- (2 other versions)Is endurantism the folk friendly view of persistence?Sam Baron, Andrew J. Latham, Jordan Veng Oh & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus.Luke Roelofs & Jeff Sebo - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1487-1506.details
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(1 other version)Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self?Christopher Register - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):219-236.details
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Critical-Set Views, Biographical Identity, and the Long Term.Elliott Thornley - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism.David Builes - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12959.details
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(1 other version)How to Explain the Importance of Persons.Christopher Register - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):920-940.details
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Richard Swinburne’s Defence of Dualism.Aykut Alper Yılmaz - 2020 - Kader 18 (1):318-343.details
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The Argument from Locality for Many Worlds Quantum Mechanics.Alyssa Ney - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self?Christopher Register - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-18.details
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No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.Luke Roelofs - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):131-146.details
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A Defense of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bradley - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):117-123.details
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Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516.details
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Embodiment and personal identity in dementia.Thomas Fuchs - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (4):665-676.details
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Modern and Medieval Modal Spaces.Arif Ahmed - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):255-273.details
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Against Person Essentialism.Eric T. Olson* & Karsten Witt - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):715-735.details
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Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.details
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Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3033-3049.details
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Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles.Philip Swenson & Bradley Rettler - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):495-508.details
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Diachronic Self-Making.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):349-362.details
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Not All Killings Are Equally Wrong.Todd Karhu - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):378–394.details
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A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2031-2049.details
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Looking at the self: perspectival memory and personal identity.Christopher Jude McCarroll - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):259-279.details
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Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.details
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Leiblichkeit und personale Identität in der Demenz.Thomas Fuchs - 2018 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 66 (1):48-61.details
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Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):842-868.details
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Métaphysique et éthique de la reproduction.Lynda Gaudemard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):1-19.details
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Memory and Personal Identity in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):243-268.details
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A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity.Jacob Berger - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (1):41-55.details
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Our animal interests.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.details
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Dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists.Duncan Matt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):945-963.details
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Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):38-58.details
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(1 other version)Against the Complex versus Simple Distinction.Patrik Hummel - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):363-378.details
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Memory and mineness in personal identity.Rebecca Roache - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):479-489.details
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The unity of consciousness, within subjects and between subjects.Luke Roelofs - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3199-3221.details
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Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects.Ben Caplan & Bob Bright - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):61-83.details
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Persistence and the First-Person Perspective.Dilip Ninan - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):425-464.details
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3D Cohabitation.Simon Langford - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1195-1210.details
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I—What is a Continuant?Helen Steward - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):109-123.details
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We Do Not Count by Identity.David Liebesman - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):21-42.details
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Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.details
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Does Division Multiply Desert?Theron Pummer - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.details
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Counting Stages.Emanuel Viebahn - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):311-324.details
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Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis.Dave Ward - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):497-515.details
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Non-branching Clause.Huiyuhl Yi - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):191-210.details
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Fission, cohabitation and the concern for future survival.Rebecca Roache - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):256-263.details
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Why I have no hands.Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):182-197.details
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Persons and their properties.Jason Stanley - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-175.details
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A survival guide to fission.Mark Moyer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):299 - 322.details
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Propositions, circumstances, objects.Walter Edelberg - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):1 - 34.details
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Animalism, dicephalus, and borderline cases.Stephan Blatti - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):595-608.details
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