Cheo cheo lưng bạc là loài đặc hữu của Việt Nam, và cho tới nay cũng chưa nơi nào khác từng phát hiện.

In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...) think that this goal is not achievable. Another goal is to provide the tools for solving or clarifying important social or philosophical problems. The chapter suggests that this is what theories of blame should focus on. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...) has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. (shrink)

Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...) responders’ thought that the targets have forfeited this claim because of their morally objectionable actions and because of how they were when they performed them. This view identifies an important part of our everyday lives and frames discussions about skepticism about blameworthiness in a new way. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea that the concept of privacy should be understood in terms of control. Three different attempts to spell out this idea will be critically discussed. The conclusion will be that the Source Control View on privacy is the most promising version of the idea that privacy is to be understood in terms of control.

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...) revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues (...) that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy. (shrink)

When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, (...) to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections. (shrink)

The issue of political violence is mostly absent from current debates about power. Many conceptions of power treat violence as wholly distinct from or even antithetical to power, or see it as a mere instrument whose effects are obvious and not in need of political analysis. In this paper, I explore what kind of ontology of power is necessary to properly take account of the various roles that violence can play in creating and maintaining power structures. I pursue this question (...) by contrasting the views of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. For Arendt, power is generated and maintained by communicative practices. She argues that power and violence are ‘opposites’ because violence can only destroy but not create these practices. In contrast, Foucault’s conception explicitly allows violence to play a constitutive role in generating power. I argue that while Arendt is right to insist that power and violence are not identical, it does not follow that violence cannot play any role in constituting power. Guided by Foucault’s approach, I formulate a non-dualist account of the relationship between power and violence that takes seriously the role that bodies, material things, and built infrastructures play in making social relations ‘more durable’ and constituting power. (shrink)

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise _in some sense_. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise _in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will_. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

How do the fact that an agent is morally responsible for a certain morally objectionable action and the fact that she is an appropriate target of blame for it relate to each other? Many authors inspired by Peter Strawson say that they necessarily co‐occur. Standard answers to the question of why they co‐occur say that the occurrence of one of the facts explains that the other obtains. This article presents a third option: that they are one and the same fact. (...) There is no difference between the fact that a person is an appropriate target of blame for an objectionable action and the fact that she is morally responsible for it. This view has the advantage of being metaphysically more parsimonious and of answering, in an elegant and plausible way, an interesting question about which many standard theories of responsibility keep silent: what is it to be morally responsible simpliciter? (shrink)

Climate change is one of the most important issues we are currently facing. There are many ways in which states can fight climate change. Some of them involve interfering with citizens’ personal lives. The question of whether such interference is justified is under-explored in philosophy. This paper focuses on a specific aspect of people’s personal lives, namely their informational privacy. It discusses the question of whether, given certain empirical assumptions, it is proportional of the state to risk its citizens’ privacy (...) or to risk infringing its citizens’ right to privacy to fight climate change. The main claim this paper argues for is that if fighting climate change and protecting our privacy conflict, we have good reason to fight climate change rather than protect our privacy. (shrink)

Power is often taken to be a central concept in social and political thought that can contribute to the explanation of many different social phenomena. This article argues that in order to play this role, a general theory of power is required to identify a stable causal capacity, one that does not depend on idiosyncratic social conditions and can thus exert its characteristic influence in a wide range of cases. It considers three promising strategies for such a theory, which ground (...) power in (1) the ability to use force, (2) access to resources, or (3) collective acceptance. It shows that these strategies fail to identify a stable causal capacity. The lack of an adequate general theory of power suggests that the concept lacks the necessary unity to play the broad explanatory role it is often accorded. (shrink)

What kind of thing, as it were, is power and how does it fit into our understanding of the social world? I approach this question by exploring the pragmatic character of power ascriptions, arguing that they involve fictional expectations directed at an open future. When we take an agent to be powerful, we act as if that agent had a robust capacity to make a difference to the actions of others. While this pretense can never fully live up to a (...) social reality whose future is open, acting on such expectations helps constitute social order. Fictional expectations are thus built into the material practices that constitute power. This account, I argue, helps us make sense of some of the deep disagreements about the nature of power. I develop the account by drawing on Thomas Hobbes’s myth of an original institution of sovereign power before expanding it to other forms of power. (shrink)

As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...) to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems, since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems. (shrink)

AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term—the (...) attributability sense. More specifically, relying on work by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (In Praise of Desire, OUP 2014), we propose that the behavior of these systems can manifest their ‘quality of will’ and thus be regarded as something they can be blameworthy for. We develop this position in detail, justify some of its crucial presuppositions, and defend it against potential objections. (shrink)

Recent studies have demonstrated neural overlap between resting state activity and self-referential processing. This “rest-self” overlap occurs especially in anterior cortical midline structures like the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC). However, the exact neurotemporal and biochemical mechanisms remain to be identified. Therefore, we conducted a combined electroencephalography (EEG)-magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) study. EEG focused on pre-stimulus (e.g., prior to stimulus presentation or perception) power changes to assess the degree to which those changes can predict subjects’ perception (and judgment) of subsequent (...) stimuli as high or low self-related. MRS measured resting state concentration of glutamate, focusing on PACC. High pre-stimulus (e.g., prior to stimulus presentation or perception) alpha power significantly correlated with both perception of stimuli judged to be highly self-related and with resting state glutamate concentrations in the PACC. In sum, our results show (i) pre-stimulus (e.g., prior to stimulus presentation or perception) alpha power and resting state glutamate concentration to mediate rest-self overlap that (ii) dispose or incline subjects to assign high degrees of self-relatedness to perceptual stimuli. (shrink)

Collective self-determination is considered to be an important political value. Many liberal political philosophers appeal to it to defend the right of states to exclude would-be newcomers. In this paper, I challenge the value of collective self-determination in the case of countries like the US, former colonial powers with a history of white supremacist immigration and citizenship policies. I argue for my claim by way of an analogy: There is no value to white neighborhoods in the US, which are the (...) result of racist attitudes and state policies, determining autonomously who should become a neighbor. In light of this commitment, defenders of the US's right to exclude would need to explain why it should be of moral value that a community whose character and composition has been shaped by white supremacy be able to determine its membership on its own terms. (shrink)

The recent global surge in large-scale foreign land acquisitions marks a radical transformation of the global economic and political landscape. Since land that attracts capital often becomes the site of expulsions and displacement, it also leads to new forms of migration. In this paper, I explore this connection from the perspective of a political philosopher. I argue that changes in global land governance unsettle the congruence of political community and bounded territory that we often take for granted. As a case (...) study, I discuss the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive as a significant driver of foreign land acquisitions. Using its global power, the European Union (EU) is effectively governing land far outside of its international borders and with it the people who live on this land or are expelled from it. As a result, EU citizens ought to consider such people fellow members of their political community. This has implications for normative debates about immigration and, in particular, for arguments that appeal to collective self-determination to justify a right of political communities to exclude newcomers. The political community to which EU citizens belong reaches far beyond the EU’s official borders. (shrink)

In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation (...) calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation. (shrink)

The Mamasapano Incident of January 25, 2015, marked a tragic episode in Philippine history, stemming from an operation aimed at neutralizing the suspected international terrorist, Zulkifli bin Hir, also known as Marwan. This operation, conducted by the Philippine National Police – Special Armed Forces (PNP-SAF), led to clashes resulting in casualties from both the SAF and MILF/BIFF members, as well as civilians, and the displacement of local residents. While the incident garnered national attention and spurred investigations primarily focused on the (...) casualties and political ramifications, the plight of the displaced civilians received inadequate scrutiny. Motivated by the impact on families associated with MSU – Maguindanao, situated near the conflict zone, this research delves into the conditions faced by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the aftermath of the Mamasapano Incident. By exploring the experiences of these respondents, the study contributes to the broader understanding of IDPs and the detrimental effects of armed conflict on society. Moreover, it aims to identify opportunities for mitigating such conflicts. The research objectives encompass examining the evacuation experiences, soliciting suggestions for supporting affected communities during times of conflict, and understanding the challenges faced by IDPs and coping mechanisms. Through an exploratory approach, the study investigates firsthand accounts of evacuation and post-return experiences in Mamasapano, Mindanao, Philippines. Findings reveal that during evacuation, respondents received basic assistance such as food, water, medicine, and clothing from various agencies, yet essential facilities like proper sanitation were lacking. Challenges encountered include food scarcity, inadequate water supply, overcrowding, and health issues. Upon return, observations of increased security presence and dwindling assistance highlighted the enduring impact of the incident on social, economic, educational, and health aspects of the community. In summary, this research sheds light on the overlooked plight of IDPs affected by the Mamasapano Incident, emphasizing the urgent need for comprehensive support and interventions to address their multifaceted challenges and facilitate sustainable recovery. (shrink)

My paper analyses the analogy between Computers and the Thomistic separate substances, and argues that Aquinas' account of angels as cognitively intuitive and non-discursive makes the analogical gap between these impossible to bridge. From there, I point the direction away from computers as the way for us to move up the order of cognitive excellence. Instead, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the way to go, since by them we participate in this intuitivity. I then lay out the ascetical (...) presuppositions for the successful participation of this gifts, in particular the necessity for the passive purgations, according to the division of the ascetical life into three stages by Garrigou-Lagrange OP. (shrink)

1. Biomedical sciences are fast-growing fields with unprecedented speed of research outputs, especially in the quantities of papers. Philosophers aiming to study ongoing biomedical changes face cha...

Vào ngày 3 tháng 9 năm 2022, Retraction Watch thông báo rằng bốn bài báo được xuất bản trong Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) đã bị rút vào cùng một ngày (02 tháng 9 năm 2022). Đáng chú ý hơn là cả bốn bài đều có tác giả chung là Gregg Semenza, một nhà nghiên cứu hàng đầu về cơ chế phân tử của quá trình điều chỉnh oxy – Gregg Semenza. Semenza đã chia sẻ Giải Nobel (...) Y học hoặc Sinh lý 2019 cùng với William Kaelin và Peter Ratcliffe vì "những khám phá về cách tế bào cảm nhận và thích nghi với sự có sẵn của oxy.". (shrink)

Tăng tính minh bạch trong các thông báo rút bài sẽ giúp cộng đồng khoa học và công chúng hiểu rõ hơn về bối cảnh của quyết định, từ đó không chỉ ngăn ngừa những hiểu lầm không công bằng và giảm thiểu sự kỳ thị không cần thiết đối với uy tín của tác giả chính trực.

Trong thế giới khoa học hiện nay, việc một nhà khoa học có bài báo bị rút thường bị ngầm hiểu gắn liền với các lỗi vi phạm đạo đức như ngụy tạo dữ liệu, đạo văn, quá trình phản biện bị thao túng, gian lận về danh sách tác giả... Điều này nếu đúng thì từ phía nhà khoa học, việc công khai, minh bạch thừa nhận các lỗi của mình với các đơn vị chức năng là điều đương (...) nhiên. (shrink)

Bạn của thể nói cho tôi biết việc rút bài khoa học nghĩa là gì không? Rút bài khoa học là hành động xóa một bài báo khoa học đã xuất bản khỏi kho lưu trữ của tạp chí khoa học. Việc này thường được thực hiện khi bài báo được phát hiện có sai sót nghiêm trọng, chẳng hạn như dữ liệu giả mạo, đạo văn hoặc vi phạm đạo đức nghiên cứu.

Trên thực tế, sự hoàn hảo của các kết quả học thuật luôn được tạo nên bởi các sai lầm và thất bại. Cơ chế tự hiệu chỉnh chính là một nét đẹp tự nhiên của khoa học, và việc rút bài cũng góp phần tạo nên vẻ đẹp ấy.

- Sự phát triển của công nghệ thông minh đã khiến bài toán về mô hình hóa quá trình chắt lọc từ biển thông tin hỗn loạn để tạo ra tri thức hữu ích ngày càng trở nên cấp thiết. Bài viết giới thiệu mô hình hành vi chấp nhận công nghệ qua tiếp biến văn hóa mindsponge, gọi tắt là mô hình MTAM. - Lý thuyết về sự sàng lọc qua tiếp biến văn hóa về công nghệ cho chúng (...) ta ba gợi ý để giảm bớt sự hỗn loạn của biển thông tin. - Ưu tiên trong việc làm rõ về giá trị cốt lõi của cá nhân và tổ chức, qua đó phân tích sự tính tương thích của các hệ thống công nghệ mới, thông tin mới với các giá trị đó. - Việc phát triển chuyên môn sâu, có tính kỉ luật giúp nền tảng bộ lọc thông tin của các cá nhân và tổ chức trở nên mạch lạc hơn. - Cuối cùng, việc đổi mới và sáng tạo để thích nghi trong điều kiện chuyển đổi số và công nghệ phát triển như vũ bão là quá trình đồng thời phản tỉnh về giá trị cốt lõi, kỉ luật phát triển chuyên môn sâu, nhằm tạo ra kết nối thông tin mới có tính giải thích, suy phóng cao. -/- . (shrink)

Trong ngày nghỉ cuối tuần (đúng Chủ Nhật), cũng lại là ngày cuối cùng của năm 2023 (31-12), bài báo của chúng tôi (đồng tác giả còn có TS. Nguyễn Hồng Sơn của Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng, và TS. Nguyễn Minh Hoàng của ĐH Phenikaa) đã lên trang, và có thể truy cập toàn văn trên trang web của Tạp chí Cộng sản.

Vẫn biết, học hỏi từ sách vở rất quan trọng, nhưng học từ thiên nhiên lại có những giá trị khó gì sánh nổi. Xét cho cùng phần nhiều kiến thức của con người cũng là thu nạp từ thông tin thiên nhiên mang lại. Hành trình của Charles Darwin từ xa xưa cũng mang bản chất học hỏi như vậy. Trong hình là hai cán bộ nghiên cứu của AISDL rời bỏ máy tính, thuật toán, dữ liệu số, để (...) đi vào rừng. Trước hướng nghiên cứu bền vững môi sinh, bước vào rừng là một việc mang nhiều ý nghĩa. (shrink)

Thành viên AISDL đã đóng góp hơn một chục nghiên cứu đã xuất bản liên quan tới trí tuệ nhân tạo (AI), tuy nhiên các ấn phẩm thuần túy nội dung bên trong của đội ngũ AISDL không có hợp tác bên ngoài đã hoàn thành là 3 bài này.

Trong hoạt động khoa học, số lượng không phải là yếu tố quyết định. Uy tín khoa học còn bắt buộc phải được gây dựng qua những bài CBQT tốt. Một trong những chỉ dấu quan trọng bậc nhất chính là việc xuất bản được trên các ấn phẩm có hệ số tác động cao (HSTĐ).

Tác giả Vương Quân Hoàng (Trung tâm Nghiên cứu Xã hội Liên ngành ISR, trường Đại học Phenikaa) vừa có bài viết quan điểm trên tạp chí Nature về việc làm thế nào để việc rút bài báo khoa học trở nên minh bạch hơn, mang lại lợi ích cho bản thân nhà khoa học bị rút bài cũng như cộng đồng khoa học.

Tháng 3-2022, Tạp chí Kinh tế và Dự báo đăng bài có tiêu đề “Suy ngẫm về trí thức tinh hoa” của TS Khúc Văn Quý, Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội. Hình ảnh đầu bài báo như dưới đây.

Các bài trên Tạp chí Cộng sản với nhóm chủ đề tập trung xung quanh kinh tế vĩ mô, kinh tế chính trị có liên quan mật thiết tới quá trình tập hợp suy nghĩ, tư liệu và xử lý dữ liệu cho cuốn sách Kinh tế Việt Nam: Thăng trầm và đột phá, do Nxb Chính trị Quốc gia Sự thật in và phát hành vào đầu tháng 6 năm 2009.

Sau 14 tháng bền bỉ, phương pháp đổi mới việc rà soát tổng quan lý thuyết xã hội của ISR, dựa trên dữ liệu metadata có cấu trúc, đã được xuất bản bởi tạp chí MethodsX (Elsevier Q2 SCImago | ISI Web of Science). Bài có tiêu đề: “Making social sciences more scientific” [1].

Vừa rồi, nguyên hiệu trưởng của trường ĐH Stanford, Marc Tessier-Lavigne, đã rút bài nghiên cứu khoa học trên Nature. Đây là một sự kiện ảnh hưởng đến độ tin cậy đối với các nghiên cứu khoa học trong công chúng. Vì thông báo rút bài minh bạch sẽ giúp giảm nhẹ tác động tiêu cực của việc rút bài đối với cộng đồng học thuật và công chúng nói chung, tôi đã sử dụng trí tuệ nhân tạo (Google Bard) (...) để kiểm tra xem các thông tin quan trọng liên quan đến việc rút bài đã được cung cấp hay chưa. (shrink)

Bài mới xuất bản vào ngày 19-5-2020 với tác giả liên lạc là NCS Nguyễn Minh Hoàng, cán bộ nghiên cứu của Trung tâm ISR, trình bày tiếp cận thống kê Bayesian cho việc nghiên cứu dữ liệu khoa học xã hội. Đây là kết quả của định hướng Nhóm nghiên cứu SDAG được nêu rõ ngay từ ngày 18-5-2019.

In “Confucianism and Same-Sex Marriage,” published recently in Politics and Religion, Professor Tongdong Bai argues for a “moderate Confucian position on same-sex marriage,” one that supports its legalization and yet endeavors “to use public opinion and social and political policies to encourage heterosexual marriages, and to prevent same-sex marriages from becoming the majority form of marriages” (Bai 2021:146). Against the backdrop of downright homophobia prevalent among vocal Confucians in mainland China today, Bai claims that his pro-legalization rendition “show[s] a different (...) version of Confucianism that challenges the received perception of Confucianism that it is deeply conservative, a perception that often lies at the core of the rejection of its contemporary relevance, especially by the so-called ‘liberals’ in China and elsewhere” (Bai 2021:133). Furthermore, Bai claims that his moderate Confucianism is normatively preferrable to “the typical liberal or individualist position” of a marriage equality supporter, because the specter of polygamy – the conservative trope of invoking polygamy as a reductio ad absurdum against same-sex marriage – imposes “a serious challenge” to liberals but not to moderate Confucians (Bai 2021:146, 153). -/- Both of Bai’s claims falter upon scrutiny, however. Granted, it is applaudable that Bai tries to dissuade his more conservative Confucian colleagues from opposing the legalization of same-sex marriage. But as Section 1 of this Response will show, the alternative rendition of Confucianism he presents, along with the way he presents it, is premised on a highly contested conception of what shared Confucian values are; does injustice to Confucians who embrace marriage equality more unreservedly (i.e., without caveats à la Bai); fails to produce new arguments that “enrich the theoretical basis for same-sex marriage” (Bai 2021:133); and, ironically, reinforces – rather than “challenges” – the “received perception” of Confucianism as deeply conservative. Meanwhile, Section 2 will show that Bai’s comparison between liberalism and moderate Confucianism relies both upon an apparent unfamiliarity with the extensive and nuanced liberal discussions on polygamy, and upon fallacious methods of assessing comparative normative valence. -/- Finally, Section 3 will offer some concluding thoughts from the perspective of decolonial theory, examining the dynamic of spectacularized postcoloniality that propels the production and consumption of dubious theoretical projects like Bai’s. As it turns out, this case serves not only as a cautionary tale of how not to conduct comparative normative theorizing, but also as a cautionary tale of how not to let the spectacle of postcoloniality derail the pursuit of academic decolonization. (shrink)

Năm 2023, Hindawi đã rút hơn 8,000 bài báo khoa học, nâng tổng số bài báo bị rút trong năm lên hơn 10,000 bài, mức kỷ lục cao nhất từ trước đến nay. Vì thông báo rút bài minh bạch sẽ giúp giảm nhẹ tác động tiêu cực của việc rút bài đối với cộng đồng học thuật và công chúng nói chung, tôi đã sử dụng trí tuệ nhân tạo (Google Bard) để kiểm tra xem các thông tin quan (...) trọng liên quan đến việc rút bài đã được cung cấp hay chưa. (shrink)

Tạp chí Investigación y Ciencia (Nº 530), số ra tháng 11-2020, đã xuất bản bài “¿Cómo retractarse en ciencia?” của Trung tâm ISR. Đây là tạp chí tiếng Tây Ban Nha do Prensa Científica (Barcelona) phát hành.

Ngày 8-6 vừa qua, tạp chí Nature danh tiếng, 151 tuổi, một trong số rất ít ngọn hải đăng của khoa học nhân loại đã xuất bản bài của TS. Vương Quân Hoàng, Trung tâm ISR (trường Đại học Phenikaa, Hà Nội).

Để thực hiện các mục tiêu phát triển kinh tế - xã hội của mỗi quốc gia, vai trò của các doanh nghiệp nhỏ và vừa (DNNVV) vô cùng quan trọng. Do đó, nhóm doanh nghiệp này là mục tiêu trọng tâm của các chính sách hỗ trợ phát triển, trong đó hỗ trợ và tạo điều kiện để các DNNVV tiếp cận với nguồn vốn được coi là then chốt. Bài viết tóm tắt kinh nghiệm hỗ trợ vốn cho (...) DNNVV của một số quốc gia như Nhật Bản, Hàn Quốc, Đài Loan, Trung Quốc, qua đó đưa ra bài học cho Việt Nam nghiên cứu, tham khảo. (shrink)

Bai Tongdong’s Against Political Equality argues for Confucian meritocracy over a pure democracy of equals. His arguments draw on a multiple modernities comparison between the Spring and Autumn Warring States period in China and early modernity in the West, and rest on a Mencian conception of human nature according to which humans are equal in moral potential but not in moral actuality. I argue that there is a crucial disanalogy between this Chinese early modernity and Western early modernity: the role (...) of capitalism. In a similarly comparativist and modernist spirit, drawing on B. R. Ambedkar and M. K. Gandhi, I argue that this disanalogy challenges both Bai’s critique of democracy and his positive account. Bai’s failure to take into account the role of capitalism in Western modernity raises a challenge to the explanatory power of his Mencian conception of human nature with regard to the failings of contemporary democracies, namely that capitalism fosters the relevant features of our moral psychology that cause those failings. Further, without that grounding assumption, Bai’s arguments against democracy cut equally against his Confucian meritocracy. The disanalogy also creates challenges for his positive proposal. Bai, I argue, provides an ideal theory of Confucian meritocracy at the same time as he provides a non-ideal theory of democracy. But, taking into account the non-ideal cultural and moral psychological features of capitalism, Bai’s Confucian meritocracy is likely to fall into an unjust and oligarchic hierarchy. (shrink)