- Widening the Picture.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 312–405.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement : the good news.David Christensen - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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(2 other versions)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Pollock on defeasible reasons.Scott Sturgeon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):105-118.details
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The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.details
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Knowledge and Justification.Godfrey Vesey - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (102):106-108.details
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Review of A Priori Justification. [REVIEW]Joel Pust - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):124-128.details
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.details
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Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793-812.details
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The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder.Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):152-169.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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The sources of knowledge.Robert Audi - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 71--94.details
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Defeat reconsidered.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):49-51.details
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 54.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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Epistemic Self-respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.details
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Reliabilism and the problem of defeaters.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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(2 other versions)Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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(2 other versions)Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Knowledge and Justification.John L. Pollock - 1974 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by John Pollock.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:221-238.details
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Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant.Mikael Janvid - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:135-154.details
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Criteria for indefeasible knowledge: John Mcdowell and 'epistemological disjunctivism'.Peter Dennis - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4099-4113.details
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Transmission of Justification and Warrant.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Understanding undermining defeat.Giacomo Melis - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):433-442.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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