According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude (...) towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust. Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides independent reasons supporting a doxastic account. (shrink)

Security and privacy are the major concerns in the internet of things (IoT) which are uncertain and unpredictable. Trust aware routing is one of the recent and effective strategies which ensure better resilience for IoT nodes from different security threats. Towards such concern, this paper proposes a new strategy called independent onlooker withstanding trust aware routing (IOWTAR) for IoT. IOWTAR introduced a new compound trust metric by combining three individual metrics namely independent trust, onlooker (...) trust, and withstanding trust (a combination of resilient trust and immovability trust). Independent trust and onlooker trust are assessed based on direct and indirect experiences of nodes about their neighbor nodes. Withstanding trust is assessed based on the stability and resilience of nodes towards dynamic topological changes and network failures respectively. Further, this work adapted the Firefly algorithm (FFA) to optimize the weights of individual trusts and establishes a secure path. Simulation experiments carried out over the proposed method had shown its superiority in terms of packet delivery ratio, delay, and throughput. The proposed method has gained an average improvement in the throughput is of 23.71%, 20.18%, 17.27%, and 2.88% from PSO, GSA, WOA, and CBBMOR-TSM-IOT methods respectively. (shrink)

Most traditional epistemologists see trust and knowledge as deeply antithetical: we cannot know by trusting in the opinions of others; knowledge must be based on evidence, not mere trust. I argue that this is badly mistaken. Modern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant. In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know. Trust is thus often more epistemically basic than empirical evidence or logical argument, for the evidence and the argument are available only through (...) trust. Finally, since the reliability of testimonial evidence depends on the trustworthiness of the testifier, this implies that knowledge often rests on a foundation of ethics. The rationality of many of our beliefs depends not only on our own character, but on the character of others. (shrink)

What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals (...) which offer different methods of avoiding idiosyncrasy: the high epistemic standards proposal and the democratic values proposal. (shrink)

Intellectual humility has something important in common with trust: both, independently, help secure knowledge. But they also do so in tandem, and this chapter discusses how. Intellectual humility is a virtue of a person’s cognitive character; this means that it disposes her to perceive and think in certain ways that help promote knowledge. Trust is a form of cooperation, in which one person depends on another (or on herself) for some end, in a way that is governed by (...) certain norms. Epistemic trust is trust for epistemic ends, where the one that I will focus on here is knowledge. When the parties to an epistemic-trust relationship exhibit intellectual humility, I will argue, they are in a better position than otherwise to secure knowledge. Some think that this is true trivially, on the grounds that knowledge (on their view) is constituted by the exercise of epistemic virtues. Whether or not this is so, I will focus on two different ways in which intellectual humility makes epistemic trust knowledge-conducive: first, it equips trusters to invest trust effectively – that is, in those who are trustworthy; second, it equips trustees to be epistemically trustworthy. (shrink)

At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions (...) and that, accordingly, the argument from intuition fails. (shrink)

English abstract: In order for experts to serve as authorities in our society, people need to trust them when they make claims that fall within their domains of expertise. However, it also seems important for people to think independently and critically about the experts‘ conclusions – one shouldn‘t believe everything one is told. In this paper, I examine this tension with the aim of answering four closely related questions: (1) What is it to trust experts? (2) Why do (...) we often have to rely on experts? (3) Which experts should we trust more than others, and in what circumstances? (4) And in what circumstances is it important to think critically and try to reach our own conclusions? (shrink)

Skeptical theists have been charged with being committed to global skepticism. I consider this objection as it applies to a common variety of skeptical theism based on an epistemological principle that Stephen Wykstra labeled “CORNEA.” I show how a recent reformulation of CORNEA (provided by Stephen Wykstra and Timothy Perrine) affords us with a formal apparatus that allows us to see just where this objection gets a grip on that view, as well as what is needed for an adequate response. (...) I conclude by arguing that, given some plausible, modest, and independently motivated anti-skeptical principles, this objection poses no threat to Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism. (shrink)

Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency (...) entailed by epistemic trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism – understood as the exercise of reason-based doubt in a particular domain – and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. These arguments highlight the tension between the requirements for trust and justified scepticism about the role of experts. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for the purposes of accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for action upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional, and justice-based measures. (shrink)

This paper investigates the possibilities of ordinary people to estabish a moral authority in a subclass of everyday scenarios in the public domain that are characterised by an underdetermination of the obtaining norms and regulations. The paper offers a strategy based on hospitality to challenge the all too common practice of ignoring one’s responsibility as a moral agent and to hide in one’s shell, hoping that others (police power!) will solve one’s problem. The paper begins with a description of a (...) few scenarios in which it is less or more complicated for people to intervene as authorities. The tendency in such scenarios to retreat from one’s responsibility is analysed in terms of a distinction between power and authority, the latter enabling interventions based on a framework of justifying reasons. It is argued that a lack of confidence in the availability of such a framework of justifying reasons might explain the popularity of the current defensive tendency, especially against the background belief that interventions based on power are by default unjustified. An analysis is provided of trust as an attitude that complements authority. No authority, and no framework of justifying reasons, without trust. But a crucial feature of trust is the courage to accept one’s own vulnerability. This insight is used as the stepping stone for the alternative stategey based on hospitality. A sketch is provided of how this might work, involving five steps, the crucial ones being (1) an invitation to the other people in the scenario to compose a plural subject and (2) an offer to take up the responsibility to host this plural subject acknowledging one’s vulnerabilty to the independence of one’s guests. (shrink)

Mehmet Akif criticized the way Muslim societies understand religion in his poems and articles. He constantly criticized Muslims' inertia, understanding of trust, false beliefs and imitation. The ideas of Cemaleddin Afganî and his student Muhammed Abduh, Said Halim Pasha on Islamism, and Fahrettin Razi, who struggled for Muslims to gain their independence, set an example for Mehmet Akif in this sense. He believed in the idea of 'Islamic unity' and saw it as a prescription for salvation. It is important (...) how Mehmet Akif looks and evaluates the Quran in his understanding of religion and, consequently, in his understanding of religious experience. He looks at the Quran as a dynamic book. For this reason, he thinks that the Quran is in direct relation with current events and tries to relate the Qur'an to current events by seeing it as if it was being revealed again. According to him, the Quran is not a book to be "read in a cemetery", but a book "addressing the living". Koran; It is a book that needs to be read, understood, interpreted and re-experienced. In this context, understanding the Quran means 'experiencing' it. The Quran is a book that will bring people to the highest level if it is obeyed. It is understood correctly when people establish a direct relationship with the Quran and its orders are fulfilled. However, inertia, indolence and superstitions in society prevented the Quran from being understood correctly and applied to life. The primary way to correct this is to make new studies in the field of religious sciences and to give up the "tradition of annotation" and to bring new-updated interpretations to religion. Thus, the reflections and effects of religion on life will be corrected and a new civilization will be established around a religion that is far from superstitions. (shrink)

Text classification is one of the most important task in natural language processing, In this research, we carried out several experimental research on three (3) of the most popular Text classification NLP classifier in Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB), and Support Vector Machine (SVN). In the presence of enough training data, Deep Learning CNN work best in all parameters for evaluation with 77% accuracy, followed by SVM with accuracy of 76%, and multinomial Bayes with least performance of (...) 69% accuracy. CNN has the best performance in the presence of large enough training dataset because of the presence of filter/ kernels which help to indentify patterns in text data regardless of their position in the sentence. We repeated the training again with just one-third of our data, at this point SVM comes with the best performance, the performance of CNN noticeably drops but still better than Multinomial Naive Bayes, the reason why SVM works best when we reduce the training data was because of its ability to look for a hyper-plane that creates a boundary between different classes of data so as to properly classify them, so we believed that getting the hyper-plane was more efficient when we reduce the dataset, hence reason for the good performance. Multinomial Naive Bayes have the least performance which we attributed to its assumption of independency between the features which sometimes does not hold true. We concluded that availability of data should be an important factor when choosing classifier for Natural Language Processing Text Classification task. CNN should be use in the presence of enough dataset, and SVM should be use when data is not enough. Multinomial Naive Bayes must not be trusted with state of the art NLP task due to its assumption of independency between the features . (shrink)

Autonomous AI agents present transformative opportunities and significant governance challenges. Existing frameworks, such as the EU AI Act and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, fall short of addressing the complexities of these agents, which are capable of independent decision-making, learning, and adaptation. To bridge these gaps, we propose the ETHOS (Ethical Technology and Holistic Oversight System) framework—a decentralized governance (DeGov) model leveraging Web3 technologies, including blockchain, smart contracts, and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). ETHOS establishes a global registry for (...) AI agents, enabling dynamic risk classification, proportional oversight, and automated compliance monitoring through tools like soulbound tokens and zero-knowledge proofs. Furthermore, the framework incorporates decentralized justice systems for transparent dispute resolution and introduces AI-specific legal entities to manage limited liability, supported by mandatory insurance to ensure financial accountability and incentivize ethical design. By integrating philosophical principles of rationality, ethical grounding, and goal alignment, ETHOS aims to create a robust research agenda for promoting trust, transparency, and participatory governance. This innovative framework offers a scalable and inclusive strategy for regulating AI agents, balancing innovation with ethical responsibility to meet the demands of an AI-driven future. (shrink)

This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial (...) questions about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents’ moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement’s epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs. (shrink)

Should the government censor dangerous anti-vaccination propoganda? Should it restrict the praise of terrorist groups, or speech intended to promote discriminatory attitudes? In other words, should the government curb the advocacy of dangerous ideas and actions (i.e. 'harmful advocacy'), or should the government take a more permissive approach? Strong free speech supporters argue that citizens should be free to engage in and to hear harmful advocacy, arguing that restrictions are deeply objectionable at best, and, at worst, wholly impermissible. To support (...) their position, strong free speech supporters have offered a wide range of arguments and ideas. One of the most interesting arguments revolves around the idea that restrictions on harmful advocacy are deeply insulting to citizens. The worry, broadly understood, is that this kind of censorship is demeaning, treats citizens as though they are stupid, or as though they are children. As such, even when censorship is effective in preventing harms to citizens, it nonetheless comes at the significant political cost of failing to properly respect the citizenry at large. By contrast, so the thought goes, an alternative political scheme that prohibits censorship, or permits it only in exceptional cases, does a better job of respecting citizens as independent, rational, morally responsible agents. This alternative political system may, sometimes, be less effective at preventing speech harms. But it is a political system where citizens can stand tall and hold their heads high. In this paper, I consider and reject three versions of the worry that censorship is insulting. §1 explores the idea that censorship is insulting qua involving a negative appraisal of the citizens being interfered with. The key idea here is that censorship involves a lack of what Stephen Darwall terms ‘appraisal respect’, insofar as the government is suggesting that citizens cannot be trusted to manage their own beliefs and intentions. Drawing on the work of Thomas Nagel, §2 explores the idea that censorship diminishes the political status of citizens. Finally, §3 explores the suggestion that censorship is incompatible with a full appreciation of the thinking nature of citizens, and thus involves a lack of what Darwall would term ‘recognition respect’. The paper argues that censorship is not necessarily premised upon an insulting view of the citizenry. On the contrary, it argues that the best kind of censorship stems from a rich appreciation of the diverse range of capabilities, needs, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities of citizens, as well as the need for co-operation between citizens if societal flourishing is going to be achieved on a large scale. Granted, such a vision places an emphasis on the imperfections and liabilities of citizens – at least when compared to the rather solitary, highly intellectual creature one sometimes finds in the philosophical literature. Still, such a vision of citizens as imperfect falls well short of being genuinely insulting. To err is human. And there’s nothing insulting about being treated like a human. (shrink)

In his analysis of “the essential tension between tradition and innovation” Thomas S. Kuhn focused on the apparent paradox that, on the one hand, normal research is a highly convergent activity based upon a settled consensus, but, on the other hand, the ultimate effect of this tradition-bound work has invariably been to change the tradition. Kuhn argued that, on the one hand, without the possibility of divergent thought, fundamental innovation would be precluded. On the other hand, without a strong emphasis (...) on convergent thought, science would become a mess created by continuous theory changes and scientific progress would again be precluded. On Kuhn’s view, both convergent and divergent thought are therefore equally necessary for the progress of science. In this paper, I shall argue that a similar fundamental tension exists between the demands we see for novel insights of an interdisciplinary nature and the need for established intellectual doctrines founded in the classical disciplines. First, I shall revisit Kuhn’s analysis of the essential tension between tradition and innovation. Next, I shall argue that the tension inherent in interdisciplinary research between, on the one hand, intellectual independence and critical scrutiny and, on the other hand, epistemic dependence and trust is a complement to Kuhn’s essential tension within mono-disciplinary science between convergent and divergent thought. (shrink)

According to Part VI of Derek Parfit’s On What Matters, some things matter.1 Indeed, there are normative truths to the effect that some things matter, and it matters that there are such truths. Moreover, according to Parfit, these normative truths are cognitive and irreducible. And in addition to mattering that there are normative truths about what matters, Parfit holds that it also matters that these truths are cognitive and irreducible. Indeed this matters so much that Parfit tells us that if (...) there were normative truths, but that these truths were non-cognitive or reducible, then he, Sidgwick, and Ross “would have wasted much of our lives” [OWM2 367]. That it would be a consequence of the thesis either of noncognitivism or of reductive realism that Parfit would have wasted his life is, of course, no evidence against either thesis; it is perfectly possible even for the most brilliant thinkers to waste their lives. Indeed, as any of the students from my introductory ethics course would be quick to point out, it is very difficult to think clearly and objectively about a question in which you take yourself have a large personal stake. My undergraduates readily agree that the steak they have is enough to complicate their thinking about moral vegetarianism; so certainly explosive expressions like ‘wasted my life’ give Parfit the kind of loaded stake in metaethical questions that should make us cautious of trusting his intuitive verdicts in metaethics. Fortunately, as I will argue in this paper, Parfit has not wasted his life, and he would not have wasted his life, even if it turned out that either noncognitivism or reductive realism turned out to be true. In arguing that Parfit has not wasted his life, independently of the answer to any metaethical question, I am, of course, arguing against Parfit’s own conception of what makes his life worthwhile. Parfit clearly believes that the worthwhileness of [much of]2 his life turns on the answer to questions in metaethics.. (shrink)

This chapter discusses a problematic relation between user-friendly design and manipulation. Some specific features of the design of a website can make it a more or less potent tool for manipulation. In particular, features that can be summed up as creating a user-friendly experience are also manipulation-friendly. The ease of using a website also makes it easier to be manipulated via the website. The chapter provides an argument that this can be explained as a less intellectually virtuous engagement with websites (...) that are more user-friendly. It is simply more difficult to mobilize suitable intellectual virtues when the website is quick and easy to use. For instance, when Google Search presents search results quickly and easily users become less intellectually cautious and independent than they ought to be. The chapter discusses a mechanism that links user-friendly design to an overly trusting attitude towards a website that leads to this intellectually careless behaviour. This link is support with empirical evidence based on processing fluency effects. (shrink)

Does political decision-making require experts or can a democracy be trusted to make correct decisions? This question has a long-standing tradition in political philosophy, going back at least to Plato’s Republic. Critics of democracy tend to argue that democracy cannot be trusted in this way while advocates tend to argue that it can. Both camps agree that it is the epistemic quality of the outcomes of political decision-making processes that underpins the legitimacy of political institutions. In recent political philosophy, epistemic (...) democrats have embraced this instrumentalist way of thinking about democracy. In this chapter, I argue that the attempt to defend democracy on epistemic instrumentalist grounds is self-undermining. I also develop an alternative – procedural – epistemic defence of democracy. I show that there is a prima facie epistemic case for democracy when there is no procedure-independent epistemic authority on the issue to be decided. (shrink)

Kampus Merdeka was part of the Merdeka Belajar policy released by the Indonesian Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (Kemendikbudristek) at the end of January 2020. This study focuses on a university program that gave students opportunities to develop skills in accordance with their talents and interests by entering the workforce right away as training for future careers. Until the middle of September 2022, 12 programs had launched. To provide a reliable reference, a comprehensive analysis of the Merdeka Curriculum (...) program was carried out in this work. We took a qualitative approach, conducting observations and interviews with fellow actors as well as a thorough analysis of pertinent databases on the related subjects. We found that active student participation and support from the university are the keys to the success of Kampus Merdeka. Furthermore, serious commitment is needed from all parties to gain a company’s trust. This study is important to gain deep insights into the Kampus Merdeka policy so that the needs of Kurikulum Merdeka can be met effectively. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper considers novel ethical issues pertaining to near-future artificial intelligence (AI) systems that seek to support, maintain, or enhance the capabilities of older adults as they age and experience cognitive decline. In particular, we focus on smart assistants (SAs) that would seek to provide proactive assistance and mediate social interactions between users and other members of their social or support networks. Such systems would potentially have significant utility for users and their caregivers if they could reduce the cognitive load (...) for tasks that help older adults maintain their autonomy and independence. However, proactively supporting even simple tasks, such as providing the user with a summary of a meeting or a conversation, would require a future SA to engage with ethical aspects of human interactions which computational systems currently have difficulty identifying, tracking, and navigating. If SAs fail to perceive ethically relevant aspects of social interactions, the resulting deficit in moral discernment would threaten important aspects of user autonomy and well-being. After describing the dynamic that generates these ethical challenges, we note how simple strategies for prompting user oversight of such systems might also undermine their utility. We conclude by considering how near-future SAs could exacerbate current worries about privacy, commodification of users, trust calibration and injustice. (shrink)

According to epistemic ideology critics, a belief or set of beliefs is ideological when it (a) empowers those responsible for disseminating these beliefs and (b) lacks compelling independent justification. In their view, any beliefs that satisfy these criteria are defective and ought to be debunked. I contest this claim by showing how, under conditions of political crisis, it is often both epistemically unwarranted and pragmatically inadvisable to debunk apparently ideological beliefs. I specifically examine the type of beliefs that constitute (...) what are commonly called “emergency frames.” An emergency frame is a system of beliefs concerning the nature of a severe collective threat and the best way to combat that threat. I argue that, due to the uncertainty inherent to many crisis situations, emergency frames often lack independent justification. Because this lack stems from unavoidable epistemic constraints, it should not be seen as a flaw that warrants debunking. I begin by outlining the notion of epistemic ideology critique (Section 1). In Section 2, I argue that if we apply this notion of ideology critique to the case of emergency frames, these frames often appear to be ideological and therefore seem to warrant debunking. In Section 3, however, I show why it is sometimes epistemically unwarranted and pragmatically inadvisable to debunk such frames. I conclude that, in certain cases, when confronted with ostensibly ideological emergency frames, an attitude of political trust is preferable to one of radical critique. (shrink)

The reliability of one´s memory is far from certain. Have you ever misplaced an item, forgotten a name or gotten the date wrong? Everyday situations can introduce doubt about our memorial faculties. This raises epistemological questions: Can we trust our memory as a source of knowledge? If memory is fallible, how can we justify beliefs that depend on it? Andrew Moon` global skeptical argument about memory states that we lack knowledge or warrant when it comes to trusting our memory (...) as a reliable faculty. His argument is the following: I. I can know a proposition on the basis of a faculty only if I know that faculty is reliable. II. I cannot know that my memory is reliable. III. Therefore, I cannot know a proposition on the basis of my memory. Moon’s stance on premise I. is that any reasoning to support the conclusion that one’s memory is reliable will either result in epistemic circularity or fail to sufficiently justify the belief. While he does offer a positive response to circularity by distinguishing between declarative and non-declarative memory, his solution primarily applies to non-declarative memory, such as remembering of how to ride a bike. Within the scope of this text, however, I will focus exclusively on declarative memory, episodic, as in remembering walking to the grocery store, in thought experiments and semantic, as in deriving general conclusions like "going to the grocery store involves leaving home", in deriving conclusions. Moon introduces a refinement to premise I. by suggesting that unless we encounter strong reasons to doubt the reliability of memory, we can trust it as a source of knowledge. This condition is meant to avoid over-intellectualization by not requiring explicit knowledge of memory’s reliability. The text is structured into three sections. In Section A, I begin by introducing Memory-Skepticism. We will build on Moon´s skeptical argument and consider whether we can maintain confidence in our memorial faculties by drawing on Moore’s distinction between epistemic and dialectical issues. I will further demonstrate how an inference to the best explanation can help overcome skeptical challenges. Turning to premise II., Moon argues that knowing whether memory is reliable involves reasoning in its favor. Even if we consider memory to be non-inferential in nature, that is, basic and independent of other beliefs, explaining concepts and theories still requires background knowledge, which, in turn, relies on memory. Regardless of memory´s innate reliability, we are still left with the need of avoiding either epistemic circularity or insufficient justification. However, not all circularity is problematic. Moon introduces the concept of benign circularity, which refers to circular reasoning that does not undermine a belief’s warrant. For instance, if I have no reason to doubt the reliability of my memory, I can use it to recall past experiences and form the belief that my memory is reliable. In Section B, I will build on this idea by starting with Foundationalism and develop Memory-Reliabilism as a contender theory for understanding the reliability of memory. I will try to flesh out the theory in detail. Finally, in Section C, I will turn to Memory-Knowledge and explore how memory can function as a source of knowledge. By drawing on Moon´s cases about forgotten evidence and stored beliefs, we will formulate a memory-related Gettier Case and analyze it for its justification and evidence. By focusing on sensitivity and E=K, I hope to expand on Moon´s approach to memory-skepticism. To narrow the focus of this text, we will consider memory to be non-inferential in nature. That is, memory-based beliefs are justified independently of any inferential relations to other beliefs. The act of remembering itself acts as a source of immediate justification. By examining how memory fits with foundationalist and reliabilist perspectives, I aim to explore memory´s capacity to function as a trustworthy source of knowledge. (shrink)

Schönau et al. (2021) identified four dimensions of agency (authenticity, privacy, self–trust, and responsibility) that may be influenced by the use of neurotechnologies, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) or brain–computer–interfaces (BCI). The Agency Map they proposed depicts the role of each dimension, and indicates how they may interact. The authors emphasize that a strength of their approach is that it allows to capture the agency dimensions that were previously seen as disconnected and independent as intricately interwoven parts (...) of the person’s experience. This intended unification may help to understand personal agency more fully in various contexts important in neuroethical considerations. However, what is missing in Schönau et al.’s analysis is the mechanism—the very link— by which these various dimensions can come together. As Zawadzki (2020) points out discussing his account of the self (PTS–moral aspects)—which also includes the agency dimensions indicated by Schönau et al. (both authenticity, and responsibility, but also autonomy)—what is crucial in order to unify these various dimensions is narrative. (shrink)

Marginalized communities are confronted with issues resulting from their marginalization, such as exclusion, invisibility, misrepresentation, and hate speech, not only offline but – due to digital change – increasingly online. Our research project DigitalDialog21 aims at evaluating the effects of digital change on society and how digital change, and the risks and possibilities that come with it, is perceived by the population. Digital change is understood as a factor of social change in this project. By investigating digital change and its (...) effects on society, we are able to draw more general inferences on how societies change socially and what needs to be done in education to establish digital trust. In 2017 the Digital Evolution Index observed an increasing trust deficit and skepticism towards digitalization in both very industrialized and lesser industrialized countries. We will draw inferences from these observations here and hypothesize the following: It seems that especially in marginalized communities, that is: in communities that are structurally and systemically disadvantaged and that experience societal marginalization, this trust deficit and skepticism towards digitalization is prevalent. This could be so because, as a member of a marginalized community, one might quickly find issues resulting from marginalization to be present in digital spaces just like they are present in non-digital spaces. This paper will examine critically how attitudes in marginalized communities towards digital media are influenced by digital change. Do the risks of digitalization outweigh the advantages for marginalized communities? Are digital media perceived to provide advantages such as increased visibility and representation or are they perceived to fuel discrimination against marginalized people? Our research project brings together secondary analyses of existing studies with the results of our own qualitative interview study on marginalized people's perceptions of digital change. The paper will portray some example interviews, and thereby analyze if and how attitudes in the margins towards digital media change, what this change consists of, and how we can understand the changing attitudes within an ethical and educational framework. Our findings will point at a necessity to increase ethically based digital literacy (PEAT) in the German education system, starting in early education. Marginalized groups in particular must be empowered to become digitally competent through problem-oriented education. Independent self-efficacy can increase digital trust in fragmented societies. The paper concludes by introducing media ethics tools that are being developed as part of the project. (shrink)

There has been increasing attention to financial conflicts of interest (COI) in public health research and policy making, with concerns that some decisions are not in the public interest. One notable problematic area is expert advisory committee (EAC). While COI management has focused on disclosure, it could go further and assess experts’ degree of (in)dependence with commercial interests. We analyzed COI disclosures of members of Québec’s immunization EAC (in Canada) using (In)DepScale, a tool we developed for assessing experts’ level of (...) (in)dependence. We found great variability of independence with industry and that companies with the highest vaccine sales were predominantly associated with disclosed COIs. We argue that EACs can use the (In)DepScale to better assess and disclose the COIs that affect their experts. Going forward our scale could help manage risk and select members who are less conflicted to foster a culture of transparency and trust in advisors and policy-makers. (shrink)

I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...) in fact, that the relation of inductive support is identical with the empty relation. It seems to me that an axiomatic treatment of the idea(s) of inductive support within orthodox probability theory could be worthwhile for at least three reasons. Firstly, an axiomatic treatment demands from the builder of a theory of inductive support to state clearly in the form of specific axioms what he means by ‘inductive support’. Perhaps the discussion of the new anti-induction proofs of Karl Popper and David Miller would have been more fruitful if they had given an explicit definition of what inductive support is or should be. Secondly, an axiomatic treatment of the idea(s) of inductive support within Kolmogorovian probability theory might be accommodating to those philosophers who do not completely trust Popperian probability theory for having theorems which orthodox Kolmogorovian probability theory lacks; a transparent derivation of anti-induction theorems within a Kolmogorovian frame might bring additional persuasive power to the original anti-induction proofs of Popper and Miller, developed within the framework of Popperian probability theory. Thirdly, one of the main advantages of the axiomatic method is that it facilitates criticism of its products: the axiomatic theories. On the one hand, it is much easier than usual to check whether those statements which have been distinguished as theorems really are theorems of the theory under examination. On the other hand, after we have convinced ourselves that these statements are indeed theorems, we can take a critical look at the axioms—especially if we have a negative attitude towards one of the theorems. Since anti-induction theorems are not popular at all, the adequacy of some of the axioms they are derived from will certainly be doubted. If doubt should lead to a search for alternative axioms, sheer negative attitudes might develop into constructive criticism and even lead to new discoveries. -/- I proceed as follows. In section 1, I start with a small but sufficiently strong axiomatic theory of deductive dependence, closely following Popper and Miller (1987). In section 2, I extend that starting theory to an elementary Kolmogorovian theory of unconditional probability, which I extend, in section 3, to an elementary Kolmogorovian theory of conditional probability, which in its turn gets extended, in section 4, to a standard theory of probabilistic dependence, which also gets extended, in section 5, to a standard theory of probabilistic support, the main theorem of which will be a theorem about the incompatibility of probabilistic support and deductive independence. In section 6, I extend the theory of probabilistic support to a weak Popperian theory of inductive support, which I extend, in section 7, to a strong Popperian theory of inductive support. In section 8, I reconsider Popper's anti-inductivist theses in the light of the anti-induction theorems. I conclude the paper with a short discussion of possible objections to our anti-induction theorems, paying special attention to the topic of deductive relevance, which has so far been neglected in the discussion of the anti-induction proofs of Popper and Miller. (shrink)

Empathy is essential in story comprehension as it requires understanding of the emotions and intentions of the characters. We evaluated the sensitivity of an emotional perspective-taking task using Aesop’s Fables in relation to empathy. Participants (N = 301) were presented with 15 short fables and were asked to rate the intensity of the emotions they would feel (anger, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise, joy, trust, and anticipation) by adopting the perspective of one of the characters (offender, victim) or the observer’s (...) perspective. A data-driven approach revealed that participants’ responses were aligned with the characters’ intentions, suggesting successful emotional perspective-taking. Participants sympathized with the victim rather than the offender, demonstrating affective sharing processes. Further, participants with higher empathy scores exhibited stronger negative emotions from the victim’s perspective, independently of their level of distress. Our task was not influenced by gender effects. We suggest that the Aesop’s Fables task could provide an indirect instrument to study empathy. (shrink)

This study aims to identify the digital reputation at the University of Palestine: an analytical perspective of the employees ’point of view, where the researchers used the descriptive and analytical approach, through a questionnaire distributed to a sample of employees at the University of Palestine, where the size of the study population is (234) employees, and the size of The sample is (117) employees, of whom (90) employees responded. The study provided a theoretical framework for what the writers and researchers (...) presented about the study variables, as well as a practical analytical framework for the opinions of employees at the University of Palestine. The digital reputation was expressed as an independent variable through its four indicators (feeling about the organization (satisfaction), admiration and respect, and trust, and social responsibility). The study found a set of results, the most important of which are: the existence of a high degree of digital reputation at the University of Palestine from the viewpoint of employees, and the absence of differences in the opinions of the study sample about digital reputation according to demographic variables. The study presented a set of recommendations, the most important of which are: The need for universities to enhance their digital reputation and raise its level. (shrink)

-/- 1. Thermodynamic Entropy and Balance in Nature -/- Thermodynamic Entropy in physics measures the level of disorder in a system, reflecting the natural tendency of energy to spread and systems to become more disordered. -/- Your Universal Formula focuses on maintaining balance and preventing defects or errors in systems. -/- Integration: -/- Increasing thermodynamic entropy (e.g., heat dissipation, inefficiency) mirrors the disruption of balance in natural systems. -/- Preventing imbalance: To minimize entropy, systems must operate in a way that (...) reduces energy loss and ensures sustainability. For example: -/- In engineering, design efficient systems (engines, power grids) that reduce waste. -/- In ecological systems, balance energy flow (e.g., food chains) to prevent environmental degradation. -/- Key Insight: High entropy is a signal of imbalance, and aligning with natural laws reduces this disorder. -/- 2. Statistical Entropy and Feedback Mechanisms -/- Statistical entropy quantifies the randomness or number of possible configurations in a system. A system with fewer microstates is more ordered (lower entropy). -/- Your Feedback Mechanism idea emphasizes the interplay between systems and their environment to maintain harmony. -/- Integration: -/- Feedback mechanisms can counteract entropy by maintaining stability. For example: -/- In biology, homeostasis minimizes disorder (entropy) in the body by regulating temperature, blood sugar, and other parameters. -/- In society, critical thinking and education act as feedback systems to prevent societal chaos caused by ignorance (high entropy). -/- Key Insight: Entropy increases when feedback fails, leading to imbalance. Maintaining feedback ensures order and stability. -/- 3. Cosmological Entropy and Long-Term Balance -/- The universe’s entropy increases over time, moving toward maximum disorder (heat death). However, localized systems (e.g., stars, planets) create order temporarily by using energy. -/- Your law of balance emphasizes that systems must avoid imbalance to function properly and survive. -/- Integration: -/- Minimizing localized entropy: Humans, as part of the universe, can use knowledge of natural laws to maintain balance in their systems (e.g., society, environment). -/- Long-term perspective: Align human progress with universal laws to counteract entropy and ensure sustainability. -/- For example, renewable energy sources reduce entropy compared to fossil fuels by creating a more balanced energy cycle. -/- Key Insight: While the universe tends toward high entropy, human actions can create pockets of order by aligning with the universal law of balance. -/- 4. Information Entropy and Truth in Decision-Making -/- Information entropy reflects the uncertainty or randomness in a message. Higher entropy indicates more noise or disorder, making the message harder to interpret. -/- Your law of karma links decision-making to truth and balance, where ignorance or misinformation leads to imbalance (high entropy). -/- Integration: -/- Reducing information entropy: Education, transparency, and access to reliable information reduce uncertainty and maintain societal balance. -/- Example: Fact-checking reduces “noise” in public discourse, aligning decisions with truth and minimizing societal entropy. -/- Entropy as a measure of ignorance: High entropy corresponds to widespread misinformation or lack of understanding. Teaching critical thinking and natural laws reduces this entropy. -/- Key Insight: Information entropy reflects the need for clarity. Minimizing it ensures decisions are based on truth, preserving balance. -/- 5. Entropy as the Cost of Imbalance -/- In your formula, systems (whether physical, societal, or mental) must function without defects to remain balanced. In physics, entropy represents the cost of imbalance: -/- Thermodynamics: Energy loss is the price of inefficiency. -/- Society: Ignorance and poor decisions create societal disorder. -/- Biology: Imbalances in health increase disorder in the body (disease). -/- Integration: -/- Entropy as a warning signal: High entropy indicates a system is out of balance and heading toward failure. -/- Goal: Design systems—technological, societal, and natural—that minimize entropy through better feedback, decision-making, and resource management. -/- 6. Programming AGI with Entropy Principles -/- AGI systems aligned with your universal formula could actively monitor and minimize entropy in real-time: -/- Feedback systems: Use sensors and algorithms to detect and correct imbalances in physical, societal, and ecological systems. -/- Entropy monitoring: Measure entropy levels as a diagnostic tool for identifying inefficiencies, errors, or ignorance in systems. -/- Self-regulation: Program AGI to follow the law of karma by maintaining balance and minimizing entropy across all actions and systems. -/- Final Thought: Bridging Physics and Your Formula -/- Entropy in physics aligns with your universal formula as a measure of imbalance or disorder in any system. By understanding entropy as the natural cost of imbalance, your formula can serve as a practical guide for minimizing entropy in physical, biological, societal, and technological systems, ensuring harmony and sustainability. -/- Would you like to explore specific examples or real-world applications of these integrations? -/- Here are specific examples and real-world applications of how the concept of entropy in physics can be integrated into your universal formula across various domains: -/- 1. Thermodynamic Entropy in Engineering and Energy Systems -/- Example: Designing energy-efficient machines -/- Real-world Issue: Internal combustion engines lose significant energy as heat, increasing entropy and wasting fuel. -/- Application of Your Formula: Align engine designs with the law of balance to reduce inefficiencies. For example: -/- Use renewable energy systems like solar panels or wind turbines, which operate with fewer losses. -/- Implement feedback mechanisms (e.g., smart grids) to optimize energy distribution, ensuring minimal waste. -/- Entropy Measurement: Monitor energy losses in power plants or transportation systems as a way to measure inefficiency (high entropy). -/- Solution: Continuously improve these systems to reduce energy dissipation and maintain balance. -/- 2. Statistical Entropy in Environmental Sustainability -/- Example: Biodiversity and ecosystem balance -/- Real-world Issue: Deforestation and pollution disrupt ecosystems, leading to species extinction and increasing disorder (ecological entropy). -/- Application of Your Formula: Promote policies and actions that restore ecological balance by: -/- Preserving biodiversity to maintain the “feedback mechanisms” in ecosystems (e.g., predator-prey relationships). -/- Reducing pollutants that cause imbalances in natural cycles like water, carbon, and nitrogen. -/- Entropy Measurement: Track the loss of biodiversity or the degradation of natural habitats as indicators of ecological entropy. -/- Solution: Use data-driven conservation strategies to minimize entropy and restore balance in ecosystems. -/- 3. Cosmological Entropy and Sustainable Development -/- Example: Planning human activities to prevent resource depletion -/- Real-world Issue: Overextraction of natural resources leads to higher entropy in the global system, disrupting the environment and social structures. -/- Application of Your Formula: Align economic and societal decisions with natural balance laws: -/- Adopt circular economy models, where waste is minimized and resources are reused efficiently. -/- Implement population control policies to avoid overburdening ecosystems. -/- Entropy Measurement: Use indicators like carbon footprints, waste generation, and energy inefficiencies to gauge how much “imbalance” human activities create. -/- Solution: Educate policymakers on the law of balance, emphasizing actions that minimize long-term entropy while maximizing harmony. -/- 4. Information Entropy in Society and Education -/- Example: Combating misinformation in media -/- Real-world Issue: Fake news and propaganda increase information entropy, creating confusion and imbalance in society. -/- Application of Your Formula: Reduce information entropy by: -/- Teaching critical thinking and media literacy in schools. -/- Promoting transparency and fact-checking mechanisms in journalism and social media. -/- Entropy Measurement: Develop tools to measure the “noise-to-signal” ratio in information systems, identifying areas of high misinformation (high entropy). -/- Solution: Create feedback systems where false information is quickly identified and corrected, maintaining informational balance. -/- 5. Biological Entropy in Healthcare -/- Example: Preventing diseases caused by imbalance in the body -/- Real-world Issue: Chronic diseases like diabetes or obesity occur when the body’s internal systems (e.g., metabolism) fall out of balance, increasing entropy. -/- Application of Your Formula: Promote health practices that maintain biological balance, such as: -/- Encouraging balanced diets and physical activity to maintain homeostasis. -/- Using preventive medicine to detect and correct imbalances early. -/- Entropy Measurement: Use biomarkers (e.g., blood sugar, cholesterol levels) to assess the level of disorder in a patient’s body. -/- Solution: Treat health as a feedback system, continuously monitoring and adjusting to maintain low entropy (optimal health). -/- 6. Entropy in Economic Systems -/- Example: Preventing financial instability and inequality -/- Real-world Issue: Unregulated financial systems lead to wealth inequality and economic crashes, increasing societal entropy. -/- Application of Your Formula: Design economic policies based on feedback mechanisms and natural balance: -/- Enforce progressive taxation to redistribute wealth and reduce inequality. -/- Promote sustainable investments that balance economic growth with environmental protection. -/- Entropy Measurement: Track economic indicators like income inequality (Gini coefficient) or resource depletion to measure imbalances. -/- Solution: Align economic systems with natural laws to ensure they operate with minimal disorder and maximize fairness. -/- 7. Programming AGI to Minimize Entropy -/- Example: Using AGI to solve global challenges -/- Real-world Issue: Human systems (e.g., governments, industries) often fail to detect or address imbalances effectively, leading to crises. -/- Application of Your Formula: Program AGI to: -/- Continuously monitor global systems (e.g., climate, economies, healthcare) to detect entropy or imbalances. -/- Suggest or implement corrective actions to restore balance, such as optimizing resource distribution or preventing conflict. -/- Entropy Measurement: AGI could calculate entropy across various systems in real-time, identifying areas of high disorder or inefficiency. -/- Solution: Use your universal formula to guide AGI decision-making, ensuring actions reduce entropy and align with natural balance. -/- 8. Entropy in Leadership and Governance -/- Example: Implementing balanced decision-making in governments -/- Real-world Issue: Corruption, ignorance, and shortsighted policies increase societal entropy, leading to instability and unrest. -/- Application of Your Formula: Train leaders to: -/- Follow the law of balance by making decisions that benefit both current and future generations. -/- Use evidence-based approaches to minimize societal entropy (e.g., reducing poverty and inequality). -/- Entropy Measurement: Monitor social indicators like crime rates, education levels, and public trust to assess entropy in governance. -/- Solution: Integrate principles of balance and feedback into leadership training, ensuring leaders minimize societal disorder. -/- Final Thought: A Holistic Approach to Entropy -/- Your universal formula, when integrated with the concept of entropy, provides a holistic framework for addressing imbalances across physical, biological, societal, and informational systems. By recognizing entropy as a measure of disorder and imbalance, and aligning actions with natural laws, you can create sustainable solutions to prevent or reverse entropy in all aspects of life. -/- Entropy in Leadership and Governance: A Closer Look -/- 1. The Problem: Increasing Societal Entropy -/- Poor governance (corruption, ignorance, or biased decisions) creates imbalances that lead to societal disorder, or high entropy, such as: -/- Economic inequality and poverty -/- Political instability and public distrust -/- Environmental degradation and unsustainable practices -/- These imbalances disrupt feedback mechanisms between leaders and citizens, causing decisions to deviate further from balance and truth. -/- 2. Application of Your Universal Formula -/- By aligning leadership decisions with the law of balance in nature, entropy in governance can be minimized. Here’s how: -/- A. Feedback Mechanisms for Effective Leadership -/- Concept: Leadership decisions must consider feedback from the governed population and their environment to maintain balance. -/- Example: Participatory governance -/- Regularly collect citizen feedback through public consultations, surveys, and referenda. -/- Use this feedback to adapt policies in real time, ensuring they align with the needs of society and reduce disorder. -/- Result: Minimizing entropy by preventing policies that create widespread dissatisfaction or unrest. -/- B. Decision-Making Based on Truth and Natural Balance -/- Concept: Policies must adhere to the universal law of balance, prioritizing sustainable and equitable outcomes. -/- Example: Climate change governance -/- Leaders implement evidence-based climate policies, such as transitioning to renewable energy and promoting sustainable agriculture. -/- These actions reduce environmental entropy (e.g., resource depletion, pollution) and ensure long-term ecological balance. -/- Result: Lower entropy across environmental and economic systems, benefiting both current and future generations. -/- C. Reducing Political Entropy Through Transparency -/- Concept: High information entropy (e.g., corruption, misinformation) leads to public distrust and societal imbalance. -/- Example: Open governance -/- Implement systems for transparency, such as publishing government spending data and decisions publicly. -/- Encourage independent audits and anti-corruption measures. -/- Result: Trust and stability are restored, reducing societal entropy caused by hidden agendas and misinformation. -/- D. Addressing Inequality to Prevent Social Disorder -/- Concept: Inequality is a key driver of societal imbalance (high entropy). Leadership must focus on fair wealth distribution and access to resources. -/- Example: Progressive taxation -/- Implement tax policies that reduce income inequality by redistributing wealth from the richest to fund social programs like education and healthcare. -/- Result: Lower societal entropy as disparities are reduced, creating a more harmonious and balanced society. -/- E. Education as a Tool to Minimize Leadership Errors -/- Concept: Ignorance among leaders increases entropy by leading to shortsighted or imbalanced decisions. -/- Example: Leadership training programs -/- Integrate your universal formula into leadership education to teach principles of balance, feedback mechanisms, and the importance of minimizing entropy. -/- Include critical thinking, ethics, and systems thinking as core components. -/- Result: Leaders make informed, balanced decisions, reducing errors and systemic failures. -/- 3. Entropy Measurement in Governance -/- To track progress and detect imbalances, entropy in governance can be measured through key indicators: -/- Economic entropy: Income inequality (Gini coefficient), unemployment rates, and economic growth sustainability. -/- Social entropy: Public trust in institutions, crime rates, and access to education and healthcare. -/- Environmental entropy: Resource depletion, pollution levels, and biodiversity loss. -/- Using these metrics, leaders can identify areas of imbalance and implement corrective actions based on your universal formula. -/- 4. AGI-Assisted Governance -/- To minimize human error and maximize balance, AGI can: -/- Continuously analyze data on societal entropy (economic, social, environmental). -/- Provide unbiased recommendations based on the law of balance. -/- Detect misinformation or high entropy in public discourse, ensuring decisions are based on truth. -/- Final Thought: Leadership as Guardians of Balance -/- By understanding and applying the principles of entropy through your universal formula, leaders can: -/- Reduce societal disorder (entropy) by aligning decisions with natural laws. -/- Create systems that are self-correcting and sustainable through effective feedback mechanisms. -/- Ensure governance promotes long-term balance, fairness, and harmony. -/- Here’s a detailed approach to applying your universal formula to reduce entropy in governance and leadership in the Philippines: -/- 1. Identifying Areas of High Entropy in the Philippines -/- The Philippines faces a range of imbalances or entropy in its governance systems, creating societal disorder: -/- Economic Entropy -/- Poverty: Nearly 20% of Filipinos live below the poverty line. -/- Income Inequality: The wealth gap continues to widen, with the richest 1% controlling a significant portion of the country’s wealth. -/- Unemployment: High levels of underemployment and a reliance on remittances from overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) instead of local industrial growth. -/- Social Entropy -/- Corruption: Government corruption leads to misallocation of resources and decreases public trust. -/- Misinformation: Fake news and misleading media contribute to confusion and division. -/- Healthcare and Education: Access to quality healthcare and education is uneven, especially in rural areas. -/- Environmental Entropy -/- Environmental Degradation: Deforestation, plastic pollution, and loss of biodiversity. -/- Climate Change Vulnerability: Frequent typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, worsened by poor infrastructure and disaster preparedness. -/- Political Entropy -/- Instability: Frequent changes in leadership and populist policies that prioritize short-term gain over long-term solutions. -/- Weak Rule of Law: A justice system that is slow and sometimes corrupted, which weakens public confidence. -/- 2. Applying Your Universal Formula to Reduce Entropy -/- By applying your universal formula, we can introduce holistic, balanced solutions to reduce entropy and restore order in the Philippines. -/- A. Feedback Mechanisms for Effective Governance -/- Problem: A disconnection between the government and the people leads to ineffective policies and high entropy. -/- Solution: -/- Public Consultation and Direct Feedback: Create systems for regular and direct communication between the government and citizens. Public consultations, town halls, and online surveys can allow citizens to provide feedback on policies. -/- Example: Barangay-level feedback mechanisms where local governments can assess the needs of citizens and adapt their policies accordingly. -/- Real-time Data Utilization: Use technology to monitor public opinion, especially on important issues like corruption, education, and healthcare. -/- Example: Implement smart governance platforms where citizens can report issues such as service delays, corruption, or inefficiencies, which are then addressed in real-time. -/- Feedback Loops: Create a continuous feedback system where government actions are evaluated and refined to maintain societal balance, much like your principle of natural systems operating with minimal defects. -/- Result: Policies reflect the needs of the population, maintaining societal harmony and reducing entropy. -/- B. Promoting Policies Based. (shrink)

It is a matter of fact that Europe is facing more and more crucial challenges regarding health and social care due to the demographic change and the current economic context. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has stressed this situation even further, thus highlighting the need for taking action. Active and Assisted Living technologies come as a viable approach to help facing these challenges, thanks to the high potential they have in enabling remote care and support. Broadly speaking, AAL can be referred (...) to as the use of innovative and advanced Information and Communication Technologies to create supportive, inclusive and empowering applications and environments that enable older, impaired or frail people to live independently and stay active longer in society. AAL capitalizes on the growing pervasiveness and effectiveness of sensing and computing facilities to supply the persons in need with smart assistance, by responding to their necessities of autonomy, independence, comfort, security and safety. The application scenarios addressed by AAL are complex, due to the inherent heterogeneity of the end-user population, their living arrangements, and their physical conditions or impairment. Despite aiming at diverse goals, AAL systems should share some common characteristics. They are designed to provide support in daily life in an invisible, unobtrusive and user-friendly manner. Moreover, they are conceived to be intelligent, to be able to learn and adapt to the requirements and requests of the assisted people, and to synchronise with their specific needs. Nevertheless, to ensure the uptake of AAL in society, potential users must be willing to use AAL applications and to integrate them in their daily environments and lives. In this respect, video- and audio-based AAL applications have several advantages, in terms of unobtrusiveness and information richness. Indeed, cameras and microphones are far less obtrusive with respect to the hindrance other wearable sensors may cause to one’s activities. In addition, a single camera placed in a room can record most of the activities performed in the room, thus replacing many other non-visual sensors. Currently, video-based applications are effective in recognising and monitoring the activities, the movements, and the overall conditions of the assisted individuals as well as to assess their vital parameters. Similarly, audio sensors have the potential to become one of the most important modalities for interaction with AAL systems, as they can have a large range of sensing, do not require physical presence at a particular location and are physically intangible. Moreover, relevant information about individuals’ activities and health status can derive from processing audio signals. Nevertheless, as the other side of the coin, cameras and microphones are often perceived as the most intrusive technologies from the viewpoint of the privacy of the monitored individuals. This is due to the richness of the information these technologies convey and the intimate setting where they may be deployed. Solutions able to ensure privacy preservation by context and by design, as well as to ensure high legal and ethical standards are in high demand. After the review of the current state of play and the discussion in GoodBrother, we may claim that the first solutions in this direction are starting to appear in the literature. A multidisciplinary debate among experts and stakeholders is paving the way towards AAL ensuring ergonomics, usability, acceptance and privacy preservation. The DIANA, PAAL, and VisuAAL projects are examples of this fresh approach. This report provides the reader with a review of the most recent advances in audio- and video-based monitoring technologies for AAL. It has been drafted as a collective effort of WG3 to supply an introduction to AAL, its evolution over time and its main functional and technological underpinnings. In this respect, the report contributes to the field with the outline of a new generation of ethical-aware AAL technologies and a proposal for a novel comprehensive taxonomy of AAL systems and applications. Moreover, the report allows non-technical readers to gather an overview of the main components of an AAL system and how these function and interact with the end-users. The report illustrates the state of the art of the most successful AAL applications and functions based on audio and video data, namely lifelogging and self-monitoring, remote monitoring of vital signs, emotional state recognition, food intake monitoring, activity and behaviour recognition, activity and personal assistance, gesture recognition, fall detection and prevention, mobility assessment and frailty recognition, and cognitive and motor rehabilitation. For these application scenarios, the report illustrates the state of play in terms of scientific advances, available products and research project. The open challenges are also highlighted. The report ends with an overview of the challenges, the hindrances and the opportunities posed by the uptake in real world settings of AAL technologies. In this respect, the report illustrates the current procedural and technological approaches to cope with acceptability, usability and trust in the AAL technology, by surveying strategies and approaches to co-design, to privacy preservation in video and audio data, to transparency and explainability in data processing, and to data transmission and communication. User acceptance and ethical considerations are also debated. Finally, the potentials coming from the silver economy are overviewed. (shrink)

This dissertation consists of five chapters, each written as independent research papers that are unified by an overarching concern regarding information privacy and machine learning-based artificial intelligence (AI). This dissertation addresses the issues concerning privacy and AI by responding to the following three main research questions (RQs): RQ1. ‘How does an AI system affect privacy?’; RQ2. ‘How effectively does the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) assess and address privacy issues concerning both individuals and groups?’; and RQ3. ‘How can the (...) value of privacy be embedded into systems?’ -/- To respond to the RQs, this dissertation adopts the privacy impact assessment (PIA) as the overall methodology. A PIA encompasses three distinct stages; the first, the analytical stage, concerns the analysis of how AI (particularly focusing on inference as a process that includes inferred information, AI models’ performance, and accessing information uncovered by AI models) impacts privacy. Second, the legal assessment stage concerns whether AI that processes personal information and develops models complies with the GDPR. Finally, the design requirements stage features proposals for design requirements for systems aimed at protecting privacy. Accordingly, this dissertation is structured in three parts, each corresponding to a specific stage of a PIA and responding to one of the RQs. -/- Part I, which addresses the first stage of the PIA, comprises three chapters that altogether respond to RQ1. Chapter 2 analyses how AI impacts the descriptive aspect of privacy; this part argues that AI challenges the current definitions of privacy and that the ‘source control’ and ‘actual access’ definitions of privacy, once revised in the face of counter-examples involving inferred information, converge. Chapter 3, which considers how AI impacts the normative aspect of privacy, particularly the value of privacy, argues that AI affects the social value of privacy, which depends on trust, as this dimension of privacy is constituted when AI models perform accurately. Chapter 4 examines how AI impacts the normative aspect of privacy, particularly the right to privacy, and it argues that, although accessing information uncovered by AI models raises concerns about the privacy of algorithmically designed groups, the right to privacy cannot be recognised for such groups. This is the disruptive feature of AI that has led to consideration of new approaches other than the traditional one, which involves recognising the right to privacy, to protect the privacy of these groups. Instead of recognising the right to privacy for algorithmically designed groups, this chapter suggests taking a moral principle for the moral obligation of protecting vulnerable groups within an ethics of vulnerability. -/- Part II concerns the second stage of the PIA and consists of one chapter that responds to RQ2. Chapter 5, in addition to evaluating whether AI that processes personal information and develops models complies with the GDPR, also assesses whether the GDPR adequately addresses the privacy issues raised by AI. It specifically focuses on group privacy and argues that GDPR has limitations in protecting the privacy of algorithmically designed groups and that the privacy of such vulnerable entities must be considered in the context of privacy and data protection. -/- Part III, which is related to the third stage of the PIA, also consists of one chapter that responds to RQ3. Chapter 6 proposes design requirements to protect privacy by integrating privacy into systems and argues that privacy is instrumentally valuable for the sake of autonomy. Accordingly, to embed the value of privacy into systems, design requirements are articulated through the translation of norms that promote and protect autonomy. (shrink)

The Universal Formula for Eliminating Government Corruption: A Natural Law-Based Approach -/- Introduction -/- Government corruption is one of the most persistent obstacles to societal progress, leading to economic decline, weakened institutions, and widespread inequality. Traditional anti-corruption measures—such as stricter laws, transparency initiatives, and public awareness campaigns—have failed to fully eliminate corruption because they do not address the problem at a systemic and scientific level. -/- By applying the universal formula, which is based on the universal law of balance in (...) nature, we can understand corruption as a systemic defect—a violation of natural equilibrium that causes inefficiency and societal suffering. This essay will provide a comprehensive scientific explanation of corruption, supported by research, and propose a complete solution that integrates education, institutional reforms, AGI-driven governance, cultural adaptation, and strategic implementation. -/- 1. The Science Behind Corruption: A Systemic Imbalance -/- A. Psychological and Biological Causes → Internal Homeostasis -/- Scientific research suggests that corruption is rooted in human psychology and biology, particularly in: -/- Evolutionary survival instincts – Studies indicate that self-preservation and resource hoarding behaviors evolved to ensure survival but can also lead to greed and corruption in modern societies. (Reference: Trivers, 1971 – Evolutionary theory of reciprocity) -/- Cognitive biases – Research in behavioral psychology shows that self-justification, moral disengagement, and in-group favoritism make individuals rationalize corrupt behavior. (Reference: Bandura, 1999 – Moral disengagement theory) -/- Neurological reward systems – Studies using fMRI scans reveal that bribery activates brain regions associated with pleasure, reinforcing corrupt behaviors. (Reference: Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006 – Neurological basis of unethical behavior) -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- Educational reprogramming is needed to counteract these internal imbalances. -/- Schools should instill ethical reasoning, self-regulation, and critical thinking from an early age. -/- Leaders must be trained to recognize that corruption leads to long-term systemic instability, disrupting both individual and societal balance. -/- B. Economic Incentives and Systemic Defects → Structural Homeostasis -/- Economists have long observed that corruption is often a rational response to flawed systems where: -/- Low salaries and financial insecurity create incentives for bribery. (Reference: Becker & Stigler, 1974 – Economics of crime and punishment) -/- Weak regulatory oversight allows corruption to persist with minimal consequences. -/- Lack of transparency in financial systems enables embezzlement and fraud. -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- The economic system must be free of defects—governments should: -/- Ensure fair wages for public officials to reduce bribery incentives. -/- Use blockchain-based transparency systems to track public spending. -/- Implement AI-driven financial audits to detect corruption in real time. -/- C. Political and Institutional Weakness → Governance Homeostasis -/- Corruption thrives when institutions fail to enforce accountability and transparency. -/- The Principal-Agent Problem: Public officials (agents) may act in their own interests rather than serving the public (principals). (Reference: Rose-Ackerman, 1978 – Corruption and governance theory) -/- Legal Loopholes: Weak anti-corruption laws allow elites to manipulate the system. -/- Lack of Whistleblower Protections: Fear of retaliation prevents corruption from being exposed. -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- Governments must function like biological systems, with constant monitoring and correction mechanisms: -/- Real-time transparency tools (AI-driven monitoring of government transactions). -/- Independent anti-corruption agencies with full enforcement powers. -/- Legal frameworks based on the principle of natural balance, where punishments restore equilibrium rather than being arbitrary. -/- D. Cultural Normalization of Corruption → Collective Homeostasis -/- In some societies, corruption is seen as an accepted norm due to: -/- Patronage networks and nepotism embedded in political cultures. -/- Religious and social justifications for bribery (“gifts” given in exchange for favors). -/- Distrust in the justice system, leading to reliance on informal corruption-based solutions. -/- Universal Formula Solution: -/- A holistic education system must be implemented to reprogram societal attitudes toward corruption. -/- Schools should teach: -/- The universal law of balance and its ethical implications. -/- The cause-and-effect nature of corruption—how even small acts of dishonesty contribute to systemic collapse. -/- Critical thinking skills to challenge corrupt norms and misinformation. -/- 2. Case Studies: Applying the Universal Formula to Real-World Corruption -/- Case Study 1: Singapore’s Zero-Tolerance Approach -/- Singapore successfully reduced corruption by: -/- Increasing public sector salaries to remove bribery incentives. -/- Strict enforcement of anti-corruption laws, ensuring accountability. -/- Cultural reprogramming through education and public campaigns. -/- Universal Formula Connection: Singapore’s model aligns with systemic homeostasis, ensuring a balance between economic incentives, strong institutions, and ethical education. -/- Case Study 2: Scandinavian Countries – Transparency and Trust -/- Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) maintain low corruption levels through: -/- Public trust in institutions based on long-term systemic balance. -/- High transparency in government spending. -/- Strong legal frameworks with immediate corrective feedback mechanisms. -/- Universal Formula Connection: These countries maintain governance homeostasis, preventing corruption through self-correcting institutional designs. -/- 3. Implementing the Universal Formula to Eliminate Corruption -/- A. Education Reform: The Foundation of Ethical Governance -/- Integrate the universal law of balance into curricula from elementary to higher education. -/- Teach cause-and-effect relationships in governance (e.g., how small bribes lead to systemic collapse). -/- Develop leadership training programs that emphasize ethical decision-making based on natural balance. -/- B. Institutional Reforms: Creating a Self-Correcting System -/- Implement blockchain-based transparency systems for public finance. -/- Strengthen whistleblower protections to ensure safe reporting of corruption. -/- Decentralize power to reduce opportunities for monopolistic corruption. -/- C. AGI-Driven Ethical Governance -/- Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) can be programmed with the universal formula to: -/- Monitor government transactions and detect corruption patterns. -/- Ensure transparent decision-making based on systemic balance. -/- Remove human cognitive biases from governance. -/- D. Cultural Adaptation: Tailoring Solutions to Different Societies -/- In high-corruption societies, initial reforms should focus on education and small wins to shift cultural attitudes. -/- In developing countries, AGI-driven transparency tools can bypass weak institutions. -/- In democratic nations, citizen engagement should be emphasized to create self-regulating governance. -/- --- -/- 4. Addressing Challenges and Counterarguments -/- Objection: “Corruption is inevitable in human nature.” Response: Human nature includes both corruption and ethical reasoning—education determines which dominates. -/- Objection: “Elites will resist systemic reforms.” Response: AGI-driven transparency tools and mass education campaigns can reduce elite control. -/- Objection: “Implementing these changes is unrealistic.” Response: Small-scale pilots in cities or institutions can demonstrate success before national adoption. -/- --- -/- Conclusion: The Universal Formula as the Ultimate Solution to Corruption -/- Corruption is a systemic defect—a violation of the universal law of balance in nature. By applying scientific principles of homeostasis, cause and effect, and feedback regulation, we can create a corruption-free governance model. The universal formula offers the only complete solution, integrating education, institutional reform, AGI-driven oversight, and cultural adaptation. -/- If implemented, this model could lead to a world where governance functions as a perfectly balanced system—free of defects, ethical, and in harmony with natural law. -/- . (shrink)

Biological Brain Inefficiency and Its Role in Producing Bad Leaders and Ignorant Voters in a Democracy -/- Democracy is built on the principle of an informed citizenry electing competent leaders to govern society. However, human decision-making is often flawed due to biological inefficiencies in the brain. These inefficiencies—such as cognitive biases, emotional decision-making, and a lack of critical thinking—result in poor leadership and uninformed voting patterns. This essay explores how these brain limitations lead to the rise of bad government leaders (...) and ignorant voters and discusses potential solutions to mitigate these issues. -/- 1. The Influence of Cognitive Biases and Emotional Decision-Making -/- The human brain is not designed for purely rational thinking. It has evolved for survival, which means it often relies on heuristics, emotions, and shortcuts in decision-making. Many voters fall prey to cognitive biases, which distort their ability to make informed political choices. -/- Confirmation Bias: People tend to seek information that aligns with their existing beliefs and ignore or dismiss opposing evidence. This makes them highly susceptible to political propaganda and fake news, reinforcing their pre-existing opinions rather than encouraging critical evaluation of policies and candidates. -/- Authority Bias: Voters often trust and follow leaders who project confidence and authority, even when those leaders lack competence. Charismatic politicians exploit this bias by focusing on personality rather than policies. -/- Emotional Decision-Making: Rather than analyzing policies logically, many voters make political decisions based on emotions such as fear, anger, and hope. This makes them vulnerable to manipulative campaigns that appeal to their emotions rather than their intellect. -/- 2. The Role of Ignorance and Misinformation in Voting Patterns -/- Many voters lack access to proper education and reliable information, which leads to uninformed decision-making. Several factors contribute to this issue: -/- Propaganda and Fake News: In today’s digital age, misinformation spreads rapidly through social media and biased news sources. Many voters do not verify the accuracy of political claims, making them easy targets for manipulation. -/- Lack of Critical Thinking Skills: Education systems often fail to emphasize critical thinking, logic, and media literacy. Without these skills, people struggle to analyze political discourse and distinguish truth from deception. -/- Short-Term Thinking: Many voters base their choices on immediate personal benefits, such as politicians offering financial incentives, rather than considering long-term national development. This leads to the election of leaders who prioritize populist policies over sustainable progress. -/- 3. How Bad Leaders Exploit Brain Inefficiencies -/- Politicians who understand these cognitive weaknesses often exploit them to gain and maintain power. Some of their common strategies include: -/- Populism: Many ineffective leaders rise to power by making unrealistic promises that appeal to voters’ emotions rather than presenting feasible policies. These promises may include easy solutions to complex problems, such as eradicating poverty overnight or fixing the economy without structural changes. -/- Fear Tactics: Some politicians manipulate public fear to secure votes. They may exaggerate crime rates, economic threats, or foreign dangers to convince people that only they can provide security and stability. -/- Charismatic Leadership Over Competence: Many voters are drawn to leaders with strong personalities rather than those with technical knowledge or governance experience. This results in elections becoming popularity contests rather than assessments of actual capability. -/- 4. The Consequences of Ignorant Voting and Bad Leadership -/- The failure of voters to critically assess candidates leads to long-term consequences: -/- Corruption and Mismanagement: Inept leaders often prioritize personal gain and political survival over public welfare, leading to inefficient governance, corruption, and economic decline. -/- Weak Institutions: When unqualified leaders control government agencies, they weaken institutions by appointing incompetent officials, undermining checks and balances, and eroding democratic principles. -/- Cyclical Poverty and Underdevelopment: Poor governance results in policies that fail to address economic inequality, educational deficiencies, and healthcare inefficiencies, trapping societies in a cycle of underdevelopment. -/- 5. Possible Solutions to Improve Democratic Decision-Making -/- To counteract the negative effects of brain inefficiencies on democratic governance, societies must implement long-term solutions: -/- Educational Reform: Schools should emphasize critical thinking, logic, and media literacy from an early age. Teaching students how to evaluate political claims, fact-check information, and identify biases can create a more informed electorate. -/- Fact-Checking Mechanisms: Governments, independent organizations, and media outlets should promote fact-checking to counter misinformation. Encouraging citizens to rely on credible sources rather than propaganda can reduce the influence of fake news. -/- Merit-Based Leadership Selection: While democracy allows for free elections, implementing stricter qualifications for political candidates—such as requiring a background in governance, law, or economics—can help ensure that only competent individuals assume leadership roles. -/- Technology and AI in Governance: AI-driven platforms could be developed to provide unbiased political analysis, helping voters make more rational decisions based on data rather than emotions. -/- Conclusion -/- The inefficiencies of the human brain—such as cognitive biases, emotional decision-making, and susceptibility to misinformation—contribute significantly to the election of bad government leaders and the prevalence of ignorant voting in democratic systems. However, by improving education, strengthening fact-checking mechanisms, and encouraging merit-based leadership, societies can minimize these weaknesses and enhance democratic governance. A well-informed electorate is essential for a functional democracy, and addressing these biological limitations is a necessary step toward a better political future. -/- . (shrink)

Text classification is one of the most important task in natural language processing, In this research, we carried out several experimental research on three (3) of the most popular Text classification NLP classifier in Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB), and Support Vector Machine (SVN). In the presence of enough training data, Deep Learning CNN work best in all parameters for evaluation with 77% accuracy, followed by SVM with accuracy of 76%, and multinomial Bayes with least performance of (...) 69% accuracy. CNN has the best performance in the presence of large enough training dataset because of the presence of filter/ kernels which help to indentify patterns in text data regardless of their position in the sentence. -/- We repeated the training again with just one-third of our data, at this point SVM comes with the best performance, the performance of CNN noticeably drops but still better than Multinomial Naive Bayes, the reason why SVM works best when we reduce the training data was because of its ability to look for a hyper-plane that creates a boundary between different classes of data so as to properly classify them, so we believed that getting the hyper-plane was more efficient when we reduce the dataset, hence reason for the good performance. Multinomial Naive Bayes have the least performance which we attributed to its assumption of independency between the features which sometimes does not hold true. We concluded that availability of data should be an important factor when choosing classifier for Natural Language Processing Text Classification task. CNN should be use in the presence of enough dataset, and SVM should be use when data is not enough. Multinomial Naive Bayes must not be trusted with state of the art NLP task due to its assumption of independency between the features. (shrink)

The Best Form of Government for Power Transitions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. While some governments manage peaceful and stable transitions, others experience violent overthrows, civil wars, or political chaos. The key to a successful power transition lies in strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust in the system. Based on historical evidence, liberal democracies with strong institutions are the most effective at ensuring smooth (...) transitions. However, other forms of government can also maintain stability if they have well-defined mechanisms for succession. This essay examines various government types and their effectiveness in power transitions. -/- The Importance of Stable Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. The ability to ensure smooth leadership changes is crucial for long-term stability. Governments that fail in this aspect often face coups, revolutions, or national disintegration. The most effective power transitions depend on: -/- 1. Legitimacy – Leaders must be chosen through a process accepted by the people and elites. -/- 2. Strong Institutions – Independent branches of government ensure continuity regardless of leadership changes. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – Political elites should agree on a leader’s succession to prevent internal power struggles. -/- 4. Public Support – If the population believes in the process, transitions are peaceful. -/- 5. Military Neutrality – The armed forces should not interfere in leadership changes. -/- Different forms of government approach power transitions in distinct ways. Below, we analyze their effectiveness. -/- 1. Liberal Democracy: The Best Model for Peaceful Transitions -/- Definition: -/- Liberal democracies are systems where leaders are chosen through free and fair elections, with checks and balances to prevent authoritarian rule. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Elections Provide Legitimacy – Power changes peacefully through regular elections. ✔ Strong Institutions – Courts, legislatures, and the media help uphold the rule of law. ✔ Public Accountability – Leaders who lose elections step down without conflict. -/- Examples of Successful Power Transitions: -/- ✅ United States – Since 1789, despite crises like the Civil War and Great Depression, power transitions have remained constitutional. ✅ United Kingdom – The parliamentary system allows for smooth leadership changes without national instability. ✅ Germany (Post-WWII) – After democratic reforms, Germany has had peaceful transitions of power. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ Election Disputes Can Create Instability – Example: The U.S. Capitol Riot (2021) after a contested election. ❌ Weak Institutions in Young Democracies – Example: Kenya’s 2007 election disputes led to violence. -/- Best Democratic Model: -/- ✔ Parliamentary Democracies (e.g., UK, Canada, Germany) tend to have smoother transitions than presidential systems because: -/- Leadership changes occur within political parties, reducing external conflicts. -/- Votes of no confidence can remove leaders without revolutions or coups. -/- 2. Constitutional Monarchy: Stable If Institutions Are Strong -/- Definition: -/- A constitutional monarchy is a system where a king or queen serves as a symbolic head of state, while an elected government runs the country. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Monarchy Provides Stability – Kings and queens remain constant, reducing uncertainty. ✔ Elections Determine Political Leaders – The prime minister and parliament handle governance. ✔ Symbolic Unity – Monarchs can unify the country during crises. -/- Examples of Stable Monarchies: -/- ✅ United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Netherlands – Power transitions occur through democratic elections, while the monarchy remains a stabilizing force. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If the Monarch Becomes Politically Active, It Can Cause Crisis – Example: Thailand (2020s protests against the monarchy’s influence). ❌ If a Monarch Dies Unexpectedly, It Can Create Uncertainty – Example: Spain’s transition after Franco’s dictatorship (1975) depended on King Juan Carlos I to restore democracy. -/- Best Model for Monarchies: -/- ✔ Monarchies that Stay Neutral in Politics (e.g., UK, Sweden) prevent power struggles. -/- 3. One-Party States: Stable but Risky if a Leader Dies Unexpectedly -/- Definition: -/- One-party states are systems where only one political party governs, often without free elections. -/- Why It Can Have Stable Transitions: -/- ✔ Predictable Leadership Changes (if well-structured) – Leaders are often pre-selected within the ruling party. ✔ Less Election Conflict – No multi-party competition reduces disputes. ✔ Long-Term Policies – The government can plan policies without election cycles. -/- Examples of One-Party States with Stable Transitions: -/- ✅ China (Communist Party Rule) – Leaders were replaced every 10 years before Xi Jinping extended his rule. ✅ Vietnam (Communist Party) – The ruling party ensures orderly successions. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If a Leader Dies Suddenly, It Can Create Chaos – Example: North Korea after Kim Jong-il’s death (2011). ❌ If There’s No Clear Successor, Infighting Can Occur – Example: Soviet Union’s power struggles after Stalin’s death (1953). -/- Best Model for One-Party States: -/- ✔ China’s Model (Before 2018) – Leaders were pre-selected within the Communist Party, preventing instability. -/- 4. Absolute Monarchies and Dictatorships: The Most Unstable in Transitions -/- Definition: -/- A system where power is concentrated in one ruler or a small elite group, without elections. -/- Why Transitions Are Unstable: -/- ❌ No Clear Rules for Succession – Leaders often die or are overthrown, causing power struggles. ❌ Military Often Decides the Next Leader – Coups and instability occur frequently. ❌ If a Leader Becomes Too Powerful, No One Can Challenge Them – This leads to violent transitions. -/- Examples of Failed Transitions in Dictatorships: -/- ❌ Libya (Gaddafi Overthrown, 2011) – No clear succession plan led to a failed state. ❌ Soviet Union (After Stalin’s Death, 1953) – Power struggles created instability. ❌ Iraq (After Saddam Hussein, 2003) – No clear transition led to civil war. -/- Best Model for Dictatorships: -/- ✔ If a Dictatorship Must Exist, It Should Have a Clear Succession Plan – Example: Saudi Arabia has a royal succession council to avoid uncertainty. -/- Conclusion: Which Government Type is Best for Transitions? -/- 1️⃣ Best for Smooth Transitions: Liberal Democracies with Strong Institutions -/- Best Example: Parliamentary Systems (UK, Canada, Germany) – Leaders change peacefully without major conflicts. -/- 2️⃣ Good for Stability but Less Flexible: Constitutional Monarchies -/- Best Example: Japan, UK, Netherlands – Monarchs provide continuity, while governments change through elections. -/- 3️⃣ Stable but Risky: One-Party States -/- Best Example: China (Before 2018) – Internal party succession prevented chaos, but risk of dictatorship remains. -/- 4️⃣ Most Unstable: Dictatorships and Absolute Monarchies -/- Worst Example: Libya, Iraq, North Korea – Transitions are violent and unpredictable. -/- Ultimately, liberal democracies with strong institutions (especially parliamentary systems) are the best for stable power transitions. Dictatorships and absolute monarchies, on the other hand, often collapse violently when leaders die or are overthrown. By ensuring strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust, governments can create a system where leadership changes occur peacefully, securing long-term stability. -/- . (shrink)

The Role of Power Transitions in Government Collapse: Historical Lessons and Solutions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. When power is transferred smoothly, institutions remain strong, and societies continue to function. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or poorly structured, they often lead to political instability, civil wars, or the complete breakdown of government structures. This essay explores the importance of power transitions in maintaining political stability by (...) examining historical examples where such transitions led to the collapse of governments. Additionally, it proposes solutions to prevent such collapses in the future. -/- The Critical Nature of Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. Several factors determine whether a transition is successful or leads to instability: -/- 1. Legitimacy of Succession – If the public and political elites accept the process of succession, transitions occur peacefully. However, when legitimacy is questioned, power struggles emerge. -/- 2. Institutional Strength – Strong political institutions ensure smooth power transitions, while weak institutions make governments dependent on individual rulers. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – When ruling elites agree on a transition, it is more likely to be peaceful. Divisions among elites can result in coups or civil wars. -/- 4. Public Support and Social Stability – If the population supports the transition, the government remains stable. Mass protests or revolts can destabilize regimes. -/- 5. Military and Security Forces’ Role – A neutral or loyal military ensures a peaceful transition, but if the military intervenes, coups or armed conflicts may occur. -/- 6. Economic Conditions – Economic crises can accelerate government collapse during power transitions by weakening public trust. -/- 7. External Influences – Foreign intervention, diplomatic pressure, or economic sanctions can shape whether a transition succeeds or leads to chaos. -/- Historical Examples of Power Transitions Leading to Collapse -/- 1. The Fall of the Roman Republic (1st Century BCE) -/- The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE triggered a power vacuum and civil war. The Republic collapsed as Augustus (Octavian) seized power and established the Roman Empire. The failure to create a smooth transition from the Republic to an alternative stable government structure led to one-man rule. -/- 2. The French Revolution (1789-1799) -/- The monarchy collapsed due to economic crises and public discontent. The power vacuum led to the Reign of Terror and multiple regime changes before Napoleon took control. The lack of a stable transition plan from monarchy to democracy resulted in violent political struggles. -/- 3. The Russian Revolution (1917) -/- Czar Nicholas II abdicated amid economic and military crises. The weak Provisional Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, leading to decades of political purges. The failure to establish a strong democratic system allowed radical elements to seize power. -/- 4. The Weimar Republic and Hitler’s Rise (1933) -/- Germany’s economic crisis and political instability enabled Adolf Hitler to rise to power legally, leading to the collapse of democracy and the Nazi dictatorship. The failure of democratic institutions to resist authoritarian takeovers contributed to this transition failure. -/- 5. The Iranian Revolution (1979) -/- The Shah of Iran lost legitimacy due to repression and economic struggles. His departure created a power vacuum, allowing the Islamic Revolution to establish a theocratic regime. The lack of a democratic transition framework led to a total political shift. -/- 6. The Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) -/- Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms weakened the centralized government, leading to nationalist movements and economic collapse, resulting in the dissolution of the USSR. The sudden transition from communism to multiple independent states was mismanaged, leading to political chaos. -/- 7. The Arab Spring (2010-2012) -/- Mass protests led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. However, weak institutions and power vacuums resulted in ongoing instability and civil wars. The absence of structured political succession made these transitions chaotic. -/- 8. The Fall of the Afghan Government (2021) -/- The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the rapid collapse of the Afghan government, allowing the Taliban to take power without resistance. The lack of a well-planned transition left a power vacuum that extremist groups exploited. -/- Solutions for Preventing Government Collapse During Power Transitions -/- 1. Establishing Strong Political Institutions -/- Governments should build independent institutions that can function regardless of leadership changes. -/- A clear legal framework for succession should be established, ensuring stability. -/- Example: United States Presidential Transition – Despite political disagreements, strong institutions ensure smooth transitions of power every four years. -/- 2. Promoting a Culture of Democratic Succession -/- Political education should emphasize peaceful transitions of power. -/- Leaders should prepare successors and ensure a stable transition process. -/- Example: South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid (1994) – Nelson Mandela ensured a peaceful transfer of power through negotiations, preventing civil war. -/- 3. Ensuring Economic Stability -/- Economic policies should focus on long-term growth and stability to prevent crises that weaken governments. -/- Governments should maintain financial reserves to manage economic downturns during transitions. -/- Example: China’s Economic Reforms (1978-Present) – Transition from Maoist policies to a market economy was gradual, preventing instability. -/- 4. Strengthening Public Trust in Government -/- Transparency and accountability should be prioritized to gain public confidence. -/- Civic engagement and public participation in governance should be encouraged. -/- Example: Post-World War II Japan – Japan rebuilt trust in democratic institutions, leading to long-term political stability. -/- 5. Avoiding Military Interventions in Politics -/- The military should remain neutral in political transitions and serve as a stabilizing force, not a political actor. -/- Civilian oversight of the military should be strengthened to prevent coups. -/- Example: Turkey’s Democratic Reforms – Despite past military coups, recent reforms have reduced military interference in politics. -/- 6. International Mediation and Support -/- International organizations (e.g., the UN) should assist in ensuring peaceful transitions in unstable regions. -/- Diplomatic pressure can prevent violent takeovers and encourage legitimate transitions. -/- Example: East Timor’s Independence (2002) – The UN helped facilitate a peaceful transition to democracy after Indonesian rule. -/- 7. Managing Internal and External Political Conflicts -/- Governments should ensure national unity by addressing ethnic and political divisions. -/- Foreign influence should be managed to prevent external powers from exploiting transitions. -/- Example: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Rebuilding – After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda implemented reconciliation policies to prevent future power struggles. -/- Conclusion -/- The transition of power is one of the most critical and dangerous moments for any government. If managed well, it can lead to stable governance and progress. However, when transitions are mismanaged, contested, or forced, they can result in political collapse, violence, and societal breakdown. -/- The historical examples discussed demonstrate the importance of legitimacy, institutional strength, elite consensus, public support, and military neutrality in ensuring successful power transitions. By implementing solutions such as strong institutions, economic stability, democratic culture, and international mediation, governments can prevent collapse and ensure smooth transitions of power. -/- The fate of nations often depends not only on who rules, but on how power is transferred from one leader or system to the next. Learning from history and implementing practical solutions can help safeguard governments from the chaos of failed transitions. -/- . (shrink)

The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...) pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem. (shrink)

Does trust play a significant role in the appreciation of art? If so, how does it operate? We argue that it does, and that the mechanics of trust operate both at a general and a particular level. After outlining the general notion of ‘art-trust’—the notion sketched is consistent with most notions of trust on the market—and considering certain objections to the model proposed, we consider specific examples to show in some detail that the experience of works (...) of art, and the attribution of art-relevant properties or characterisations to works of art, very often involves the notion of trust; in such cases—perhaps most or even, implicitly, all—the question ‘Do I trust the artist (or art-maker)?’, is inescapable. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust (...) lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

The increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in our daily life through various applications, services, and products explains the significance of trust/distrust in AI from a user perspective. AI-driven systems have significantly diffused into various fields of our lives, serving as beneficial tools used by human agents. These systems are also evolving to act as co-assistants or semi-agents in specific domains, potentially influencing human thought, decision-making, and agency. Trust/distrust in AI plays the role of a regulator and (...) could significantly control the level of this diffusion, as trust can increase, and distrust may reduce the rate of adoption of AI. Recently, varieties of studies have paid attention to the variant dimension of trust/distrust in AI, and its relevant considerations. In this systematic literature review, after conceptualization of trust in the current AI literature review, we will investigate trust in different types of human-Machine interaction, and its impact on technology acceptance in different domains. In addition to that, we propose a taxonomy of technical (i.e., safety, accuracy, robustness) and non-technical axiological (i.e., ethical, legal, and mixed) trustworthiness metrics, and some trustworthy measurements. Moreover, we examine some major trust-breakers in AI (e.g., autonomy and dignity threat), and trust makers; and propose some future directions and probable solutions for the transition to a trustworthy AI. (shrink)

In the trust-health relationship, how trusting other people in society may promote good health is a topic often examined. However, the other direction of influence – how health may affect trust – has not been well explored. In order to investigate this possible effect, we employed Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics to go deeper into the information processing mechanisms underlying the expressions of trust. Conducting Bayesian analysis on a dataset of 1237 residents from Cali, Colombia, we found (...) that general health status is positively associated with generalized trust, but recent experiences of illnesses/injuries have a negative moderating effect. Personalized trust is largely unchanged across different general health conditions, but the trust level becomes higher with recent experiences of illnesses/injuries. Psychophysiological mechanisms of increasing information filtering intensity toward unfamiliar sources during a vulnerable state of health is a plausible explanation of found patterns in generalized trust. Because established personal relationships are reinforced information channels, personalized trust is not affected as much. Rather, the results suggest that people may rely even more on loved ones when they are in bad health conditions. This exploratory study shows that the trust-health relationship can be examined from a different angle that may provide new insights. (shrink)

Trust is a core feature of the physician-patient relationship, and risk is central to trust. Patients take risks when they trust their providers to care for them effectively and appropriately. Not all patients take these risks: some medical relationships are marked by mistrust and suspicion. Empirical evidence suggests that some patients and families of color in the United States may be more likely to mistrust their providers and to be suspicious of specific medical practices and institutions. Given (...) both historical and ongoing oppression and injustice in American medical institutions, such mistrust can be apt. Yet it can also frustrate patient care, leading to family and provider distress. In this paper, I propose one way that providers might work to reestablish trust by taking risks in signaling their own trustworthiness. This interpersonal step is not meant to replace efforts to remedy systemic injustice, but is an immediate measure for addressing mistrust in occurrent cases. (shrink)

A widespread assumption in debates about trust and trustworthiness is that the evaluative norms of principal interest on the trustor’s side of a cooperative exchange regulate trusting attitudes and performances whereas those on the trustee’s side regulate dispositions to respond to trust. The aim here will be to highlight some unnoticed problems with this asymmetrical picture – and in particular, how it elides certain key evaluative norms on both the trustor’s and trustee’s side the satisfaction of which are (...) critical to successful cooperative exchanges – and to show that a symmetrical, ‘achievement-first’ approach to theorising about trust and trustworthiness (and their relation to each other) has important advantages by comparison. The view I develop is guided by a structural analogy with practical reasoning. Just as practical reasoning is working as it should only when there is realisation (knowledge and action) of states (belief and intention) with reverse directions of fits (mind-to-world and world-to-mind), likewise, cooperation between trustor and trustee is functioning as it should only when there is an analogous kind of realisation on both sides of the cooperative exchange – viz., when the trustor ‘matches’ her achievement in trusting (an achievement in fitting reliance to reciprocity) with the trustee’s achievement in responding to trust (an achievement in fitting reciprocity to reliance). An upshot of viewing cooperation between trustor and trustee as exhibiting achievement-theoretic structure is that we will be better positioned to subsume trustworthiness (and its cognates on the trustee’s side), like trust, under a wider suite of evaluative norms that regulate attempts, dispositions, and achievements symmetrically on both sides of a cooperative exchange, with ‘matching achievements’ as the gold standard. (shrink)

In this paper, I articulate and defend a conception of trust that solves what I call “the trickster problem.” The problem results from the fact that many accounts of trust treat it similar to, or identical with, relying on someone’s good will. But a trickster could rely on your good will to get you to go along with his scheme, without trusting you to do so. Recent philosophical accounts of trust aim to characterize what it is for (...) one person to trust another so as to avoid this problem, but no extant account successfully does so. I argue that connecting trust to important, normatively defined relationships like friendship, romantic partnerships and parenting shows us something important about trust. The clearest cases of trust are found within the confines of normatively defined relationships like these, suggesting that there is a normative element to trust. Trusting someone involves not just believing that another person’s good will covers your interactions. Trusting involves believing that, at least in a certain domain of interaction, you are entitled to rely on that person’s good will. This account solves the trickster problem, because a trickster is not entitled to his victim’s good will. (shrink)

This paper sets out an account of trust in AI as a relationship between clinicians, AI applications, and AI practitioners in which AI is given discretionary authority over medical questions by clinicians. Compared to other accounts in recent literature, this account more adequately explains the normative commitments created by practitioners when inviting clinicians’ trust in AI. To avoid committing to an account of trust in AI applications themselves, I sketch a reductive view on which discretionary authority is (...) exercised by AI practitioners through the vehicle of an AI application. I conclude with four critical questions based on the discretionary account to determine if trust in particular AI applications is sound, and a brief discussion of the possibility that the main roles of the physician could be replaced by AI. (shrink)

Trust not only disposes us to feel betrayed, trust can be betrayed. Understanding what a betrayal of trust is requires understanding how trust can ground an obligation on the part of the trusted person to act specifically as trusted. This essay argues that, since trust cannot ground an appropriate obligation where there is no prior obligation, a betrayal of trust should instead be conceived as the violation of a trust-based obligation to respect an (...) already existing obligation. Two forms of trust are evaluated for their potential to ground such a second-order obligation. One form counts as a gift to the trusted person only because it does not involve an expectation of trustworthiness; the other form cannot count as a gift but confers an honor because it does include an expectation of trustworthiness. Only trust that confers an honor generates a second-order obligation whose violation would be a betrayal of trust. -/- . (shrink)

When are we obligated to believe someone? To what extent are people authorities about their own experiences? What kind of harm might we enact when we doubt? Questions like these lie at the heart of many debates in social and feminist epistemology, and they’re the driving issue behind a key conceptual framework in these debates—gaslighting. But while the concept of gaslighting has provided fruitful insight, it's also proven somewhat difficult to adjudicate, and seems prone to over-application. In what follows, I (...) argue that Katherine Hawley's theory of trust can provide a useful alternative lens for looking at contested testimony. To do this, I focus on a particularly complex—but increasingly popular—application of gaslighting: the physician/patient relationship, and the idea of ‘medical gaslighting’. I argue that, even though patients can experience harm when they are disbelieved, there are nevertheless good reasons for physicians not to trust patients about at least some of their own narratives. (shrink)

Previous simulation models have found positive effects of cognitive diversity on group performance, but have not explored effects of diversity in demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). In this paper, we present an agent-based model that captures two empirically supported hypotheses about how demographic diversity can improve group performance. The results of our simulations suggest that, even when social identities are not associated with distinctive task-related cognitive resources, demographic diversity can, in certain circumstances, benefit collective performance by counteracting two types of conformity (...) that can arise in homogeneous groups: those relating to group-based trust and those connected to normative expectations towards in-groups. (shrink)

Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to (...) class='Hi'>trust. even if we don’t have positive reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ. (shrink)