Results for 'Knowledge representation'

999 found
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  1. Dealing with Concepts: From Cognitive Psychology to Knowledge Representation.Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto - 2013 - Frontiers of Psychological and Behevioural Science 2 (3):96-106.
    Concept representation is still an open problem in the field of ontology engineering and, more generally, of knowledge representation. In particular, the issue of representing “non classical” concepts, i.e. concepts that cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, remains unresolved. In this paper we review empirical evidence from cognitive psychology, according to which concept representation is not a unitary phenomenon. On this basis, we sketch some proposals for concept representation, taking into account (...)
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  2.  65
    Logic in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Central Topics Via Readings.Luis M. Augusto - manuscript
    Logic has been a—disputed—ingredient in the emergence and development of the now very large field known as knowledge representation and reasoning. In this book (in progress), I select some central topics in this highly fruitful, albeit controversial, association (e.g., non-monotonic reasoning, implicit belief, logical omniscience, closed world assumption), identifying their sources and analyzing/explaining their elaboration in highly influential published work.
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  3. Ontology-Based Knowledge Representation of Experiment Metadata in Biological Data Mining.Scheuermann Richard, Kong Megan, Dahlke Carl, Cai Jennifer, Lee Jamie, Qian Yu, Squires Burke, Dunn Patrick, Wiser Jeff, Hagler Herb, Herb Hagler, Barry Smith & David Karp - 2009 - In Jake Chen & Stefano Lonardi (eds.), Biological Data Mining. Boca Raton: Chapman Hall / Taylor and Francis. pp. 529-559.
    According to the PubMed resource from the U.S. National Library of Medicine, over 750,000 scientific articles have been published in the ~5000 biomedical journals worldwide in the year 2007 alone. The vast majority of these publications include results from hypothesis-driven experimentation in overlapping biomedical research domains. Unfortunately, the sheer volume of information being generated by the biomedical research enterprise has made it virtually impossible for investigators to stay aware of the latest findings in their domain of interest, let alone to (...)
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  4. Philosophy of Science: Interfaces Between Logic and Knowledge Representation.Emma Ruttkamp - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):275-289.
    In this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate (...)
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  5. The Knowledge Level in Cognitive Architectures: Current Limitations and Possible Developments.Antonio Lieto, Christian Lebiere & Alessandro Oltramari - 2018 - Cognitive Systems Research:1-42.
    In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build arti cial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of (...)
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  6. Representing Knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.
    A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. I propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a "know"-parenthetical. A (...)
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  7.  61
    Representation and Misrepresentation of Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    I argue for three points: First, evidence of the primacy of knowledge representation is not evidence of primacy of knowledge. Second, knowledge-oriented mindreading research should also focus on misrepresentations and biased representations of knowledge. Third, knowledge-oriented mindreading research must confront the problem of the gold standard that arises when disagreement about knowledge complicates the interpretation of empirical findings.
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  8.  52
    Knowledge and Representations: Explaining the Skeptical Puzzle.Guido Melchior - 2017 - In C. Limbeck-Lilienau and F. Stadler (ed.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Papers of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 150-152.
    (*This paper was awarded the Elisabeth and Werner Leinfellner Award 2017 for outstanding contributions.) -/- This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an attached point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a detached point view. From an attached (...)
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  9.  68
    Pictorial Representation And Moral Knowledge.Katerina Bantinaki - 2004 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 1 (2):69-76.
    The idea that pictorial art can have cognitive value, that it can enhance our understanding of the world and of our own selves, has had many advocates in art theory and philosophical aesthetics alike. It has also been argued, however, that the power of pictorial representation to convey or enhance knowledge, in particular knowledge with moral content, is not generalized across the medium.
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  10. A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise (...)
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  11. Knowledge Before Belief.Jonathan Phillips, Wesley Buckwalter, Fiery Cushman, Ori Friedman, Alia Martin, John Turri, Laurie Santos & Joshua Knobe - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-37.
    Research on the capacity to understand others’ minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one doesn't even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods (...)
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  12. Dual PECCS: A Cognitive System for Conceptual Representation and Categorization.Antonio Lieto, Daniele Radicioni & Valentina Rho - 2017 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 29 (2):433-452.
    In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis (...)
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  13. Environmental Representation of the Body.Adrian Cussins - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body (...)
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  14. Quasi‐Indexicals and Knowledge Reports.William J. Rapaport, Stuart C. Shapiro & Janyce M. Wiebe - 1997 - Cognitive Science 21 (1):63-107.
    We present a computational analysis of de re, de dicto, and de se belief and knowledge reports. Our analysis solves a problem first observed by Hector-Neri Castañeda, namely, that the simple rule -/- `(A knows that P) implies P' -/- apparently does not hold if P contains a quasi-indexical. We present a single rule, in the context of a knowledge-representation and reasoning system, that holds for all P, including those containing quasi-indexicals. In so doing, we explore the (...)
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  15. Bodily Skill and Internal Representation in Sensorimotor Perception.David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):157-173.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory’s associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to ‘knowledge’ means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper (...)
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  16. Logical Foundations for Belief Representation.William Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
    This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning (...)
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  17. From Symbols to Knowledge Systems: A. Newell and H. A. Simon's Contribution to Symbolic AI.Luis M. Augusto - 2021 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 2 (1):29 - 62.
    A. Newell and H. A. Simon were two of the most influential scientists in the emerging field of artificial intelligence (AI) in the late 1950s through to the early 1990s. This paper reviews their crucial contribution to this field, namely to symbolic AI. This contribution was constituted mostly by their quest for the implementation of general intelligence and (commonsense) knowledge in artificial thinking or reasoning artifacts, a project they shared with many other scientists but that in their case was (...)
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  18.  46
    Bayesian Representation of a Prolonged Archaeological Debate.Efraim Wallach - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):401-431.
    This article examines the effect of material evidence upon historiographic hypotheses. Through a series of successive Bayesian conditionalizations, I analyze the extended competition among several hypotheses that offered different accounts of the transition between the Bronze Age and the Iron Age in Palestine and in particular to the “emergence of Israel”. The model reconstructs, with low sensitivity to initial assumptions, the actual outcomes including a complete alteration of the scientific consensus. Several known issues of Bayesian confirmation, including the problem of (...)
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  19. Conceptual Spaces for Cognitive Architectures: A Lingua Franca for Different Levels of Representation.Antonio Lieto, Antonio Chella & Marcello Frixione - 2017 - Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 19:1-9.
    During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [35]) adopt a classical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA[ 48]) are based on a purely connectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [59]) adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic representational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical representations and (...)
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  20.  63
    Embodying Artifact Production Knowledge -- From Embodied Know-How to Sensory-Motor Result Representations.Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler - 2018 - Proceedings of a Body of Knowledge -- Embodied Cognition and the Arts.
    On a modified view of embodied cognition, I argue that the conceptual structure of some present-day’s abstract artifact concepts such as PIECE OF MUSIC or PIECE OF ART can be effectively explained if it is taken into account that “visual recordings” of first observed result objects played a major role in developing abstract artifact concepts.
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  21. A Computational Framework for Concept Representation in Cognitive Systems and Architectures: Concepts as Heterogeneous Proxytypes.Antonio Lieto - 2014 - Proceedings of 5th International Conference on Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, Boston, MIT, Pocedia Computer Science, Elsevier:1-9.
    In this paper a possible general framework for the representation of concepts in cognitive artificial systems and cognitive architectures is proposed. The framework is inspired by the so called proxytype theory of concepts and combines it with the heterogeneity approach to concept representations, according to which concepts do not constitute a unitary phenomenon. The contribution of the paper is twofold: on one hand, it aims at providing a novel theoretical hypothesis for the debate about concepts in cognitive sciences by (...)
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  22. Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments.Craig French - 2019 - In Duncan Pritchard, Casey Doyle & Joe Milburn (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.
    Orthodox epistemological disjunctivism involves the idea that paradigm cases of visual perceptual knowledge are based on visual perceptual states which are propositional, and hence representational. Given this, the orthodox version of epistemological disjunctivism takes on controversial representational commitments in the philosophy of perception. Must epistemological disjunctivism involve these commitments? I don’t think so. Here I argue that we can take epistemological disjunctivism in a new direction and develop a version of the view free of these representational commitments. The basic (...)
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  23. Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of (...)
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  24.  92
    How to Distinguish Memory Representations? A Historical and Critical Journey.Marina Trakas - 2019 - Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10 (3):53-86.
    Memory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different (...)
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  25. Heterogeneous Proxytypes Extended: Integrating Theory-Like Representations and Mechanisms with Prototypes and Exemplars.Antonio Lieto - 2018 - In Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing: Proceedings of BICA. Springer.
    The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the (...)
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  26.  71
    Non Classical Concept Representation and Reasoning in Formal Ontologies.Antonio Lieto - 2012 - Dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Salerno
    Formal ontologies are nowadays widely considered a standard tool for knowledge representation and reasoning in the Semantic Web. In this context, they are expected to play an important role in helping automated processes to access information. Namely: they are expected to provide a formal structure able to explicate the relationships between different concepts/terms, thus allowing intelligent agents to interpret, correctly, the semantics of the web resources improving the performances of the search technologies. Here we take into account a (...)
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  27.  85
    Functions and Mental Representation: The Theoretical Role of Representations and its Real Nature.Miguel Sebastián - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):317-336.
    Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality (...)
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  28. Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):361-378.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection (...)
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  29.  11
    Preschool Children's Use of Perceptual-Motor Knowledge and Hierarchical Representational Skills for Tool Making.Gökhan Gönül, Annette Hohenberger & Ece Takmaz - 2021 - Acta Psychologica 103415 (220).
    Although other animals can make simple tools, the expanded and complex material culture of humans is unprecedented in the animal kingdom. Tool making is a slow and late-developing ability in humans, and preschool children find making tools to solve problems very challenging. This difficulty in tool making might be related to the lack of familiarity with the tools and may be overcome by children's long term perceptual-motor knowledge. Thus, in this study, the effect of tool familiarity on tool making (...)
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  30. Implicit and Explicit Representation.David Kirsh - 2003 - Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science 2:478–481.
    The degree to which information is encoded explicitly in a representation is related to the computational cost of recovering or using the information. Knowledge that is implicit in a system need not be represented at all, even implicitly, if the cost of recurring it is prohibitive.
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  31. Logicism, Interpretability, and Knowledge of Arithmetic.Sean Walsh - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):84-119.
    A crucial part of the contemporary interest in logicism in the philosophy of mathematics resides in its idea that arithmetical knowledge may be based on logical knowledge. Here an implementation of this idea is considered that holds that knowledge of arithmetical principles may be based on two things: (i) knowledge of logical principles and (ii) knowledge that the arithmetical principles are representable in the logical principles. The notions of representation considered here are related to (...)
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  32. Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language.Barry C. Smith - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):431-456.
    In his latest book, Michael Devitt rejects Chomsky’s mentalist conception of linguistics. The case against Chomsky is based on two principal claims. First, that we can separate the study of linguistic competence from the study of its outputs: only the latter belongs to linguistic inquiry. Second, Chomsky’s account of a speaker’s competence as consisiting in the mental representation of rules of a grammar for his language is mistaken. I shall argue, first, that Devitt fails to make a case for (...)
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  33. Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including (...)
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  34.  86
    The Representation of Context: Ideas From Artificial Intelligence.James Franklin - 2003 - Law, Probability and Risk 2:191-199.
    To move beyond vague platitudes about the importance of context in legal reasoning or natural language understanding, one must take account of ideas from artificial intelligence on how to represent context formally. Work on topics like prior probabilities, the theory-ladenness of observation, encyclopedic knowledge for disambiguation in language translation and pathology test diagnosis has produced a body of knowledge on how to represent context in artificial intelligence applications.
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  35.  97
    Knowledge, Adequacy, and Approximate Truth.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 83:102950.
    Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the (...)
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  36. Imaginative Resistance and Modal Knowledge.Daniel Nolan - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):661-685.
    Readers of fictions sometimes resist taking certain kinds of claims to be true according to those fictions, even when they appear explicitly or follow from applying ordinary principles of interpretation. This "imaginative resistance" is often taken to be significant for a range of philosophical projects outside aesthetics, including giving us evidence about what is possible and what is impossible, as well as the limits of conceivability, or readers' normative commitments. I will argue that this phenomenon cannot do the theoretical work (...)
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  37. Knowledge Bases and Neural Network Synthesis.Todd R. Davies - 1991 - In Hozumi Tanaka (ed.), Artificial Intelligence in the Pacific Rim: Proceedings of the Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence. IOS Press. pp. 717-722.
    We describe and try to motivate our project to build systems using both a knowledge based and a neural network approach. These two approaches are used at different stages in the solution of a problem, instead of using knowledge bases exclusively on some problems, and neural nets exclusively on others. The knowledge base (KB) is defined first in a declarative, symbolic language that is easy to use. It is then compiled into an efficient neural network (NN) (...), run, and the results from run time and (eventually) from learning are decompiled to a symbolic description of the knowledge contained in the network. After inspecting this recovered knowledge, a designer would be able to modify the KB and go through the whole cycle of compiling, running, and decompiling again. The central question with which this project is concerned is, therefore, How do we go from a KB to an NN, and back again? We are investigating this question by building tools consisting of a repertoire of language/translation/network types, and trying them on problems in a variety of domains. (shrink)
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  38. Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation.P. D. Magnus & Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (1):37-52.
    According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the claim that, (...)
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  39. Higher-Level Knowledge, Rational and Social Levels Constraints of the Common Model of the Mind.Antonio Lieto, William G. Kennedy, Christian Lebiere, Oscar Romero, Niels Taatgen & Robert West - forthcoming - Procedia Computer Science.
    In his famous 1982 paper, Allen Newell [22, 23] introduced the notion of knowledge level to indicate a level of analysis, and prediction, of the rational behavior of a cognitive arti cial agent. This analysis concerns the investigation about the availability of the agent knowledge, in order to pursue its own goals, and is based on the so-called Rationality Principle (an assumption according to which "an agent will use the knowledge it has of its environment to achieve (...)
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  40. The Protein Ontology: A Structured Representation of Protein Forms and Complexes.Darren Natale, Cecilia N. Arighi, Winona C. Barker, Judith A. Blake, Carol J. Bult, Michael Caudy, Harold J. Drabkin, Peter D’Eustachio, Alexei V. Evsikov, Hongzhan Huang, Jules Nchoutmboube, Natalia V. Roberts, Barry Smith, Jian Zhang & Cathy H. Wu - 2011 - Nucleic Acids Research 39 (1):D539-D545.
    The Protein Ontology (PRO) provides a formal, logically-based classification of specific protein classes including structured representations of protein isoforms, variants and modified forms. Initially focused on proteins found in human, mouse and Escherichia coli, PRO now includes representations of protein complexes. The PRO Consortium works in concert with the developers of other biomedical ontologies and protein knowledge bases to provide the ability to formally organize and integrate representations of precise protein forms so as to enhance accessibility to results of (...)
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  41. What Remains of Our Knowledge of Language?: Reply to Collins.Barry C. Smith - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):557-75.
    The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence gives us knowledge *of* a language, and that the representations in the language faculty are representations *of* anything. In reply, I have argued that through their intuitions speaker/hearers, (but not their language faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend this idea against the objections Collins (...)
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  42. Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. But on virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that (...)
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  43.  21
    Beyond Embodiment: From Internal Representation of Action to Symbolic Processes.Isabel Barahona Fonseca, Jose Barahona Fonseca & Vitor Pereira - 2013 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Swan L. (eds) Origins of Mind. Biosemiotics, vol 8. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 187-199.
    In sensorimotor integration, representation involves an anticipatory model of the action to be performed. This model integrates efferent signals (motor commands), its reafferent consequences (sensory consequences of an organism’s own motor action), and other afferences (sensory signals) originated by stimuli independent of the action performed. Representation, a form of internal modeling, is invoked to explain the fact that behavior oriented to the achievement of future goals is relatively independent from the immediate environment. Internal modeling explains how a cognitive (...)
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  44. Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: The Awareness‐First Solution.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea (...)
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  45. AI, Concepts, and the Paradox of Mental Representation, with a Brief Discussion of Psychological Essentialism.Eric Dietrich - 2001 - J. Of Exper. And Theor. AI 13 (1):1-7.
    Mostly philosophers cause trouble. I know because on alternate Thursdays I am one -- and I live in a philosophy department where I watch all of them cause trouble. Everyone in artificial intelligence knows how much trouble philosophers can cause (and in particular, we know how much trouble one philosopher -- John Searle -- has caused). And, we know where they tend to cause it: in knowledge representation and the semantics of data structures. This essay is about a (...)
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  46. Epistemic Limitations and Precise Estimates in Analog Magnitude Representation.Justin Halberda - 2016 - In D. Barner & A. Baron (eds.), Core Knowledge and Conceptual Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-186.
    This chapter presents a re-understanding of the contents of our analog magnitude representations (e.g., approximate duration, distance, number). The approximate number system (ANS) is considered, which supports numerical representations that are widely described as fuzzy, noisy, and limited in their representational power. The contention is made that these characterizations are largely based on misunderstandings—that what has been called “noise” and “fuzziness” is actually an important epistemic signal of confidence in one’s estimate of the value. Rather than the ANS having noisy (...)
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  47. Linguistics as a Theory of Knowledge.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - Education and Linguistics Research 1 (2):62-84.
    A theory of knowledge is the explanation of things in terms of the possibilities and capabilities of the human way of knowing. The human knowledge is the representation of the things apprehended sensitively either through the senses or intuition. A theory of knowledge concludes about the reality of the things studied. As such it is a priori speculation, based on synthetic a priori statements. Its conclusions constitute interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. Linguistics as the science studying real (...)
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  48. Intersubjectivity and Physical Laws in Post-Kantian Theory of Knowledge Natorp and Cassirer.Scott Edgar - 2015 - In Sebastian Luft & J. Tyler Friedman (eds.), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 141-162.
    Consider the claims that representations of physical laws are intersubjective, and that they ultimately provide the foundation for all other intersubjective knowledge. Those claims, as well as the deeper philosophical commitments that justify them, constitute rare points of agreement between the Marburg School neo-Kantians Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer and their positivist rival, Ernst Mach. This is surprising, since Natorp and Cassirer are both often at pains to distinguish their theories of natural scientific knowledge from positivist views like (...)
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  49. Swamp Mary’s Revenge: Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge and Physicalism.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247.
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it's like to have experiences of, e. g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists (...)
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  50. Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):93-101.
    It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition (...)
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