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  1. Moore's Paradox and the Logic of Belief.Andrés Páez - manuscript
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  2. On a No Defeat Evidence Principle of Tal and Comesaña.Randall G. Mccutcheon - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):237-240.
    We offer a critical evaluation of a recent proposal of E. Tal and J. Comesa\~na on the topic of when evidence of evidence constitutes evidence. After establishing that attempts of L. Moretti and W. Roche to discredit the proposal miss their mark, we fashion another, which does not.
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  3. Reader in epistemology; Classic epistemology.Samal H. R. Manee - 2018 - Kurdistan: Mexak publishing house.
    This is book l of three philosophy books in international language; formal academic philosophy source in Kurdish language Given overall view on classic epistemology for university student in non English language philosophy departments and philosophy schools .
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  4. Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.
    Recent objections to epistemic permissivism have a metaepistemic flavor. Impermissivists argue that their view best accounts for connections between rationality, planning and deference. Impermissivism is also taken to best explain the value of rational belief and normative assessment. These objections pose a series of metaepistemic explanatory challenges for permissivism. In this paper, I illustrate how permissivists might meet their explanatory burdens by developing two permissivist metaepistemic views which fare well against the explanatory challenges.
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  5. Principles of Indifference.Benjamin Eva - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (7):390-411.
    The principle of indifference states that in the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational agent will distribute their credence equally among all the possible outcomes under consideration. Despite its intuitive plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. In this article, I present a novel rehabilitation of PI in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgments. In particular, I consider two natural comparative reformulations of PI and argue that (...)
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  6. A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - forthcoming - Mind:fzz046.
    Our evidence can be about different subject matters. In fact, necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence can be about different subject matters. Does the hyperintensionality of ‘aboutness’ engender any hyperintensionality at the level of rational credence? In this paper, I present a case which seems to suggest that the answer is ‘yes’. In particular, I argue that our intuitive notions of 'independent' evidence and 'inadmissible' evidence are sensitive to aboutness in a hyperintensional way. We are thus left with a paradox. While (...)
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  7. Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...)
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  8. On Formal Aspects of the Epistemic Approach to Paraconsistency.Walter Carnielli, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Abilio Rodrigues - 2018 - In Max Freund, Max Fernandez de Castro & Marco Ruffino (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Logic: Recent Trends in Latin America and Spain. London: College Publications. pp. 48-74.
    This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for (...)
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  9. Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):52-61.
    The verb ‘to know’ can be used both in ascriptions of propositional knowledge and ascriptions of knowledge of acquaintance. In the formal epistemology literature, the former use of ‘know’ has attracted considerable attention, while the latter is typically regarded as derivative. This attitude may be unsatisfactory for those philosophers who, like Russell, are not willing to think of knowledge of acquaintance as a subsidiary or dependent kind of knowledge. In this paper we outline a logic of knowledge of acquaintance in (...)
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  10. The Relation Between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - manuscript
    Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...)
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  11. Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: pp. 123-145.
    Pérez Carballo adopts an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Within this framework he seeks to show that we can make sense of the intuitive idea that some true beliefs—say true beliefs about botany—are more valuable than other true beliefs—say true beliefs about the precise number of plants in North Dakota. To do so, however, Pérez Carballo argues that we must (...)
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  12. Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.
    Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right. I consider some (...)
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  13. From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
    According to the Lockean thesis, a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be (...)
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  14. Convergence, Continuity and Recurrence in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Dominik Klein & Rasmus K. Rendsvig - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017, Sapporo, Japan). Springer. pp. 108-122.
    The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action (...)
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  15. Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory (...)
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  16. The Interplay Between Models and Observations.Claudio Masolo, Alessander Botti Benevides & Daniele Porello - 2018 - Applied Ontology 13 (1):41-71.
    We propose a formal framework to examine the relationship between models and observations. To make our analysis precise,models are reduced to first-order theories that represent both terminological knowledge – e.g., the laws that are supposed to regulate the domain under analysis and that allow for explanations, predictions, and simulations – and assertional knowledge – e.g., information about specific entities in the domain of interest. Observations are introduced into the domain of quantification of a distinct first-order theory that describes their nature (...)
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  17. Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to (...)
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  18. Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.Bryan Frances - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57.
    This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the (...)
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  19. Logical Consequence in Modal Logic II: Some Semantic Systems for S4.George Weaver - 1974 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15:370.
    ABSTRACT: This 1974 paper builds on our 1969 paper (Corcoran-Weaver [2]). Here we present three (modal, sentential) logics which may be thought of as partial systematizations of the semantic and deductive properties of a sentence operator which expresses certain kinds of necessity. The logical truths [sc. tautologies] of these three logics coincide with one another and with those of standard formalizations of Lewis's S5. These logics, when regarded as logistic systems (cf. Corcoran [1], p. 154), are seen to be equivalent; (...)
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  20. Nascimentos da Psicologia: A Natureza E o Espírito.Paul Mengal & Miotto - 2015 - Ideação 32:259-288.
    Desde sua constituição como domínio do saber no fim do século XVI, a psicologia divide-se rapidamente em duas tendências com orientações diferentes. A primeira, de inspiração naturalista, situa-se no prolongamento do comentário da Física aristotélica e se desenvolve principalmente nas universidades protestantes de Marburgo e Leiden. Nesses estabelecimentos onde reinava então um espírito humanista, racionalista e tolerante, toma lugar a primeira forma de dualismo da alma e do corpo. Mas na mesma época, em círculos místicos e herméticos, desenvolve-se uma outra (...)
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  21. Not Much Higher-Order Vagueness in Williamson’s ’Logic of Clarity’.Nasim Mahoozi & Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    This paper deals with higher-order vagueness in Williamson's 'logic of clarity'. Its aim is to prove that for 'fixed margin models' (W,d,α ,[ ]) the notion of higher-order vagueness collapses to second-order vagueness. First, it is shown that fixed margin models can be reformulated in terms of similarity structures (W,~). The relation ~ is assumed to be reflexive and symmetric, but not necessarily transitive. Then, it is shown that the structures (W,~) come along with naturally defined maps h and s (...)
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  22. Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning III: Two Theories of Proof,.John Corcoran - 1971 - Journal of Structural Learning 3 (3):1-24.
    ABSTRACT This part of the series has a dual purpose. In the first place we will discuss two kinds of theories of proof. The first kind will be called a theory of linear proof. The second has been called a theory of suppositional proof. The term "natural deduction" has often and correctly been used to refer to the second kind of theory, but I shall not do so here because many of the theories so-called are not of the second kind--they (...)
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  23. Assessing Theories, Bayes Style.Franz Huber - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):89-118.
    The problem addressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen, BC, 1983, Theory comparison and relevant Evidence. In J. Earman (Ed.), Testing scientific theories (pp. 27–42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Sections 1– 3 contain the general plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment. In a nutshell, the message is (1) that there are two values a theory should exhibit: (...)
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  24. Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning II: The Nature of a Correct Theory of Proof and Its Value.John Corcoran - 1971 - Journal of Structural Learning 3 (2):1-16.
    1971. Discourse Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical Reasoning II: The Nature of a Correct Theory of Proof and Its Value, Journal of Structural Learning 3, #2, 1–16. REPRINTED 1976. Structural Learning II Issues and Approaches, ed. J. Scandura, Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, New York, MR56#15263. -/- This is the second of a series of three articles dealing with application of linguistics and logic to the study of mathematical reasoning, especially in the setting of a concern for improvement of (...)
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  25. A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-Probabilist.Leszek Wronski - manuscript
    We point out a yet unnoticed flaw in Dutch Book arguments that relates to a link between degrees of belief and betting quotients. We offer a set of precise conditions governing when a nonprobabilist is immune to the classical Dutch Book argument. We suggest that diachronic Dutch Book arguments are also affected.
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  26. Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanz
    An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic relevance and the (...)
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  27. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalised -- Part Two: The Premise-Based Approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48:787–814.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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  28. Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Franz Huber - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (4):257-259.
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  29. The AGM Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change.Koji Tanaka - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):113-150.
    The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply (...)
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  30. Essay Review: The Laws of Belief. [REVIEW]Franz Huber - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):584-588.
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  31. Wolfgang Spohn: The Laws of Belief. [REVIEW]Franz Huber - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):584-588.
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  32. On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge.Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.
    The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...)
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  33. Buzaglo, Meir. The Logic of Concept Expansion. [REVIEW]Nathaniel Goldberg - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):141-143.
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  34. Difference and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. [REVIEW]Pascal Massie - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):471-472.
    Western liberal democracies praise themselves for protecting a full range of differences among individuals and groups. The origin of this ongoing process is thought to be Locke’s Epistola de Tolerantia. Before the Reformation, it is assumed, “a multiplicity of beliefs was deemed to be dangerous, as well as evil; diversity was, so to speak, the devil’s work, and where it existed it was to be stamped out”. Yet, although flattering to liberalism, the conceit of a modern liberal discovery of liberty (...)
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  35. Philosophy of Probability: Foundations, Epistemology, and Computation.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Groningen
    This dissertation is a contribution to formal and computational philosophy. -/- In the first part, we show that by exploiting the parallels between large, yet finite lotteries on the one hand and countably infinite lotteries on the other, we gain insights in the foundations of probability theory as well as in epistemology. Case 1: Infinite lotteries. We discuss how the concept of a fair finite lottery can best be extended to denumerably infinite lotteries. The solution boils down to the introduction (...)
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  36. Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 54.
    Conciliatory theories of disagreement face a revenge problem; they cannot be coherently believed by one who thinks they have peers who are not conciliationists. I argue that this is a deep problem for conciliationism.
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  37. Review of Vincent F. Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology (Cambridge University Press 2006). [REVIEW]Franz Huber - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (4):257-259.
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  38. Do Beliefs Supervene on Degrees of Confidence.Luc Bovens - 1999 - In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press. pp. 6--27.
    I examine the relationship between belief and credences and distinguish between a dogmatic, a Lockean, an agentic, and an abductive notion of belief. I conclude with some thoughts on voluntarism and evidentialism.
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Belief Revision
  1. The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms -- the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief -- are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker's semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing (...)
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  2. Staying True with the Help of Others: Doxastic Self-Control Through Interpersonal Commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.
    I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...)
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  3. Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...)
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  4. Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view (...)
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  5. Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
    We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to (...)
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  6. The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
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  7. The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis.Daniele Chiffi & Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):1-22.
    The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a (...)
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  8. How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
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  9. Epistemic Theories of Truth: The Justifiability Paradox Investigated.Vincent C. Müller & Christian Stein - 1996 - In C. Martínez Vidal, U. Rivas Monroy & L. Villegas Forero (eds.), Verdad: Lógica, Representatión y Mundo. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. pp. 95-104.
    Epistemic theories of truth, such as those presumed to be typical for anti-realism, can be characterised as saying that what is true can be known in principle: p → ◊Kp. However, with statements of the form “p & ¬Kp”, a contradiction arises if they are both true and known. Analysis of the nature of the paradox shows that such statements refute epistemic theories of truth only if the the anti-realist motivation for epistemic theories of truth is not taken into account. (...)
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  10. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  11. The Ramsey Test Revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-182.
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  12. Belief Change for Introspective Agents.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.
    We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about (...)
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