- Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.details
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Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Values and the heart's command.Bas van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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(1 other version)Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology?: Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals.David Christensen - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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(1 other version)The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral dilemmas and nonmonotonic logic.John Horty - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):35 - 65.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
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The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1897 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers & Ignas K. Skrupskelis.details
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Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification.Kevin McCain - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
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From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries.Tim Henning - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):169-206.details
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(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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The Ethics of Requirement.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (2):147 - 153.details
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence?Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Normative conflicts and the logic of 'ought'.Lou Goble - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):450-489.details
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(1 other version)Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.details
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(1 other version)Evidence.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.details
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Could've Thought Otherwise.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (12).details
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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