- Publishing without (some) belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.details
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Replies.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1577-1597.details
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The Standard of Correctness and the Ontology of Depiction.Enrico Terrone - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):399-412.details
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(1 other version)You gotta believe.John Turri - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-199.details
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Illocutionary harm.Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1631-1646.details
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Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse?Manuel García-Carpintero - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):143-177.details
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Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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How to understand the knowledge norm of assertion: Reply to Schlöder.Jonny McIntosh - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):207-214.details
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Inheriting the World.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - Journal of Applied Logics 7 (2):163-70.details
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Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals.Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (2):475-511.details
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Presupposing Counterfactuality.Julia Zakkou - 2019 - Semantics and Pragmatics 12.details
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Schlechte Nachrichten: Fake News in Politik und Öffentlichkeit.Romy Jaster & David Lanius - 2020 - In Michael Harnischmacher, Elfi Heinke, Ralf Hohlfeld & Michael Sengl (eds.), Fake News und Desinformation: Herausforderungen für die vernetzte Gesellschaft und die empirische Forschung. Baden-Baden: Nomos. pp. 245-267.details
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Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose.Mylan Engel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7891-7921.details
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Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):349-363.details
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The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
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The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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Normative Fiction‐Making and the World of the Fiction.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2019 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (3):267-279.details
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Deepfakes and the Epistemic Backstop.Regina Rini - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (24):1-16.details
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Critique of Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2019 - Diametros 16 (59):23-34.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat.Spencer Case - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):92-104.details
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Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):264-270.details
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The Duty to Object.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):35-60.details
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Silencing and assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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Cognition and Content.João Branquinho - 2005 - Lisboa, Portugal: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffielddetails
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Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Conceptual competence injustice.Derek Egan Anderson - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (2):210-223.details
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Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502.details
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Against selfless assertions.Ivan Milić - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2277-2295.details
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(1 other version)II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Barcelonadetails
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(1 other version)Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.details
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Testimony, evidence and interpersonal reasons.Nick Leonard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2333-2352.details
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Accommodating Presuppositions Is Inappropriate in Implausible Contexts.Raj Singh, Evelina Fedorenko, Kyle Mahowald & Edward Gibson - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):607-634.details
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Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Assertions, joint epistemic actions and social practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.details
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Heidegger's Logico-Semantic Strikeback.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22:19-38.details
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(1 other version)Defending the Coherence of Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):319-333.details
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(1 other version)Defending the Coherence of Epistemic Contextualism.Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):319-333.details
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