In a recent paper in 'Social Epistemology' Dimitri Ginev aims to show that Ludwik Fleck uses transcendental arguments in two contexts in his work that are closely intertwined: the context of comparative cognitive sociology and the context of socio-historical epistemology. I am skeptical about Ginev’s interpretation and my aim is to show that at least the part of Ginev’s argument in which he aims to show Fleck’s use of transcendental arguments in the context of socio-historical epistemology is not convincing. To (...) my mind, a much better interpretation of Fleck’s argument in this context is to see Fleck as using scientisticinstead of transcendental arguments. (shrink)

Here, I lay the foundations of a high-level ontology of particulars whose structuring principles differ radically from the 'continuant' vs. 'occurrent' distinction traditionally adopted in applied ontology. These principles are derived from a new analysis of the ontology of “occurring” or “happening” entities. Firstly, my analysis integrates recent work on the ontology of processes, which brings them closer to objects in their mode of existence and persistence by assimilating them to continuant particulars. Secondly, my analysis distinguishes clearly between processes and (...) events, in order to make the latter abstract objects of thought (alongside propositions). Lastly, I open my ontological inventory to properties and facts, the existence of which is commonly admitted. By giving specific roles to these primitives, the framework allows one to account for static and dynamic aspects of the physical world and for the way that subjects conceive its history: facts account for the life of substances (physical objects and processes), whereas events enable cognitive subjects to account for the life story of substances. (shrink)

In this essay, we aim to help clarify the nature of so-called 'occurrences' by attributing distinct modes of existence and persistence to processes and events. In doing so, we break with the perdurantism claimed by DOLCE’s authors and we distance ourselves from mereological analyzes like those recently conducted by Guarino to distinguish between 'processes' and 'episodes'. In line with the works of Stout and Galton, we first bring closer (physical) processes and objects in their way of enduring by proposing for (...) processes a notion of dynamic presence (contrasting with a static presence for objects). Then, on the events side, we attribute to them the status of abstract entities by identifying them with objects of thought (by individual and collective subjects), and this allows us to distinguish for themselves between existence and occurrence. We therefore identify them with psychological (or even social) endurants, which may contingently occur. (shrink)

Perhaps the question “What is philosophy?” can only be posed late in life, when old age has come, and with it the time to speak in concrete terms. It is a question one poses when one no longer has anything to ask for, but its consequences can be considerable. One was asking the question before, one never ceased asking it, but it was too artificial, too abstract; one expounded and dominated the question, more than being grabbed by it. There are (...) cases in which old age bestows not an eternal youth, but on the contrary a sovereign freedom, a pure necessity where one enjoys a moment of grace between life and death, and where all the parts of the machine combine to dispatch into the future a trait that traverses the ages: Turner, Monet, Matisse. The elderly Turner acquired or conquered the right to lead painting down a deserted path from which there was no return, and that was no longer distinguishable from a final question. In the same way, in philosophy, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is a work of old age, a wild work from which descendants will never cease to flow.We cannot lay claim to such a status. The time has simply come for us to ask what philosophy is. And we have never ceased to do this in the past, and we already had the response, which has not varied: philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts. But it was not only necessary for the response to take note of the question; it also had to determine a time, an occasion, the circumstances, the landscapes and personae, the conditions and unknowns of the question. One had to be able to pose the question “between friends” as a confidence or a trust, or else, faced with an enemy, as a challenge, and at the same time one had to reach that moment, between dog and wolf, when one mistrusts even the friend. Gilles Deleuze was professor of philosophy at the University of Paris VIII, Vincennes-St.-Denis, until his retirement in 1987. Among his books translated into English are the two-volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia , the two-volume Cinema , The Logic of Sense , and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza . Daniel W. Smith is a doctoral candidate in philosophy at the University of Chicago. He is at work on a study of the philosophy of Deleuze, and is translating Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. Arnold I. Davidson, executive editor of Critical Inquiry, teaches philosophy at the University of Chicago and is currently Marta Sutton Weeks Fellow at the Stanford Humanities Center. (shrink)

This article presents a formal ontology which accounts for the general nature of artefacts. The objective is to help structure application ontologies in areas where specific artefacts are present - in other words, virtually any area of activity. The conceptualization relies on recent philosophical and psychological research on artefacts, having resulted in a largely consensual theoretical basis. Furthermore, this ontology of artefacts extends the foundational DOLCE ontology and supplements its axiomatization. The conceptual primitives are as follows: artificial entity, intentional production (...) of entities, (state of) capacity, capacity to play a role in actions of a given type, function and functional object. These primitives enable artefacts in general to be characterized as intentionally and successfully produced entities, and isolate an important subclass of “technical” artefacts to which a function is ascribed. Lastly, we emphasize the novelty of this ontology by comparing it with other works with similar objectives. (shrink)

Existing research has shown that norm violations influence causal judgments, and a number of different models have been developed to explain these effects. One such model, the necessity/sufficiency model, predicts an interac- tion pattern in people’s judgments. Specifically, it predicts that when people are judging the degree to which a particular factor is a cause, there should be an interaction between (a) the degree to which that factor violates a norm and (b) the degree to which another factor in the (...) situation violates norms. A study of moral norms (N = 1000) and norms of proper functioning (N = 3000) revealed robust evidence for the predicted interaction effect. The implications of these patterns for existing theories of causal judgments is discussed. (shrink)

This volume comprises original articles by leading authors – from philosophy as well as sociology – in the debate around relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Its aim has been to bring together several threads from the relevant disciplines and to cover the discussion from historical and systematic points of view. Among the contributors are Maria Baghramian, Barry Barnes, Martin Endreß, Hubert Knoblauch, Richard Schantz and Harvey Siegel.

Aristotle's conception of being is dynamic. He believes that a thing is most itself when engaged in its proper activities, governed by its nature. This paper explores this idea by focusing on Metaphysics , a text that continues the investigation of substantial being initiated inMetaphysics Z. Q.1 claims that there are two potentiality-actuality distinctions, one concerned with potentiality in the strict sense, which is involved in change, the other concerned with potentiality in another sense, which he says is more useful (...) for the present project. His present project is the investigation of substantial being, and the relevant potentiality is the potentiality for activity, the full manifestation of what a thing is. I explore Aristotle's two potentiality-actuality distinctions AND argue that the second distinction is modeled on the first, with one crucial modification. Whereas a change is brought about by something other than the object or by the object itself considered as other (as when a doctor cures himself), an activity is brought about byte object itself considered as itself. This single modification yields an important difference: whereas a change leads to a state other than the one an object was previously in, an activity maintains or develops what an object already is. (shrink)

In this article, we advocate the use of “epistemic” ontologies, i.e., systems of categories representing our knowledge of the world, rather than the world directly. We first expose a metaphysical framework based on a dual mental and physical realism, which underpins the development of these epistemic ontologies. To this end, we refer to the theories of intentionality and representation established within the school of Franz Brentano at the turn of the 20th century and choose to rehabilitate the notion of a (...) ‘representation object’, as theorized by Kasimir Twardowski. We therefore propose that the categories of epistemic ontologies correspond to ‘general representation objects’. Secondly, we apply these proposals to the treatment of technical artefacts, material qualities of objects and events (notably as a continuation of our previous work on events). This leads us to sketch out a foundational epistemic ontology. (shrink)

If the allusive stratagems can claim to define a new type of systematicity, it is because they give access to a space where the singularity, the diagram and the metaphor may interlace, to penetrate further into the physico-mathematic intuition and the discipline of the gestures which precede and accompany ‘formalisation’. This interlacing is an operation where each component backs up the others: without the diagram, the metaphor would only be a short-lived fulguration because it would be unable to operate: without (...) the metaphor, the diagram would only be a frozen icon, unable to jump over its bold features which represent the images of an already acquired knowledge; without the subversion of the functional by the singular, nothing would come to oppose the force of habit. (shrink)

The recently much discussed phenomenon of testimony as a social source of knowledge plays a crucial justificatory role in Richard Swinburne's philosophy of religion. Although Swinburne officially reduces his principle of testimony to the criterion of simplicity and, therefore, to a derivative epistemic source, we will show that simplicity does not play the crucial role in this epistemological context. We will argue that both Swinburne's philosophical ideas and his formulations allow for a fundamental epistemic principle of testimony, by showing that (...) Swinburne has already implicitly justified the use of testimony as an epistemic source via his fundamental a priori principle of credulity. (shrink)

This book is about trying to comprehend the mind from both scientific and philosophical standpoints. In recent years interest has revived in the difficult problem of consciousness. The many difficulties of understanding our minds have been considered in the past, mainly from philosophical or religious viewpoints, but only more recently from scientific perspectives. The book charts the landscape and proposes that the fundamental thing in the world is an arrangement, and this concept can encompass both material objects and things of (...) the mind. This eliminates the old contrast between mind and matter as both should be properly considered as arrangements, producing a philosophical monism that is consistent with modern science. The idea that all mental activity should be viewed as essentially physical is considered not wrong but misconceived and irrelevant, as it is far from the most parsimonious explanation of many mental events. A viewpoint is developed that is sufficiently wide to encompass most human activities but narrowed to exclude certain philosophical puzzles. Suggestions are made about how some of the tough problems in the philosophy of mind, such as causality, intentionality, and the nature of qualia, can be resolved by considering the fundamental structures and limitations of thought, linguistic processes, and our position in the web of life and its evolution. The nature of acts of creation and their importance in the arts are considered, and suggestions are made about the place in our lives for spiritual beliefs. This book is different from others as it aims to provide a complete overview of the territory of the mind in a way that removes older philosophical dilemmas but is compatible with modern science. It offers a new perspective on the old difficulties of understanding the mind and presents new avenues of thought. (shrink)

Bayesian models of legal arguments generally aim to produce a single integrated model, combining each of the legal arguments under consideration. This combined approach implicitly assumes that variables and their relationships can be represented without any contradiction or misalignment, and in a way that makes sense with respect to the competing argument narratives. This paper describes a novel approach to compare and ‘average’ Bayesian models of legal arguments that have been built independently and with no attempt to make them consistent (...) in terms of variables, causal assumptions or parameterization. The approach involves assessing whether competing models of legal arguments are explained or predict facts uncovered before or during the trial process. Those models that are more heavily disconfirmed by the facts are given lower weight, as model plausibility measures, in the Bayesian model comparison and averaging framework adopted. In this way a plurality of arguments is allowed yet a single judgement based on all arguments is possible and rational. (shrink)

This paper adopts the philosophical approach of Stoicism as the basis for re-examining the cognitive and ethical relationship between Homo sapiens and Neanderthals. Stoicism sets out a clear criterion for the special moral status of human beings, namely rationality. We explore to what extent Neanderthals were sufficiently rational to be considered “human”. Recent findings in the fields of palaeoanthropology and palaeogenetics show that Neanderthals possessed high-level cognitive abilities and produced viable offspring with anatomically modern humans. Our discussion offers insights for (...) reflecting on the relationship between humans and other forms of natural life and any moral obligations that result. (shrink)

Staff reported paranormal experiences in connection with the outpatient Medical Assistance in Dying room at the hospital. This case study reports on staff experiences and illustrates how the Ethics team’s role expanded to deal with this novel situation by facilitating an interdisciplinary response.

Interpreting others' actions is essential for understanding the intentions and goals in social interactions. Activity in the motor cortex is evoked when we see another person performing actions, which can also be influenced by the intentions and context of the observed action. No study has directly explored the influence of reward and punishment on motor cortex activity when observing others' actions, which is likely to have substantial relevance in different social contexts. In this experiment, EEG was recorded while participants watched (...) movie clips of a person performing actions that led to a monetary reward, loss or no change for the observer. Using the EEG mu rhythm as an index of motor resonance, our results demonstrate that observation of rewarding actions produce significantly greater motor cortex activity than punishing or neutral actions, with punishing actions producing greater activity than neutral ones. In addition, the dynamic change in the mu rhythm over sensorimotor cortex is modulated by reward and punishment, with punishing actions producing a prolonged suppression. These findings demonstrate that the associated reward value of an observed action may be crucial in determining the strength of the representation of the action in the observer's brain. Consequently, reward and punishment is likely to drive observational learning through changes in the action observation network, and may also influence how we interpret, understand, engage in and empathize with others' actions in social interaction. (shrink)

Traditional epistemology is haunted by the spectre of scepticism. Yet the more pressing concern in the contemporary intellectual scene must surely be relativism rather than scepticism. This has been the case in the history and philosophy of science since the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, to say nothing of the emergence of the sociology of scientific knowledge. In Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Markus Seidel comes firmly to grips with this modern spectre. Though Seidel devotes attention (...) to other forms of relativism, the primary focus of the book is epistemic relativism, which he understands to be relativism about epistemic justification. Relativist or relativist-tending authors such as Kuhn, Nelson Goodman, Martin Kusch, Richard Rorty and Peter Winch receive some discussion . But Seidel takes as his main relativist target the work of the founding figures of the Edinburgh “strong programme”, Barry Barnes and David Bloor. While .. (shrink)

We present a module based criterion, i.e. a sufficient condition based on the absolute value of the matrix coefficients, for the convergence of Gauss–Seidel method (GSM) for a square system of linear algebraic equations, the Generalized Line Criterion (GLC). We prove GLC to be the “most general” module based criterion and derive, as GLC corollaries, some previously know and also some new criteria for GSM convergence. Although far more general than the previously known results, the proof of GLC is (...) simpler. The results used here are related to recent research in stability of dynamical systems and control of manufacturing systems. (shrink)

Difference and Repetition: Deleuze’s magnum opus, “Difference and Repetition” (1968), explores the interplay between difference and repetition. He argues that difference is fundamental to reality, and repetition is not mere duplication but a creative force. Deleuze challenges conventional notions of identity and sameness, emphasizing the productive potential of difference. Gilles Deleuze’s “Difference and Repetition” is a seminal work that challenges traditional Western metaphysics and offers a fresh perspective on concepts like identity, repetition, and creativity. Let’s explore some key ideas from (...) this remarkable book: Pure Difference: Deleuze argues that difference is fundamental to reality. Unlike classical philosophy that seeks universal truths, he emphasizes divergence and decentering. Each moment contains unique differences, and these differences shape our understanding of the world. Complex Repetition: Repetition, for Deleuze, isn’t mere duplication. Instead, it involves displacement and disguising. While repetition contributes to generality and thought, it’s the differences within each repetition that account for change and novelty. Concepts and things derive meaning from these differences. Shift Away from Hegel and Marx: “Difference and Repetition” played a crucial role in shifting French thought away from Hegel and Marx toward Nietzsche and Freud. Deleuze’s exploration of difference challenged established philosophical norms and paved the way for new perspectives. The Image of Thought: Deleuze critiques the traditional “image of thought,” which often relies on fixed identities and binary oppositions. Instead, he encourages us to embrace multiplicities, complexities, and the perpetual process of becoming. Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible: Deleuze introduces the concept of asymmetrical synthesis, emphasizing the interplay between perception and affect. Reality is a dynamic, ever-changing process, not a static being. Copies are never identical; they’re something new. “Difference and Repetition” invites us to rethink how we perceive reality, emphasizing creativity, multiplicity, and the constant flux of existence. Deleuze’s work continues to inspire thinkers across disciplines, bridging philosophy with art, literature, and mysticism. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to develop an account of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical project as a departure from ontology and ontological thinking. Ontology can be broadly understood as the study of being or the study of the meaning of being. Traditional ontology examines the nature of being while more contemporary philosophy often understands being itself as becoming or a process. In this respect, Deleuze has often been interpreted as a process or differential ontologist. This project departs from that interpretation (...) by arguing for a non-ontological Deleuze. The dissertation is broken into three papers where each presents a different account of what I call the non-ontological Deleuze through his work on the major pre-Kantian modern philosophers: David Hume, Benedict Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz. Each paper then uses the non-ontological Deleuze to engage with a related movement in post-Deleuzian Continental Philosophy. The first paper focuses on Deleuze’s early work on Hume to argue for a re-reading of the history of modern philosophy with a basis in transcendental empiricism rather than Kantian transcendental idealism. This paper uses Deleuze’s reading of Hume to respond to and critique the Speculative Realist movement’s charge that post-Kantian philosophy suffers from what they call correlationism. The second paper uses Deleuze’s work on Spinoza to argue for what the former calls ethology as a replacement for ontology. The claim here is that we should think of things in terms of what they do rather than what they are: in terms of their motion and affects rather than their being. There I contrast my reading of Deleuze’s Spinoza with those thinkers who have recently used that work to develop what is often referred to as New Materialism. The final paper argues that understanding things in terms of what they can do requires a nomadology, which is Deleuze’s play on Leibniz’s monadology. This paper uses Deleuze’s nomadology to create a dialogue with the emerging literature on Critical Posthumanism and subjectivity that has been influenced by Deleuze to suggest that posthumanist subjectivity should be understood in non-ontological terms. (shrink)

In this essay we will take the American experimental composer John Cage’s understanding of sound as the starting point for an evaluation of that term in the field of sound studies. Drawing together two of the most influential figures in the field, Cage’s thought and work will serve as a lens through which to engage with recent debate concerning the uptake in sound studies of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. In so doing we will attempt to develop a path between (...) conflicting sides of sound studies, putting forward an understanding of sound that presents it not as an uninterrogated ontological essence, nor as only a term in a discursive web, but as a problem which must be repeatedly posed anew. We will consider points where this may yet be pushed towards a reified, essentialized understanding of the nature of sound, but move to offset this by emphasizing the production of a practical process of learning and experimentation. (shrink)

El 4 de noviembre de 2015 se cumplieron veinte años de la muerte del filósofo Gilles Deleuze. Para conmemorar su presencia viva compilamos este volumen, compuesto como un encuentro entre amigos que celebra la potencia del pensamiento y ofrece la leve inquietud de la aventura que nos arrastra más allá de nuestra área de comprensión, hacia una tierra espiritual en la que la filosofía habla a nombre propio, produciendo efectos, actualizaciones, compilaciones de lo disperso. Por eso, con ocasión de esta (...) conmemoración, no vamos a su encuentro como quien pone una corona a los pies de un monumento, sino como quien lleva flores a su tumba. Hemos renunciado a la fidelidad del comentario erudito de su obra, pues aspiramos a la soberana libertad de usarla para nuevos propósitos en función de una vida más rica y potente, que se afirme como obra de arte en tanto sea la "vivida sugestividad del poeta". Las flores aquí ofrecidas escapan a las exigencias de una incierta fidelidad. Son más bien los testigos y testimonios fecundos de efectos que estos textos empiezan a explorar. Sentimos en ellos gracia y encanto, belleza y gusto creador, pero sobre todo fuerza: la fuerza de unos textos que aspiran a hacer respirar algunos de los conceptos deleuzianos, a vivirlos en su realización práctica; textos que ríen y confabulan en la estela de la vida, aún si esta se hace cada vez más irrespirable: sin aire, también se puede vivir, si se es capaz de cambiar de atmósfera. (shrink)

The dissertation presents a systematic analysis of the work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze , using two interrelated themes as its guiding threads. The first is the concept of "difference," which is normally conceived as an empirical relation between two terms each of which have a prior identity of their own . In Deleuze, this primacy is inverted: identity persists, but it is now a secondary principle produced by a prior relation between differential elements. Difference here becomes a transcendental (...) principle that constitutes the sufficient reason of empirical diversity as such. The second theme thus concerns Deleuze's relation to Kant. Deleuze's philosophy, I argue, can be read as both an inversion and a completion of Kant's philosophy--a "transcendental empiricism," as Deleuze puts it. It entails a resumption of the critical project on a new basis and with an entirely new set of non-categorical concepts. Each chapter of the dissertation considers a philosophical domain that roughly parallels those laid out in the architectonic of Kant's three Critiques in order to examine the implications of the positing of a principle of difference in each of them: Dialectics, or the theory of the Idea; Aesthetics, or the theory of Sensation; Analytics, or the theory of the concept; Ethics, or the theory of affectivity; and Politics, or social theory. Taken together, the five chapters attempt to present the broad outlines of Deleuze's philosophy of difference, and to indicate the nature of its demands in each of these domains. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to Seidel’s objections against my argument from expert performance to the effect that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. I clarify what Seidel takes to be unclear points in my argument and show that it withstands Seidel’s objections.

Resumen: Resulta incuestionable la importancia que el filósofo francés Gilles Deleuze otorga al cinematógrafo. Conforme a su teoría del conocimiento, si la filosofía "piensa" mediante conceptos, el cine "piensa" mediante imágenes: se trata de un medio de creación artística a la vez que de reflexión (distinta de otras formas de "escritura") acerca de los problemas de la condición humana. De hecho, afirmamos que el propio pensamiento de Deleuze guarda mucho en común con las técnicas cinematográficas, al igual que sucedería en (...) la literatura del siglo XX, por ejemplo en James Joyce (en lengua anglosajona) y Jorge Luis Borges (en lengua castellana). -/- Abstract: There is no doubt as to the importance that cinematography has for the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. According to Deleuze's theory of knowledge, just as philosophy "reasons" through concepts, cinema "reasons" by means of images. Cinema is a means of artistic creation and at the same time reflects in a way distinct from writing on the problems of the human conditions. In fact, this essay argues that Deleuze's own thought had much in common with cinematographic techniques, a relation which occurred in the twentieth century literature of James Joyce (in the English language) and Jorge Luis Borges (in the Spanish language). (shrink)

Michael B. Gill’s A Philosophy of Beauty: Shaftesbury on Nature, Virtue, and Art focuses on Shaftesbury’s thinking about nature, religion, morality, and art. This beautifully and engagingly written book is insightful for scholars and general readers alike, and invites readers to explore the philosophical issues that arise from Shaftesbury’s philosophy. Gill not only shows how Shaftesbury’s ideas were revolutionary at the turn of the eighteenth century but also how they remain relevant today. Shaftesbury’s major work, Characteristicks of Men, (...) Manners, Opinions, Times, was one of the most influential books published during the first half of the eighteenth century. According to Gill, “[i]t played a momentous role in turning European thought away from the negative and toward the positive—in nature, religion, morality, and art” (1). Although Characteristicks serves as a major source, Gill also engages with numerous other published and unpublished writings by Shaftesbury. A Philosophy of Beauty is divided into five chapters which focus respectively on nature and God, virtue, art, painting, and writing. (shrink)

Review of Dominic Roser and Christian Seidel, Climate Justice: An Introduction (trans. Ciaran Cronin).

[Presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), University of Oregon, 24-26 October. Part of the panel Events, Actions and the Problem of Agency in the Wake of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, organized in collaboration with Sean Bowden and James Williams.] In this paper I will bring the positions of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur into proximity with each other in order to draw out points of conflict. I do not aim to solve (...) these conflicts, nor to develop them into a full clash. Rather, I will show that both Ricoeur and Deleuze develop a theory of novelty that can be characterized as a reversal of Platonism. These theories are not opposed per se, but they differ in orientation. Deleuze situates novelty in the virtual event. This virtual event can be understood as a singular point of transition that transforms one system into another. Or to catch the event in a somewhat more concrete image, it is a kind of metamorphosis (in Kafka’s sense). In contrast, Ricoeur situates novelty in human actions that are played out as a fruitful tension between two poles. This tension opens up a field of potentiality in which new ideas and novel meanings can emerge. Ricoeur has analysed this tension on many levels. Its most basic structure can be found in what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor. This living metaphor is itself something ‘in action’; it brings two opposed semantic fields into a fruitful tension with each other. This tension reveals a previously unnoticed proximity between these two semantic fields, without destroying their distance. In this way a new, third semantic field is opened up that is only given in potential. Ricoeur argues that it is within tensions like this that generative differences arise, resulting in new ideas and novel meanings. The main point of divergence between Deleuze and Ricoeur can therefore be framed in two contrasting pairs: virtual event versus human action; point of transition versus tension (or: metamorphosis versus metaphor). (shrink)

In this essay, I will look closer at the death of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who committed suicide in 1995. I will scrutinize his death in concordance with his philosophical thoughts, but frame my gaze within Albert Camus’ well-known opening- question from The Myth of Sisyphus: “Judging whether life is worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy” (Camus, 2005:1).

What is Schizoanalysis? (An Introduction to Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari) -Irfan Ajvazi.

Discussione sul testo di Rocco Ronchi "Gilles Deleuze. Credere nel reale". Per un pensiero della temporalità della filosofia come Fuori assoluto.

In his account of the individuation and creation of thinking in Difference and Repetition Gilles Deleuze claims that there belongs “an experience of death.” What does this mean and imply for an attempt to come to terms with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism? The following article presents a reading that explores this question, arguing that Deleuze’s account of what it means to think has two aspects that must be understood in relation to each other. On the one hand, Deleuze’s ontology of intensive (...) difference involves an image of human individuation grounded upon a “death present in the living.” On the other hand, Deleuze writes that in the creation of “thinking in thought” there is an experience of death. Understanding the relation between the individuating aspect of death – as the emergence of the pure and empty form of time as the basis for representational thinking and judgement – and the experience of this individuating factor in the creation of thinking in thought, Deleuze’s claim can be made sense of and its centrality in his system clarified. When death as an individuating factor becomes experience, thinking is transmuted from dead representation to intensive life, and transcendental empiricism is operationalized. (shrink)

This article reconstructs Gilles Deleuze’s engagement with phenomenology, and with the phenomenological problematic of sensation, in his Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Considering Deleuze’s adoption, from the phenomenology of art, of notions of sensation and rhythm, it examines how Deleuze complexifies these phenomenological notions by aligning them with his profoundly non-phenomenological notion of the body without organs, as well as with the concepts of modulation and the diagram. In mapping Deleuze’s complexification of rhythm and his development of a logic (...) of rhythmic modulation, this article shows how Deleuze immanently refines an approach to working beyond phenomenology, through phenomenology. (shrink)

The first section of this article focuses on the treatment of “time travel” in science-fiction literature and film as presented in the secondary literature in that field. The first anthology I will consider has a metaphysical focus, including (a) relating the time travel of science fiction to the banal time travel of all living beings, as we move inexorably toward the future; and (b) arguing for the filmstrip as the ultimate metaphor for time. The second anthology I will consider has (...) a more political focus, arguing that the “special effects” form of science-fiction films, rather than the visual or narrative content of science-fiction-films, is truly imaginative and futural. The second section of this article ties together a variety of concepts and insights between time-travel cinema and Deleuze’s Cinema 1, suggesting (among other things) that (c) time-traveling characters in cinema function as a redoubled phenomenon of the “mobile sections” of Bergsonian duration (in reference to Henri Bergson), and (d) time-travel cinema vividly illustrates the imagistic nature of the entire world. (shrink)

Este artículo extrapola conceptos cinematográficos que desarrollan Gilles Deleuze y Alain Badiou, tales como movimiento, cuadro, plano y montaje. El propósito de corroborar estas categorías es para articularlas en el largometraje del director Melinton Eusebio, Jarjacha. El demonio del incesto (2000), y detectar la cosmovisión concomitante que prevalece en una localidad distanciada de la capital, caracterizada por la presencia andina de una tradición y una organización política basada en el sometimiento de una localidad hacia un alcalde, quien dictamina y castiga (...) a través de una personificación endemoniada. Este análisis será factible, una vez que se diferencien los instantes privilegiados y ordinarios, que abarcan las escenas de la película de acuerdo con su intencionalidad. De ese modo, se comprenderá el funcionamiento del filme desde una perspectiva más contundente y eximia para el espectador, además de que logrará reconocer los momentos fundados desde la realidad y lo real. (shrink)

This essay aims at inspecting the question of evil within Gilles Deleuze’s thought, focusing especially on his historical-philosophical works. I will attempt to show how, for Deleuze, the question of evil represented the most difficult issue to overcome in the construction of his vitalistic materialism, the latter established on the complete overlapping of ontology and ethics. By reconstructing the gradual composition of such «pure ontology» through Deleuze’s interpretations of Hume, Bergson, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, I will eventually define his vitalistic materialism (...) as a biodicy that makes the question of evil ethically irrelevant for the sake of individuals’ freedom to express their vitality. The main consequence of such a biodicy is the definition of a dichotomous relationship between suffering and freedom that risks justifying natural inequalities subsisting among living beings. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Einheit und Vielheit als ein Grundproblem der Philosophiegeschichte erfährt in den Werken von zwei der gegenwärtig einflussreichsten französischen Denker, Gilles Deleuze und Jean-Luc Nancy, eine je spezifische Reformulierung mit weitreichenden ontologischen sowie politischen Konsequenzen. Durch einen innovativen, aber dennoch einführenden Vergleich kontrastiert und verschränkt Ralf Gisinger erstmalig Ansätze beider Philosophen, indem er sein originäres Konzept der „Pluralisierung“ entwickelt. In einem Feld zwischen Allgemeinheit und Partikularität lassen sich so insbesondere klassische Kategorien der politischen Philosophie wie Identität, Subjekt oder (...) Gesellschaft radikal neu begreifen. -/- Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Luc Nancy, two of the most influential thinkers of our time, both engage with the classic philosophical problem of the one and the many. Ralf Gisinger develops his original concept of ‘pluralization’ by contrasting and intersecting these two philosophers, while shedding a light on the consequences of these pluralizations on an ontological as well as political level regarding notions like identity, subject or society. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the status and stakes of Gilles Deleuze’s “break” with structuralism. With a particular focus on a transitional text of Deleuze, the 1967/1972 article “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” it asks how Deleuze understood structuralism and why, after his encounter with Félix Guattari and Guattari’s own transitional text, 1969’s “Machine and Structure,” Deleuze felt the need to break with structuralism. It argues that reading these two texts together allows us to see that Deleuze already perceived tensions (...) within the structuralist project, and argues that Guattari’s non-structural account of the machine allowed Deleuze to clarify this perception, and see it as necessitating a departure from structuralism. To close, however, it turns to recent work by philosophers such as Étienne Balibar and Patrice Maniglier that re-examines the structuralist moment and identifies an ongoing legacy that the “poststructuralism” of Deleuze and Guattari may be part of. By considering Deleuze and Guattari’s break with structuralism in light of this work, this article considers how the polemical rejection of structuralism by Deleuze and Guattari may not fully account for the ongoing legacy of the structuralist program and the persistence of a structuralist problematic in their thought. (shrink)

Traversing the genres of philosophy and literature, this book elaborates Deleuze's notion of difference, conceives certain individuals as embodying difference, and applies these conceptions to their writings.

Nella sua riflessione filosofica sull’immagine filmica Gilles Deleuze sembra aver tradotto nella maniera più immediata, ancorché insolubilmente problematica, la presenza di uno spazio e di un tempo che giocano il proprio ruolo su di una forma passiva di soggettività: è proprio ne L’image- mouvement, infatti, che Deleuze mostra come uno dei passaggi più proficui delle sue osservazioni sul cinema sia proprio la crisi di ciò che egli definisce immagine-azione, a favore, invece, di un’immagine-tempo, o situazione ottica e sonora pura. Per (...) quanto attiene specificamente lo statuto filosofico dell’immagine, si può dire che sia proprio questo passaggio che consente a Deleuze stesso di modulare la sua riflessione riponendo maggiore attenzione all’elemento temporale rispetto invece al movimento — concetto dal quale, ciononostante, l’indagine sul cinema aveva preso abbrivio. (shrink)

In the following paper I develop an account of Gilles Deleuze’s ethics through his work on Spinoza, which he contrasts with morality, to argue that an ethical response to the COVID-19 pandemic should resist the moralizing of the New Normal and instead have an immanent focus on what is happening to us. In the first part of the paper I detail the novel approach to ethics as ethology that Deleuze works out most explicitly in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. In the second (...) part I show exactly how Deleuze contrasts ethics from morality and moral thinking before showing the relation of ethics to morality in relation to the New Normal and contrast the Deleuzian ethical perspective from other ethical philosophical accounts that I claim are indicative a moral approach to the New Normal. I conclude by arguing that the prevalence of the New Normal amidst COVID-19 represents a triumph of what Spinoza calls the sad passions and suggest Deleuze’s ethics might be a way to reject those sad passions. (shrink)

Nella sua riflessione filosofica sull’immagine filmica Gilles Deleuze sembra aver tradotto nella maniera più immediata, ancorché insolubilmente problematica, la presenza di uno spazio e di un tempo che giocano il proprio ruolo su di una forma passiva di soggettività: è proprio ne L’image- mouvement, infatti, che Deleuze mostra come uno dei passaggi più proficui delle sue osservazioni sul cinema sia proprio la crisi di ciò che egli definisce immagine-azione, a favore, invece, di un’immagine-tempo, o situazione ottica e sonora pura. Per (...) quanto attiene specificamente lo statuto filosofico dell’immagine, si può dire che sia proprio questo passaggio che consente a Deleuze stesso di modulare la sua riflessione riponendo maggiore attenzione all’elemento temporale rispetto invece al movimento — concetto dal quale, ciononostante, l’indagine sul cinema aveva preso abbrivio. (shrink)