Aim: Low professional help-seeking intention (PHSI) hinders effective treatment of mental illness. PHSI among Chinese students is still understudied and under-recognized. This study aimed to evaluate the status of PHSI and its associated risk factors among Chinese medical students. -/- Methods: A cross-sectional survey was conducted in Hainan province, South China, between January 1, 2021, and May 31, 2021. A total of 2182 medical students were recruited and surveyed via an anonymous structured questionnaire. Logistic regression analyses were performed to identify (...) the factors associated with PHSI. -/- Results: Among the 2182 medical students (mean age 21.0 years (SD = 3.70), 61.5% females), those with and without PHSI were 72.0% and 28.0%, and 16.4% with moderate to severe depression. Male students, those with a high level of depression stigma, serious family dysfunction, and heavy dependence on mobile phones were significantly less likely to seek professional mental health help, with odds ratios (ORs) of 1.5, 2.0, 2.1, and 1.7, respectively. -/- Conclusion: A significant proportion of Chinese medical students demonstrate low PHSI, influenced by factors such as gender, depression stigma, family dysfunction, and mobile phone dependence. Future interventions aimed at increasing medical students’ PHSI should prioritize reducing depression stigma, mitigating reliance on mobile phone use, and enhancing family function to address these key barriers to seeking professional mental health support. (shrink)

Skeptical invariantists maintain that the expression “knows” invariably expresses an epistemically extremely demanding relation. This leads to an immediate challenge. The knowledge relation will hardly if ever be satisfied. Consequently, we can rarely if ever apply “knows” truly. The present paper assesses a prominent strategy for skeptical invariantists to respond to this challenge, which appeals to loose talk. Based on recent developments in the theory of loose talk, I argue that such appeals to loose talk fail. I go on to (...) present a closely related, more promising response strategy, which combines assumptions about the dynamics of pragmatic presuppostions from Blome-Tillmann (2014) with an appeal to conversational exculpature, a phenomenon recently studied by Hoek (2018, 2019). (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss what I will call “skeptical pragmatic invariantism” as a potential response to the intuitions we have about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. SPI, very roughly, is a form of epistemic invariantism that says the following: The subject in the bank cases doesn’t know that the bank will be open. The knowledge ascription in the low standards case seems appropriate nevertheless because it has a true implicature. The goal of this paper is to (...) show that SPI is mistaken. In particular, I will show that SPI is incompatible with reasonable assumptions about how we are aware of the presence of implicatures. Such objections are not new, but extant formulations are wanting for reasons I will point out below. One may worry that refuting SPI is not a worthwhile project given that this view is an implausible minority position anyway. To respond, I will argue that, contrary to common opinion, other familiar objections to SPI fail and, thus, that SPI is a promising position to begin with. (shrink)

It is commonly held that retraction data, if they exist, show that assessment relativism is preferable to non-indexical contextualism. I argue that this is not the case. Whether retraction data have the suggested probative force depends on substantive questions about the proper treatment of tense and location. One’s preferred account in these domains should determine whether one accepts assessment relativism or non-indexical contextualism.

The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism predicts that we should assess them in the (...) light of the taste standard governing the context of use. We show in a range of experiments that neither prediction is correct. People have no clear preferences either way and which taste standard they choose in evaluating a previous taste claim crucially depends on whether they start out with a favorable attitude towards the object in question and then come to have an unfavorable attitude or vice versa. We suggest an account of the data in terms of what we call hybrid relativism. (shrink)

Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can (...) be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deflationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, first, that the bank cases are underspecified even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will fill in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case. (shrink)

It seems to be a common and intuitively plausible assumption that conversational implicatures arise only when one of the so-called conversational maxims is violated at the level of what is said. The basic idea behind this thesis is that, unless a maxim is violated at the level of what is said, nothing can trigger the search for an implicature. Thus, non-violating implicatures wouldn’t be calculable. This paper defends the view that some conversational implicatures arise even though no conversational maxim is (...) violated at the level of what is said. (shrink)

It has been argued that epistemic contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, they are not true by the standard of their own context. In my paper, I want to show that the argument to the (...) factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel understanding of the notion of calculability. In Gricean frameworks, calculability is defined in terms of how speakers can infer an implicature. The relevant inferences must e.g. be based on maxims of conversation or cooperation principles. Meanwhile, I suggest to define calculability in terms of when, or under which conditions, speakers can infer an implicature. An implicature is calculable if hearers can infer its existence even supposing that the implicature is not semantically encoded. This approach avoids (...) familiar challenges, including recently prominent challenges from pragmatic particularism. (shrink)

Desire is an important philosophical topic that deeply impacts everyday life. Philosophical practice is an emerging trend that uses philosophical theories and methods as a guide to living a eu‐ daimonic life. In this paper, we define desire philosophically and compare different theories of desire in specific Eastern and Western traditions. Based on the Lacanian conceptual–terminological triad of “Need‐Demand‐Desire”, the research of desire is further divided into three dimensions, namely, the subject of desire, the object of desire, and the desire (...) itself. The concept of desire is then an‐ alyzed from this triad and these three dimensions through different philosophical theories. This paper selects Buddhism as the representative of Eastern tradition, and Stoicism as the representative of the West, paying special attention to Stoicism’s “spiritual exercises” following Pierre Hadot. By exploring and comparing the Buddhist paths to liberation from suffering (i.e., the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path) and the two theoretical pillars in Stoicism (i.e., the notions of “living according to nature” and “the dichotomy of control”), practical guidance is then provided for un‐ derstanding and regulating desire in times of crisis. This understanding and regulation of desire constitutes a philosophical therapy for today’s troubles, particularly those caused by excessive or irrational desires. (shrink)

Scroggs's theorem on the extensions of S5 is an early landmark in the modern mathematical studies of modal logics. From it, we know that the lattice of normal extensions of S5 is isomorphic to the inverse order of the natural numbers with infinity and that all extensions of S5 are in fact normal. In this paper, we consider extending Scroggs's theorem to modal logics with propositional quantifiers governed by the axioms and rules analogous to the usual ones for ordinary quantifiers. (...) We call them Π-logics. Taking S5Π, the smallest normal Π-logic extending S5, as the natural counterpart to S5 in Scroggs's theorem, we show that all normal Π-logics extending S5Π are complete with respect to their complete simple S5 algebras, that they form a lattice that is isomorphic to the lattice of the open sets of the disjoint union of two copies of the one-point compactification of N, that they have arbitrarily high Turing-degrees, and that there are non-normal Π-logics extending S5Π. (shrink)

Materialization practices in the architecture and building industry have evolved with the advancement of manufacturing and information technologies. This evolution is evident across various design and production phases, with a pronounced impact on prototyping. Advances in design and fabrication tools have empowered prototypes, integral in any production cycle, to furnish a growing array of information and feedback for designers and manufacturers. In this context, prototypes have transformed from merely showcasing data-driven building solutions to presenting socio-environmentally conscious systems. Innovation in prototyping (...) connects the initial design and construction stages to the operational phase, creating a seamless transition throughout the project lifecycle. This chapter provides a range of definitions and prototypical case studies for smart prototyping by identifying practiced approaches in integrated design to production workflows. This chapter introduces three paradigms for smart prototyping: Digital prototyping focuses on data-driven design for mass customization, phygital prototyping involves mixed-reality-enabled design and assembly, and thirdly collaborative prototyping explores human-machine hybrid intelligence and co-production in architectural and urban contexts. The chosen case studies in this chapter and how they are categorized aim to provide a comprehensive overview of smart prototyping, covering projects conducted in both research and practice. This chapter concludes with potential future trends and the role of emerging and evolving mediums of prototyping for smart design and construction. (shrink)

Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic (WAML) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with n-ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. WAML has some interesting applications on epistemic logic and logic of games, so we study some basic model theoretical aspects of WAML in this paper. Specifically, we give a van Benthem-Rosen characterization theorem of WAML based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation and show that each basic WAML system Kn lacks Craig Interpolation.

The view of embodied cognition believes that cognition is embodied in nature, only the dynamics involved in the interaction between cognitive activities and the nervous system, body and environment, only by closely linking the correct evaluation of time-dependent and relationship, then only can make a correct understanding of cognitive activities. The core concepts of body and environment involved in embodied cognition are different from the body and environment in the usual sense. In terms of research methods, dynamic research methods that (...) are different from traditional computer simulations are also adopted. The article first integrates and analyzes the basic position and general propositions in the discipline, then the embodied cognition are explained based on author's understanding. In addition, the suitability of dynamic research methods, its advantages and disadvantages is analyzed, and finally, a brief summary of the current status of embodied cognition research. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the performance stories in the Zhuangzi, and the Butcher Ding story, emphasize an activity meditation practice that places the performer in a mindfulness flow zone, leading to graceful, efficacious, selfless, spontaneous, and free action. These stories are metaphors showing the reader how to attain a meditative state of focused awareness while acting freely in a flow experience. From my perspective, these metaphors are not about developing practical or technical skills per se. My argument (...) challenges a strict instrumental reading. Although instrumental reasoning can easily lead one to focus on the pragmatic outcomes depicted in these stories (See Eno, “Cook Ding’s Dao;” Callahan, “Cook Ding’s Life;” and Robins, “Beyond Skill”), the proposed pragmatic outcomes are merely a kind of collateral result of effortless, free actions, in the flow experience. The metaphors of Butcher Ding, the Lüliang rapids swimmer, the Wheelwright Bian, the Woodcarver Qing, the cicada catcher, the naked artist and so on are used to show the reader a way to engage in free and graceful action in the flow experience. Zhuangzi is not concerned about developing labour skills. He criticizes such skills; seen below when the Butcher claims to have “… left skill behind …” (進乎技矣) (Graham, Chuang-tzu, 63), and chapter five notes that “… skill is a peddler” (工為商) (Watson, Complete, 75). (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to de-naturalize the prevailing economistic imaginary of work that Max Weber and later commentators described as ‘protestant work ethic,’ epitomized in the figure of homo economicus. We do so by contrasting it with the imaginary of skillful work that can be found in vignettes about artisans in the Zhuangzi. We argue that there are interesting contrasts between these views concerning 1) direct goal achievement vs. indirect goal achievement through the cultivation of skills; 2) the hierarchization (...) of mental versus physical dimensions of work; 3) the crafting of non-dominating relationships between the working subject, their object, and their instruments of work, which leads to questions about the sustainability of these relationships; and 4) the relationship between work and well-being, which the Daoist texts conceptualize in a much more holistic, but also more presentist way than Western economic rationality. We conclude by pointing out the relevance of these differences for several contemporary debates about work, by denaturalizing a dominant imaginary of work, by distinguishing different forms of work, by suggesting a different relation between work and nature, and by raising questions about the desirability of the automation of work. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is an ontological clarification of the concept of artefact. The following questions are addressed: 1. Do artefacts constitute an ontological category of objects in its own right, and if so, how could this category be characterized? 2. How do artefacts come into existence? 3. What kind of artefacts are there, and in which relations do they stand to each other? It is argued that artefacts are characterized essentially through their genesis and that they owe their (...) existence to mental acts of a particular kind, which I call “acts of creation”. It is maintained that there are not only concrete, material artefacts, but also abstract artefacts, that is, artefacts that cannot be perceived through the senses and are not located in space. Furthermore, it shall be claimed that in a sense those abstract artefacts are even primary to the concrete, material artefacts. (shrink)

I present a vision of a university in which each of the departments is based on having solved a paradox (especially for those who think that philosophers on here lack vision, in a grand sense!). I do so imitating a notable modernist writer, apologies for any political incorrectness.

This is a review of the new translation-cum-commentary of Lucretius, De rerum Natura by Klaus Binder, published by dtv, Munich 2017. The review stresses the importance of Lucretius work for the Enlightenment. The translation is o. k. on the whole, however the translator should have avoided rendering the Latin >religio< by >Aberglauben< (superstition). >superstition< was the word chosen by the English translator in the Loeb-Library, W. H. D. Rouse. Rouse was a Headmaster of the Perse School in Cambridge and he (...) may have chosen this rendering in 1924 to avoid getting into trouble with the Church of England. (shrink)

In the semantic debate about perspectival expressions – predicates of taste, aesthetic and moral terms, epistemic modals, etc. – intuitions about armchair scenarios (e.g., disagreement, retraction) have played a crucial role. More recently, various experimental studies have been conducted, both in relation to disagreement (e.g., Cova, 2012; Foushee and Srinivasan, 2017; Solt, 2018) and retraction (e.g., Knobe and Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2018; Beddor and Egan, 2018; Dinges and Zakkou, 2020; Kneer 2021; 2022; Almagro, Bordonaba Plou and Villanueva, 2023; Marques, 2024), (...) with the aim of establishing a more solid foundation for semantic theorizing. Both these types of data have been used to argue for or against certain views (e.g., contextualism, relativism). In this paper, I discern a common thread in the use of these data and argue for two claims: i) which perspective is adopted by those judging the armchair scenarios put forward and by the participants in experimental studies crucially matters for the viability of the intended results; ii) failure to properly attend to this puts recent experimental work at risk. Finally, I consider the case of cross-linguistic disagreement and retraction and assess their importance for the semantic debate about perspectival expressions, as well as for the claim that perspective matters in putting forward the data on which decisions about the right semantic view are made. (shrink)

Üblicherweise sind die Dinge kompliziert. Dies führt dazu, dass es eine Menge (unvereinbarer) Theorien gibt, die sich diesen Dingen widmen. Manche sind recht einfach gestrickt, andere sind komplexer. Die Existenz dieser unterschiedlichen Ideen sind ein Indiz dafür, dass die Dinge bisher letztlich unerklärt sind. Und sie sind eine Aufforderung, weiter zu denken. Manchmal sind sie aber auch eine Aufforderung, einmal aufzuräumen. Diese Aufgabe habe ich mir zu Herzen genommen und will deswegen in dieser Arbeit (sozusagen als kleiner Reiseführer) einige Theorien (...) zu Handlungsgründen beleuchten. (shrink)

This paper develops an analysis of non-epistemic deniability. On my analysis, a speaker has non-epistemic deniability for G-ing when non-acknowledgment social norms make it impermissible for others to retaliate against the speaker for G-ing. I identify two kinds of non-acknowledgment norms that generate non-epistemic deniability: two-tracking norms, which function to contain conflict within a group, and open secrecy norms, which function to inhibit the group from acting on shared knowledge. Narrowly, this paper builds on Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou’s recent (...) landmark analysis of deniability. Dinges and Zakkou argue that non-epistemic deniability does not exist. I disagree. But I also use their account of epistemic deniability in order to motivate my own analysis of non-epistemic deniability. Broadly, my paper provides a case study in how speakers strategically leverage non-acknowledgment norms in order to protect their own interests at the expense of others’. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb, which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. Expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is P (...) ‘in its own right’ or without some further ‘condition’. Accordingly, “an sich selbst” should not be treated as forming complex nouns. This analysis has significant consequences for the interpretation of “thing in itself” in particular, for it implies that the latter is not a complete nominal expression. Instead, one must treat ‘an sich selbst’ as expressing how some S is a ‘thing’, looking to the wider sentential context. I conclude with a brief account of the new significance granted to the concept of a ‘thing’ (Ding) according to the present interpretation. (shrink)

How is it that a speaker _S_ can at once make it obvious to an audience _A_ that she intends to communicate some proposition _p_, and yet at the same time retain plausible deniability with respect to this intention? The answer is that _S_ can bring it about that _A_ has a high justified credence that ‘_S_ intended _p_’ without putting _A_ in a position to know that ‘_S_ intended _p_’. In order to achieve this _S_ has to exploit a (...) sense in which communication can be lottery-like. After defending this view of deniability I argue that it compares favorably to a rival account recently developed by Dinges and Zakkou (Mind, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac056, 2023 ). (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Aufsatz untersucht die Theorie der exemplarischen Kausalität von Petrus Aureoli (1280–1322). Mindestens bis zur zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts behaupteten mittelalterliche Autoren, dass die Welt geordnet und intelligibel war, weil Gott sie nach aus der Ewigkeit in seinem Intellekt existierenden Modellen (d.h. göttlichen Ideen) geschaffen hatte. Aureoli focht diese traditionelle Ansicht an. In Aureolis Theorie ist die göttliche Essenz das einzige Urbild für die Erschaffung. Um zu erklären, wie ein einziges Objekt allein als Urbilder für die Erschaffung mehrerer (...) verschiedener Kreaturen fungieren kann, muss er den Begriff der Nachahmbarkeit neu überdenken und ein neues Modell der exemplarischen Kausalität entwickeln. Das traditionelle Modell war das der Analogie: Eine Ursache erzeugt einen Effekt, der zum Teil ähnlich wie sie und zum Teil anders als sie ist. Aureoli greift auf den Be-griff von Äquivokation zurück. Er argumentiert, dass keine direkte Ähnlichkeit zwischen Ursache und Effekt notwendig ist. Im Gegenteil: Damit ein Objekt das Urbild für mehrere verschiedene Dinge sein kann, ist es notwendig, dass es für keinen von ihnen repräsentativ ist. Der Begriff der Äquivokation erlaubt es Aureoli, das traditionelle Modell der Erschaffung abzulehnen. Aequivocatio sieht keine Ähnlichkeit zwischen Idee und Ideatum vor. Es be-steht also kein Widerspruch darin, wenn man sagt, dass ein einziges Objekt (göttliche Essenz) aequivoce die exemplarische Ursache für mehrere verschiedene Objekte ist. (shrink)

Several philosophers maintain that outright belief exists because it plays a reasoning simplifying role (Holton 2008; Ross and Schroeder 2014; Staffel 2019; Weisberg 2020). This claim has been recently contested, on the grounds that credences also can simplify reasoning (Dinges 2021). This paper takes a step back and asks: what features of an attitude explain its alleged ability to simplify reasoning? The paper contrasts two explanations, one in terms of dispositions and the other in terms of representation, arguing in favour (...) of the latter and against the former. The proposed explanation yields two interesting results: first, both belief and other attitudes, such as acceptance and imagination, can play a reasoning simplifying role; second, credences do not simplify our reasoning. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

According to the neo-Kantian and cultural anthropologist Ernst Cassirer, man always interacts with nature. This assumption forms the basis for his philosophical approach to the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms of 1929. It is based on the thesis that we do not conceive nature as objects (‘Ding-Wahrnehmung’), but immediately feel and suffer nature through the so-called ‘perception of expression’ (‘Ausdrucks-Wahrnehmung’). Thus, our understanding of the world is based on interaction with nature, because feeling and suffering depend on something we feel (...) and suffer about. In conclusion, Cassirer developed already a theory of Enaktivismus, embodiment, and respectively to modern film theories of immersion. The thesis of the following paper is based on these findings of Cassirer and states that that there is no dichotomy between nature and man. (shrink)

This paper investigates the argument that substantiates Nietzsche's refusal of teh Kantian concept of thing in itself. As Maudmarie Clark points out, Nietzsche dismisses this notion because he views it as self-contradictory. The main concern of the paper will be to account for this position. In particular, the two main theses defended here are that the argument underlying Nietzsche's claim is that the concept of thing in itself amounts to the inconsistent idea of a propertyless thing and that this argument (...) is a sound one. Finally, I will show that the reading proposed allows a deflationary response to the objection that Nietzsche's will to power is simply a new version of the post-Kantian thing in itself.Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Argumentation, die Nietzsches Zurückweisung des kantischen Begriffs des Dings an sich untermauert. Wie Maudmarie Clark betont, berwift Nietzsche diesen Begriff als selbstwidersprüchlich. Hauptanliegen des Aufsatzes ist, dies deutlich zu machen. Insbesondere werden folgende zwei Thesen vertrenen: dass das Nietzsches Position zugrundeliegende Argument darin besteht, der Begriff des Dings an sich sei der inkonsistente Begriff eines eigenschaftslosen Dings; dass dieses Argument stichhaltig ist. Schließlich wird gezeigt, dass diese Interpretation eine delfationäre Antwort auf den Einwand ermöglicht, Nietzsches Wille zur Macht sei einfach eine neue Variante des postkantischen Dings an sich. (shrink)

Das in diesem Aufsatz vorgebrachte Argumentationsmuster hat folgende Schritte: 1. Der menschliche Geist ist vom Körper nicht trennbar, sie bilden ein Kontinuum. 2. Unser Bewusstsein und alle darauf aufbauenden geistigen Phänomene sind die Emanation eines materiellen Prozesses, den ein komplexes System verursacht. 3. Komplexe Systeme lassen sich mathematisch nicht modellieren und nicht kausal verstehen. 4. Computer sind Turing-Maschinen. Sie können nur mathematische Modelle berechnen. Es wird niemals Hyper-Turing Maschinen geben, und wenn es sie gäbe, könnten sie auch nur mathematische Modelle (...) berechnen. 5. Es ist nicht möglich, den Körper als Substrat des Geistes durch einen Computer zu ersetzen. Die digitale Unsterblichkeit ist demzufolge ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit. (shrink)

This paper makes an effort to interpret the relationship between the concepts "Zuhandenheit" (readiness-to-hand) and "Vorhandenheit" (presence-at-hand), as they are analysed in §§ 15-16 of Heidegger's "Being and Time". These concepts are two modes of existence of the beings met in our surrounding world. So, they don't concern different things. Heidegger doesn't give the title "things" to the beings ready-to-hand; he names them "equipments" (Zeug). It's a concept relative to the Aristotelian "organon", which Aristotle exemplifies with the human hand as (...) a primary equipment. But Zuhandenheit isn't a quality of the things; the term has to do with the secret character of the equipments as the maining way of their disclosure. It's the Being-in-itself of the equipments, as long as they are useful. This Being-in-itself has nothing common with the Kantian Ding an sich, which is based on the presupposition of a cognitive relationship between subject and object. I posit also the question, whether Zuhandenheit can rendet the secretness and familiarity of our immediate approach to the environment, and my answer to this question is negative. (shrink)

Iemand die uiteindelijk voor de PhD-positie wordt gekozen, moet in staat zijn om alle vakjes aan te kruisen. Maar één ding is vrijwel zeker: van een promovendus die de functie aanvaardt, wordt zelden verwacht dat zij het basisidee voor het onderzoek, de opzet, de methodologie of iets anders heeft bedacht. Men hoeft alleen maar trainable te zijn. Tijdens de jaren "onder contract" zal de kandidaat immers waarschijnlijk niet worden aangemoedigd om een eigen intellectueel pad te ontwikkelen, of om een (...) nieuwe en interessante richting in het onderzoeksveld uit te stippelen. In plaats daarvan zal van de kandidaat naar alle waarschijnlijkheid worden verwacht dat zij de ideeën van de promotor napraat en vaak zelfs volledig overneemt. (shrink)

Die deutsche Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan zielte erstens darauf ab, in Afghanistan für Demokratie und Menschenrechte zu sorgen; zweitens darauf, an Ort und Stelle für Sicherheit zu sorgen (ohne die kein wirtschaftlicher und gesellschaftlicher Aufbau möglich ist); und drittens darauf, unsere eigene Sicherheit (etwa vor terroristischen Angriffen) zu erhöhen. Diese Ziele sind erstrebenswert – aber es ist mehr als fraglich, ob jemals realistische Aussicht bestand, diese Ziele zu erreichen. Wir haben in Afghanistan nach der optimalen Mischung aus zivilen und (...) militärischen Maßnahmen gesucht – und haben sie nicht gefunden. War die Intervention zum Scheitern verurteilt? Nein; aber zu keinem Zeitpunkt verfügten wir über das für Erfolg erforderliche Wissen. Wir haben versucht, in ein chaotisches System einzugreifen, das sich während der Intervention immer wieder änderte. Wir haben zu langsam dazugelernt, und wir hätten auch kaum schneller lernen können, denn dieser Krieg ist Chaos, also unkontrollierbar (so wie viele andere Kriege auch). Das bedeutet, dass sich die Kriegsbefürworter und -planer maßlos überschätzt haben – technisch, militärisch, politisch, erkenntnistheoretisch und ethisch. Nicht die Pazifisten waren Traumtänzer in der Debatte über den Afghanistan-Krieg. Diese Thesen begründe ich angesichts des Stands der Dinge vom Winter 2010/1. Ich plädiere für einen sofortigen Abzug aus Afghanistan – und für noble Gesten gegenüber den Afghanen, die an unserer Seite Kopf & Kragen riskiert haben. (shrink)

This is a report of the international workshop «Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy 2: Kant’s Appearance, Its Ontological and Epistemic Status» (April 27—29, 2017, Moscow), the tasks of which was (1) to discuss the specificity of transcendental idealism, (2) to study the nature of one of Kant’s important concepts — that of appearance — within the framework of the essential conceptual triad of transcendentalism: thing in itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung), (3) to analyse the (...) distinction between Kant’s concepts of appearance and phenomenon, and (4) to examine the concepts of appearance and phenomenon in relation to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

Schon am Anfang seiner Lehrtätigkeit war Kant kritisch gegenüber den gängigen Definitionen der Philosophie, weil er bereits eine eigene Reform der Metaphysik entworfen hatte. Um diese These zu zu stützen, beschäftigt sich der Beitrag mit Kants Behandlung von Martin Knutzens Definition der Philosophie und dem dritten Teil von Kants Schrift Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio (1755), die zwei neue metaphysische Grundsätze enthält. Mit ihrer innovativen Theorie von Zeit und Raum liefern «der Satz der Aufeinanderfolge» und «der Satz des Zugleichseins» (...) eine neue Begründung der Psychologie und Kosmologie, die eine Alternative zur Theorie des physischen Einflusses sowie zu Leibniz’ vorherbestimmter Harmonie darstellen. Kants Theorie einer allgemein begründeten Harmonie wird somit als ein Versuch vorgestellt, die Grundsätze der Metaphysik zu erneuern, um die Bestimmung der Philosophie als Wissenschaft von den Gründen der Dinge im Vergleich zum zeitgenössischen Rationalismus besser zu rechtfertigen. (shrink)

Ang kolektibong sanaysay na ito ay nagtatasa sa kalagayan at estado ng edukasyong pansining biswal sa mga piling pamantasan sa Pilipinas. Sakop ng papel ang mga sumusunod na paaralan: Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, De La Salle-Lipa, Mindanao State UniversityIligan Institute of Technology, at Notre Dame of Marbel University. Dalawang tanong ang tinangkang sagutin ng papel: Una, ano ang estado ng edukasyong pansining biswal sa mga piling pamantasan sa Pilipinas? Pangalawa, ano-ano ang mga posibleng solusyon sa mga suliranin na nakahahadlang sa (...) patuloy na pag-unlad ng edukasyong pansining biswal? Isinagawa ang panunuring dokumentaryo at pakikipanayam sa mga tagapangasiwa ng sining kultural at pangakademiko. Upang masagot at matalakay nang lubos ang katanungan, ang mga may-akda ay nagkaroon ng tuon sa dalawang parametro: panloob (pamamahalang pang-akademiko tulad ng pagtatalaga ng guro, paghahanda sa mga kagamitan at kasanayan,at kawalan ng tuon sa edukasyong pansining) at panlabas (suporta mula sa mga institusyong nasa labas ng pamantasan). Sa dulo ng papel, natuklasan ang mga karaniwang suliranin na kinahaharap ng mga pamantasang sakop ng papel-pananaliksik na ito; may mga payak na rekomendasyon ding pinanukala ang papel. (shrink)

Die Vernunft ist für Hegel die Einheit des Subjekts und des Objekts ? anders ausgedrückt: Subjekt zu sein impliziert, die Welt zu erkennen. Die Inhalte, die die Erkenntnistätigkeit spontan findet, »setzen« ihre eigene Erkenntnis nicht, weil die der Erkenntnis gegebenen Inhalte keine »unverursachten Ursachen« oder »unbewegten Beweger« des Erkennens sind. Die Erkenntnisobjekte sind für Hegel sowohl ruhend als auch in Bewegung: Unmittelbarkeit und Vermittlung sind bloße Standpunkte über die Erkenntnistätigkeit. Sich ein absolutes Nichtsein des Erkennens vorzustellen (z.B. durch die Zustimmung (...) zum cartesischen Gedankenexperiment, durch eine philosophische Deutung des psychologischen Phänomens des Unbewusstseins oder durch eine naturalistische Interpretation der Theorie der transzendentalen Subjektivität), verändert grundsätzlich unser Verständnis des Erkenntnisphänomens, weil es das Bedürfnis nach speziellen Gründungsakten erzeugt, die als absolute Ursachen der Erkenntnis fungieren sollen. Anhand von Spinozas Substanzbegriff hält Hegel dagegen das Erkennen für streng genommen unverursacht und insofern die Erkenntnisakte für innere Momente des unendlichen absoluten Elements des Erkennens, d.h. der ununterbrochenen und ununterbrechbaren Geist-Welt-Einheit. Vom Standpunkt des künstlich vorgestellten Nichtseins der Geist-Welt-Einheit muss aber der Kreislauf der Erkenntnisakte irgendwann angefangen haben; das menschliche Erkennen bzw. Denken wird dadurch zum bloß formalen Denken - in Hegels Terminologie: zum »Bewusstsein«. Damit die Tatsache begreiflich wird, dass das Erkennen schon immer einen Inhalt hat, müssen die Bestimmungen einiger Denkakte als Dinge interpretiert werden, die von außen her das Erkennen in Gang setzen und erfüllen. Erst diese hypostasierten Denkakte können die Tatsache erklären, dass der menschliche Geist die Wirklichkeit erkennt; im Gegensatz zu diesen Denkakten, denen das epistemische Privileg verliehen wird, den Geist mit der Welt in Kontakt zu bringen, werden die restlichen Denkakte zu bloß subjektiven Vorstellungen reduziert. In diesem Zusammenhang soll die sinnliche Wahrnehmung oder Empfindung den absoluten Anfang des Erkennens bilden, obwohl sie selber ein Akt und Moment des Denkens ist. Die empirische Erkenntnis soll hier ein in sich leer gewordenes Denken in Kontakt mit der Welt setzen, damit dieses erst dann zum Erkennen dessen wird, was es wirklich gibt. Für Hegel bilden dagegen die empirischen Gegenstände keinen absoluten Anfang der Erkenntnis, sondern sind bereits da im Denken als unendlicher Totalität des erkennenden Geistes und der erkannten Welt. In diesem theoretischen Rahmen gibt es - selbstverständlich! - Raum für sinnliches Erkennen, aber keinen für Empirismus. Aristoteles? Aussage, dass »die Seele in gewisser Weise alle Dinge« ist, und das scholastische Diktum, dass »ens et verum convertuntur«, paraphrasierend, behauptet Hegel: »das Absolute ist der Geist«. (shrink)

The Meaning of Things explores the meanings of household possessions for three generation families in the Chicago area, and the place of materialism in American culture. Now regarded as a keystone in material culture studies, Halton's first book is based on his dissertation and coauthored with Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. First published by Cambridge University Press in 1981, it has been translated into German, Italian, Japanese, and Hungarian. The Meaning of Things is a study of the significance of material possessions in contemporary (...) urban life, and of the ways people carve meaning out of their domestic environment. Drawing on a survey of eighty families in Chicago who were interviewed on the subject of their feelings about common household objects, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton provide a unique perspective on materialism, American culture, and the self. They begin by reviewing what social scientists and philosophers have said about the transactions between people and things. In the model of 'personhood' that the authors develop, goal-directed action and the cultivation of meaning through signs assume central importance. They then relate theoretical issues to the results of their survey. An important finding is the distinction between objects valued for action and those valued for contemplation. The authors compare families who have warm emotional attachments to their homes with those in which a common set of positive meanings is lacking, and interpret the different patterns of involvement. They then trace the cultivation of meaning in case studies of four families. Finally, the authors address what they describe as the current crisis of environmental and material exploitation, and suggest that human capacities for the creation and redirection of meaning offer the only hope for survival. A wide range of scholars - urban and family sociologists, clinical, developmental and environmental psychologists, cultural anthropologists and philosophers, and many general readers - will find this book stimulating and compelling. Translations: Il significato degli oggetti. Italian translation. Rome: Edizione Kappa, 1986. Der Sinn der Dinge. German translation. Munich: Psychologie Verlags Union, 1989. Japanese translation 2007. Targyaink tukreben. Hungarian translation, 2011. (shrink)

I begin by considering a question that has driven much scholarship on transcendental idealism: are appearances numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear, or numerically distinct? I point out that much of the debate on this question has assumed that this is equivalent to the question of whether they are the same objects, but go on to provide textual, historical, and philosophical evidence that “object” (Gegenstand) and “thing” (Ding) have different meanings for Kant. A thing is a (...) locus of intensively gradable causal force, reality. I argue that appearances and things in themselves are not identical as objects, because the very concept of object-identity is tied, for Kant, to the concept of an intellect that would cognize the numerical identity of the objects in question. Because no intellect can be both discursive and intellectual, no intellect could cognize the numerical identity of objects across the phenomenal/noumenal divide, and thus the claim that they are identical has no content. However, the very same things, the same reality, can be given to our sensible intellects, and to divine intuitive intellect, as two non-overlapping domains of objects. Identity readers are thus shown to be right about the same thing relation, while non-identity readers are vindicated on the numerical identity of objects. (shrink)

This article juxtaposes two of the most influential thinkers of the previous century, Georges Bataille and Martin Heidegger: my overarching claim will be that a contrastive approach allows a better understanding of two central dynamics within their work. First, I show that both were deeply troubled by a certain methodological anxiety; namely, that the practice of writing might distort and deform their insights. By employing a comparative strategy, I suggest that we can gain a better understanding of the very specific (...) form this fear takes in them: in each case, it is articulated and justified in terms of the ‘chose’ or ‘Ding’ (‘thing’) or the ‘objet’ or ‘Objekt’ (‘object’). Second, I argue that close textual comparison allows us to identify an important, new dimension in their reactions to this shared anxiety: the thing or object which was originally the site of the anxiety gradually becomes, through series of ontological and textual shifts, the solution to it. I track this transformation across a range of case studies including Heidegger’s later work on the term ‘Ding’ and Bataille’s treatment of prostitution. I close by indicating how these results might create avenues for further research. (shrink)

Was ist Wert? Des Öfteren hat man bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage den Wert als etwas einer Qualität oder einem Attribut Ähnliches konzipiert. Meines Erachtens muss die Antwort hingegen in der Verbindung des Wertes mit der Erfahrung gesucht werden. Der Wert ist nichts, was dem Phänomen von außen zugeschrieben würde, sondern etwas, was dem Phänomen die Möglichkeit gibt, sich zu offenbaren und sich zu konstituieren. In dieser Richtung behauptet Scheler, dass der Wert keine „Eigenschaft“ eines Dinges neben seinen anderen Eigenschaften (...) sei. Der Wert gehört demnach einem Teilbereich der Erfahrung an, jedoch nicht als einfaches Phänomen, sondern vielmehr als Urphänomen. Daraus folgt, dass der Wert nicht – wie eine Wertqualität oder ein Attribut – auf die Gegebenheit eines Phänomens zurückgeführt werden kann, da er der Erscheinung des Phänomens selbst vorangeht. Als Urphänomen ist der Wert Element der Vorgegebenheit, nicht der faktischen Gegebenheit. (shrink)

Sebastian Franck hat Teile von Agrippas De Vanitate Scientiarum übersetzt und kommentiert. Von daher ist der Einfluss der Philosophie von Agrippa auf Franck bekannt. Es gab allerdings bisher keine ausführlichen Untersuchungen zu den Einflüssen von Agrippa auf Franck. Diese Lücke versucht dieser Aufsatz zu schließen. Beim Vergleich der metaphysischen Systeme von Franck und Agrippa stellt sich heraus, dass es bedeutende Einflüsse im Bereich der Seelenlehre und der Christologie gab. Sowohl Agrippa als auch Franck sind Anhänger der platonischen Lehre der drei (...) Seelenteile. Die Seele besteht nach dieser Lehre aus Geist, Seele und Körper. Der Geist ist der unsterbliche göttliche Teil im Menschen. Der Hauptunterschied zwischen Agrippa und Franck kann darin gesehen werden, dass Agrippas Synkretismus stärker den Neuplatonismus betont und Franck`s Synkretismus die Gnosis. Die Weltseele ergibt im Konzept von Franck nur wenig Sinn, während diese bei Agrippa ganz zentral ist. Franck lehnt den Gedanken ab, die Welt werde durch eine Vernunft geleitet. Sein pessimistisches Bild von der Welt und vom Menschen verträgt sich nicht mit diesem Gedanken. Da es keine Vernunft gibt, ist auch die Astrologie, die Mantik oder die Kabbalistik nicht wichtig für Franck. Daher ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Franck nirgends die Occulta philosophia zitiert, sondern immer nur De Vantitate Scientiarum Der Synkretismus von Agrippa beinhaltet Astrologie, Mantik, Kabbala und Neuplatonismus. Am ehesten spielt bei Franck noch die Hermetik eine Rolle. Franck meint, Christus habe im Pimander mit Hermes Trismegistos kommuniziert. Diesen Gedanken findet man nicht nur bei Franck, sondern auch bei Agrippa. Die für Franck so wichtige Lehre des inneren Christus ist ebenfalls Teil der Seelenlehre von Agrippa. Wenn der Mensch seinen Geist oder seinen inneren Christus erkennt, dann erkennt er Gott. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Franck nur diejenigen Dinge von dem „weisen Agrippa“ übernommen hat, die in sein Konzept passen. (shrink)

Karaniwang nasasagkaan ng pinamamayaning pamantayan at perspektibang hinango mula sa labas ang konfigurasyon ng pag-aaral sa kasaklawang pangturismo ng mga Pilipino. Mula sa sinasaligang epistemolohiya hanggang sa praksis ng disiplinang ito na malaong maglilimita sa makaPilipinong dalumat kaugnay ng paglalakbay. Gayumpaman, hindi pa rin isinasantabi ang mga dulog mula sa labas dahil lamang sa kaligiran nito. Sa halip, layunin pa ng artikulong ito na angkinin ang Tourism Studies at tangkaing maipasok sa talastasang F/Pilipino ang usapin ng turismo at paglalakbay na (...) direktang aapuhap sa tatlong espisipikong aspekto: (1) kalagayan ng turismo at paglalakbay sa Pilipinas; (2) pangunahing salik sa paglalakbay; at malaong itatawid sa (3) sosyo-kultural at politiko-ekonomikong kinahinatnan ng paglalakbay. Sa diwa ng binubuong Araling Pangmanlalakbay sa diwa ng Araling Kabanwahan, hindi lamang nito nilalayong maipakita ang ugnayan at/o pag-uugnay ng turismo at paglalakbay sa Pilipinas at Timog Silangang Asya. Bukod sa panunuring pangkalinangan, layunin ding maipakita ng Araling Pangmanlalakbay ang panunuring panlipunang nakasalig sa katarungan ng turismo at paglalakbay. Sa ganitong pagtatangka, maipopook ang diskursong pangturismo ng mga Pilipino hindi lamang sa kaniyang sariling bayan ngunit maging sa Timog Silangang Asya at sa daigdig. (shrink)

"Wir mögen an der Natur beobachten, messen, rechnen, wägen und so weiter, wie wir wollen, es ist doch nur unser Maß und Gewicht, wie der Mensch das Maß der Dinge ist." So schrieb Goethe im Jahre 1807. "Die Natur wird uns keine Sonderbehandlung gewähren, nur weil wir uns als 'Krone der Schöpfung' betrachten... Ich fürchte, sie ist nicht eitel genug, um sich an den Menschen als einen Spiegel zu klammern, in dem allein sie ihre eigene Schönheit sehen kann", schreibt der (...) Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr heute. Diesen beiden Stellungnahmen liegen sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis Mensch - Natur zugrunde. Wie überhaupt die Naturphilosophie von den Vorsokratikern bis in die Gegenwart die unterschiedlichsten Varianten dieser Beziehung durchgespielt hat. Dass der Mensch sich jedoch in einem weit über die alttestamentarische Vorstellungskraft hinausgehenden Maße die Natur "untertan" gemacht und dabei großräumig zerstört hat, steht außer Zweifel. Im Rahmen der ökologischen Krise muss das Verhältnis zur Natur neu überdacht werden. Das vorliegende Lesebuch, das sich auch als Studientext und Diskussionsgrundlage für Schulen und Hochschulen bestens eignet, bietet den Blick in die Geschichte der Naturphilosophie, der dafür unerlässlich ist: Die Schwierigkeiten, die heute im Umgang mit der Natur auftreten, sind vielfach auf immer noch wirksame traditionelle Naturvorstellungen zurückzuführen. Andererseits gibt es einige eigenständige, bisher noch zu wenig berücksichtigte Ansätze, die zu neuen Konzeptionen anregen können. ------------------------------------------------------------- Inhalt: Vorwort; Einführung: Traditionslinien der Naturphilosophie; Heraklit und die Atomisten Leukipp und Demokrit; Platon und Aristoteles; Christliches Naturverstehen im Mittelalter: Aurelius Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Jacob Böhme; Naturvorstellungen in der beginnenden Neuzeit: Galileo Galilei, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton; Kants Naturbegriff; Goethes Naturforschung; Nachkantische Naturphilosophie: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Geschichte der Natur und Kritik des Naturalismus: Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill; Kritik des Substanzbegriffes, Alfred North Whitehead, Werner Heisenberg, Ilya Prigogine und Isabelle Stengers; Bibliographie. (shrink)

Als eine von tausenden von Arten, welche im Zuge der Evolution nach dem darwinschen Prinzip von Variation und natürlicher Selektion entstanden sind, ist der Mensch ein Teil der Natur. Eine Besonderheit scheint ihn allerdings von allen anderen Systemen der Natur abzuheben: Er besitzt die Fähigkeit, Dinge zu erzeugen, die ihrerseits nicht mehr Teil der Natur sind. Denn Objekte wie Werkzeuge, Gebäude, Musikinstrumente oder Bücher sind zwar Teil der physischen Welt, sie gehören aber nur schon deshalb nicht zur Natur, weil sie (...) künstlich hergestellt und damit, dem allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch folgend, das Gegenteil von natürlich sind. Doch warum bleibt eigentlich die Fähigkeit, Kunstobjekte herzustellen, dem Menschen vorbehalten? Die Antwort auf diese Frage hängt eng mit derjenigen nach dem Unterschied zwischen menschlichem Handeln und rein physikalischen Vorgängen einerseits, sowie tierischem Verhalten andererseits zusammen. Antworten auf die Frage werden im vorliegenden Beitrag im Kontext der Evolutionsgeschichte gesucht, angefangen bei der Entwicklung einfacher Formen phänomenalen Bewusstseins lange vor der Entstehung des Menschen, und endend bei der von den außerordentlichen kommunikativen und kognitiven Leistungen des Menschen, kurz gesagt von seiner Sprache und seinem Geist geprägten Geschichte von Kultur und Technik. Mitbetrachtet wird dabei ein wichtiger Aspekt, der oft falsch eingeschätzt wird und für den Menschen wenig schmeichelhaft ist: Die Schattenseite seiner Rolle als Erschaffer von Kunst und Technik ist diejenige als Zerstörer der Natur. Entgegen einer verbreiteten Ansicht ist dem Menschen diese Rolle in gewisser Weise in die Wiege gelegt, in vollkommenem Einklang mit der Natur hat er nie gelebt. Die schwerwiegenden Probleme, die mit der Naturzerstörung verbunden sind, sind uns allerdings erst im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts schmerzlich bewusst geworden, was den modernen Menschen dazu zwingt, noch eine weitere Rolle zu übernehmen: Diejenige des Beschützers des natürlich Gewachsenen vor sich selbst. (shrink)

Hugot mula sa ideang geopolitikang pangkalinangang subersyon, tatangkaing uunawain sa papel na ito ang naging hakbanging kolonyal ng mga Espanyol at Amerikano sa kanilang ginawang pananakop sa Pilipinas.`Ito’y bagamat may subersyon ding isinagawa si Jose Rizal sa kolonyalismo, hindi nangangahulugang pagtutuunan sa papel ang nasabing paksa upang higit na makita ang naging hakbanging koloyal ng mga mananakop sa Pilipinas. Gamit ang lapit na singkroniko at diakroniko, sisipatin sa gagawing pag-aaral ang materyal na kulturang pinagkaugatan ng ginawang pangkalinangang subersyon kay (...) Jose Rizal ng mga mananakop. Uunawain sa ginawang pananaliksik ang naging saysay niya sa loob ng pangkalinangang pamana at sagisag na panlahi ng mga Pilipino. Sa pamamagitan ng pagsasawalang bisa at pagpapahina sa damdaming bayan o nasyonalismong isinasagisag ni Rizal, nagtagumpay ang mga Amerikano na demoralisahin iyon gamit ang kinagisnang idea sa pamana. Sa pagsusuri, ang panlipunang halagahin mula sa pangkalinangang pamana sa anito ang ginamit ng kolonyal na estadong Espanyol para sa mitipikasyon o pagsasaalamat ukol sa kapangyarihan ng ikonograpiyang panrelihiyon. Iniangkas ng mga Espanyol ang kanilang dala-dalang santo sa naririyang pumapaimbulog na gawain sa pag-aanito upang saklutin mula rito ang espiritwal na kapangyarihan sa loob ng kalinangan at lipunang Pilipino. Sa ganitong diwa, tinularan ng US ang kanilang ideang sekular gamit ang pagbabantayog o pagtatag ng monumento para kay Rizal upang maisingkaw rito ang pagkauhaw sa edukasyon ng mga Pilipono. Naging daan ang pangkalinangang subersyong ito para dominahin ng US ang larang na intelektwal sa Pilipinas gamit si Rizal bilang geopolitikal na pananagisag. Nilalayon ng papel na ito sa pangkalahatan na tayahin ang praktikang geopolitikal ng imperyalistang kapangyarihan. Mag-aambag sa madaling salita sa partikular ang pag-aaral hinggil sa pagpapalawak, pagpapayabong, at paglalaman sa pampamanang pag-aaral (Heritage Studies), pagpapalawig sa diskursong Rizal (Rizal Discourse), at pagpapaunlad ng historiograpiyang Pilipino (Philippine Historiography). (shrink)

Abstract Die moderne Physik besteht nicht nur aus neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen durch die Relativitätstheorie und durch die Quantenphysik. Sie besteht auch aus völlig neuen Sichtweisen und flexiblen Denkweisen von Zusammenhängen und Verschränkungen zwischen den Dingen. Die moderne Physik hat sich von dem Klischee des Schwarz-Weiß-Denkens verabschiedet, für das es nur getrennte Dinge, ohne fließende Übergänge gibt. Solche unbeweglichen, dogmatischen schwarzweißen Denkweisen können wir zurückverfolgen bis zu dem griechischen Philosophen Aristoteles. In der Zeit der Klassischen Mechanik hatten sie einen überwältigenden (...) Erfolg. Galilei behauptete, das Buch der Natur sei in der Sprache der Mathematik geschrieben. Das war die sehr kurzgefasste Formulierung der Klassischen Mechanik. Die moderne Physik hat sich keineswegs von der Mathematik verabschiedet, ganz und gar nicht. Doch der heilige Ernst und der starre und absolute Dogmatismus hat nachgelassen. Moderne Denkweisen in der Physik können mit den Begriffen von fließenden Übergängen, von Zwischenstufen, von Zusammenhängen zwischen den Dingen und von Schwingungen gekennzeichnet werden. Seit Faraday und Maxwell hat sich eine Verschiebung der Untersuchungsobjekte ergeben: Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, seit ca 1850, drehen sich die Denkmodelle der modernen Physik nicht mehr um getrennte, isolierten Körper, die im Nichts schwimmen, sondern um die Zwischenräume zwischen den Körpern und um die flexiblen Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den Dingen und um die Netzwerke, die die Dinge umgeben. Das sind ganz neue physikalische Denkweisen, die durchaus Dunkelzonen und Zweifel und Ungewissheiten kennen, die den Bereich der Exaktheit überschatten. Neue Beiträge der physikalischen Denkweisen sind auch durch eine Flexibilität bei der Bildung von Begriffen gekennzeichnet. Sie lassen sich nicht auf einige wenige Begriffe oder auf eine starre und exakte Festlegung der Wortwahl festnageln. „Jede Philosophie bezieht ihre Farbe von der geheimen Lichtquelle eines Vorstellungshintergrunds, der niemals ausdrücklich in ihren Gedankenketten auftaucht“ (Whitehead) (1). (shrink)

Si Jose Rizal ay inilalarawan bilang may estilong diplomatiko sa pakikipaglaban. Ito ay naging inspirasyon ng mga Indones sa pagpapaunlad ng kanilang diwang makabayan at pagsulong kanilang laban para sa kalayaan. At sa pagtatamo ng Indonesia ng kabansaan, si Rizal ay naging tampok sa kanilang diplomasya at pakikipag-ugnayan sa Pilipinas. Makikita rin sa iba’t ibang aspeto ang naging dulot na inspirasyon ni Rizal sa mga Indones. Ang mga pagtatampok namang ito ay sinikap ding mabigyang resiprokasyon ng mga Pilipino. Ang (...) pagtingin ng mga Indones kay Rizal, batay sa isinagawang pananaliksik, ay kinakitaan ng mga salik partikular ang pagtingin ni Tan Malaka kay Rizal, pagkabatid sa mga salitang Arabiko gayundin sa kaalaman sa pagsasalin. Ang mga salik na nabanggit, gayunpaman, ay inirerekomenda ng pagaaral na ito na magawan pa ng balidasyon sa mga mamamayang Indones partikular ang ukol sa tuwirang kinalaman, kalawakan ng kamalayan, at/o interpretasyon ng kanilang kapwa Indonesia kay Rizal at/o kanyang mga akda. (shrink)