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Epistemological motivations for anti-realism.Billy Dunaway - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2763-2789.details
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Evidential externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.details
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The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
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Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):395-403.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
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Religious Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):63--86.details
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Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Knowing against the odds.Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.details
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Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge.Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):1-20.details
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A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
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Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3717-3723.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Hope, knowledge, and blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.details
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Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.details
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Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.details
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The insignificance of philosophical skepticism.Jonathan Dixon - 2022 - Synthese 200 (485):1-22.details
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Indoctrination Anxiety and the Etiology of Belief.Joshua DiPaolo & Robert Mark Simpson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10):3079-3098.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Science Generates Limit Paradoxes.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):409-432.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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Incentivizing Replication Is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust.Hugh Desmond - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):906-917.details
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Group belief reconceived.Jeroen de Ridder - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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Review essay on Jonathan Kvanvig's the value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding.Michael R. Depaul & Stephen R. Grimm - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):498–514.details
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No norm for (off the record) implicatures.Javier González de Prado - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1705-1711.details
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Criteria for indefeasible knowledge: John Mcdowell and 'epistemological disjunctivism'.Peter Dennis - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4099-4113.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1129-1150.details
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Hazardous Conditions Persist.Daniel Deasy & Jonathan Tallant - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1635-1658.details
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.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.details
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Reflective epistemological disjunctivism.J. J. Cunningham - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):111-132.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Review: The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW]C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.details
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Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.details
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