- (1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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One standard to rule them all?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.details
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(1 other version)The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.details
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The Vices of Argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):413-422.details
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A defense of objectivism about evidential support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse: Fifty Contributions to the Development of Pragma-Dialectics.Bart Garssen, Frans Eemeren & Frans H. van Eemeren (eds.) - 2015 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse: Fifty Contributions to the Development of Pragma-Dialectics.Scott Jacobs, Sally Jackson, Frans Eemeren & Frans H. van Eemeren (eds.) - 2015 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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(1 other version)Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse: Fifty Contributions to the Development of Pragma-Dialectics.Bert Meuffels, Bart Garssen, Frans van Eemeren & Frans H. van Eemeren - 2015 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and Argumentation.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):395-402.details
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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
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Open-Mindedness as a Critical Virtue.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):403-411.details
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On the Priority of Agent-Based Argumentative Norms.David Godden - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):345-357.details
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A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2007 - Argumentation 21 (1):39-61.details
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(1 other version)The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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On “Epistemic Permissiveness”.Anthony Brueckner & Alex Bundy - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):165-177.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?Tim Dare & Justine Kingsbury - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):503-518.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Diachronic coherence versus epistemic impartiality.David Christensen - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):349-371.details
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Conservatism in epistemology.David Christensen - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):69-89.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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Continuing on.Michael Titelbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691.details
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Epistemology and Cognition.Robert Audi - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):733-738.details
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One’s own reasoning.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):208-232.details
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Dynamic Conservatism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3 (13):349-376.details
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Burden of Proof, Presumption and Argumentation.Douglas Walton - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Arguments that Backfire.Daniel H. Cohen - 2005 - In D. Hitchcock & D. Farr (eds.), The Uses of Argument. OSSA. pp. 58-65.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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(2 other versions)Disagreement. [REVIEW]Nathan Ballantyne & Nathan L. King - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):808-812.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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