment of a specific kind of function —status-function— to pre-existing objects. Thus, a piece of paper counts as money in a certain context because people collectively recognize it as money, and impose a status upon it, which in turn enables that piece of paper to deliver certain functions (means of payment, etc.). The first (...) part of this essay presents Searle’s theory of social ontology and summarizes his views on money. The second part centers on criticisms of his views and compares his theory with its main competitors, including the theories of Tuomela, Guala and Hindriks, and Smit, Buekens and Duplessis. The conclusion attempts to see what may remain of Searle’s theory after careful examination. (shrink)

Translated from: Searle, J. R. 'Social Ontology: some basic principles'. Anthopological Theory, 2006, Vol. 6, issue 1, pp.51-71.

The article is translated here from John R. Searle : What is an Institution? Journal of Institutional Economics (2005), 1: 1, 1–22 Printed in the United Kingdom, The JOIE Foundation, 2005.

Part 1 of this exchange consists in a critique by Smith of Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality focusing on Searle’s use of the formula ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Smith argues that this formula works well for social objects such as dollar bills and presidents where the corresponding X terms (pieces of paper, human beings) are easy to identify. In cases such as debts and prices and money in a banks computers, however, the formula fails, (...) because these are cases of what he calls ‘free-standing Y terms’, since there is here no X which can count as the corresponding Y. In his response in Part 2, Searle argues that Smith’s critique rests on three misunderstandings: 1. in wrongly presupposing that Searle is trying to analyze the nature of what he calls “social objects”, rather than of social facts; 2. in thinking that the counts as formula is intended as a definition, rather than as a mere mnemonic; and 3. in neglecting the naturalism of Searle’s account. (shrink)

Polish translation of "John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social Reality", -/- We provide an overview of Searle's contributions to speech act theory and the ontology of social reality, focusing on his theory of constitutive rules. In early versions of this theory, Searle proposed that all such rules have the form 'X counts as Y in context C' formula – as for example when Barack Obama (X) counts as President of the United States (Y) in the (...) context of US political affairs. Crucially, the X and the Y terms are here identical. A problem arises for this theory for cases involving 'free-standing Y terms', as for example in the case of money in a computerized bank account. Here there is no physical X to which a status function might be attached. We conclude by arguing that Searle's response to this problem creates difficulties for his naturalistic framework. (shrink)

دراسة فى فلسفة العقل عند جون سيرل، مع التركيز على مفهوم القصدية John Searle is one of the most important and influential living philosophers of the last thirty years. The core concept of his philosophy is intentionality. Intentionality is the mind's capacity to direct itself at things or represent them. How does the mind work? How can the human mind represent the external world? Representation is the primary function of our minds. When we believe, think, plan, hope, desire, (...) conceive, we are representing the world, and this makes our mental states intentional states. Do all mental states exhibit intentionality? Do only mental states exhibit intentionality? What is the structure of intentional states? What is the intentionality of perception and action? What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between the intentionality of mind and intentionality of language? In this monograph, I try to answer these questions and others, and I will reconstruct Searle’s theory of intentionality and evaluate it in the light of the history of intentionality, especially Brentano’s thesis, and recent developments in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

We provide an overview of Searle's contributions to speech act theory and the ontology of social reality, focusing on his theory of constitutive rules. In early versions of this theory, Searle proposed that all such rules have the form 'X counts as Y in context C' formula – as for example when Barack Obama (X) counts as President of the United States (Y) in the context of US political affairs. Crucially, the X and the Y terms are here (...) identical. A problem arises for this theory for cases involving 'free-standing Y terms', as for example in the case of money in a computerized bank account. Here there is no physical X to which a status function might be attached. We conclude by arguing that Searle's response to this problem creates difficulties for his naturalistic framework. (shrink)

John Searle’s Speech Act Theory enumerates necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-defective act of promising in producing sincere promises. This paper seeks to demonstrate the conjunctive insufficiency of the foregoing conditions due to the inadequacy of the sincerity condition to guarantee predicated acts being fulfillable. Being the definitive condition which contains the psychological state distinct in promises as illocutionary acts, that is the expression of intention (S intends to A), I purport that not all sincere promises are (...) non-defective. To motivate this, I shall explicate Searle’s conception of full blown explicit promises as his basic qualification for the application of the above conditions, and set the line as to how explicit is ‘explicit’? As a response to this insufficiency, I shall propose a condition, as part and parcel of the Propositional Content Clause, that makes up Searle’s felicity conditions for promises, which requires explicitness of the form: “A is fulfillable if A is explicit in form”. A is explicit if and only if 1) A is literal in form, where A can have either 1 basic or multiple meanings, and 2) The meaning of A, whether basic or multiple, with respect to its context is directly stated in the sentence uttered. I call this the Discharge Condition. (shrink)

John Searle challenges two main stances about the nature of visual experience: The Traditional View and Disjunctivism. He aims to remove the mistakes of these two stances and to present an alternative view which supports Direct Realism. The first part of this review presents the main theses and arguments of Searle's stance. In the second part, it is argued that Searle's analysis of Disjunctivism is not accurate enough.

This paper aims to: 1-Formulating the problem of consciousness in precise formulation that helps in understanding it and trying to solve it. 2- Determine the basic trends in treating consciousness. 3- Reconstructing Searle's views of consciousness to form a logical, interconnected structure. يهدف هذا المقال إلى: 1- صياغة مشكلة الوعي صياغة دقيقة تساعد في فهمها ومحاولة حلها. 2- تحديد الاتجاهات الأساسية في معالجة الوعي. 3- إعادة بناء آراء سيرل في الوعي بحيث تشكل بنية منطقية مترابطة الأجزاء.

I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post‐truth politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth‐telling put forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle. My first goal is to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jurgen Habermas), go about explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community. The main difference is (...) that for Lewis and game theorists, “truthful” signaling follows from an align- ment of interests, and deception follows from mixed motives leading to the calculation that sending false information is better for oneself. Following in the Enlightenment tradition, Searle argues that practical reasoning, which involves mastery of at least one language, requires that actors intend to communicate. This intention includes constraining the content of statements to uphold veracity conditions. After distinguishing between these two accounts, I will artic- ulate the implications for explaining, and even informing actions, constitutive of post‐truth politics. I argue that the strategic view of communication is suffi- cient neither to model everyday conversation nor to reflect a public sphere useful for democratic govern- ment. Both the pedagogy of strategic communication as cheap talk, and its concordance with new digital information technologies, challenge norms of truthful- ness that underlie modern institutions essential to an effective public sphere. (shrink)

Before commenting in detail on Making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC,TARW and other books by these two geniuses of (...) descriptive psychology. -/- S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and other books for more details. -/- Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my reviews). Ideally they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

사회 세계 (MSW)를 만들기 에 자세히 언급하기 전에 m나는 먼저 철학 (설명 심리학)과 Searle (S)와 비트 겐슈타인 (W)의 작품에서 예시로 현대 심리학 연구와의 관계에 대한 몇 가지 의견을 제공 할 것입니다, 나는 이것이 행동에 Searle 또는 어떤 해설자를 배치하는 가장 좋은 방법이라고 생각하기 때문에, 적절한 관점에서. 그것은 크게 설명 심리학의이 두 천재에 의해 PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW 및 기타 책의 내 리뷰를 볼 도움이 될 것입니다. S는 TLP의 메커니즘으로 W의 선견지명 진술과 그의 후기 작업에서 그의 파괴에 대한 (...) 언급을하지 않습니다. W, S는 행동의 이러한 기계적 견해의 주요 해체자가되었다, 그리고 가장 중요한 설명 심리학자 (철학자), 하지만 W가 그를 완전히 예상하고, 크게, 다른 사람을 수행 (하지만 W, 튜링과 AI에 프라우드 풋과 코플랜드의 많은 논문과 책을 참조하십시오). S의 작품은 W보다 훨씬 쉽게 따라할 수 있으며, 일부 전문 용어가 있지만 올바른 방향으로 접근하면 대부분 극적으로 분명합니다. 자세한 내용은 W S 및 기타 책에 대한 내 리뷰를 참조하십시오. 전반적으로, MSW는 작업의 S의 반세기에서 발생하는 Wittgenstein을 통해 많은 실질적인 발전의 좋은 요약이지만, 내 보기에, W는 여전히 그가 말하는 것을 파악하면 기본 심리학에 대한 타의 추종을 불허합니다 (내 리뷰 참조). 이상적으로, 그들은 함께 읽어야한다 : S1 / S2의 운영W의 기발한 예와 함께 설명 S2 / S3의 운영에 명확한 일관된 산문과 일반화에 대한 Searle, 그의 화려한 격언. 제가 훨씬 어렸을 때, 저는 그 일을 하는 책을 쓰곤 했습니다. 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is (...) classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the book. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Vít Gvoždiak published a reconciliatory analysis of Searle’s social ontology with semiotics in Gvoždiak (2012). Without prior knowledge of his paper, an analysis of the same subject appeared in Msimang (2014). Even though Searle’s social ontology is a common point of reference in the formulation of semiotics in these papers, it also serves as a point of departure in their understanding of semiotics and its development. The semiotic theory expressed in Gvoždiak (2012) is an inherently linguistic (speech act (...) centred) theory, whereas the semiotic theory presented in Msimang (2014) tends more towards a general theory of communicative systems in which social ontology, which follows from speech act theory, is an interesting part. It is my purpose in this note to contrast the two positions of semiotic theory as they appear in the aforementioned papers in reference to their appropriation of Searle’s social ontology. (shrink)

Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking (...) throughout. However his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. -/- His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. -/- Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s (...) multiple drafts model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness. (shrink)

사회 세계 (MSW)를 만들기 에 자세히 언급하기 전에 m나는 먼저 철학 (설명 심리학)과 Searle (S)와 비트 겐슈타인 (W)의 작품에서 예시로 현대 심리학 연구와의 관계에 대한 몇 가지 의견을 제공 할 것입니다, 나는 이것이 행동에 Searle 또는 어떤 해설자를 배치하는 가장 좋은 방법이라고 생각하기 때문에, 적절한 관점에서. 그것은 크게 설명 심리학의이 두 천재에 의해 PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW 및 기타 책의 내 리뷰를 볼 도움이 될 것입니다. S는 TLP의 메커니즘으로 W의 선견지명 진술과 그의 후기 작업에서 그의 파괴에 대한 (...) 언급을하지 않습니다. W, S는 행동의 이러한 기계적 견해의 주요 해체자가되었다, 그리고 가장 중요한 설명 심리학자 (철학자), 하지만 W가 그를 완전히 예상하고, 크게, 다른 사람을 수행 (하지만 W, 튜링과 AI에 프라우드 풋과 코플랜드의 많은 논문과 책을 참조하십시오). S의 작품은 W보다 훨씬 쉽게 따라할 수 있으며, 일부 전문 용어가 있지만 올바른 방향으로 접근하면 대부분 극적으로 분명합니다. 자세한 내용은 W S 및 기타 책에 대한 내 리뷰를 참조하십시오. 전반적으로, MSW는 작업의 S의 반세기에서 발생하는 Wittgenstein을 통해 많은 실질적인 발전의 좋은 요약이지만, 내 보기에, W는 여전히 그가 말하는 것을 파악하면 기본 심리학에 대한 타의 추종을 불허합니다 (내 리뷰 참조). 이상적으로, 그들은 함께 읽어야한다 : S1 / S2의 운영W의 기발한 예와 함께 설명 S2 / S3의 운영에 명확한 일관된 산문과 일반화에 대한 Searle, 그의 화려한 격언. 제가 훨씬 어렸을 때, 저는 그 일을 하는 책을 쓰곤 했습니다. 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...) a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., human ecology and psychology) in school, maybe civilization would have a chance. -/- In my view these articles and reviews have many novel and highly useful elements, in that they use my own version of the recently (ca. 1980’s) developed dual systems view of our brain and behavior to lay out a logical system of rationality (personality, psychology, mind, language, behavior, thought, reasoning, reality etc.) that is sorely lacking in the behavioral sciences (psychology, philosophy, literature, politics, anthropology, history, economics, sociology etc.). The philosophy centers around the two writers I have found the most important, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. -/- Now that I think I understand how the games work I have mostly lost interest in philosophy, which of course is how Wittgenstein said it should be. But since they are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put, it due to the lack of perspicuity of language, the problems run throughout all human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning principally with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) -/- Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS),but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I mention in the articles. -/- When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in an Amazon review as the Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing behavior. I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research. -/- Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior. -/- The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides Standard Social Science Model. Democracy and equality are wonderful ideals, but without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation and any world that adopts them. The monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our children’s heritage for temporary comforts. -/- The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the thoughts of System 1) must lead directly to actions. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves an heuristic for how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it,includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth. -/- My writings are available in updated versions as paperbacks and Kindles on Amazon. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) 2nd printing with corrections (Feb 2018) ASIN B0711R5LGX -/- Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) ASIN B07CQVWV9C . (shrink)

Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books by these two geniuses (...) of descriptive psychology. -/- S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and other books for more details. -/- Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is (...) classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the book. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Bevor ich mich ausführlich zu making the Social World (MSW) bespreche, werde ich zunächst einige Kommentare zur Philosophie (deskriptive Psychologie) und zu ihrem Zusammenhang mit der zeitgenössischen psychologischen Forschung, wie sie in den Werken von Searle (S) und Wittgenstein (W) exemplarisch dargestellt wird, anbieten, da ich glaube, dass dies der beste Weg ist, Searle oder irgendeinkommentator in die richtige Perspektive zu stellen. Es wird sehr helfen, meine Rezensionen von PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW und anderen Büchern von diesen (...) beiden Genies der beschreibenden Psychologie zu sehen. S bezieht sich nicht auf W es vorausschauende Geistesaussage als Mechanismus in TLP und seine Zerstörung in seinem späteren Werk. Seit W. ist S zum Hauptdekonstruktor dieser mechanischen Verhaltensauffassungen und der wichtigste beschreibende Psychologe (Philosoph) geworden, erkennt aber nicht, wie vollständig W ihn vorwegnahm und im Großen und Ganzen andere tun (aber siehe die vielen Papiere und Bücher von Proudfoot und Copeland über W, Turing und KI). S Arbeit ist wesentlich einfacher zu folgen als W,und obwohl es etwas Jargon gibt, ist es meistens spektakulär klar, wenn man sich ihm aus der richtigen Richtung nähert. Siehe meine Bewertungen von W S und anderen Büchern für weitere Details. Insgesamt ist MSW eine gute Zusammenfassung der vielen wesentlichen Fortschritte gegenüber Wittgenstein, die sich aus S' halbes Jahrhundert Arbeit ergeben, aber meiner Meinung nach ist W immer noch unerreicht für die Grundlegende Psychologie, wenn man begreift, was er sagt (siehe meine Rezensionen). Idealerweise, sollten sie zusammen gelesen werden: Searle für die klare kohärente Prosa und Verallgemeinerungen über den Betrieb von S2/S3, illustriert mit W es perspicacious Beispiele der Operation von S1/S2, und seine brillanten Aphorismen. Wenn ich viel jünger wäre, würde ich ein Buch schreiben, das genau das tut. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic (...) problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I begin with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en (...) el segundo acápite, mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

Bevor ich das Buch kommentiere, möchte ich Kommentare zu Wittgenstein und Searle und der logischen Struktur der Rationalität abgeben. Die Essays hier sind meistens bereits während des letzten Jahrzehnts veröffentlicht (obwohl einige aktualisiert wurden), zusammen mit einem unveröffentlichten Artikel, und nichts hier wird für diejenigen, die mit seiner Arbeit mithalten können, nicht überraschen. Wie W gilt er als der beste Standup-Philosoph seiner Zeit und sein schriftliches Werk ist solide als Fels und bahnbrechender durchweg. SeinVersäumnis, das spätere W so ernst (...) zu nehmen, führt jedoch zu einigen Fehlern und Verwirrungen. Nur ein paar Beispiele: Auf S. 7 stellt er zweimal fest, dass unsere Gewissheit über grundlegende Tatsachen auf das überwältigende Gewicht der Vernunft zurückzuführen ist, das unsere Behauptungen stützt, aber W hat in "On Certainty" definitiv gezeigt, dass es keine Möglichkeit gibt, an der wirklichen axiomamatischen Struktur unserer System-1-Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen und Gedanken zu zweifeln, da sie selbst die Grundlage für das Urteil ist und nicht selbst beurteilt werden kann. Im ersten Satz auf P8 sagt er uns, dass Sicherheit revisierbar ist, aber diese Art von "Sicherheit", die wir Sicherheit2 nennen könnten, ist das Ergebnis der Erweiterung unserer axiomamatischen und nicht revisierbaren Gewissheit (Sicherheit1) durch Erfahrung und ist völlig anders, wie sie propositional (wahr oder falsch) ist. Dies ist natürlich ein klassisches Beispiel für den "Kampf gegen die Verhexung unserer Intelligenz durch Sprache", den W. immer wieder demonstrierte. Ein Wort - zwei (oder viele) unterschiedliche Verwendungen. Sein letztes Kapitel "Die Einheit des Vorschlags" (bisher unveröffentlicht) würde auch sehr davon profitieren, W es "On Certainty" oder DMS es two books on OC (siehe meine Rezensionen) zu lesen, da sie den Unterschied zwischen wahren Sätzen, die S1 beschreiben, und wahren oder falschen Sätzen, die S2 beschreiben, deutlich machen. Dies erscheint mir als eine weit überlegene Herangehensweise an Ses Nehmen S1 Wahrnehmungen als propositional, da sie erst T oder F werden, nachdem man beginnt, über sie in S2 nachzudenken. Sein Standpunkt, dass Die Sätze Aussagen von tatsächlicher oder potenzieller Wahrheit und Falschheit, von Vergangenheit und Zukunft und Fantasie erlauben und damit einen enormen Fortschritt gegenüber der vor- oder protolinguistischen Gesellschaft ermöglichen, ist überzeugend. Er sagt: "Ein Satz ist alles, was eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit bestimmen kann... und eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit... ist, dass dies der Fall ist und so ist." Oder, das muss man hinzufügen, das könnte oder könnte sein oder sein könnte. Insgesamt ist PNC eine gute Zusammenfassung der vielen wesentlichen Fortschritte gegenüber Wittgenstein, die sich aus S' halbes Jahrhundert Arbeit ergeben, aber meiner Meinung nach ist W immer noch unerreicht, wenn man begreift, was er sagt. Im, Idealfall sollten sie zusammen gelesen werden: Searle für die klare kohärente Prosa und Verallgemeinerungen, illustriert mit W es perspicacious Beispiele und brillanten Aphorismen. Wenn ich viel jünger wäre, würde ich ein Buch schreiben, das genau das tut. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Die jenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Avant de commenter le livre, je vous propose des commentaires sur Wittgenstein et Searle et la structure logique de la rationalité. Les essais ici sont pour la plupart déjà publiés au cours de la dernière décennie (bien que certains ont été mis à jour), avec un élément non publié, et rien ici ne viendra comme une surprise pour ceux qui ont suivi son travail. Comme W, il est considéré comme le meilleur philosophe standup de son temps et son travail (...) écrit est solide comme un rocher et révolutionnaire tout au long. Cependant, son incapacité à prendre le W plus tard assez au sérieux conduit à quelques erreurs et confusions. Juste quelques exemples: sur p7, il note deux fois que notre certitude sur les faits de base est due à l’importance écrasante de la raison à l’appui de nos revendications, mais W a montré définitivement dans «Sur la certitude» qu’il n’y a aucune possibilité de douter de la véritable seule structure axiomatique de notre système 1 perceptions, souvenirs et pensées, car il est lui-même la base du jugement et ne peut pas lui-même être jugé. Dans la première phrase sur p8, il nous dit que la certitude est révisable, mais ce genre de «certitude», que nous pourrions appeler Certainty2, est le résultat de l’extension de notre certitude axiomatique et non révisible (Certitude1) par l’expérience et est tout à fait différent car il est proposé (vrai ou faux). C’est bien sûr un exemple classique de la « bataille contre l’envoûtement de notre intelligence par la langue » dont W a démontré maintes et maintes fois. Un mot- deux (ou plusieurs) utilisations distinctes. Son dernier chapitre "L’unité de la proposition" (précédemment inédit) bénéficierait également grandement de la lecture de W "On Certainty" ou les deux livres de DMS sur OC (voir mes commentaires) car ils font clairement la différence entre les phrases vraies seulement décrivant S1 et les propositions vraies ou fausses décrivant S2. Cela me semble comme une approche bien supérieure à S de prendre S1 perceptions comme propositionnelle car ils ne deviennent T ou F après que l’on commence à penser à eux dans S2. Cependant, son point que les propositions permettent des déclarations de vérité réelle ou potentielle et de fausseté, du passé et du futur et de la fantaisie, et donc fournir une énorme avancée sur la société pré ou protolinguistique, est convaincante. Comme il l’affirme : « Une proposition est tout ce qui peut déterminer une condition de satisfaction... et une condition de satisfaction... est que tel ou tel est le cas. Ou, il faut ajouter, qui pourrait être ou aurait pu être ou pourrait être imaginé pour être le cas. Dans l’ensemble, PNC est un bon résumé des nombreuses avancées substantielles sur Wittgenstein résultant du demi-siècle de travail de S, mais à mon avis, W est toujours inégalé une fois que vous saisissez ce qu’il dit. Idéalement, ils devraient être lus ensemble: Searle pour la prose et les généralisations clairement cohérentes, illustrés par les exemples perspicaces de W et les aphorismes brillants. Si j’étais beaucoup plus jeune, j’écrirais un livre faisant exactement cela. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Prima di commentare in dettaglio su making il mondo sociale (MSW) offrirò prima alcuni commenti sulla filosofia (psicologia descrittiva) e il suo rapporto con la ricerca psicologica contemporanea come esemplificato nelle opere di Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), dal momento che sento che questo è il modo migliore per posizionare Searle o qualsiasi comportamento commentatore, nella giusta prospettiva. Aiuterà molto vedere le mie recensioni di PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW e altri libri di questi due geni della psicologia (...) descrittiva. S non fa alcun riferimento alla presciente dichiarazione d'animo di W come meccanismo in TLP, e la sua sua distruzione nel suo lavoro successivo. Dal momento che W, S è diventato il principale decostruttore di queste visioni meccaniche del comportamento, e il più importante psicologo descrittivo (filosofo), ma non si rende conto di come W lo abbia anticipato completamente né, in generale, fare altri (ma vedere i molti articoli e libri di Proudfoot e Copeland su W, Turing e AI). Il lavoro di S è molto più facile da seguire di quello di W, e anche se c'è qualche gergo, è per lo più spettacolare chiaro se ti avvicini dalla giusta direzione. Vedi le mie recensioni su W S e altri libri per maggiori dettagli. Nel complesso, MSW è una buona sintesi dei molti progressi sostanziali su Wittgenstein derivanti dal mezzo secolo di lavoro di S, ma a mio parere, W è ancora ineguagliabile per la psicologia di base una volta compreso quello che sta dicendo (vedi le mie recensioni). Idealmente, dovrebbero essere letti insieme: Searle per la chiara prosa coerente e generalizzazioni sul funzionamento di S2/S3, illustrate con esempi perspicaci di W del funzionamento di S1/S2, e i suoi brillanti aforismi. Se fossi molto più giovane scriverei un libro facendo esattamente questo. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Avant de commenter en détail sur Making the Social World (MSW) Je vais d’abord offrir quelques commentaires sur la philosophie (psychologie descriptive) et son rapport à la recherche psychologique contemporaine comme illustré dans les œuvres de Searle (S) et Wittgenstein (W), puisque je pense que c’est la meilleure façon de placer Searle ou tout commentateur sur le comportement, en perspective appropriée. Il aidera grandement à voir mes critiques de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW et d’autres livres par ces (...) deux génies de la psychologie descriptive. S ne fait aucune référence à la déclaration prémonitoire de L’esprit de W comme mécanisme dans TLP, et sa destruction de celui-ci dans son travail ultérieur. Depuis W, S est devenu le principal déconstructeur de ces vues mécaniques du comportement, et le psychologue descriptif le plus important (philosophe), mais ne se rend pas compte à quel point W l’a anticipé complètement ni, dans l’ensemble, faire d’autres (mais voir les nombreux papiers et livres de Proudfoot et Copeland sur W, Turing et AI). Le travail de S est beaucoup plus facile à suivre que celui de W, et bien qu’il y ait un certain jargon, il est surtout spectaculairement clair si vous l’approchez de la bonne direction. Voir mes commentaires de W S et d’autres livres pour plus de détails. Dans l’ensemble, MSW est un bon résumé des nombreux progrès substantiels sur Wittgenstein résultant du demi-siècle de travail de S, mais à mon avis, W est toujours inégalé pour la psychologie de base une fois que vous saisissez ce qu’il dit (voir mes commentaires). Idéalement, ils devraient être lus ensemble: Searle pour la prose clairement cohérente et les généralisations sur le fonctionnement de S2/S3, illustré avec les exemples perspicaces de W de l’opération de S1/S2, et ses aphorismes brillants. Si j’étais beaucoup plus jeune, j’écrirais un livre faisant exactement cela. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

एम making सामाजिक दुनिया पर विस्तार से टिप्पणी करने से पहले(MSW) मैं पहली बार दर्शन पर कुछ टिप्पणी की पेशकश करेगा (वर्णनात्मक मनोविज्ञान) और समकालीन मनोवैज्ञानिक अनुसंधान के लिए अपने रिश्ते के रूप में Searle के कार्यों में उदाहरण के रूप में (एस) और Wittgenstein (डब्ल्यू), जब से मुझे लगता है कि यह सबसे अच्छा तरीका है Searle या व्यवहार पर किसी भी टीकाकार जगह है, उचित परिप्रेक्ष्य में. यह बहुत वर्णनात्मक मनोविज्ञान के इन दो प्रतिभाशाली द्वारा पीएनसी, (...) TLP, पीआई, ओसी, TARW और अन्य पुस्तकों की मेरी समीक्षा देखने में मदद मिलेगी. एस TLP में तंत्र के रूप में मन के डब्ल्यू prescient बयान के लिए कोई संदर्भ नहीं है, और उसके बाद के काम में इसे नष्ट. डब्ल्यू के बाद से, एस व्यवहार के इन यांत्रिक विचारों के प्रमुख deconstructor बन गया है, और सबसे महत्वपूर्ण वर्णनात्मक मनोवैज्ञानिक (philosopher), लेकिन पता नहीं कैसे पूरी तरह से डब्ल्यू उसे प्रत्याशित और न ही, कुल मिलाकर, दूसरों को करते हैं (लेकिन कई कागजात देखते हैं और डब्ल्यू, ट्यूरिंग और एअर इंडिया पर Proudfoot और Copeland की किताबें). एस का काम डब्ल्यू की तुलना में पालन करने के लिए काफी आसान है, और हालांकि वहाँ कुछ शब्दजाल है, यह ज्यादातर शानदार स्पष्ट है अगर आप इसे सही दिशा से दृष्टिकोण. अधिक जानकारी के लिए डब्ल्यू एस और अन्य पुस्तकों की मेरी समीक्षा देखें. कुल मिलाकर, MSW Wittgenstein पर कई पर्याप्त अग्रिमों का एक अच्छा सारांश है काम की एस आधी सदी से जिसके परिणामस्वरूप है, लेकिन मेरे विचार में, डब्ल्यू अभी भी बुनियादी मनोविज्ञान के लिए असमान है एक बार तुम समझ कि वह क्या कह रहा है (मेरी समीक्षा देखें). आदर्श रूप में, वे एक साथ पढ़ा जाना चाहिए: S2/S3 के संचालन पर स्पष्ट सुसंगत गद्य और सामान्यीकरण के लिए Searle, S1/S2 के संचालन के W's perspicacious उदाहरण के साथ सचित्र, और उसके शानदार aphorisms. अगर मैं बहुत छोटा था मैं एक किताब लिखना होगा कि वास्तव में कर रही है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking (...) throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. -/- His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. -/- Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Easy to understand philosophy papers in all areas. Table of contents: Three Short Philosophy Papers on Human Freedom The Paradox of Religions Institutions Different Perspectives on Religious Belief: O’Reilly v. Dawkins. v. James v. Clifford Schopenhauer on Suicide Schopenhauer’s Fractal Conception of Reality Theodore Roszak’s Views on Bicameral Consciousness Philosophy Exam Questions and Answers Locke, Aristotle and Kant on Virtue Logic Lecture for Erika Kant’s Ethics Van Cleve on Epistemic Circularity Plato’s Theory of Forms Can we trust our senses? Yes (...) we can Descartes on What He Believes Himself to Be The Role of Values in Science Modern Science Kant’s Moral Philosophy Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy Schopenhauer on Human Suffering Bertrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy The Philosophical Value of Uncertainty Logic Homework: Theorems and Models Searle vs. Turing on the Imitation Game Hume, Frankfurt, and Holbach on Personal Freedom Manifesto of the University of Wisconsin, Madison Secular Society Michael’s Analysis of the Limits of Civil Protections Bentham and Mill on Different Types of Pleasure Set Theory Homework Aristotle on Virtue Nagel On the Hard Problem Wittgenstein on Language and Thought Camus and Schopenhauer on the Meaning of Life Camus’ Hero as Rebel without a Cause My Little Finger: Camus’ Absurdism Illustrated Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? Does Mathematics Assume the Truth of Platonism? The Self-defeating Nature of Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Generally What is The Good Life? Bentham and Mill regarding types of pleasures Kant’s Moral Philosophy Five Short Papers on Mind-body Dualism Tracy Latimer’s Father had the Right to Kill Her: Towards a doctrine of generalized self-defense Arguments Concerning God and Morality Goldman, Rousseau and von Hayek on the Ideal State J.S Mill on Liberty and Personal Freedom A Kantian Analysis of a Borderline Date-rape Situation Living Well as Flourishing: Aristotle’s Conception of the Good Life Three Essays on Medical Ethics: Answers to Exam Questions on Elective Amputation, Vaccination, and Informed Consent Hobbes, Marx, Rousseau, Nietzsche: Their Central Themes De Tocqueville on Egoism Mill vs. Hobbes on Liberty Exam-Essays on the Moral Systems of Mill, Bentham, and Kant Kant’s Moral System Aristotle on Virtue Plato’s Cave Allegory An Ethical Quandary Superorganisms The Tuskegee Experiment A Rawlsian Analysis Why Moore’s Proof of an External World Fails A Defense of Nagel’s Argument Against Materialism A Utilitarian Analysis of a Case of Theft The Paradox of the Self-aware Wretch: An Analysis of Pascal’s Moral Philosophy Jean-Paul Sartre: Decline and Fall of a Marxist Sell-out A One Page Proof of Plato’s Theory of Forms Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy The problem of the one and the many Four Short Essays on Truth and Knowledge What is ‘the Good Life?’ The Ontological Argument Different Political Philosophies: Plato, Locke, Madison, Rousseau, Hayek, and Mill on the State What do I know with certainty? Skepticism about skepticism Neuroscience and Freewill Operant Conditioning What makes us special? Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? No Two Papers on Epistemology: Gettier and Bostrom Examination Nietzsche on Punishment God’s Foreknowledge and Moral Responsibility . (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute acerca de la posibilidad de llevar a cabo afirmaciones epistémicamente objetivas respecto del arte a partir de la filosofía de la sociedad de John Searle y de la epistemología del desacuerdo. Para ello se considerarán las distinciones ontológicamente objetivo/subjetivo y epistémicamente objetivo/subjetivo en relación con el arte como fenómeno relativo a la intencionalidad, señalándolo como ontológicamente subjetivo y epistémicamente objetivo. Luego se discutirá acerca del desacuerdo en torno a obras polémicas de arte y (...) de la disolución de tales desacuerdos al considerar la oposición entre creencia y aceptación según la propuesta de Jonathan Cohen. Finalmente, mostrando la posibilidad de generar acuerdos en torno al juicio de gustos, se señala el rol de las instituciones relativas al arte en nuestra comprensión del estatuto artístico de las obras polémicas. De esta manera, se pretende señalar que la apreciación de una obra como ‘arte’ es una cuestión objetiva dependiente de las instituciones que operan en nuestra sociedad. (shrink)

Prima di commentare il libro, offro commenti su Wittgenstein e Searle e sulla struttura logica della razionalità. I saggi qui sono per lo più già pubblicati nell'ultimo decennio (anche se alcuni sono stati aggiornati), insieme a un elemento inedito, e nulla qui verrà come una sorpresa per coloro che hanno tenuto il passo con il suo lavoro. Come W, è considerato il miglior filosofo del suo tempo e il suo lavoro scritto è solido come una roccia e innovativo in (...) tutto. Tuttavia, la sua incapacità di prendere la Successiva W abbastanza sul serio porta ad alcuni errori e confusioni. Solo alcuni esempi: su p7 osserva due volte che la nostra certezza sui fatti di base è dovuta al peso schiacciante della ragione che sostiene le nostre affermazioni, ma W ha mostrato definitivamente in 'On Certainty' che non c'è possibilità di dubitare della vera struttura assiomatica delle nostre percezioni, ricordi e pensieri del sistema 1, poiché è essa stessa la base del giudizio e non può essere giudicata. Nella prima frase su p8 ci dice che la certezza è revisionabile, ma questo tipo di 'certezza', che potremmo chiamare Certezza2, è il risultato dell'estensione della nostra certezza assiomatica e non revisionabile (Certezza1) attraverso l'esperienza ed è completamente diversa in quanto proposizionale (vera o falsa). Questo è ovviamente un classico esempio della "battaglia contro l'intrattenere della nostra intelligenza per linguaggio" che W ha dimostrato più e più volte. Una parola- due (o molti) usi distinti. Anche il suo ultimo capitolo "L'unità della proposizione" (precedentemente inedito) trarrebbe grande beneficio dalla lettura dei due libri di W "On Certainty" o dei due libri di DMS su OC (vedi le mie recensioni) in quanto fanno chiaramente la differenza tra solo frasi vere che descrivono S1 e proposizioni vere o false che descrivono S2. Questo mi sembra un approccio di gran lunga superiore a S's prendendo le percezioni S1 come proposizionale dal momento che diventano solo T o F dopo che si inizia a pensare a loro in S2. Tuttavia, il suo punto che le proposizioni permettono dichiarazioni di verità e falsità reali o potenziali, del passato e del futuro e della fantasia, e quindi forniscono un enorme progresso rispetto alla società pre o protolinguistica, è cogente. Come egli afferma: "Una proposta è qualsiasi cosa che può determinare una condizione di soddisfazione... e una condizione di soddisfazione... è che tale e tale è il caso. Oppure, si deve aggiungere, che potrebbe essere o potrebbe essere stato o potrebbe essere immaginato per essere il caso. Nel complesso, PNC è una buona sintesi dei molti progressi sostanziali su Wittgenstein derivanti dal mezzo secolo di lavoro di S, ma a mio parere, W è ancora ineguagliabile una volta compreso ciò che sta dicendo. Idealmente, dovrebbero essere letti insieme: Searle per la chiara prosa coerente e generalizzazioni, illustrate con esempi perspicaci di W e brillanti aforismi. Se fossi molto più giovane scriverei un libro facendo esattamente questo. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Proporciono un estudio crítico de algunos de los principales hallazgos de Wittgenstein y Searle sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein, que todos los problemas verdaderamente ' filosóficos ' son los mismos — confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo que todas las soluciones son las mismas — observando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para (...) que sus condiciones de verdad (condiciones de satisfacción o COS) sean claras. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa menos que uno no puede significar (el estado claro COS para) cualquier enunciado arbitrario y significado es solamente posible en un contexto muy específico. Empiezo con ' On Certainty ' (‘En Certeza’) y continúo el análisis de los escritos recientes por y sobre ellos desde la perspectiva de los dos sistemas de pensamiento, empleando un nuevo cuadro de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punta de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Como tantas veces en filosofía, el título no sólo establece la línea de batalla, sino que expone los prejuicios y errores del autor, ya que si podemos o no dar sentido al juego de idiomas 'Ver las cosas como son' y si es posible tener una 'teoría filosófica' de percepción' (que sólo puede ser sobre cómo funciona el lenguaje de la percepción), a diferencia de uno científico, que es una teoría sobre cómo funciona el cerebro, son exactamente los problemas. Este (...) es el Clásico Searle, excelente y probablemente al menos tan bueno como cualquier otro puede producir, pero carente de una comprensión completa de las ideas fundamentales del Wittgenstein posterior y sin comprender los dos sistemas de marco de pensamiento, lo que podría haberlo hecho brillante. Al igual que en su trabajo anterior, Searle evita en gran medida la ciencia, pero hay lapsos frecuentes y no entiende que los problemas son siempre sobre los juegos de idiomas, un fracaso que comparte con casi todo el mundo. Después de proporcionar un marco que consiste en una Tabla de Intencionalidad basada en los dos sistemas de pensamiento y pensamiento y investigación de decisiones, doy un análisis detallado del libro. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019), Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política , Economía, Hitoria y Literatura (2020) y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky (2019) y otras. Al igual que con Wittgenstein (en adelante W), todo lo que Searle (en adelante S) escribe es un tesoro y es maravilloso que permanezca afilado a medida que se acerca a los 80. A diferencia de la mayoría, incluso sus primeros trabajos siguen siendo relevantes y está trabajando en varios otros libros. También sugiero sus más de 100 conferencias y entrevistas en youtube, vimeo, etc., que, aunque inevitablemente un poco repetitivas, contienen muchas declaraciones que no están en sus escritos. He leído casi toda su obra, y he escuchado todas las conferencias, la mayoría de ellas 2 o 3 veces. Estos son de especial interés como (como Wittgenstein) que no lee de las notas, por lo que cada uno es único y no una réplica de un papel, y es un excelente orador extemporáneo que en su mayoría utiliza un lenguaje sin pretensiones (ambos tan diferentes de la mayoría de los demás). Las conferencias recientes dadas en las Universidades Europeas son magníficas, pero no te pierdas las antiguas como la conferencia de la BBC "Una realidad cambiante, la ciencia del comportamiento humano", que da un excelente relato de por qué la causalidad legítima y repetitiva del rápido cerebro sistema automático, no linguístico 1 (S1) es fundamentalmente diferente y no destacable de la misma manera que la complejidad ilimitada de razones que caracterizan el lento sistema deliberativo, consciente de la lengua 2 (S2), que genera una explosión combinatoria no generalmente representable de una manera útil por las leyes científicas. El sistema dual (S1, S2) método de describir el pensamiento utilizado en esta revisión, común a la investigación de razonamiento desde hace unos 20 años, es mío y no de Searle. Dado que recientemente he escrito un artículo de 75p analizando el trabajo de Searle en comparación con el de Wittgenstein (La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje como revelado por Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle) no lo repetiré y lo repetiré concentrarse en este libro solamente. (shrink)

Antes de comentar sobre el libro, ofrezco comentarios sobre Wittgenstein y Searle y la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Los ensayos aquí son en su mayoría ya publicados durante la última década (aunque algunos han sido actualizados), junto con un artículo inédito, y nada aquí vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, es considerado como el mejor filósofo de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera (...) en todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. Sólo algunos ejemplos: en P7, dos veces señala que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al peso abrumador de la razón que respalda nuestras afirmaciones, pero W demostró definitivamente en ' on certidumbre ' que no hay posibilidad de dudar de la verdadera estructura axiomática de nuestro sistema 1 percepciones, memorias y pensamientos, ya que es en sí la base para el juicio y no puede ser juzgado. En la primera frase del P8 nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente, ya que es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra-dos (o muchos) usos distintos. Su último capítulo "la unidad de la Proposición" (anteriormente inédito) también se beneficiaría en gran medida de la lectura de W "en la certeza" o de los dos libros de DMS sobre OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas sólo frases que describen S1 y verdadero o falso proposiciones que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional ya que sólo se convierten en T o F después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto de que las proposiciones permiten declaraciones de la verdad y la falsedad real o potencial, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. Como dice, "una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso. En general, PNC es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable una vez que se comprende lo que está diciendo. Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa y generalizaciones coherentes, ilustradas con los ejemplos perspicaces de W y aforismos brillantes. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

이 책에 댓글을 달기 전에, 나는 비트겐슈타인과 Searle과 합리성의 논리적 구조에 대한 의견을 제공합니다. 여기에 에세이는 대부분 이미 지난 10 년 동안 출판 (일부는 업데이트되었지만), 하나의 게시되지 않은 항목과 함께, 여기에 아무것도 그의 작품을 유지 한 사람들에게 놀라움으로 올 것이다. W와 마찬가지로 그는 동시대의 최고의 스탠드업 철학자로 여겨지며, 그의 저술작품은 전체적으로 바위와 획기적인 작품으로 견고합니다. 그러나,, 그의 실패는 충분히 심각하게 나중에 W를 가지고 몇 가지 실수와 혼란에 이르게. 단지 몇 가지 예 : p7에 그는 기본 사실에 대한 우리의 확실성은 우리의 (...) 주장을 지원하는 이유의 압도적 인 무게때문이라고 두 번 지적하지만, W는 '확실성에'에서 결정적으로 우리의 시스템 1 인식의 진정한 유일한 축 세포 구조를 의심 할 가능성이 없다는 것을 보여 주었다, 기억과 생각, 그것은 그 자체가 판단의 기초이기 때문에. p8의 첫 번째 문장에서 그는 확실성이 개정 될 수 있다고 우리에게 말하지만, 우리가 확실성2라고 부를 수있는 이런 종류의 '확실성'은 경험을 통해 우리의 공리및 비회복확실성 (확실성1)을 확장한 결과이며 명제 (참 또는 거짓)와 는 완전히 다릅니다. 이것은 물론 W가 거듭 시연한 "언어에 의한 우리의 지능의 요정에 맞서 싸우는 전투"의 전형적인 예입니다. 하나의 단어- 두 (또는 많은) 별개의 용도. 그의 마지막 장 "발의안의 통일"(이전에 출판되지 않은)은 또한 W의 "확실성에"또는 OC에 DMS의 두 권의 책을 읽는 것이 크게 도움이 될 것입니다 (내 리뷰 참조) 그들은 S1을 설명하는 진정한 유일한 문장과 S2를 설명하는 진실 또는 거짓 제안의 차이를 명확히로. 이것은 S2에서 그들에 대해 생각하기 시작한 후에 만 T 또는 F가되기 때문에 S1 인식을 제안으로 취하는 S의 훨씬 우수한 접근 법으로 나를 공격합니다. 그러나, 제안은 실제 또는 잠재적 진실과 거짓, 과거와 미래와 환상의 진술을 허용하고, 따라서 사전 또는 프로토티즘 사회에 큰 진보를 제공하는 그의 지적은, cogent (중요한) . 그는 "제안은 만족의 조건을 결정할 수있는 모든 것입니다 ... 그리고 만족의 조건 ... 그런 경우입니다." 또는, 하나 추가 해야, 그 수 있습니다 또는 경우 로 상상 될 수 있습니다. 전반적으로, PNC는 S의 작품의 반세기에서 발생하는 비트 겐슈타인을 통해 많은 실질적인 발전의 좋은 요약이지만, 내 보기에, W는 여전히 당신이 그가 무슨 말을 하는지 파악하면 타의 추종을 불허한다. 이상적으로, 그들은 함께 읽어야한다 : 명확한 일관된 산문과 일반화에 대한 Searle, W의 perspicacious (매우 명확한) 예와 화려한 격언으로 설명. 제가 훨씬 어렸을 때, 저는 그 일을 하는 책을 쓰곤 했습니다. 현대 의 두 systems (시스템) 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

mソーシャルワールド(MSW)の作るについて詳しくコメントする前に、私はまず、サール(S)とウィトゲンシュタイン(W)の作品に例示されている哲学(記述心理学)と現代心理学研究との関係についてコメントし ます。これは、記述心理学のこれらの2つの天才によってPNC、TLP、PI、OC、TARWおよび他の本の私のレビューを見るのに大いに役立ちます。 Sは、TLPのメカニズムとしてのWの優れた心の声明と、彼の後の作品でそれを破壊することに言及していません。W以来、Sはこれらの機械的な行動観の主要なデコンスであり、最も重要な記述心理学者(哲学者)であ るが、Wが彼をいかに完全に予想していたか、そして大きく他の人たちも(しかし、W、チューリング、AIのプラウドフットとコープランドの多くの論文や本を見る)を知らない。Sの仕事はWの仕事よりもはるかに簡単 で、専門用語はありますが、正しい方向からアプローチすればほとんど見事に明らかです。詳細については、W S やその他の書籍の私のレビューを参照してください。 全体として、MSWはSの半世紀の仕事に起因するヴィトゲンシュタインに対する多くの実質的な進歩の良い要約ですが、私の見解では、Wは彼が言っていることを理解すると、基本的な心理学のためにまだ不平等です(私 のレビューを参照)。理想的には、彼らは一緒に読む必要があります:S2 / S3の動作に関する明確な一貫した散文と一般化のためのサールは、S1 / S2の動作のWの厄介な例と彼の華麗な格言で示されています。もし私がずっと若かったら、まさにそれをやっている本を書くだろう。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Sebelum berkomentar secara rinci tentang making dunia sosial (MSW) saya akan pertama kali menawarkan beberapa komentar tentang filsafat (psikologi deskriptif) dan hubungannya dengan penelitian psikologis kontemporer seperti yang dicontohkan dalam karya Searle (S) dan Wittgenstein (W), karena saya merasa bahwa ini adalah cara terbaik untuk menempatkan Searle atau komentator pada perilaku, dalam perspektif yang tepat. Ini akan sangat membantu untuk melihat ulasan saya PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW dan buku-buku lain oleh dua jenius ini deskriptif psikologi. -/- S (...) tidak merujuk kepada W prescient pernyataan pikiran sebagai mekanisme di TLP, dan kehancuran itu dalam karyanya kemudian. Sejak W, S telah menjadi utama dekonstruktor pandangan mekanik ini perilaku, dan deskriptif yang paling penting psikolog (filsuf), tetapi tidak menyadari betapa benar-sama W diantisipasi dia maupun, oleh dan besar, melakukan orang lain (tetapi melihat banyak makalah dan buku dari dari dari membanggakan dan Copeland di W, Turing dan AI). S pekerjaan jauh lebih mudah untuk mengikuti dari W, dan meskipun ada beberapa jargon, itu sebagian besar spektakuler jelas jika Anda mendekati dari arah yang benar. Lihat ulasan saya untuk W S dan buku lainnya untuk lebih jelasnya. -/- Secara keseluruhan, MSW adalah ringkasan yang baik dari banyak kemajuan besar atas Wittgenstein yang dihasilkan dari setengah abad S bekerja, tetapi dalam pandangan saya, W masih adalah tiada banding untuk psikologi dasar setelah Anda memahami apa yang dia katakan (Lihat ulasan saya). Idealnya, mereka harus dibaca bersama-sama: Searle untuk CLEAR koheren prosa dan generalisasi pada operasi S2/S3, diilustrasikan dengan contoh W perspiculet operasi S1/S2, dan brilian aphorisms. Jika saya masih jauh lebih muda saya akan menulis buku melakukan hal itu. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systEMS tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) . (shrink)

Antes de comentar detalhadamente sobre making o mundo social (MSW) vou primeiro oferecer alguns comentários sobre a filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e sua relação com a pesquisa psicológica contemporânea como exemplificada nas obras de Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), desde que eu sinto que esta é a melhor maneira de colocar Searle ou qualquer comentarista sobre o comportamento, na perspectiva adequada. Ele vai ajudar muito para ver os meus comentários de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW e outros livros por (...) esses dois gênios da psicologia descritiva. S não faz nenhuma referência à afirmação presciente de W da mente como o mecanismo em TLP, e sua destruição dele em seu trabalho mais atrasado. Desde W, S tornou-se o principal desestruturador dessas visões mecânicas do comportamento, e o psicólogo descritivo mais importante (filósofo), mas não percebe o quão completamente W o antecipou, nem, em geral, fazer outros (mas ver os muitos papéis e livros de Proudfoot e Copeland em W, Turing e AI). S trabalho é muito mais fácil de seguir do que W, e embora haja algum jargão, é principalmente espetacularmente claro se você abordá-lo a partir da direção certa. Veja meus comentários de W S e outros livros para mais detalhes. Globalmente, MSW é um bom resumo dos muitos avanços substanciais sobre Wittgenstein resultante do meio século S de trabalho, mas na minha opinião, W ainda é inigualável para a psicologia básica, uma vez que você entender o que ele está dizendo (ver meus comentários). Idealmente, devem ser lidos junto: Searle para a prosa coerente desobstruída e generalizações na operação de S2/S3, ilustrado com os exemplos perspicazes de W da operação de S1/S2, e seus aforisms brilhantes. Se eu fosse muito mais jovem, escreveria um livro fazendo exatamente isso. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

पुस्तक पर टिप्पणी करने से पहले, मैं Wittgenstein और Searle और तर्कसंगतता की तार्किक संरचना पर टिप्पणी की पेशकश करते हैं. निबंध यहाँ ज्यादातर पहले से ही पिछले दशक के दौरान प्रकाशित कर रहे हैं (हालांकि कुछ अद्यतन किया गया है), एक अप्रकाशित आइटम के साथ, और यहाँ कुछ भी नहीं जो अपने काम के साथ रखा है के लिए एक आश्चर्य के रूप में आ जाएगा. डब्ल्यू की तरह, वह अपने समय का सबसे अच्छा standup दार्शनिक के रूप (...) में माना जाता है और अपने लिखित काम एक चट्टान और groundbreaking भर के रूप में ठोस है. हालांकि, बाद में डब्ल्यू को गंभीरता से लेने में उनकी विफलता कुछ गलतियों और भ्रमों की ओर ले जाती है। बस कुछ उदाहरण: p7 पर वह दो बार नोट है कि बुनियादी तथ्यों के बारे में हमारी निश्चितता हमारे दावों का समर्थन कारण के भारी वजन के कारण है, लेकिन डब्ल्यू निश्चित रूप से 'पर कुछ' में दिखाया है कि वहाँ की सच केवल स्वयंसिद्ध संरचना पर शक की कोई संभावना नहीं है हमारी प्रणाली 1 धारणा, यादें और विचारों, क्योंकि यह अपने आप में निर्णय के लिए आधार है और खुद को न्याय नहीं किया जा सकता है. p8 पर पहले वाक्य में वह हमें बताता है कि निश्चितता संशोधन योग्य है, लेकिन 'निश्चितता' है, जो हम Certainty2 कह सकते हैं इस तरह के अनुभव के माध्यम से हमारे स्वयंसिद्ध और nonrevisable निश्चितता (Certainty1) का विस्तार करने का परिणाम है और पूरी तरह से अलग है के रूप में यह है प्रस्तावात्मक (सही या गलत)। यह निश्चित रूप से "भाषा द्वारा हमारी बुद्धि के मोहित के खिलाफ लड़ाई" जो डब्ल्यू पर और फिर से प्रदर्शन की एक क्लासिक उदाहरण है. एक शब्द- दो (या कई) अलग-अलग उपयोग। अपने पिछले अध्याय "प्रस्ताव की एकता" (पहले अप्रकाशित) भी पढ़ने से बहुत लाभ होगा डब्ल्यू "पर निश्चितता" या डीएमएस ओसी पर दो किताबें (मेरी समीक्षा देखें) के रूप में वे सच केवल S1 का वर्णन वाक्य और सच है या गलत के बीच अंतर स्पष्ट कर S2 का वर्णन करने वाले प्रस्ताव. यह मुझे एस के लिए एक दूर बेहतर दृष्टिकोण के रूप में हमलों के प्रस्ताव के रूप में S1 धारणा ले रही है क्योंकि वे केवल टी या एफ बन के बाद एक S2 में उनके बारे में सोच शुरू होता है. हालांकि, उनका कहना है कि प्रस्ताव वास्तविक या संभावित सत्य और झूठ के बयान की अनुमति, अतीत और भविष्य और कल्पना की, और इस तरह पूर्व या protolinguistic समाज पर एक बड़ा अग्रिम प्रदान करते हैं, cogent है. के रूप में वह यह राज्यों "एक प्रस्ताव सब पर कुछ भी है कि संतुष्टि की स्थिति निर्धारित कर सकते हैं ... और संतुष्टि की एक शर्त ... यह है कि इस तरह के और इस तरह की स्थिति है। या, एक जोड़ने की जरूरत है, कि हो सकता है या हो सकता है या मामला होने की कल्पना की जा सकती है. कुल मिलाकर, पीएनसी काम के एस आधा सदी से जिसके परिणामस्वरूप Wittgenstein पर कई पर्याप्त अग्रिमों का एक अच्छा सारांश है, लेकिन मेरे विचार में, डब्ल्यू अभी भी असमान है एक बार तुम समझ कि वह क्या कह रहा है. आदर्श रूप में, वे एक साथ पढ़ा जाना चाहिए: स्पष्ट सुसंगत गद्य और सामान्यीकरण के लिए Searle, डब्ल्यू perspicacious उदाहरण और शानदार aphorisms के साथ सचित्र. अगर मैं बहुत छोटा था मैं एक किताब लिखना होगा कि वास्तव में कर रही है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019). (shrink)

This chapter treats Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping as part of his wider project of demonstrating the sovereignty of practical intelligence over all other forms of intelligence. In contrast to the standard picture of human beings as essentially rational, individual agents, Dreyfus argued powerfully on phenomenological and empirical grounds that humans are fundamentally embedded, absorbed, and embodied. These commitments are present throughout Dreyfus’ philosophical writings, from his critique of Artificial Intelligence research in the 1970s and 1980s to his rejection (...) of John McDowell’s conceptualism in his 2005 APA Presidential Address. The present chapter articulates Dreyfus’ proposal for a contentless, non-mentalistic form of intentionality by contrasting his position with that of his U.C. Berkeley colleague John Searle and defending it as a plausible alternative to the so-called “Standard Story” of intentional action as the effect of an agent’s mental states. (shrink)

在详细评论社会世界(MSW)之前,我将首先就哲学(描述性心理学)及其与当代心理学研究的关系提出一些评论,如西尔(S)和维特根斯坦(W),因为我觉得这是把西尔或任何评论者的行为,在正确的视角最好的方式。 这将是很大的帮助,看到我对PNC,TLP,PI,OC,TARW和其他书籍的评论,这两个天才的描述心理学。 S没有提到W在TLP中作为机制的先见之明的思想陈述,以及他在后来的工作中对它的破坏。自W以来,S已经成为这些机械行为观的主要解构者,以及最重要的描述性心理学家(哲学家),但没有意识到W如何完全期待他, 也没有意识到,总的来说,做别人(但看到许多论文和普劳福和科普兰在W,图灵和AI的书)。S 的工作比 W 的工作要容易得多,尽管有一些行话,但如果你从正确的方向接近它,它几乎非常明显。有关更多详细信息,请参阅我对 W S 和其他书籍的评论。 总体而言,MSW很好地总结了在维特根斯坦的半个世纪的工作带来的许多实质性进展,但在我看来,W仍然是无与伦比的基本心理学,一旦你掌握了他在说什么(见我的评论)。理想情况下,它们应该一起阅读:Searle 对S2/S3操作的明确连贯的散文和概括,用W对S1/S2操作的敏锐例子,以及他辉煌的格言来说明。如果我年轻得多,我会写一本书。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019).