Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes, and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...) what partly explains one or both of the explananda is that people believe themselves to have a stable persisting self which is imagined either as moving through time, or as being stationary, with time moving around it. This paper empirically investigates this explanation. We found, however, no evidential support for the stable-self explanation, leaving the non-dynamist but also, we will argue, the dynamist, with an extant explanatory challenge. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior (...) belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time. (shrink)

Even if we grant that the concept of force has an important place in Schopenhauer’s view of natural sciences and that we definitely should avoid treating Schopenhauer’s theory of the will as a scientific hypothesis, it still does not follow that dynamic concepts would not be of utmost importance for metaphysics as Schopenhauer conceives it. A careful analysis that takes into account the context provided by early modern thinkers reveals that Schopenhauer’s system is based on an elaborate theory in which (...) the concepts of force and striving play a key role, and that this underpins a line of thought essentially dynamistic in character both with regard to phenomenal and noumenal realms. Understanding Schopenhauer’s twofold dynamism and its conceptual architecture allows us not only to gain insight into the nature of his metaphysical enterprise by designating its place within the context of this book, but also to obtain a better grasp of his view of the relationship between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. I also suggest a reading of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the phenomenal world in which it is interpreted as a dynamic field of matter. (shrink)

Let us call non-presentist dynamism any view according to which (a) a single moment of time is objectively present and (b) which time is objectively present changes and (c) objectively non-present times exist, and at least some of these are occupied by objects, events, or properties. Non-presentist dynamism has an advantage over presentist dynamism—the view that only present objects, properties, and events exist, and that which objects, properties and events there are, changes—in the truthmaking arena. Presentists have (...) trouble finding plausible truthmakers for past (and future) tensed propositions, since no past, (or future) objects, properties, or events exist, which could make true said propositions. Hence presentists have to resort to one of two strategies. According to the first, nothing makes past (or future) tensed propositions true, though some are true nonetheless. For some class of propositions, the truth of said propositions does not in any way depend on ontology. This strategy rejects even the fairly weak requirement that for any proposition P, and worlds w and v, if P is true in w but not in v, then either something exists in v but not in w or else some n-tuple of things stands in some fundamental relation in v but not in w . Call this account No Truthmaker: -/- No Truthmaker: There are no truthmakers for past-tensed truths. -/- Embracing No Truthmaker is typically taken to be a cost of presentism. According to the second strategy, some presently existing thing makes true past-tensed truths. Advocates of this strategy embrace anti-aboutness truthmaking, the view that while all truths are grounded in being, the truth of a proposition need not grounded in the thing(s) the proposition is about. Since past things do not exist, past-tensed propositions are made true by something other than what they are about. Such presentists endorse some version of Present Record Truthmaking. (shrink)

Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the (...) part of the deflationist, one candidate explanation. We hypothesise that people’s belief that the future is what we call deliberatively open partly explains why they represent time as dynamical. In a series of two experiments we test this hypothesis. We find no evidence that beliefs about deliberative openness explain why people represent time as dynamical. Hence there remains an explanatory burden for the deflationist to discharge. (shrink)

The Pfizer-BioNTech coronavirus vaccine is 90 percent effective in protecting against COVID-19. It would not have been possible without the tireless effort of Professor Katalin Karikó, a scientific innovator fitting the mold of dynamic inventor Arthur Diamond presents in his book, Openness to Creative Destruction Sustaining Innovative Dynamism. Not only did Professor Karikó persist in her beliefs in the therapeutic potential of synthetic messenger RNA over the course of four decades, but she did so despite the criticisms of other (...) scientists and despite lack of financial backing for large parts of her career. Professor Karikó is a good example of the unconventional picture that Diamond paints of entrepreneurs in a specific version of market capitalism he terms, innovative dynamism. Specifically, she is an example of someone who does not hold prevailing academic theories in too high a regard and instead privileges her tacit knowledge (knowledge gained from years of working with mRNA in the lab) to persist believing in the potential of a therapy that now could quite literally save the world. Most surprisingly, she, like most of the entrepreneurs surveyed in the book, seem not primarily motivated by profit, though the money their projects eventually attract is integral to disseminating their creative ideas to the masses. -/- Are the many examples offered by Diamond that are similar to Professor Karikó’s story evidence against the long-standing suspicion that there is something morally damning in the self-interested motivations of innovative entrepreneurship? Is it the case that others would have inevitably pursued the cure that Karikó pursued, regardless of economic system? In light of COVID-19 and other high-pressure situations, ought we to care how we constrain the innovators who develop solutions? Diamond’s case for the economic system, innovative dynamism, seeks to answer these and other important questions concerning our political and cultural treatment of innovators and entrepreneurs. This review critically assesses his efforts. I make my case by first reviewing the major argumentative structure of the book, then I summarize and evaluate the three major themes Diamond presents in the book: (1) what is innovative dynamism and who are its competitors, (2) what are the major benefits of innovative dynamism, (3) who is the innovative entrepreneur and how do we support him or her? (shrink)

Although contemporary Western culture and criticism has usually valued composition over improvisation and placed the authority of a musical work with the written text rather than the performer, this essay posits these divisions as too facile to articulate the complex dynamics of making music in any genre or form. Rather it insists that music should be understood as pieces that are created with specific intentions by composers but which possess possibilities of interpretation that can only be brought out through performance.

Temporal dynamists argue that we should believe that there exists temporal passage because there being passage is the best explanation for the presence of our temporal phenomenology. Some non-dynamists have countered that the presence of passage makes no difference to our temporal phenomenology, and consequently that temporal phenomenology cannot be evidence that there is passage. This paper attempts to bolster this non-dynamist response by offering new arguments for the claim that the presence of passage makes no difference to our phenomenology.

We investigated, experimentally, the contention that the folk view, or naïve theory, of time, amongst the population we investigated is dynamical. We found that amongst that population, ~ 70% have an extant theory of time that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory, and ~ 70% of those who deploy a naïve theory of time deploy a naïve theory that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory. Interestingly, while we found stable results across our (...) two experiments regarding the percentage of participants that have a dynamical or non-dynamical extant theory of time, we did not find such stability regarding which particular dynamical or non-dynamical theory of time they take to be most similar to our world. This suggests that there might be two extant theories in the population—a broadly dynamical one and a broadly non-dynamical one—but that those theories are sufficiently incomplete that participants do not stably choose the same dynamical theory as being most similar to our world. This suggests that while appeals to the ordinary view of time may do some work in the context of adjudicating disputes between dynamists and non-dynamists, they likely cannot do any such work adjudicating disputes between particular brands of dynamism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Temporal dynamists argue that we should believe that there exists temporal passage because there being passage is the best explanation for the presence of our temporal phenomenology. Presentists argue that presentism is the best version of temporal dynamism. Therefore, conditional on us accepting temporal dynamism, we should accept presentism. In this paper it is argued that if we understand temporal passage as the presentist does, such an argument can succeed only if dualism is true. Thus, we conclude, (...) either presentists should embrace dualism, or they should reject any argument for presentism that proceeds via any such argument for temporal passage that proceeds via considerations of what best explains our temporal phenomenology. (shrink)

Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) do (...) those who represent actual time as dynamical, represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical—what we call insensitive dynamism—or do they represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical only conditional on the actual world in fact being dynamical—what we call sensitive dynamism and (c) do dynamists and non-dynamists deploy two different representations of time, or deploy the same representation, but disagree about what actually satisfies that representation? We found no evidence that the folk representation of time is sensitive, or that the folk representation of time is essentially dynamical in either sense, though we did find evidence of a shared representation, on which dynamical features are sufficient, but not necessary, for time. (shrink)

Temporal dynamists typically hold that it seems to us as though time robustly passes, and that its seeming so is explained by the fact that time does robustly pass. Temporal non-dynamists hold that time does not robustly pass. Some non-dynamists nevertheless hold that it seems as though it does: we have an illusory phenomenal state whose content represents robust passage. Call these phenomenal passage illusionists. Other non-dynamists argue that the phenomenal state in question is veridical, and represents something other than (...) robust passage. Call this the veridical passage-less view. This paper argues against in favour of the latter view over the former, by arguing that we should reject passage illusionism. (shrink)

In this paper we provide an analysis of dynamic dispositionalism. It is usually claimed that dispositions are dynamic properties. However, there is no exhaustive analysis of dynamism in the dispositional literature. We will argue that the dynamic character of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of three features: (i) temporal extension, (ii) necessary change and (iii) future orientedness. Roughly, we will defend the idea that dynamism entails a continuous view of time, to be analyzed in mathematical terms, where (...) intervals are its constitutive elements, whose duration lasts as much as a certain change takes to occur (in support of i). Such changes are the necessary components for the flowing of time because we think there cannot be time without change, (thus supporting ii) and that the forward-looking feature of properties is what determines the direction of time (as per iii). The paper is structured in 5 sections. In the first section, we set the problem: we outline and criticize some dispositional theories that defend an unsatisfying notion of dynamism. In the second, third and fourth sections we defend each desideratum for a disposition to be dynamic. Finally, we draw some conclusions and consider potential future research. (shrink)

Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads us mistakenly (...) to believe that our experiences seem that way. Cognitive Error Theory is a relatively new view and little has been said to explain why we make such an error, or where, in the cognitive architecture, such an error might creep in. In this paper we remedy this by offering a number of hypotheses about the source of error. In so doing we aim to show that Cognitive Error Theory is a plausible competitor to Phenomenal Illusion Theory. (shrink)

The dynamism between otherness and differences with identity and equivalence provides key ideas for analyzing the process of gender individuation by artistic works. In this article I discuss the problem of artistic and aesthetic reactions to homogeneous cultural patterns of masculinity, which is characterized by the concept of "toxic masculinity" in pop-cultural, sociological, psychological and gender studies discourses. One common theme is that "toxic masculinity" encompasses harmful standards that generate antagonisms and diminish multi-figure masculinity to a singular "socially acceptable" (...) level at the expense of children, women and men - and thus society as a whole. The artist's task is to reveal this noxiousness, and to highlight the value of the coexistence of a variety of forms of masculinity in terms of its diversity, thereby helping to mitigate the consequences of disruptive gender relations. (shrink)

This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is time in B-theory worlds, (...) only ~ 45% say there is time in C-theory worlds. Thus, while the presence of directedness makes dynamists more inclined to say there is time in a world, a substantial subpopulation of dynamists judge that there is time in non-directed worlds. By contrast, a majority of non-dynamists judged that there was time in both growing block worlds and C-theory worlds, with no significant differences between the means. Experiment 2 found that when participants are only presented with non-dynamical worlds—namely, a directed world and a non-directed world—they report significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in B-theory worlds. However, the majority of participants still judge that there is time in C-theory worlds. We conclude that while the presence of directedness bolsters judgements that there is time, most people do not judge it to be necessary for time. (shrink)

Despite being a staple of liberal-democratic politicians’ and theorists’ rhetorical arsenal, ‘openness’ as a political commitment has yet to receive sustained philosophical analysis. My aim in this paper is to provide such an analysis. I will argue that political openness involves a readiness by an agent to engage with others forthrightly and receptively, and to recognise their authoritative standing in political domains. I demonstrate the explanatory value of this account by showing that it provides an insightful explanation of what’s at (...) stake in the emerging political cleavage between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ politics, explains the appeal of ‘the open society’ as an epithet for liberal democracies, and provides a compelling interpretation of openness’ contribution to social dynamism and progressive reform, one which diverges favourably from the emphasis others have put on social experimentation and trial and error learning. (shrink)

Several philosophers have suggested that certain aspects of people’s experience of agency partly explains why people tend to report that it seems to them, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. In turn, it has been suggested that people come to believe that time robustly passes on the basis of its seeming to them in experience that it does. We argue that what require explaining is not just that people report that it seems to them as though time robustly (...) passes, and that they believe that it does, but rather, the substantial variation (a) in people’s reports regarding whether it seems as though time robustly passes, and (b) their beliefs about whether time robustly passes. We empirically investigate the agentive explanation of (a), according to which variation in people’s agentive experiences explains variation in people’s reports regarding whether it seems to them as though time robustly passes. We also empirically investigate the experiential seeming explanation of belief, according to which variation in people’s beliefs about whether time robustly passes is explained by variation in their reports regarding whether it seems in experience as though time robustly passes. We found empirical support for the agentive explanation, but not for the experiential seeming explanation of passage beliefs. We consider the implications of our results for three views about temporal experience and temporal beliefs: dynamism, passage illusionism and deflationism. (shrink)

It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not). This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the same kind of thing as (...) what makes true, present-tensed propositions. They have done so in an attempt to defuse a particular epistemic objection to their view. In this paper it is argued that the new growing block theorist faces a dilemma. The more unified a strategy is for responding to the epistemic objection, the more that strategy results in the new growing block model positing truthmakers that are similar to those posited by the presentist, which erodes the purported advantage of the growing block theory over presentism. On the other hand, versions of the new growing block theory that embrace disunified strategies are better able to differentiate themselves from presentism, but are unattractive because of their disunity. (shrink)

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not support either assumption. One experiment instead found the reverse (...) correlation: people were more likely to report having passage phenomenology if they endorsed a non-dynamical theory of time. Given that people do not have an unambiguous phenomenology as of time passing, we conclude that this is suggestive evidence in favor of veridical non-dynamism—the view that our phenomenology is veridical, and that it does not unambiguously represent that time passes. Instead, our phenomenology veridically has some quite different content. (shrink)

Since his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft was first published in 1786, controversy has surrounded Immanuel Kant’s conception of matter. In particular, the justification for both his dynamical theory of matter and the related dismissal of mechanical philosophy are obscure. In this paper, I address these longstanding issues and establish that Kant’s dynamism rests upon Leibnizian, metaphysical commitments held by Kant from his early pre-Critical texts on natural philosophy to his major critical works. I demonstrate that, throughout his corpus and (...) inspired by Leibniz, Kant endorses the a priori law of continuity of alteration as a truth of metaphysics, according to which all alterations in experience must occur gradually through all intervening degrees. The principle thus legislates against mechanical philosophy’s absolutely impenetrable atoms, as they would would involve instantaneous changes of velocity in impact. This reveals the metaphysical incoherencies in mechanical philosophy and leaves Kant’s own dynamical theory of matter, grounded on material forces, as the only viable approach to physical explanation. Subsequently, I demonstrate that Kant nevertheless made conceptual space in his system for the theoretical consideration of mechanical explanations, which makes manifest one of the positive roles that the faculty of reason can play with respect to natural science. (shrink)

Dance receives relatively little attention in the history of philosophy. My strategy for connecting that history to dance consists in tracing a genealogy of its dance-relevant moments. In preparation, I perform a phenomenological analysis of my own eighteen years of dance experience, in order to generate a small cluster of central concepts or “Moves” for elucidating dance. At this genealogical-phenomenological intersection, I find what I term “positure” most helpfully treated in Plato, Aristotle and Nietzsche; “gesture” similarly in Condillac, Mead and (...) Kristeva; “grace” in Avicenna, Schiller and Dewey; and “resilience” in Fanon, (Judith) Butler and Deleuze. With these analyses in place, I apply the four Moves in analyzing various forms of dancing (including salsa dancing and the pollen dance of the honeybee) and coordinate them to outline a comprehensive philosophy of dance. This philosophy points to certain conditions for an ideally flourishing, dancing society. And these conditions create the possibility for a coalition of sympathetic discourses (including critical race theory, queer theory, disability studies and democratic theory) united in pursuit of political virtue. The development of a philosophy of dance offers a deeper understanding of the intellectual values of a practice often identified with bodily immediacy and therefore judged uninteresting. It also reinvigorates philosophy with the dynamism and bodily relevance of the practice of dancing. Most important, it demonstrates the meaningful intersection of aesthetics and political ethics, by exploring how aesthetic practices underlie and inspire human flourishing. (shrink)

Conceptual modeling of a portion of the world is a necessary prerequisite to set the stage and define software system boundaries. In this context, one of the challenges is to provide a unified framework to create a comprehensive representation of the targeted domain. According to many researchers, conceptual model (CM) development is a hard task, and system requirements are difficult to collect, causing many miscommunication problems. Accordingly, CMs require more than modeling ability alone: they first require an understanding of the (...) targeted domain that the model attempts to represent. Accordingly, a preconceptual modeling (pre-CM) stage is intended to address ontological issues before typical CM development is initiated. It involves defining a portion of reality when entities and processes are differentiated and integrated as unified wholes. This pre-CM phase forms the focus of research in this paper. The purpose is not show how to model; rather, it is to demonstrate how to establish a metaphysical basis of the involved portion of reality. To demonstrate such a venture, we employ the so-called thinging machine (TM) modeling that has been proposed as a high-level CM. A TM model integrates staticity and dynamism grounded in a fundamental construct called a thimac (things/machine). It involves two modes of reality, existence (events) and subsistence (regions: roughly, specifications of things and processes). Currently, the dominant approach in CM has evolved to limit its scope of application to develop ontological categorization (types of things). In contrast, advocates of TM modeling have pursued a broader metaphysical study of the nature of the domain’s things and processes beyond categorization. In the TM approach, pre-CM metaphysics is viewed as a part and parcel of CM itself. The general research problem is how to map TM constructs to what is out there in the targeted domain. Discussions involve the nature of thimacs (things and processes) and subsistence and existence as they are superimposed over each other in reality. Specifically, we make two claims, (i) the perceptibility of regions as a phenomenon and (ii) the distinctiveness of existence as a construct for events. The results contribute to further the understanding of TM modeling in addition to introducing some metaphysical insights. (shrink)

北宋理學家張載和程頤創造性地提出了內在感應論及其實踐問題。張載認為內在感應論以「靜中之動」的動力模式為特徵，且十分強調「至靜」的境界在道德實踐中的重要性。「神」和「地氣」為至靜的太虛能夠產生內在感應活 動提供了動力。相較之下，程頤明確反對「靜中之動」的模式，他通過揭示天理在兩端的互動中持續向內感發，闡明瞭天理擁有不竭內在動力的可能性。這種可能性在主體層面體現為主動的誠意在與邪念的抵抗中不斷湧現。總體 而言，張載和程頤的感應論分別以太虛的「靜中之動」和天理的「恆久之動」為特徵，代表了兩種不同的感應動力模式和修養路徑。兩位儒者從各自獨特的視角論證了內在感應的可能性，從而為傳統感應論注入了新的理論意涵。 Abstract: Northern Song Confucian scholars Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi creatively formulated the theory of internal resonance along with its practical implications. Zhang Zai posited that internal resonance manifests as a dynamic pattern of “motion within stillness,” emphasizing the significance of the state of “ultimate tranquility” in moral refinement. The “numinous” (shen) and “earthly energy” (diqi) serve as the driving forces for the emergence of internal resonance activities within the state of the great void tranquility. In contrast, Cheng Yi (...) explicitly opposed the “motion within stillness” model. Instead, he revealed the continuous inward resonance of Heavenly Principle through its interaction at dual poles, thus illuminating the potentiality of Heavenly Principle possessing inexhaustible intrinsic dynamism. At the subjective level, this potential manifests as proactive sincerity continually emerging amidst resistance to deviant thoughts. In summary, the internal resonance theories proposed by Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi respectively feature the “motion within stillness” of the great void and the “constant motion” of the Heavenly Principle, representing two distinct patterns of inductive dynamics and avenues for self-cultivation. The two Confucian scholars expounded the potentiality of internal resonance from their respective unique perspectives, thereby infusing novel theoretical implications into traditional theories of resonance. Key Terms: Internal Resonance, Non-external Movement, Non-external Inductance, Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi. (shrink)

Summing up, we note that the business environment has high dynamism, information uncertainty and unpredictability of events and results of their activities, which requires a revision of traditional approaches to the formation of competitive strategies and management in the global economic space.

The dominant approach to the study of dynamic preference is to generate preference change by manipulating aspects of decision-problem presentation (problem description, task procedure, contextual options). The predisposing approach instead manipulates the decision maker’s mental state while holding problem presentation constant. Three illustrative studies are outlined here. The first modified preferences for ambitious consumption by manipulating subjects’ consumption energy. The second modified preferences for immediate consumption by manipulating subjects’ hedonic resources. The third modified preferences for consumption itself by manipulating subjects’ (...) desire proneness. Whereas framing is thought to affect perception, predisposing apparently can affect tastes and so involves a special kind of preference dynamism. (shrink)

As far as our experience goes, we live in a dynamic present. Those two phenomenal features of experience—presentness and dynamism—are obviously connected. However, how they are connected is not obvious at all. In this paper, I criticise the view according to which the former can explain the latter, which I call sophisticated representationalism. My criticism will be based on an ambiguity in the notion of tense found in the philosophical literature, that between the perspectival understanding and the dynamic understanding (...) of tenses. The distinction is not just of independent interest, but it has a role in providing indirect evidence for the claim that the feeling of passage of time should be understood in non-representationalist terms. (shrink)

This paper aims to determine whether we can locate temporal passage in a non-dynamical (block universe) world. In particular, we seek to determine both whether temporal passage can be located somewhere in our world if it is non-dynamical, and also to home in on where in such a world temporal passage can be located, if it can be located anywhere. We investigate this question by seeking to determine, across three experiments, whether the folk concept of temporal passage can be satisfied (...) in our world if it is non-dynamical, and, if it can, what sort of thing in our world satisfies that concept. In particular, we focus on the question of whether that concept (if satisfied) is satisfied by something mind-dependent or something mind-independent. In other words, we ask, is temporal passage something that is at least partially in the mind, or is it entirely external to the mind? We find, contrary to what is often assumed by dynamists and non-dynamists alike, that the folk concept of temporal passage is satisfied in our world conditional on it being non-dynamical, and that the concept is satisfied by something mind-independent. This provides further ammunition for recent deflationary accounts of temporal passage that attempt to locate passage somewhere in our non-dynamical world. (shrink)

How, if at all, consciousness can be part of the physical universe remains a baffling problem. This article outlines a new, developing philosophical theory of how it could do so, and offers a preliminary mathematical formulation of a physical grounding for key aspects of the theory. Because the philosophical side has radical elements, so does the physical-theory side. The philosophical side is radical, first, in proposing that the productivity or dynamism in the universe that many believe to be responsible (...) for its systematic regularities is actually itself a physical constituent of the universe, along with more familiar entities. Indeed, it proposes that instances of dynamism can themselves take part in physical interactions with other entities, this interaction then being “meta-dynamism” (a type of meta-causation). Secondly, the theory is radical, and unique, in arguing that consciousness is necessarily partly constituted of meta-dynamic auto-sensitivity, in other words it must react via meta-dynamism to its own dynamism, and also in conjecturing that some specific form of this sensitivity is sufficient for and indeed constitutive of consciousness. The article proposes a way for physical laws to be modified to accommodate meta-dynamism, via the radical step of including elements that explicitly refer to dynamism itself. Additionally, laws become, explicitly, temporally non-local in referring directly to quantity values holding at times prior to a given instant of application of the law. The approach therefore implicitly brings in considerations about what information determines states. Because of the temporal non-locality, and also because of the deep connections between dynamism and time-flow, the approach also implicitly connects to the topic of entropy insofar as this is related to time. (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

Abstract: Female at the top of managerial hierarchy is less as compared to male throughout the world. in the same manner Balochistan cannot be ignored. Balochistan is severely dominated by male chauvinism and is a patriarchal society with that women face restrictions or hurdles while heading to top managerial positions or career. In addition, literacy is showing positive indicators, effective efforts from incumbent government, awareness, social media; main-media women at work places and top positions are being accepted. There is much (...) activism and dynamism throughout the country. The sole aim of the study to discern women practices, experiences, obstacles, and relevant challenges. This study is qualitative in nature. With that, it is based on phenomenology approach. The sample for the paper collected from field of education, literate women and working women in different organizations. The paper finds out that recognition of women at the managerial level is recognized. For the study three main themes emerged from the study, first, obstacle confronted by working females of Balochistan, second, with that their experiences at work places and third, what role played by the government and how the existing issues or conundrum can be resolved with the help of the government of Pakistan and the society at large. (shrink)

Several prominent contemporary philosophers, including Jürgen Habermas, John Caputo, and Robert Bernasconi, have at times painted a somewhat negative picture of Gadamer as not only an uncritical traditionalist, but also as one whose philosophical project fails to appreciate difference. Against such claims, I argue that Gadamer’s reflections on art exhibit a genuine appreciation for alterity not unrelated to his hermeneutical approach to the other. Thus, by bringing Gadamer’s reflections on our experience of art into conversation with key aspects of his (...) philosophical hermeneutics, we are able to better assess the viability of Gadamer’s contributions to contemporary discussions of difference and alterity. -/- Sections two through six focus on key concepts in Gadamer’s account of art’s dynamic ontology and our experience of art. Such concepts include the play structure of art, hermeneutic identity, tarrying with a work, and contemporaneity. The opening sections provide not only a discussion of these central themes, but they also (1) draw attention to the various ways in which difference and otherness are integral to Gadamer’s account, and (2) utilize relevant musical examples that prepare the reader for a more focused discussion of a Gadamerian approach to free jazz in section seven. By highlighting how Gadamer’s understanding of art possesses a dialogical play structure, is characterized by identity and difference, requires actively engaged spectators and auditors, and is amenable to what many criticize as an unintelligible musical expression, viz. free jazz, Gadamer’s project is shown as other-affirming and open to ambiguity and dynamism. That is, the essential structures and concepts characterizing Gadamer’s reflections on art are likewise central to his overall hermeneutical project, and hence are not rightly described as un-attuned to difference or other-negating. Rather, Gadamer’s philosophical project upholds difference, since it requires a dialogical interplay between self and other that creates the possibility for a transformative experience. (shrink)

Recent events have revived questions about the circumstances that ought to trigger therapists' duty to warn or protect. There is extensive interstate variation in duty to warn or protect statutes enacted and rulings made in the wake of the California Tarasoff ruling. These duties may be codified in legislative statutes, established in common law through court rulings, or remain unspecified. Furthermore, the duty to warn or protect is not only variable between states but also has been dynamic across time. In (...) this article, we review the implications of this variability and dynamism, focusing on three sets of questions: first, what legal and ethics-related challenges do therapists in each of the three broad categories of states (states that mandate therapists to warn or protect, states that permit therapists to breach confidentiality for warnings but have no mandate, and states that give no guidance) face in handling threats of violence? Second, what training do therapists and other professionals involved in handling violent threats receive, and is this training adequate for the task that these professionals are charged with? Third, how have recent court cases changed the scope of the duty? We conclude by pointing to gaps in the empirical and conceptual scholarship surrounding the duty to warn or protect. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: Dengsø and Kirchhoff offer a revised dynamic conception of the individual in place of the bounded cognitive agent of classical cognitive science. However, this may not be sufficiently robust to ground the enquiries into individual and cultural differences that remain vital in the proposed “deterritorialized cognitive science.” It also needs to make contact with rich traditions of 4E (...) research on socially distributed cognition, which are neglected in Dengsø and Kirchhoff’s critique. It is just because individualization is a fragile process, and because boundaries are hard-won achievements, that anti-individualists who highlight the multiplicity, heterogeneity, and dynamism of cognitive ecologies must reconfigure rather than eliminate or efface the individual. (shrink)

Preface/Introduction: The question under discussion is metaphysical and truly elemental. It emerges in two aspects — how did we come to be conscious of our own existence, and, as a deeper corollary, do existence and awareness necessitate each other? I am bold enough to explore these questions and I invite you to come along; I make no claim to have discovered absolute answers. However, I do believe I have created here a compelling interpretation. You’ll have to judge for yourself. -/- (...) What follows is the presentation of three essays I have worked on over the past several years seeing publication for the first time. “Hollows of Experience” was written first as an invited chapter for a collection on the ontology of consciousness. However, when cuts became necessary, my chapter got the knife. Its length has prohibited it from publication in any print journal. “Myth and Mind” was written next as a journal article, but as my involvement with it grew so did its length, so it has also idled on my websty awaiting its call. “From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience” was written most recently, but it is the only one to have been available to the public elsewhere than my own website. Under the name, “The Continuum of Experience”, it was Target Article #95 on the recently closed Karl Jaspers Forum (for discussion purposes only). -/- I have put them in a different sequence here, for reasons of logical sense. Up first, “Panexperientialism” deals with an idea difficult for many to accept, namely that conscious experience is a particular mode of symbolically reflected experience that is largely unique to our species. However, I aver that experienced sensation in itself (as found, for example, in autonomic sensory response systems) goes “all the way down” into nature, and thus the title, panexperientialism. -/- Understanding this idea is helpful to dealing with the focus on language in Part I of “Hollows”, next, since here speech and general symbolic interaction in general are found to be the catalysts for the creation of our consciously experienced world (our “lived reality”). In Part II, however, I explore how experienced sensations must be coeval with existence, and, with even greater temerity, how all this sensational existence might have arisen within some literally inconceivable background of awareness-in-itself that yet has a dynamism that occasionally breaks into existence as experiential events and entities. (The latter may sound wacky, but physicists and cosmologists are themselves attempting to come to terms with that which seethes with vast potential energy in what they refer to as the quantum vacuum.) -/- “Myth and Mind” was put third since it deals with a major lacuna in “Hollows” — that presumed prehistoric period when members of our species made the painful crossing of the symbolic threshold into the beginnings of cultural consciousness. Speech plays a central role here, too, but I look more at narrative structures from the dawn of self-awareness when ritual and myth became vital to human survival. Why would fantastic stories and bizarre rituals be necessary? I speculate that growing foresight led to the unavoidable realization of certain mortality, from which, in turn, emerged the secondary realization that we were now alive. In contrast to our yet-to-come death, we have life here and now, and by ritually identifying with a symbolically expanded mythic, i.e., sacred, reality, we may continue to live on after bodily death, just as our ancestors and loved ones must also do. Language and mythmaking are necessary to avoid mortal despair and they remain at the core of human consciousness. -/- As Ernst Cassirer (1944) has noted, language and myth are “twin creatures”, both metaphoric webs over a reality we can never wholly comprehend. We live in the symbolic and construct our works of imagination and wars of conquest to make life meaningful, to feel immortal, and to sense that we ourselves participate in a reality greater than ourselves. No doubt we do, but this does not mean our culturally constructed self-identities survive the death of our bodies, and it does not imply that our symbolic concepts can ever indicate the ultimate truth. We simply must symbolize an extended reality that was sacred to our ancestors: “Is it not our way, as illusory as it may be, to force continuance on our world and our life in the face of their inevitable ending? Are we not compelled to extend those imaginary horizons as far as we can despite the terror and the sometime joy their extension incites? Is their closure not a form of death?” (Crapanzano, p. 210) -/- Of course, this leaves me in the uncomfortable position of being forced to admit that this venture of mine must inevitably be another attempt at meaningful mythmaking. But what else could it be? This is certainly not a scientific proof though it is indeed an academically rigorous exploration. (Just try to count the citations!) I hope the reader will judge my thesis on the basis of its coherence, the sense of meaning it evokes, my intellectual responsibility, and, finally, the engagement it inspires. If you have read my expositions and found yourself immersed in the timeless questions I here call forth, I would call these writings successful (even if you violently disagree with my answers). -/- I am very grateful to Huping Hu for granting me this special issue of JCER in which to present my ideas in some detail. He has patiently dealt with my exuberant approach and allowed the many changes I kept coming up with right until the final publication date. I also wish to thank the many potential commentators who politely replied to my invitation, and, even more, I thank those who made time to write actual commentaries. -/- References -/- Cassirer, E. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven/London: Yale UP. -/- Crapanzano, V. (2004). Imaginative Horizons: An Essay in Literary-Philosophical Anthropology. Chicago: U of Chicago Press. -/- Gregory M. Nixon University of Northern British Columbia Prince George, British Columbia, Canada Email: [email protected] Websty: http://members.shaw.ca/doknyx. (shrink)

This paper is a critical review of the most relevant studies about the Levinasian concept of passivity. The purpose is to follow the way in which Levinas’s scholars have dealt with the following aspects: the relation between ethical passivity and the possibility of effective ethical agency, the origin of passivity, and the validity of ethical passivity in the public sphere. As a starting point for future research, I finally argue that the best way to read Levinas’s passive ethics is through (...) the dynamism between maximums and minimums present within it. This means that without sacrificing the omni comprehensive view of divine revelation and Jewish tradition, Levinas presents ethics as rationally understandable by everyone and philosophically defensible. Despite being biblically based, Levinas does not appeal to authority in supporting his view, he is confident in arguing rationally. This account could place Levinas in the way of public ethics, which consists in an ethos shared by all members of democratic societies. These minimums of justice could be the way to universalize Levinas’s ethics. (shrink)

John Locke’s theory of classification is a subject that has long received scholarly attention. Little notice has been taken, however, of the problems that were posed for taxonomy by its inability to account for organic processes. Classification, designed originally as an exercise in logic, becomes complicated once it turns to organic life and the aims of taxonomy become entangled with processes of generation, variation, and inheritance. Locke’s experience with organisms—experience garnered through his work in botany and medicine—suggested to him both (...) the dynamism of nature and the artificiality of any a priori system of classification. This reinforced Locke’s critique of classification in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and by tracing its influence it is possible to approach Locke’s nominalism from a fresh perspective. (shrink)

For Whitehead and Nishitani, a rethinking of religion necessitates a rethinking of the metaphysics that underlie one’s concept of religion. The dynamism of religion is unveiled only within the metaphysical grounding of an ontology that accommodates the philosophical preference of “becoming” as an ultimate category of reality. The novelty of Whitehead’s theory of religion lies in the process metaphysics that it presupposes. For him, religion, like the whole of reality, is inherently developing and evolving. What Nishitani offers is a (...) rethinking of Western understanding of religion by way of an Asian speculative approach grounded in Zen Buddhism. He argues that Western religion, particularly Christianity and Judaism, has succumbed to the modern predicament of nihilism, or relative nothingness. He radicalizes this same nihility towards absolute nothingness (śūnyatā). For both Whitehead and Nishitani, despite the distortion of religion by religious fundamentalists, genuine religion consolidates and points a society towards its real destiny. However, the realization of religion’s role necessitates reflexivity on its own inherent dynamism. (shrink)

The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology (...) of time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time; that is, a “specious present.” I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally. (shrink)

This book aims to examine the contributions that beauty (pulchrum in Latin) can offer to the educational activity, focusing on the subject from the point of view of Thomistic Psychology. For this, comes to answering some previous criterial and methodological objections to recall thereafter the main points of that psychological conception. The book presents what this conception understands as human powers, their interaction and dynamism, the role of emotions in the latter, and the processes arising from such interaction. In (...) succession, it analyzes the interaction of these powers amongst themselves and with the transcendentals of being, as well as the catalytic role that the pulchrum can have on those processes, placing them in synergy, particularly for the formation of personality and character. The book examines, then, the relations of this synergy with the essence of learning, the contributions that this later can receive from the Thomistic conception of person and their relationship with the proper use of pulchrum in education. And concludes with the didactic efficacy that results from the confluence of all these factors, its positive consequences for the various forms of educational activities and for life in society, as well as opening an invitation to the development of research in this area. (shrink)

Domestic courts have attained prominent status in the international human rights system. While adjudicating individual claims and interpreting legal provisions, domestic courts have conveyed meanings that are integral to the working of the international human rights system. The dynamism of domestic courts is an undeniable quality, through which they incorporate diverse perspectives based on principles linked to individual sovereignty, justice, peace, etc. In this paper, the role of the Indian Supreme Court has been discussed in light of three landmark (...) decisions where the court applies international and domestic human rights standards to substantiate its interpretations. In light of the cases of Navtej Singh v. Union of India, Joseph Shine v. Union of India, and KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the paper examines the approach of the court under five broad headings: (a) the domestic context, (b) autonomy and determination, (c) constitutional parameters and validity of laws (d) vulnerability, and (e) other courts and other contexts. On the role of domestic courts in general, the paper outlines a list of the contributions that domestic courts are making in the field of human rights.]. (shrink)

In this chapter it is pointed out that leaders who make decisions normally rely on both their intuition and their analytical thinking. Modern research shows that intuitive thinking has the potential to support the analytical, if used properly. Leaders must therefore be aware of the possibilities and limitations of intuition. Fresh thinking and innovation are key elements in leadership analysis, thus creative problem-solving is an important complement to traditional leadership thinking. Creative leaders work extensively with both intuition and logic. They (...) also often work with metaphors, analogies, images and imagination to create dynamism in the analysis of a problem. Many leaders come in daily contact with problems that are not necessarily self-generated. It is therefore important that they have the opportunity to take an outside perspective on the situation. They must be able to define the problems which are of strategic importance for the activity. Leaders should not allow themselves to be stressed too much by various everyday problems, but be aware that they usually cannot just ignore them. After delineating a problem a leader should think through what trials ought to be conducted to test a given hypothesis about reality. This can be done by showing how different problems are related to each other. When analyzing various problems it is useful to clarify what kinds of decisions theyrelate to. Some decisions must be made directly, while others canbe postponed. Some decisions are reversible in nature while others are irrevocable -/- . (shrink)

Do minds and ideas connect, interact, or even depend on each other, and if so, how exactly do they connect and interact? How should we conceive of the mode and process of minds and ideas being in a network and connected in some way, that is, being intersubjective or social? Martin Lenz's study Socializing Minds convincingly shows that, contrary to widespread opinion in philosophy of mind, at least some early modern philosophers, here Spinoza, Locke, and Hume, actually give a positive (...) answer to the first question and present models that respond to the second question, thus addressing what Lenz proposes calling 'the contact problem' and repudiating the idea that mentalism is necessarily bound to individualism. In this comment, I focus on a detail in Lenz's reconstruction of Spinoza's 'metaphysical model' of the intersubjectivity of minds, namely the Aristotelian physical dynamism that would underlie Spinoza's idea of the interaction of minds. While I agree that Spinoza's model of interaction of minds refers to the Aristotelian conception of motion, I argue that the guiding principle in natural motion is best understood not only in terms of contrariety but also in terms of complementarity. Admittedly, my proposal goes beyond Spinoza's model of ideas in contact, and probably beyond Lenz's interpretation of that model, but it might enrich the imagination of the socialising of minds and ideas from a kinetic point of view, which, at least as I understand it, is precisely what Spinoza and Lenz thrive on. (shrink)

What is the research for in the society? We may imagine the professionals engaged in these activities, shall we say, university professors, researchers in the public and private institutions, and even the lay inventors at home or in the neighborhood. The research is related with some of knowledge or ideas, which, however, should be creative and original. It is the main function of those professionals, and can develop in dissemination of the findings produced by research. It frontiers the knowledge of (...) humans which enables a better view of world and generates the public welfare. The scholars are often those professionals who are required or in some cases, squeezed to produce an original contribution to the specific field of academy. As the society develops, we now require a scientific knowledge beyond the plain understanding of the nature and society. The scientific knowledge is qualified of some elements, i.e., evidence-based, universal frame to be applied, sense of understanding, pragmatic in comprehension or application, more persuasion on theory, paradigm, typologies, intersubjectivity, empirical relevance and so. It informs a philosophy of humans, makes them conscientious and knowledgeable, as well as enhances a professional performance for not only their field but also other disciplines. For example, the criminal justice system borrows the idea or information confirmed by other disciplines, psychology and sociology notably. What is the Durham rule in the excuse of culpability? The scope of rule could not enjoy a persuasion if not to be supported by the works of psychologists. The scientific knowledge perhaps could recourse its most salient dynamism in coupling with an economic exploitation. A cultivation of knowledge to serve the economic use and its industrialization reveals it’s competitive edge in the society. The kind of concepts, information age, e-technology, and intellectual property rights are leading the present time of narrative as we see routinely. Many new laws, and new concept of e-education or e-government, GMO products as well as the travel of universe in the near future also follow that the updated profile of scientific knowledge on the engineering and natural science contributed to expand our horizon of subsistence. With this crucial importance, the author attempts to file some thoughts on the research and society. (shrink)

This book is a collection of papers presented at conferences by the author on topics related to Thomistic Psychology. Although not being a systematic exposition of it, its reading provides a comprehensive view of the psychological approach derived from the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, complemented by the specific developments of each subject treated. Topics such as the process of human knowledge, emotions, the formation of opinions, certainties and decisions, the constitution of ethos and its plasticity, its relations with the (...) instinct of sociability, the repercussions of this dynamism on personality and behavior, as well as the contributions that Thomistic Psychology offers to mental health diagnosis and therapy are addressed. The teachings of St. Thomas elucidate these and several other questions of daily life that are not always answered by contemporary psychological currents. To facilitate comprehension, the necessary assumptions are presented in accessible language, with examples and applications to daily life, correlating them, when appropriate, with contemporary themes such as computer science, neuroscience and Cognitive-Behavioral Psychology. The common reader thus acquires a better knowledge of his own mind, that of others and of the psychological interaction in life in society. And to the specialized reader, the invitation is opened for new and thought-provoking studies on questions of surprising actuality. -/- . (shrink)

Plato’s theory of virtue in the Laws could be striking for someone who is more familiar with Aristotle’s ethics for conceptual complementarity between the two positions (contrary emotions, the ordering element of reason, virtue as a mean which lies between two forms of vice, typically linked to excessive actions, etc.). Plato’s theory, however, still differs from that of Aristotle in two crutial points. First, the source of emotional dynamism is, according to Plato, supraindividual as far as the psyche is (...) a cosmological principle. Only if it comes to be formed and ordered, it separates from the universal cosmic context and make up the emotional nature of an individual soul. But the soul is not, and this is the second point of difference, ordered by some external element (training or education, organized by a rational agent). Plato counts on a pre-arranged order of emotions at a particular ontological topos of the individual soul into which reason eventually descends. Emotions, on their part, seem to include a nexus between formable and forming that is chronologically and methodocally prior to that between the biological substratum and its rational organization, as assumed by Aristotle. (shrink)

Conscious or Unconscious, we survive under the age of strategy or strategic planning. It is one of essential process for the public organization, and the kind of central reference for the leadership. For the followers, it is the kind of standard of conduct for reward and discipline, probably a soft norm from the hard nature of laws. It is a province for development and sustainability, as distinct from the latter, often a province of inertia for law- abiding and some career (...) pursuing modern personality. For the general public, the strategic planning or its crystallization into the mission statement or vision plan allow to understand the public organization, and hence the kind of thread for public relations or general awareness of complex mosaic of world dynamism. In this context, the paper deals with the primary feature of strategic planning and its evolution with the intense speed of globalization. For the stimulation, the author begins with the part of communication exchanged with the peer scholars. Next the author proceeds with the nature of strategic planning, its benefits, limitations, and pitfalls. The author delivers a final message, which highlights a new fashion of strategic planning in response with the global environment. Keywords: strategic planning; globalization; 3 Cs; entrepreneurship; public organization; leadership; efficiency. (shrink)

Among the main components of a smart city, the modern public space plays a vital and core role in the transition towards a friendly lifestyle. However, urban planning and design guidelines in many countries’ practices have radically transformed without cultural preservation purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to design public space with local cultural wisdom demonstrated as renewable criteria considered a sustainable public space solution for smart cities. This may improve places, increasing prosperity and extending expectations of modernization in many cities. (...) This article contributes to cultural preservation dynamism in public spaces. It explores how modernist approaches to planning and design along with cultural features shaped the quality of urban space. This study uses the Banjar culture in Banjarbaru City, Indonesia as a replanned city in a rapidly developing economy, but one where largely unusable public spaces have failed to meet people’s everyday needs and aspirations. The study was performed based on extensive literature reviews, documentary analyses, morphological surveys, photographic and qualitative surveys. In general, the integration of Banjar culture into modern public space provides a better promotion understanding of identity and friendly environmental quality. (shrink)

Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth Sikh Guru, was a divine preceptor and crusader for noble cause of human welfare. He was a great religious leader, a poet and a mystic, a true scholar and philosopher. He was also a fearless warrior and a military commander, who always fought against tyranny and oppression, to establish a just and benign state. In his hymns of 'Bachitar Natak', he proclaimed his mission as 'to protect the righteous, oppressed and downtrodden people and to destroy (...) the evil-doers'. He stressed on the unity between humans, rejected all sorts of discriminations and preached equality and goodwill. Being a prolific writer and a poet of rare sensibility, Guru Gobind Singh greatly enriched the literary heritage of India. His poetic vision depicts the glorious epitome of medieval Indian literary traditions. Through his compositions, he enunciated a doctrine of armed struggle for the protection of truth and justice. The fusion of the devotional and martial, of the spiritual and the heroic ethos is the most important feature of his literary work and his charismatic leadership. With his spiritual dynamism, he attempted to reconcile the transcendent with the immanent through his creation of the Khalsa. The commonwealth of the Khalsa was founded based on all round equality and total dedication to one Supreme Reality. Guru Gobind Singh was a pioneer Indian leader to introduce republican set up and democratic institutions. His teachings have great relevance for the modern man to build a global society with a commitment to peace and goodwill across all sorts of constraints and geographical boundaries. (shrink)

In this article, Zubiri’s concept of history is expounded. We may view this concept, along with the rest of his philosophy, from a naturalistic perspective which contemplates history as a social dynamism grounded in nature, and not as an essentially spiritual phenomenon or a rational one endowed with teleological progress separate from nature. By means of fundamental concepts in Zubirian philosophy, such as “possibility”, “tradition”, “reality in a condition”, “capacitation”, and others, our philosopher distinguishes himselffrom other idealistic visions which (...) analyze history in virtue of a teleological ideal external to the dynamism proper to the real. This is the case with Kant, who structures history starting from an ideal of ethical-political progress, which is for him already inscribed within human nature. And it is also the case with Hegel, for whom history is a rational process, which is supposed to reach the Absolute Spirit by means of the prominence of the State as the locus of Reason’s revelation. -/- En este artículo se expone la concepción de la historia de Xavier Zubiri. Tal concepción la podemos situar, al igual que el resto de su filosofía, en el marco de una perspectiva naturalista que contempla la historia como un dinamismo social fundamentado en la naturaleza, y no como un fenómeno esencialmente espiritual o racional de progreso teleológico ajeno a lo natural. Mediante conceptos fundamentales en la filosofía zubiriana como sonlos de “posibilidad”, “tradición”, “realidad en condición”, “capacitación”, ..., nuestro filósofo se desmarca de otras visiones idealistas que analizan la historia en virtud de un ideal teleológico externo al propio dinamismo de lo real. Es este el caso de Kant, el cual vertebra la historia a partir de un ideal de progreso ético-político que estaba inscrito ya en la misma naturaleza humana. O es también el caso de Hegel, para quien la historia es un proceso racional que ha de alcanzar el Espíritu Absoluto a través del protagonismo del Estado como lugar de desvelación de la Razón. (shrink)