- Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
|
|
Veritism and the normativity of logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):7-19.details
|
|
The value of thinking and the normativity of logic.Manish Oza - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (25):1-23.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Normativity.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:240-266.details
|
|
A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
|
|
Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (1):5-31.details
|
|
Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
|
|
(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why Be Rational&quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Ethics 94 (2):326-327.details
|
|
An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
|
|
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
|
|
Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
|
|
“Ought”, reasons, and vice: a comment on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity. [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):451 - 463.details
|
|
Reasons and Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
|
|
Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.details
|
|
(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
(1 other version)Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
|
|
(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
|
|
What is the Normative Role of Logic?Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
|
|
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
|
|
Brandom on modality, normativity, and intentionality.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23.details
|
|
Responding to the Spread of Conspiracy Theories.Nader Shoaibi - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|