- The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Logical Principles of Agnosticism.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1263-1283.details
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Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions.Avery Archer - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (53):63-88.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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What are Conditional Intentions?Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6):30-60.details
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Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Judging, believing and thinking.Quassim Cassam - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):80-95.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Agnosticism as a third stance.Sven Rosenkranz - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):55-104.details
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Refraining.Robert E. Moore - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (4):407 - 424.details
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(1 other version)Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief.Robert Audi - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1 (1):87-109.details
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Contextualism defended.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 56-62.details
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Attitudes, Tracing, and Control.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2):115-132.details
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Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing.".Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):263-283.details
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Systems-oriented social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 189-214.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm & Israel Scheffler - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3):381-393.details
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Justified belief and epistemically responsible action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.details
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Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.details
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Suspension as Spandrel.Ernest Sosa - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):357-368.details
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