- The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
Possibly false knowledge.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):225-246.details
|
|
Epistemology of Religion.Nicholas Wolterstorff - 2017 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 303–324.details
|
|
Unnatural doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism.Michael Williams - 1991 - Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.details
|
|
Skepticism.Michael Williams - 2017 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 33–69.details
|
|
Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
|
|
Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
|
|
The normative force of reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.details
|
|
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
|
|
Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief.James Van Cleve - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):90-104.details
|
|
An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.details
|
|
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
|
|
Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.details
|
|
'Ought' and 'can'.Michael Stocker - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):303 – 316.details
|
|
Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
|
|
Destructive defeat and justificational force: the dialectic of dogmatism, conservatism, and meta-evidentialism.Matthias Steup - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2907-2933.details
|
|
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.Alessandra Tanesini - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):303-306.details
|
|
Contextualism and conceptual disambiguation.Matthias Steup - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.details
|
|
Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.details
|
|
Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
|
|
Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.details
|
|
Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
|
|
Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
|
|
Skepticism and the Internal/External Divide.Ernest Sosa - 2017 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 143–157.details
|
|
Relevant alternatives, contextualism included.Ernest Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.details
|
|
How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
|
|
Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.details
|
|
Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
|
|
Understanding free will.Michael A. Slote - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):136-51.details
|
|
Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs.Daniel J. Singer - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):281-293.details
|
|
Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1951-1966.details
|
|
Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief–Assertion Parallel.Mona Simion - 2018 - Analysis:any048.details
|
|
How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
|
|
Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.details
|
|
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
|
|
A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
|
|
XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.Stephen Schiffer - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):317-334.details
|
|
The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
|
|
Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge.Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) - 1994 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
|
|
Social Epistemology.Frederick Schmitt - 2017 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 354–382.details
|
|
Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
|
|
Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
|
|
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
|
|
Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
|
|
How to be an Anti-Skeptic and a NonContextualist.Bruce Russell - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):245-255.details
|
|
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
|
|
Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
|
|
Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.details
|
|