- Unbounded Utility.Zachary Goodsell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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The Case for Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):414-453.details
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Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):533-555.details
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Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.details
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?Cian Dorr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):472-503.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Factivity, consistency and knowability.James Chase & Penelope Rush - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):899-918.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence.Lara Buchak - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):113-133.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.details
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Constraints on Rational Theory Choice.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):639-661.details
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On the Rationality of Decisions with Unreliable Probabilities.Birman Fernando - 2009 - Disputatio 3 (26):97-116.details
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On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):25.details
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The quantitative problem of old evidence.E. C. Barnes - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):249-264.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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Stakes and beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.details
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Stake-invariant belief.Brad Armendt - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief.Keith Frankish - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 75--93.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.details
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Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.details
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A bayesian paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):51-66.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Epistemology quantized: Circumstances in which we should come to believe in the Everett interpretation.David Wallace - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):655-689.details
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The notion of consistency for partial belief.Susan Vineberg - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):281 - 296.details
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The Agnostic Subtly Probabilified.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):212-220.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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Uncertainty, equality, fraternity.Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9603-9619.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
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