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Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.details
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Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.details
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Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):513-530.details
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Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.details
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Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.details
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The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.details
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The Visual Role of Objects' Facing Surfaces.William E. S. Mcneill - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):411-431.details
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(1 other version)XV—Epistemic Charge.Susanna Siegel - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):277-306.details
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Almost One, Overlap and Function.C. S. Sutton - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):45-52.details
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Philosophical Theory-Construction and the Self-Image of Philosophy.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):231-243.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).details
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Through a Shadow, Darkly.István Aranyosi - manuscriptdetails
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Gurwitsch’s Phenomenal Holism.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.details
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Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism.F. A. I. Buekens & F. A. Muller - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):91-100.details
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Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.details
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Intuitive knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.details
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The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.details
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The Meaning of "Look".Wylie Breckenridge - 2007 - Dissertation, New College, University of Oxforddetails
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Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.details
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Formal ontology, common sense, and cognitive science.Barry Smith - 1995 - International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 43 (5-6):641–667.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Gestalt psychology and the philosophy of mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.details
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Emotional Experience and Propositional Content.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):535-561.details
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Schellenberg’s Capacitism.Alex Byrne - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):713-19.details
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Schellenberg on Perceptual Capacities.Jonathan Cohen - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):720-730.details
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Perceptual Capacities: Questions for Schellenberg.Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):730-739.details
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(1 other version)Perceptual Capacities.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 137 - 169.details
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Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith A. Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.details
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The nonclassical mereology of olfactory experiences.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):867-886.details
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The Sense of Time.Gerardo Viera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):443-469.details
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Umbrales de transparencia en la imagen producida por artefactos de registro mecánico de la realidad.Alberto Murcia Carbonell - 2016 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 69:39-54.details
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Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?Marek Pokropski - 2017 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 38:58-73.details
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Expressions, Looks and Others' Minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2000 - In Anita Avramides (ed.), Other Minds. New York: Routledge.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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Dispositions, Their Bases And Correlates – Meinong's Analysis.Kevin Mulligan - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.details
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The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.details
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XIII—Hearing Properties, Effects or Parts?Casey O'callaghan - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):375-405.details
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Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2015 - In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. New York: Routledge. pp. 49-88.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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Either / or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94.details
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An ecological approach to cognitive (im)penetrability.Rob Withagen & Claire F. Michaels - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400.details
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P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.details
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Introspection and authoritative self-knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):355-372.details
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(1 other version)Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error.Anna Vaughn - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):670-688.details
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Perception and ordinary objects.Alex Byrne - 2018 - In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Near Triviality of Conclusive Reasons.Tetsuji Iseda - 2005 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-20.details
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