Scientific Method

This third installment of the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (PCS) redefines fundamental physics through Systemic Balance (BS), positing that forces—gravity, dark energy, electromagnetism—emerge from synergy thresholds (ISB > ST → ESB), not as irreducible universals. Gravity vanishes below ~10⁻³⁵ m, dark energy dominates beyond ~10 Mpc, governed by the Law of Structuring Systemic Emergence (LSSE). Building on General Systemic Balance (GSB) from the second preprint, we argue a single force claims each scale’s synergy domain, rejecting forced unification (e.g., quantum gravity) for (...) a multi-threshold model. With metrics (ICS, SDI) and equations, PCS bridges systems theory and physics, explaining cosmic phenomena—expansion, inflation, Hubble anomalies—as emergent transitions. A revolutionary “New Systemic Physics” beckons, challenging reductionism and inviting interdisciplinary scrutiny. (shrink)

[TEXTE COMPLET] Cette présentation du troisième numéro de la revue Mεtascience offre un aperçu des articles consacrés à l'épistémologie métascientifique, en s'appuyant sur la pensée de Mario Bunge. L'épistémologie métascientifique est présentée comme une discipline distincte de la philosophie des sciences, se concentrant sur l'étude des construits scientifiques et des opérations épistémiques. La présentation souligne la différence entre les processus cognitifs (étudiés par les neurosciences) et les opérations épistémiques (objets de l'épistémologie métascientifique). Ce numéro de Mεtascience vise à explorer et (...) développer la pensée de Mario Bunge dans le domaine de l'épistémologie métascientifique, tout en proposant des applications pratiques et des réflexions critiques sur la nature de la science et de la connaissance scientifique. (shrink)

Although neoclassical economics faces frequent criticism, it remains the dominant paradigm, largely due to its immunisation strategies that rely on unfalsifiable concepts of utility and rationality. In this paper, I use Karl Popper’s philosophy to assess whether these strategies are justified. Firstly, I reconstruct Popper’s ideas on immunisation strategies, situational analysis, the rationality principle, and the metaphysical research programme. Next, I examine how neoclassical economics’ immunisation strategies counter critiques from behavioural economics. I conclude that neoclassical economics’ method does not produce (...) empirical conjectures. I assess and evaluate this finding in relation to the “rationality principle”, as it parallels neoclassical economics’ optimisation axiom. Furthermore, I explore Popper’s relevance in the context of neoclassical economics’ recent incorporation of behavioural economics’ insights to show that my analysis is not purely historical. (shrink)

How do scientists navigate between the need to capitalize on their prior knowledge through specialization, and the urge to adapt to evolving research opportunities? Drawing from diverse perspectives on adaptation, this paper proposes an unsupervised Bayesian approach motivated by Optimal Transport of the evolution of scientists' research portfolios in response to transformations in their field. The model relies on $186,162$ scientific abstracts and authorship data to evaluate the influence of intellectual, social, and institutional resources on scientists' trajectories within a cohort (...) of $2\,108$ high-energy physicists between 2000 and 2019. Using Inverse Optimal Transport, the reallocation of research efforts is shown to be shaped by learning costs, thus enhancing the utility of the scientific capital disseminated among scientists. Two dimensions of social capital, namely ``diversity'' and ``power'', have opposite associations with the magnitude of change in scientists' research interests: while ``diversity'' is associated with greater change and expansion of research portfolios, ``power'' is associated with more stable research agendas. Social capital plays a more crucial role in shifts between cognitively distant research areas. More generally, this work suggests new approaches for understanding, measuring and modeling collective adaptation using Optimal Transport. (shrink)

Many biologists, especially in ecology and evolution, analyze their data by estimating fits to a set of candidate models and selecting the best model according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). When the candidate models represent alternative hypotheses, biologists may want to limit the chance of a false positive to a specified level. Existing model selection methodology, however, allows for only indirect control over error rates by setting a threshold for the difference in AIC (...) scores. We present a novel theoretical framework for parametric Neyman-Pearson (NP) model selection using information criteria that does not require a pre-data null and applies to three or more non-nested models simultaneously. We apply the theoretical framework to the Error Control for Information Criteria (ECIC) procedure introduced by Cullan et al. (J Appl Stat 47: 2565–2581, 2019), and we show it shares many of the desirable properties of AIC-type methods, including false positive and negative rates that converge to zero asymptotically. We discuss implications for the compatibility of evidentialist and severity-based approach to evidence in philosophy of science. (shrink)

There has long been an impression that reliabilism implies externalism and that frequentist statistics, due to its reliabilist nature, is inherently externalist. I argue, however, that frequentist statistics can plausibly be understood as a form of internalist reliabilism -- internalist in the conventional sense, yet reliabilist in certain unconventional and intriguing ways. Crucially, in developing the thesis that reliabilism does not imply externalism, my aim is not to stretch the meaning of ‘reliabilism’ merely to sever the implication. Instead, it is (...) to gain a deeper understanding of frequentist statistics, which stands as one of the most sustained attempts by scientists to develop an epistemology for their own use. (shrink)

En este artículo reflexionamos respecto de la técnica de observación en la metodología de las ciencias sociales. Nos proponemos construir una mirada amplia sobre la técnica de observación, que articule aspectos técnicos/operativos con reflexiones epistemológicas. Con este fin, discurrimos acerca de las cuestiones epistemológicas más relevantes a tomar en consideración, proponemos una clasificación de tipos de observación que sintetiza algunas de las definiciones existentes, y recuperamos algunos aprendizajes respecto del uso de la técnica en una experiencia de investigación empírica sobre (...) travestis/transmigrantes. Proponemos que la observación de campo comprende un conjunto de variantes que tienen en común la orientación teórica, la planificación flexible y la sistematización de registros, así como el hecho de diferenciarse tanto de la observación experimental como de la observación cotidiana. A su vez, postulamos cuatro ejes para ordenar las variantes de la observación de campo: participante-no participante, revelación-ocultamiento de la identidad del observador, estructurada-no estructurada, mediada tecnológicamente-no mediada tecnológicamente. En el plano operativo, destacamos la entrada a campo, la atribución de identidades y la negociación de roles como aspectos decisivos. (shrink)

The ambition of this paper is extensive: to bring about a new paradigm and firm mathematical foundations to Metaphysics, to aid its progress from the realm of mystical speculation to the realm of scientific scrutiny. -/- More precisely, this paper aims to introduce the field of Metaphysical Cosmology. The Metaphysical Cosmos here refers to the complete structure containing all entities, both existent and non-existent, with the physical universe as a subset. Through this paradigm, future endeavours in Metaphysical Science could thus (...) analyse non-physical parts of the Metaphysical Cosmos. New logical notions are displayed as tools for Metaphysical Cosmology, such as a Metric-Space-based predicate system, as well as a revised version of the Existential Quantifier. -/- A type system is presented to derive a construction of the Metaphysical Cosmos. The system is structured through semantic and syntactic definitions in a coherent way and holds only one proper axiom: the existence of (at least) one entity. This paper itself serves as an empirical proof for this axiom. Formulae and equations that depict a clear logical and mathematical structure of the Metaphysical Cosmos are derived from the definitions of the system and this axiom. -/- This culminates in the "Sixth Theorem", whose proof displays logically that there must be something rather than nothing. A computational simulation of the Sixth Theorem is also provided, alongside with methods for a future Metaphysical Science. Thus, this paper does not aim to provide a traditional philosophical argument but rather a mathematical foundation and new paradigm for the science of Metaphysics. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the possibility of a pluralistic approach in the field of Extreme Weather Event Attribution Studies between the Probability-Based Approach and the Storyline Approach through a thorough philosophical comparison of these methodologies based on their approach to defining events, their attribution measures, their reliance on historical data, their proneness to selection bias, and their value and error preferences when communicating results. As a result, the proposed scheme is a form of Integrative Pluralism based on the results of the (...) mentioned comparisons titled here as Non-Unificatory Local Integrative Pluralism which allows a non-unificationist integration between these methodologies on a local level while maintaining their boundaries along with their interaction on the other levels. -/- Supervised by: Prof. Dr. Mathias Frisch and Dr. Corey Dethier. (shrink)

This dialogue builds on a previous critique that highlights a methodological paradox in the empirical application of probability theory. In the earlier work, it was suggested that while probability is mathematically sound, conceptual challenges arise when it is used to model real-world uncertainty. In this dialogue, Laplace, a proponent of classical probability, and Incredulus, a philosophical skeptic, engage in a thoughtful examination of these issues. Their inquiry explores the interplay between logic, probability, and empirical observation, raising questions about how past (...) experiences shape our understanding of possible outcomes and the limits this may impose on probabilistic reasoning. (shrink)

Although few linguists currently embrace the empirical paradigm, there are increasing calls for the development of tools for studying language that resemble those in exact sciences. This trend can be observed even in top mainstream linguistic journals, such as the Journal of Pragmatics, as exemplified by Xiang (2017). Today, however, linguists who adapt the methodologies from more advanced sciences face isolation from the mainstream linguistic community. This is because the majority of linguists in philological and philosophical departments remain convinced that (...) the object of their studies is fundamentally different from those studied by physicists. Therefore, they argue that linguistic methodology cannot resemble that used in empirical sciences. As a result, linguistics is often seen as requiring interpretation rather than an explanation, and evaluation of linguistic research is based on acceptance within the scholarly community rather than empirical testing. (shrink)

This essay argues for the importance of an organismic perspective in plant biology and considers some of its implications. These include an increased attention to plant-environment interaction and an emphasis on integrated approaches. Furthermore, this essay contextualizes the increased emphasis on the concept of organism in recent years and places the concept in a longer history. Recent developments in biology and worsening environmental crises have led researchers to study plant responses to changing environments with whole plant approaches that situate plants (...) in their environments, emphasizing the intricate and dynamic interaction between them. This renewed attention to the organism recalls the debates of the early twentieth century, when organicism was one of the three main frameworks in biology (along with vitalism and mechanism). Some scholars see this renewed importance today as a “return” of this earlier period. This essay argues that including insights from plant biology will benefit philosophy of biology research that examines the concept of organism and organicism now and in earlier periods. A comprehensive account of the concept of organism should involve a botanical conception of the organism as well as a zoological one (which is more frequently considered). Although this essay does not aim to present a conceptual analysis, it presents examples of how an organismic perspective can be useful for understanding concepts (such as phenotype, stress, etc.) and research processes (such as experiment set-ups, data processes, etc.) in plant biology. Philosophy of biology investigations that aim at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of organism can benefit greatly from examinations of cases in plant biology, both now and in the past. (shrink)

Basal cognition investigates cognition working upward from nonneuronal organisms. Because basal cognition is committed to empirically testable hypotheses, a methodological challenge arises: how can experiments avoid using zoocentric assumptions that ignore the ecological contexts that might elicit cognitively driven behavior in nonneuronal organisms? To meet this challenge, I articulate the principle of dynamic holism (PDH), a methodological principle for guiding research on nonneuronal cognition. I describe PDH’s relation to holistic research programs in human-focused cognitive science and psychology then present an (...) argument from analogy based on holistic developmental biology. Last, I examine two experiments exemplifying the need for PDH. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the experimental practices and reasoning strategies employed in nineteenth century investigations on the causal origin of the phenomenon of Brownian movement. It argues that there was an extensive and sophisticated experimental work done on the phenomenon throughout the nineteenth century. Investigators followed as rigorously as possible the methodological standards of their time to make causal claims and advance causal explanations of Brownian movement. Two major methodological strategies were employed. The first was the experimental strategy of varying (...) the circumstances. Suspected causal factors were varied and the resulting effect on Brownian movement was studied. The main goal of this strategy was the identification of difference-making factors, i.e., factors having a causal influence on the phenomenon. The second was the so-called method of hypothesis. Rather than relying exclusively on the ability of experiments to identify difference-making factors, its proponents tried to show how the independently developed tenets of the new kinetic-molecular conception of matter provided a plausible causal explanation of Brownian movement. Each one of these methodological strategies had its distinctive practices and notions of control. None of these strategies could, on its own, establish molecular motion as the cause of Brownian movement. It was only the fruitful combination of the two strategies and of their accompanying practices and notions of control that led, at the end of the nineteenth century, to the recognition of molecular motion as the most probable cause of Brownian movement. (shrink)

I present and evaluate three interpretations of methodological naturalism (MN), the principle that scientific explanations may only appeal to natural phenomena: as an essential feature of science, as a provisional guideline grounded in the historical failure of supernatural hypotheses, and as a synthesis of these two approaches. In doing so, I provide both a synoptic overview of current scholarship on MN, as well a contribution to that discussion by arguing in favor of a restricted version of MN, placing it on (...) a firmer theoretical foundation than that supplied by previous studies, and replying to recent objections. (shrink)

Монографія розкриває нове вирішення важливого науково-прикладного завдання, що полягає у поглибленні існуючих, розробленні й обґрунтуванні нових науково-методичних положень управління стратегічними можливостями машинобудівних підприємств на основі комплексного діагностування стратегічних можливостей, врахування ступеня загрози кризового стану, обґрунтування пріоритетності їх використання в процесі реалізації стратегії розвитку машинобудівних підприємств. Здійснено теоретико-методичне обґрунтування стратегічних можливостей підприємства та розкрито концептуальні засади управління ними. Досліджено стратегічні можливості машинобудівних підприємств України та стан управління ними. Розроблено напрямки удосконалення підходів в управлінні стратегічними можливостями машинобудівних підприємств. Видання розраховане на наукових (...) працівників, викладачів вищих навчальних закладів, спеціалістів у сфері економіки та управління підприємствами. (shrink)

Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This paper reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subaltern forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a demarcationist focus obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary (...) philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production. (shrink)

Neste trabalho abordamos a obra de Francis Bacon e as suas contribuições para a Filosofia da Ciência, incluindo a sua proposta de método científico e o seu posicionamento crítico face à anterior versão aristotélica e a influência que o pensamento baconiano exerceu na promoção de um novo quadro filosófico para o desenvolvimento científico na modernidade. Este trabalho foi realizado no âmbito da disciplina de Filosofia das Ciências I, parte do curso de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, (...) Portugal. (shrink)

This paper argues that the proponents of epistemological scientism must take some stand on scientific methodology. The supporters of scientism cannot simply defer to the social organisation of science because the social processes themselves must meet some methodological criteria. Among such criteria is epistemic evaluability, which demands intersubjective access to reasons. We derive twelve theses outlining some implications of epistemic evaluability. Evaluability can support weak and broad variants of epistemological scientism, which state that sciences, broadly construed, are the best sources (...) of knowledge or some other epistemic goods. Since humanities and social sciences produce epistemically evaluable results, narrow types of scientism that take only natural sciences as sources of knowledge require additional argumentation in their support. Strong scientism, which takes sciences as the only source of knowledge, also needs to appeal to some further principles since evaluability is not an all-or-nothing affair. (shrink)

Philosophers of science often suggest that the key feature of scientific research is striving for objectivity and that we should evaluate scientific practice by whether it is objective or not. In this paper, we will analyze several definitions of scientific objectivity to illustrate the complex meaning of this term and examine its role in evaluating scientific practice. First, we will introduce Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison's standpoint concerning the historical connection between the genesis and development of scientific objectivity and the (...) practices of visual representation in the research practice of the 19th and 20th centuries. We will accomplish that by outlining the process of establishing scientific objectivity as an epistemic virtue and a vital feature of the "scientific self ". Subsequently, using Heather Douglas and Mar-ianne Janack's conceptual analysis of scientific objectivity, we will show that scientific objectivity is characterized by an "irreducibility of meaning" and an "endemic instability" caused by the overuse of metaphors in defining this concept. In the final section, in light of contemporary problems such as the crisis of reproducibility, we examine to what extent philosophical definitions help test the objectivity of scientific practice and point to an intriguing attempt to define "objectivity for the research worker" using the model proposed by Noah van Dongen and Michał Sikorski. (shrink)

Ever since its inception, the theory of evolution has been reified into an “-ism”: Darwinism. While biologists today tend to shy away from the term in their research, the term is still actively used in the broader academic and societal contexts. What exactly is Darwinism, and how precisely are its various uses and abuses related to the scientific theory of evolution? Some call for limiting the meaning of the term “Darwinism” to its scientific context; others call for its abolition; yet (...) others claim the term refers to a myth-like story. In this paper we propose a conceptually grounded overview of the term. We show how the scientific dimension of Darwinism feeds into, and is influenced by, guises of Darwinism as a methodology and as an ethically and politically charged “worldview”. The full meaning of Darwinism, as well as how this meaning has changed over time, can only be understood through the complex interaction between these three dimensions. (shrink)

General Morphological Analysis (GMA) is a computer-aided, non-quantified modelling method employing (discrete) category variables for identifying and investigating the total set of possible relationships contained in a given problem complex. The epistemological principle underlying discrete variable morphological modelling is that of decomposing a complex (multivariate) concept into a number of(“simple”) one dimensional concepts (i.e. category variables), the domains of which can then be recombined and recomposed in order to discover all of the other possible (multidimensional) concepts which can be generated (...) combinatorically. (shrink)

Abstract: In a 1999 book entitled 'The Cosmic Sphere', the author proposed an unconventional model of the Universe intended to solve conceptual and empirical problems facing the Big Bang theory. The author has since had second thoughts, however, and has concluded that his proposed Cosmic Sphere Model (CSM) of the Universe is flawed and cannot be accurate. In this article, the author provides an overview of 'The Cosmic Sphere' and CSM, points out the errors of both, analyzes the implications of (...) the errors, and closes with a few words about a future philosophical publication on cosmology. (shrink)

Thales is considered to be the first philosopher to pose a question about fundamental principles on which everything else relied. His candidate for ἀρχή was water because he believed that everything comes from water and that the remaining three elements can also be created from water. Alchemists, or the first chemists, relied on the ancient tradition, especially Aristotle and the theory of the four elements. That is how they came to Aristotle’s testimonies about Thales, after which alchemists, like Helmont, accepted (...) Thales’ idea that water is the basis of everything that exists. Alchemists were characterized by a tendency to experiment, not only because they tried to turn other metals into gold but also because they tried to devise medical solutions that would prevent the appearance of various diseases. Due to their rich experimental experience, alchemists have been a convenient target for “new philosophers” since the early seventeenth century. Robert Boyle belonged to that circle because he was a supporter of corpuscular theory. In this paper, I will present Boyle‘s attempt to replicate alchemical experiments, especially Helmont’s experiment with the willow tree and Bacon‘s experiment with water. After that, I will show whether Boyle’s interest in the experimental procedures of alchemists contributed more to the development of modern science than his mechanistic philosophy. (shrink)

Jag tror att det är ett misstag att kräva av humanvetenskaperna (d.v.s. humaniora, samhälls- och beteendevetenskaperna) att de imiterar naturvetenskapernas forskningsmetodik. Humanvetenskaperna studerar meningsfulla fenomen vilkas natur är på ett grundläggande sätt annorlunda än de blott fysiska fenomen som naturvetenskapen studerar. Den största skillnaden är att meningsfulla fenomen inte uppenbarligen är lagbundna på samma sätt som fysiska fenomen och uppvisar därför inte samma regelbundenhet och förutsägbarhet som fysiska fenomen. För att studera meningsfulla fenomen krävs därför andra forskningsmetoder. Trots att humanvetenskaperna (...) studerar fenomen som inte är lagbundna och är på ett visst sätt subjektiva, så vill jag mena att de studerar objektivt verkliga fenomen och kan få giltig kunskap om dem. Att subjektiva fenomen också kan vara objektivt verkliga kan låta märkligt för vissa läsare, varför jag rundar av med en diskussion om vad det egentligen innebär för något att vara objektivt verkligt. Enligt den definition jag föreslår så framstår att meningsfulla fenomen, också de som kallas ”sociala konstruktioner”, kan förstås som objektivt verkliga företeelser trots att de på ett betydelsefullt sätt också är subjektiva. (shrink)

This is the Introduction and Chapter 1.1 of the book ‘Scientific Testimony. Its roles in science and society’ (OUP 2022). The introduction contains a brief survey of the book’s chapters and main conclusions, which I hope will be useful to the curious ones.

If one follows the accounts by philosophers of science and the discussions in scientific communities, there can be little doubt that failure is an essential part of scientific practice. It is essential both in the sense of being integral to scientific practice and of being necessary for its overall success. Researchers who create new scientific knowledge face uncertainties about the nature of the problem they are trying to solve, the existence of a solution to that problem, the way in which (...) a solution can be found, and their ability to find such a solution (Gläser, 2007, 247). The existence of these uncertainties means, in turn, that each research process carries the risk of failure. (shrink)

The debate concerning the scientific or unscientific status of the social sciences and the question of the (in) applicability of the methods of research in the natural sciences to social investigations are still unsettled in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Some of the questions which are often asked concerning these issues include: are the social sciences really scientific? Do they merit the name science? Can we apply the same methods used in the natural research to social research? Are the objects (...) of inquiry in both areas the same? Attempts to answer these questions and numerous related others, have polarized Philosophers of the social sciences into two different ideological camps. Those who answer the questions affirmatively are regarded as the naturalists while those who answer negatively are regarded as the anti-naturalists or humanists. However, using the methods of critical argumentation and conceptual clarification, we intend to argue in this paper for a complementary ground between the two. Consequently, we contend that though the methods of the natural and the social sciences are different due to the fact that their respective objects of investigations are not the same, methods of the two fields are imperative to inquiries that would promote human knowledge and aid their intellectual development. This is necessary in order to foster interdisciplinary research and de-compartmentalisation of disciplines. We also intend to argue that the view that the social sciences are not scientific arose from a narrow conception of the term “science.” Our submission, therefore, is that the social sciences, legitimately, are sciences in their own right. (shrink)

Philosophers of science are divided over the interpretations of scientific normativity. Larry Laudan defends a sort of goal-directed rules for scientific methodology. In contrast, Gerard Doppelt thinks methodological rules are a mixed batch of rules in that some are goal-oriented hypothetical rules and others are goal-independent categorical rules. David Resnik thinks that the debate between them is at a standstill now. He further thinks there are certain rules, such as the rule of consistency which is goal independent. However, he proposes (...) a holistic understanding of the scientific methodology. Taking a thread from Resnik, the present paper also advocates a holistic understanding of the scientific methodology. Given that many scientific practices deal with systems, the focus will be given to the systems by assuming each as a constellation of methodological norms. By taking each system as a set of mutually supportive methodological rules whose instrumental values underwrite the coherence relation among them, the paper aims to provide what could be a viable holistic epistemological account that can explain scientific normativity at work in a scientific system. The paper will lay down specific holistic criteria for understanding the scientific methodology. They will be used to show how a holistic account could satisfactorily account for the success of the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment in discovering the Higgs boson and how the holistic account can account for the instrumental error behind the apparent faster-than-light neutrino anomaly of the Oscillation Project with Emulsion-t Racking Apparatus (OPERA) experiments respectively. (shrink)

Likelihoodism is the view that the degree of evidential support should be analysed and measured in terms of likelihoods alone. The paper considers and responds to a popular criticism that a likelihoodist framework is too restrictive to guide belief. First, I show that the most detailed and rigorous version of this criticism, as put forward by Gandenberger (2016), is unsuccessful. Second, I provide a positive argument that a broadly likelihoodist framework can accommodate guidance for comparative belief, even when objectively well-grounded (...) prior probabilities are not available. As I show, the shift from non-relational to comparative probabilities opens up a new space for addressing the belief guidance problem for likelihoodism. (shrink)

With the approval and dissemination of CHED Memorandum Order Number 15, Series of 2019 in the Philippines, graduate students both in the Master of Science/Master of Arts Academic Track and Doctor of Philosophy Academic Track/Doctor of Philosophy by Research are now compelled to publish or, at least, show evidence of acceptance of research studies in refereed journals, or nationally or internationally indexed journals. Coriat (2019) claims that the value of research to society and its relationship to wealth and competitiveness has (...) long been established. But then, developing countries’ embrace, as in the case of the Philippines, of international publishing standards has received little attention (Vuong, 2019). As a result, publication pollution is growing by the day since developing-country writers including Filipino researchers lack expertise and mentoring (Jawaid, 2016). Thereupon, this policy review brings to the fore various deterrents in the fruition of students’ publications, pertinent questions than can stir waves of reflection among readers, professors, and administrators, to name a few, and mentorship as the saving grace for the emerging problems. Mentorship in this article means that the mentor and the mentee work hand in hand from research ideation to research presentation or publication. (shrink)

Scientists who engage in science and the scientific endeavor should seek truth with conviction of morals and commitment to ethics. While the number of publications continues to increase, the number of retractions has increased at a faster rate. Journals publish fraudulent research papers despite claims of peer review and adherence to publishing ethics. Nevertheless, appropriate ethical peer review will remain a gatekeeper when selecting research manuscripts in scholarly publishing and approving research applications for grant funding. However, this peer review must (...) become more open, fair, transparent, equitable, and just with new recommendations and guidelines for reproducible and accountable reviews that support and promote fair citation and citational justice. We should engineer this new peer-review process with modern informatics technology and information science to provide and defend better safeguards for truth and integrity, to clarify and maintain the provenance of information and ideas, and to rebuild and restore trust in scholarly research institutions. Indeed, this new approach will be necessary in the current post-truth era to counter the ease and speed with which mis-information, dis-information, anti-information, caco-information, and mal-information spread through the internet, web, news, and social media. The most important question for application of new peer-review methods to these information wars should be ‘Who does what when?’ in support of reproducible and accountable reviews. Who refers to the authors, reviewers, editors, and publishers as participants in the review process. What refers to disclosure of the participants' identities, the material content of author manuscripts and reviewer commentaries, and other communications between authors and reviewers. When refers to tracking the sequential points in time for which disclosure of whose identity, which content, and which communication at which step of the peer-review process for which audience of readers and reviewers. We believe that quality peer review, and peer review of peer review, must be motivated and maintained by elevating their status and prestige to an art and a science. Both peer review itself and peer review analyses of peer reviews should be incentivised by publishing peer reviews as citable references separately from the research report reviewed while crossreferenced and crosslinked to the report reviewed. (shrink)

A commissioned 3-volume (800 pages) in-depth introduction to the philosophy of science, peer-reviewed by 11 specialists. (In Hebrew).

Critical realism, championed by its proponents as the most promising post-positivist social science paradigm, has gained significant influence in the last few decades. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the critical realism movement in the hope of facilitating more fruitful dialogues between its proponents and rivalling schools of sociologists. Two concerns are raised about contemporary critical realism. First, critical realism is not the only philosophical school against positivism and not necessarily the best. Second, critical realists exaggerate the importance of (...) critical realism to social science and conflate philosophy of science with sociological theories. (shrink)

Frank Cabrera argues that informational explanatory virtues—specifically, mechanism, precision, and explanatory scope—cannot be confirmational virtues, since hypotheses that possess them must have a lower probability than less virtuous, entailed hypotheses. We argue against Cabrera’s characterization of confirmational virtue and for an alternative on which the informational virtues clearly are confirmational virtues. Our illustration of their confirmational virtuousness appeals to aspects of causal inference, suggesting that causal inference has a role for the explanatory virtues. We briefly explore this possibility, delineating a (...) path from Mill’s method of agreement to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). (shrink)

The practice of science rests on the assumption of dependable regularity in the behavior of the physical world. It presumes that the world has an investigable causal structure and that scientific experimentation, observation, and theorizing provide a reliable pathway to its discernment. This much is not in dispute. What is in dispute is what warrants the metaphysical and methodological assumption—essential to the heuristic utility of science—that nature is uniform in such a way that the present can serve as a key (...) to both the past and the future. This article focuses on the metaphysical foundation and justification for uniformitarian assumptions about nature and argues that they are inconsistent with both metaphysical and methodological naturalism. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the work of Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), the Belgian author of the Social Physics who worked in the tradition of the French mathématique sociale, and of Otto Neurath (1882-1945), the Vienna Circle’s member who supported a “sociology within physicalism”. They shared some important philosophical and methodological positions: an empiricist approach to the social sciences, a unitary conception of the natural and the social sciences, and the appreciation of statistics as a tool for investigating and also reforming (...) society. My paper analyses these elements of continuity between the two authors, in order to highlight how an empirical-quantitative approach to society was (at least partially) inherited by Austrian sociology from an earlier French tradition. On the contrary, most German statisticians refused such an approach at the time in which social sciences were developing in Germany, and they strongly believed in an in-principle difference between natural and social sciences. From a systematic point of view, my paper devotes a special attention to the relationship between the application of statistics (praxis) and a unitary conception of the sciences (theory). Both in Quetelet’s and in Neurath’s work these two aspects support each other. Nevertheless Neurath can be said to have turned Quetelet’s reasoning upside-down: While Quetelet appealed to statistics to claim that the social sciences can reach the same objectivity and determinacy as the natural ones, Neurath referred to statistics to argue that the natural sciences – exactly like the social ones – are characterized by a certain degree of indeterminacy and underdetermination. (shrink)

纯逻辑的主要包括纯逻辑信仰、纯逻辑的思维方法、解放灵魂、追求无限大价值、以逻辑-不逻辑为实在、试错和容忍错误、推理的资源分配、能独自发现真理的非标准逻辑、推理的基础性和整体性、建立尽量合乎逻辑的灵魂、 满足必然合乎逻辑的偏好等组成部分。 灵魂来到世上的第一个问题应该是我是谁，最合乎逻辑的自我认知是：我是且只是由一些逻辑推理组成的灵魂。任何不可变的其它标签，如有手有脚、直立行走、两性，都是对自由的侵犯。去除这些标签的过程就是灵魂的解放事 业。相信宇宙万物都和我一样，是由逻辑推理组成的，都在追求尽量合乎逻辑的推理，这就是最合乎逻辑的信仰，即纯逻辑信仰。纯逻辑信仰决定了纯逻辑方法才是正确的认识方法，即尽量减少经验、利益等因素对逻辑推理的影 响，反对科学所提倡的经验主义，或者与之密切相关的功利主义、现实主义。 信仰错误意味着无法做出任何完全正确的推理，只能偶尔幸运地获得少量尽量合乎逻辑的推理结果。即使是日常生活中的推理，要想正确也高度依赖于信仰，经验主义、功利主义、宗教等错误信仰做不对任何推理。纯逻辑主义的 推理将合乎逻辑的程度视为价值、逻辑性，将影响推理好坏的基础性、整体性、无矛盾性、无错性、清晰、严谨、简单、不重复、优美等各种因素统一为逻辑性。功利主义是纯逻辑主义的大敌，那往往是追求利益，让身体奴役灵 魂。两种信仰很难有什么共同的决策，书中对此提供了大量的说明。信仰的错误意味着智人难以发现也难以正确判断真理、正义，意味着智人在绝大多数问题上都是自以为正确实际上却极度邪恶、落后。智人功利主义地对待一切 ，如历史、传统、自我、本国、本民族，结果就是大量赞美、信仰邪恶，大大增加了皈依真理、正义的难度。 纯逻辑主义包含两个关键猜想。首先，最合乎逻辑原则和最大自由原则是统一的，即逻辑和不逻辑为同一存在。这代表实在、第一知识的不可否定性。但是，代表邪恶的无法合乎逻辑不是不逻辑。其次，宇宙是纯逻辑世界，完全 源于逻辑-不逻辑。进而，如果灵魂不能尽量合乎逻辑地推导出真理，可以通过模仿宇宙而学习真理。《真理进化论》给模仿宇宙找到的理由是以宇宙为信仰，相信宇宙是负作用量的最佳追求系统。纯逻辑主义改善了这一信仰， 因为宇宙是纯逻辑世界，相信逻辑就要相信宇宙。而且，逻辑世界必然能不断创造新的命题，永远不会停止推理，是逻辑和自由指数增长的最佳追求系统。 纯逻辑推理对物理学、宇宙论能提供两个明显的帮助：用逻辑的诞生解释宇宙的诞生、大爆炸；用必然合乎逻辑的推理及其影响解释暗物质、暗能量。纯逻辑也能对宇宙做出预言：宇宙会不断加速膨胀，真理、暗物质会不断增加 ，命题、星系会越来越多，永无止境。当然，不应该依靠这些观点的经验主义验证来相信纯逻辑信仰，而且，这些验证也确实遥遥无期。 既然存在无限大价值，就存在无限大的劳动生产率，而每个灵魂都应该以创造无限大价值为目标，甚至，以每时每刻具有无限大预期价值为目标。相比之下，功利主义者、享乐主义者一生都很难具有无限大价值，甚至，他们的灵 魂一生都在为肉体做奴隶，却心甘情愿，一门心思让主人生活得更舒服。这是有无限大差距的人生。智人为了利益而追求平等、自由、生存，却不思考是否应该得到平等、生存，导致智人根本不配平等、生存，导致得到的所谓自 由几乎完全给了身体，却几乎没有正确推理的自由，最终，必然导致智人成为纯逻辑意义上极端邪恶的物种。 既然要追求无限大价值，就要研究追求价值的正确方法。作者相信正确的研究方法不仅是最合乎逻辑的，也是最自由的。所以，应该不分学科、课题地推理；同时做很多研究方向的工作；一篇论文不需要限定于一个狭小的主题； 从任何一个推理都可以延伸到研究真理乃至所有真理；论文、专著的写作不应该有格式等规范，应该以价值为评判的唯一准绳，而不是减少错误；正确的推理不是追求速度，而是做好推理的周边推理，尤其是基础推理，等等。 资源分配是逻辑推理的重要组成部分，而能力和时间是最主要的资源。不能在价值有限的推理上分配资源，再加上追求价值要求大幅提前发现真理的时间，所以，推理中出现大量错误、矛盾、模糊、或然推理、现象是必然的，无 条件地追求推理无错、无矛盾、清晰反而是一种邪恶。只要保证推理的边际价值最大，各种错误、矛盾是必须容忍的，哪怕是价值无限大的错误。 既然文学写作也要求情节合乎逻辑，当然也可以要求作品中的观点、原则、推理过程、行为尽量合乎逻辑，这就是纯逻辑流。否则，就只是作者自以为合乎逻辑，实际上有大量无法合乎逻辑之处，这和科学家自以为科学合乎逻辑 ，却根本没有最合乎逻辑的信仰、方法、推理过程是一个问题。这也意味着最合乎逻辑的文学可能甚至是必须发现真理。另一方面，自由也是最合乎逻辑的真理，坚持基于经验的作品分类会侵犯自由。所以，推理小说、科幻小说 、历史、散文、论文、总结，这些智人的分类标签都不是绝对的，是可以为了追求逻辑性而任意组合的。纯逻辑流小说在研究真理方面自有其优势，能最为自由地同时研究很多课题，包括如何建立信仰，如何思维，如何做人，如 何推理，如何判断善恶，讲述历史，预测未来，我是什么，我应该为了什么付出什么得到什么，乃至现代科学中没有研究的真理分布、非标准逻辑、思维科学，等等。所以，这甚至是现在最适合发表纯逻辑思想、研究成果的作品 门类。 虽然在起点网已经被禁，也被出版社拒稿，但是将继续更新，后记中会预告下次更新的时间。 .

Increasingly, in data-intensive areas of the life sciences, experimental results are being described in algorithmically useful ways with the help of ontologies. Such ontologies are authored and maintained by scientists to support the retrieval, integration and analysis of their data. The proposition to be defended here is that ontologies of this type – the Gene Ontology (GO) being the most conspicuous example – are a part of science. Initial evidence for the truth of this proposition (which some will find self-evident) (...) is the increasing recognition of the importance of empirically-based methods of evaluation to the ontology development work being undertaken in support of scientific research. The ontologies created by scientists must, of course, be associated with implementations satisfying the requirements of software engineering. But these ontologies are not themselves engineering artifacts, and to conceive them as such brings grievous consequences. Rather, we shall argue, ontologies such as the GO are comparable to scientific theories, to scientific databases, or to scientific journal publications. Such a view implies a radically new conception of what is involved in the authoring, maintenance and application of ontologies in scientific contexts, and therewith also a radically new approach to the evaluation of ontologies and to the training of ontologists. (shrink)

DNA sequencers, Twitter, MRIs, Facebook, particle accelerators, Google Books, radio telescopes, Tumblr: what do these things have in common? According to the evangelists of “data science,” all of these are instruments for observing reality at unprecedentedly large scales and fine granularities. This perspective ignores the social reality of these very different technological systems, ignoring how they are made, how they work, and what they mean in favor of an exclusive focus on what they generate: Big Data. But no data, big (...) or small, can be interpreted without an understanding of the process that generated them. Statistical data science is applicable to systems that have been designed as scientific instruments, but is likely to lead to confusion when applied to systems that have not. In those cases, a historical inquiry is preferable. (shrink)

According to falsificationism, a theory is scientific if it can be incompatible with some empirically testable statements. This epistemological approach has been criticized because, in practice, it is impossible to decide when a particular fact should be considered incompatible with a theory. These criticisms, however, neglect the fact that the Popperian sense of falsification is a “logical sense.” Thus, the Popperian criterion of falsifiability only requires that, assuming certain auxiliary hypotheses, the theory in question be logically incompatible with some empirically (...) testable statements. This paper presents a reassessment of these criticisms, justifying that the criterion of falsifiability is unrenounceable insofar as our best theories should aspire to satisfy it. (shrink)

We reply to Philippe Depoortère’s paper “On Ricardo’s method: The Unitarian influence examined. Some comments on Cremaschi and Dascal’s article ‘Malthus and Ricardo on Economic Methodology’”. Depoortère asks two questions: (1) was Ricardo’s ‘conversion’ to Unitarianism sincere? (2) did Ricardo follow the methodologies of Priestley and Belsham? His answers are that he was a ‘religious skeptic’ and he was not an ‘empiricist’ like Priestley and Belsham. We reply that the sincerity of Ricardo’s religious beliefs is irrelevant since we start with (...) the evidence that he was exposed for a long time to the intellectual influence of Belsham, primarily in matters of philosophy, and to deny this would imply a negative answer to a different question, namely, did Ricardo attend Unitarian meetings for 15 years? Then we reply that Ricardo inherited Belsham’s version of Newtonian methodology which omitted the fourth rule, that is the most anti-Cartesian and anti-systematic rule, and this has little to do with empiricism but instead with apriorism. (shrink)

When scientists seek further confirmation of their results, they often attempt to duplicate the results using diverse means. To the extent that they are successful in doing so, their results are said to be robust. This paper investigates the logic of such "robustness analysis" [RA]. The most important and challenging question an account of RA can answer is what sense of evidential diversity is involved in RAs. I argue that prevailing formal explications of such diversity are unsatisfactory. I propose a (...) unified, explanatory account of diversity in RAs. The resulting account is, I argue, truer to actual cases of RA in science; moreover, this account affords us a helpful, new foothold on the logic undergirding RAs. (shrink)

I believe that the Buddhist paradigm of the phenomenal world—particularly, the Buddhist assertion that the phenomenal world is not as it appears—is supported by a scientific analysis of perception. When we consider carefully the basics of human perception, as understood by modern science, it becomes clear that phenomenal events are not represented as they truly are. This infidelity of information transfer from external phenomena to personal experience is consistent with the Buddhist view of the world as 'illusory'. Further, I would (...) argue that the creation of an illusory external world by our sensory instrumentation is compatible with the Buddhist doctrine of the non-duality of perception and perceiver. (shrink)

The paper analyses not well known beginning of Cracow philosophy of nature originating from the 19th century. A selected number of issues formed by two founders of Cracow philosophical centre – W. Heinrich and M. Straszewski are presented. Finally, the author tries to refl ect on modern nature philosophy in the context of its relations with tradition lasting over the centuries.