- Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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“The Thing To Do” Implies “Can”.Nicholas Southwood - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):61-72.details
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Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Reasons for Belief and Aretaic Obligations.Emmanuel Smith - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William J. Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.details
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Epistemic Rationality.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):608-630.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.Nicholas Shackel - 2013 - In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 417-438.details
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Justification.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - Episteme:1-20.details
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Stanford’s Unconceived Alternatives from the Perspective of Epistemic Obligations.Matthew S. Sample - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):856-866.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.details
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Agency Evidentialism: Trust and Doxastic Voluntarism.Snježana Prijić-Samaržija - 2018 - Rivista di Estetica 69:68-84.details
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Is There an 'I' in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.details
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Is There an ‘I’ in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.details
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A metaphilosophical dilemma for epistemic externalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.details
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The value of truth and the normativity of evidence.Tommaso Piazza - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5067-5088.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.details
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Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):433-449.details
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Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):119-133.details
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A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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The very idea of rational irrationality.Spencer Paulson - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (1):3-21.details
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Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.details
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In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):435-446.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.details
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A Defense of the Objective/subjective Moral Ought Distinction.Kristian Olsen - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):351-373.details
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Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.details
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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification: a reassessment.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2219-2241.details
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Epistemic norms, all things considered.Kate Nolfi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737.details
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Ought We Accept What Neuroscience Might Imply? Many Questions, Incommensurable Answers?Nathan Nobis - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4):45-47.details
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IV—Lost in (Modal) Space: Demographic Base-Rate Neglect in the Service of Modal Knowledge.Jessie Munton - 2023 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (1):73-96.details
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Choosing to believe.Ronney Mourad - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1-3):55-69.details
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