- The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Quasi-Evidentialism: Interests, Justification and Epistemic Virtue.Karyn L. Freedman - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):147-160.details
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Building Epistemically Healthier Platforms.Dallas Amico-Korby, Maralee Harrell & David Danks - forthcoming - Episteme.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes.Thomas Kelly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2):233-266.details
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Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
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Friendship and epistemic norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.details
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Reasons for Belief and Aretaic Obligations.Emmanuel Smith - 2023 - Episteme (N/A):1-12.details
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Believing in order to know: The cue from Augustine.John Zeis - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (3):207-223.details
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Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.details
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Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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Sceptical Rationality.Jan Willem Wieland - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Is it Rational to Trust?Jeremy Wanderer & Leo Townsend - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):1-14.details
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Deontic-doxastic belief revision and linear system model.Andrea Vestrucci - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.details
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Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.details
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In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism.Matthew Vermaire - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):615-631.details
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Staying true with the help of others: doxastic self-control through interpersonal commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.details
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Inquiry and the epistemic.David Thorstad - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2913-2928.details
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Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
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Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):95-112.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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Stance empiricism and epistemic reason.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):709-733.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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“The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):61-72.details
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Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William J. Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.details
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