Results for 'Preference axiomatization'

238 found
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  1.  45
    Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Stochastic independence (SI) has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory, hence a property that any theory on the foundations of probability should be able to account for. Bayesian decision theory, which is one such theory, appears to be wanting in this respect. In Savage's classic treatment, postulates on preferences under uncertainty are shown to entail a (...)
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  2. Against "Humanism": Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference.Simon Cushing - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (4):556–571.
    Article responds to the criticism of speciesism that it is somehow less immoral than other -isms by showing that this is a mistake resting on an inadequate taxonomy of the various -isms. Criticizes argument by Bonnie Steinbock that preference to your own species is not immoral by comparison with racism of comparable level.
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  3. A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.
    According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose (...)
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  4. Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...)
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  5.  61
    Affine Geometry, Visual Sensation, and Preference for Symmetry of Things in a Thing.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2016 - Symmetry 127 (8).
    Evolution and geometry generate complexity in similar ways. Evolution drives natural selection while geometry may capture the logic of this selection and express it visually, in terms of specific generic properties representing some kind of advantage. Geometry is ideally suited for expressing the logic of evolutionary selection for symmetry, which is found in the shape curves of vein systems and other natural objects such as leaves, cell membranes, or tunnel systems built by ants. The topology and geometry of symmetry is (...)
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  6. The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals.Brian Kim - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
    When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...)
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  7. Introspection, Revealed Preference and Neoclassical Economics: A Critical Response to Don Ross on the Robbins-Samuelson Argument Pattern.D. Wade Hands - 2008 - Journal of the History of Economic Thought 30:1-26.
    Abstract: Don Ross’ Economic Theory and Cognitive Science (2005) provides an elaborate philosophical defense of neoclassical economics. He argues that the central features of neoclassical theory are associated with what he calls the Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern and that it can be reconciled with recent developments in experimental and behavioral economics, as well as contemporary cognitive science. This paper argues that Ross’ Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern is not in the work of either Robbins or Samuelson and in many ways is in conflict (...)
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  8. Pure Time Preference in Intertemporal Welfare Economics.J. Paul Kelleher - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):441-473.
    Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question concerns the evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at different (...)
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  9. The Desire to Work as an Adaptive Preference.Michael Cholbi - 2018 - Autonomy 4.
    Many economists and social theorists hypothesize that most societies could soon face a ‘post-work’ future, one in which employment and productive labor have a dramatically reduced place in human affairs. Given the centrality of employment to individual identity and its pivotal role as the primary provider of economic and other goods, transitioning to a ‘post-work’ future could prove traumatic and disorienting to many. Policymakers are thus likely to face the difficult choice of the extent to which they ought to satisfy (...)
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  10.  95
    Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty.Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato - manuscript
    We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...)
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  11. Adaptive Preference.H. E. Baber - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):105-126.
    I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions (...)
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  12. On the Preference for More Specific Reference Classes.Paul Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.
    In attempting to form rational personal probabilities by direct inference, it is usually assumed that one should prefer frequency information concerning more specific reference classes. While the preceding assumption is intuitively plausible, little energy has been expended in explaining why it should be accepted. In the present article, I address this omission by showing that, among the principled policies that may be used in setting one’s personal probabilities, the policy of making direct inferences with a preference for frequency information (...)
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  13. Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.
    To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the (...) for x. So-revising one's preferences is rational in paradoxical choice situations like Kavka's Deterrence Paradox. I then try to meet the following objections: that this is stoicist, incoherent, bad faith; that it conflates instrumental and intrinsic value, gives wrong solutions to the problems presented by paradoxical choice situations, entails vicious regresses of value justification, falsifies value realism, makes valuing x unresponsive to x's properties, causes value conflict, conflicts with other standards of rationality, violates decision theory, counsels immorality, makes moral paradox, treats value change as voluntary, conflates first- and second-order values, is psychologically unrealistic, and wrongly presumes that paradoxical choice situations can even occur. (shrink)
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  14. Realism, Commonsensibles, and Economics:The Case of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory.D. Wade Hands - 2012 - In Aki Lehtinen, Jaakko Kuorikoski & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Economics for Real: Uskali Mäki and the Place of Truth in Economics. Routledge. pp. 156-178.
    This paper challenges Mäki's argument about commonsensibles by offering a case study from contemporary microeconomics – contemporary revealed preference theory (hereafter CRPT) – where terms like "preference," "utility," and to some extent "choice," are radical departures from the common sense meanings of these terms. Although the argument challenges the claim that economics is inhabited solely by commonsensibles, it is not inconsistent with such folk notions being common in economic theory.
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  15. Reasoning About Outcome Probabilities and Values in Preference Reversals.Marcus Selart, Ole Boe & Tommy Garling - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (2):175 – 188.
    Research on preference reversals has demonstrated a disproportionate influence of outcome probability on choices between monetary gambles. The aim was to investigate the hypothesis that this is a prominence effect originally demonstrated for riskless choice. Another aim was to test the structure compatibility hypothesis as an explanation of the effect. The hypothesis implies that probability should be the prominent attribute when compared with value attributes both in a choice and a preference rating procedure. In Experiment 1, two groups (...)
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  16. Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare.Alex Voorhoeve - 2006 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Preferences and Well-Being. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 265-79.
    Can a preference-based conception of welfare accommodate changes in people's preferences? I argue that the fact that people care about which preferences they have, and the fact that people can change their preferences about which preferences it is good for them to have, together undermine the case for accepting a preference-satisfaction conception of welfare.
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  17.  27
    The Preference Toward Identified Victims and Rescue Duties.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics 15 (2):25-27.
    Jeremy R. Garrett claims that the nature and scope of our rescue duties cannot be properly understood and addressed without reference to social context or institutional background conditions. In my comment I focus not on social or institutional but on psychological background conditions that are also necessary for the conceptualization of rescue cases. These additional conditions are of crucial importance since an entire paradigm of “rescue medicine” is founded, as Garret notices, on the powerful and immediate “impulse to rescue” (Garrett (...)
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  18. A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.William B. Starr - manuscript
    Imperative sentences like Dance! do not seem to represent the world. Recent modal analyses challenge this idea, but its intuitive and historical appeal remain strong. This paper presents three new challenges for a non-representational analysis, showing that the obstacles facing it are even steeper than previously appreciated. I will argue that the only way for the non-representationalist to meet these three challenges is to adopt a dynamic semantics. Such a dynamic semantics is proposed here: imperatives introduce preferences between alternatives. This (...)
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  19. Violations of Procedure Invariance in Preference Measurement: Cognitive Explanations.Marcus Selart, Henry Montgomery, Joakim Romanus & Tommy Gärling - 1994 - European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 6:417-435.
    A violation of procedure invariance in preference measurement is that the predominant or prominent attribute looms larger in choice than in a matching task. In Experiment 1, this so-called prominence effect was demonstrated for choices between pairs of options, choices to accept single options, and preference ratings of single options. That is, in all these response modes the prominent attribute loomed larger than in matching. The results were replicated in Experiment 2, in which subjects chose between or rated (...)
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  20. Democracy Without Preference.David M. Estlund - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):397-423.
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  21.  63
    Temptation and Preference-Based Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - In José Bermudez (ed.), Self-control, decision theory and rationality. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...)
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  22. A Generalized Model of Judgment and Preference Aggregation.Ismat Beg - 2013 - Fuzzy Economic Review (1).
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  23. Democracy & Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, Geoffery Brennan and Loren Lomasky. Cambridge University Press, 1993, 225 + X Pages. [REVIEW]David Estlund - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):113.
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  24.  33
    Disagreeing Over Evaluatives: Preference, Normative and Moral Discourse.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):39-63.
    Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives (...)
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  25.  57
    Why Arrow's Theorem Matters for Political Theory Even If Preference Cycles Never Occur.Sean Ingham - forthcoming - Public Choice.
    Riker (1982) famously argued that Arrow’s impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of “populism”, the view that in a democracy, laws and policies ought to express “the will of the people”. In response, his critics have questioned the use of Arrow’s theorem on the grounds that not all configurations of preferences are likely to occur in practice; the critics allege, in particular, that majority preference cycles, whose possibility the theorem exploits, rarely happen. In this essay, I argue that the (...)
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  26.  91
    Aspects of Compatibility and the Construction of Preference.Marcus Selart - 1997 - In Rob Ranyard, Ray Crozier & Ola Svenson (eds.), Decision making: Cognitive models and explanations. Routledge. pp. 58-72.
    This chapter focuses on the psychological mechanisms behind the construction of preference, especially the actual processes used by humans when they make decisions in their everyday lives or in business situations. The chapter uses cognitive psychological techniques to break down these processes and set them in their social context. When attributes are compatible with the response scale, they are assigned greater weight because they are most easily mapped onto the response. For instance, when subjects are asked to set a (...)
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  27.  86
    Preference Judgments and Choice: Is the Prominence Effect Due to Information Integration or Information Evaluation?Henry Montgomery, Tommy Gärling, Erik Lindberg & Marcus Selart - 1990 - In Katrin Borcherding, Oleg Larichev & David Messick (eds.), Contemporary issues in decision making. North-Holland.
    Several studies have shown that preference is not necessarily synonymous with choice. In particular, the most preferred object from a set of objects presented in a non—choice context is not necessarily chosen when the same objects are options in a choice situation (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973; Tversky, Sattah, & Slovic, 1988) . Our research on the choice—preference discrepancy replicates these findings and thus bears some resemblance to the study by Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic (1988). Two competing explanations (...)
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  28.  52
    Sex Preference and Interest in Preconception Sex Selection: A Survey Among Pregnant Women in the North of Jordan.Edgar Dahl - 2009 - Human Reproduction and Genetic Ethics 24 (7):1665-1669.
    BACKGROUND Preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons is a controversial issue in bioethics. Little research has described preferences for preconception sex selection among Arab populations. This study describes the sex preference and interest in employing sex selection techniques among pregnant women in northern Jordan. -/- METHODS A self-reported questionnaire was administered to 600 pregnant women in Irbid, Jordan. χ2 test and binary logistic regression were used to examine the factors associated with interest in preconception sex selection. -/- RESULTS In (...)
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  29. Preference Reversals in Judgment and Choice.Marcus Selart - 1994 - Gothenburg University Press.
    According to normative decision theory there exists a principle of procedure invariance which states that a decision maker's preference order should remain the same, independently of which response mode is used. For example, the decision maker should express the same preference independently of whether he or she has to judge or decide. Nevertheless, previous research in behavioral decision making has suggested that judgments and choices yield different preference orders in both the risky and the riskless domain. In (...)
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  30.  17
    Morality is Neither an External Object nor a Personal Preference, It's a Simplifying Framework.Uri Harris - manuscript
    The central question in meta-ethics, and arguably all of ethics, is the question of what moral statements refer to. Several candidates have been proposed, including Platonic objects, natural objects, commands, and personal preferences. The answer, I suggest, is that it is none of these. Rather, morality is a framework. We see this by looking at common moral terms: ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘justice’, ‘guilt’, ‘responsibility’, ‘blame’, and ‘rights’. These terms all have something in common: they are legal terms. Since morality dates (...)
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  31. Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although (...)
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  32. Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.Christian List & Franz Dietrich - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):249-281.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific (...)
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  33. Conditional Preferences and Practical Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.
    I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the proper analysis of indicative practical conditionals (...)
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  34. Nonindexical Context-Dependence and the Interpretation as Abduction Approach.Erich Rast - 2011 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7 (2):259-279.
    Nonindexical Context-Dependence and the Interpretation as Abduction Approach Inclusive nonindexical context-dependence occurs when the preferred interpretation of an utterance implies its lexically-derived meaning. It is argued that the corresponding processes of free or lexically mandated enrichment can be modeled as abductive inference. A form of abduction is implemented in Simple Type Theory on the basis of a notion of plausibility, which is in turn regarded a preference relation over possible worlds. Since a preordering of doxastic alternatives taken for itself (...)
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  35. Where Do Preferences Come From?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
    Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice, we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain "motivationally salient" properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change (...)
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  36.  14
    Computation Tree Logics and Temporal Logics with Reference Pointers.Valentin Goranko - 2000 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 10 (3-4):221-242.
    A complete axiomatic system CTL$_{rp}$ is introduced for a temporal logic for finitely branching $\omega^+$-trees in a temporal language extended with so called reference pointers. Syntactic and semantic interpretations are constructed for the branching time computation tree logic CTL* into CTL$_{rp}$. In particular, that yields a complete axiomatization for the translations of all valid CTL*-formulae. Thus, the temporal logic with reference pointers is brought forward as a simpler (with no path quantifiers), but in a way more expressive medium for (...)
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  37. Choice-Based Cardinal Utility. A Tribute to Patrick Suppes.Philippe Mongin - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (3):268-288.
    We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes's contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and dis- tinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes's doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions (...)
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  38.  70
    The Basic Algebra of Game Equivalences.Valentin Goranko - 2003 - Studia Logica 75 (2):221-238.
    We give a complete axiomatization of the identities of the basic game algebra valid with respect to the abstract game board semantics. We also show that the additional conditions of termination and determinacy of game boards do not introduce new valid identities. En route we introduce a simple translation of game terms into plain modal logic and thus translate, while preserving validity both ways game identities into modal formulae. The completeness proof is based on reduction of game terms to (...)
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  39.  17
    Single-Peakedness and Semantic Dimensions of Preferences.Daniele Porello - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (4).
    Among the possible solutions to the paradoxes of collective preferences, single-peakedness is significant because it has been associated to a suggestive conceptual interpretation: a single-peaked preference profile entails that, although individuals may disagree on which option is the best, they conceptualize the choice along a shared unique dimension, i.e. they agree on the rationale of the collective decision. In this article, we discuss the relationship between the structural property of singlepeakedness and its suggested interpretation as uni-dimensionality of a social (...)
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  40.  68
    Temporal Logics with Reference Pointers and Computation Tree Logics.Valentin Goranko - 2000 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 10 (3):221-242.
    A complete axiomatic system CTL$_{rp}$ is introduced for a temporal logic for finitely branching $\omega^+$-trees in a temporal language extended with so called reference pointers. Syntactic and semantic interpretations are constructed for the branching time computation tree logic CTL$^{*}$ into CTL$_{rp}$. In particular, that yields a complete axiomatization for the translations of all valid CTL$^{*}$-formulae. Thus, the temporal logic with reference pointers is brought forward as a simpler (with no path quantifiers), but in a way more expressive medium for (...)
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  41. The Money Pump Is Necessarily Diachronic.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2014 - Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin/Philosophy.
    In “The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity,” The Journal of Philosophy CX, 8 (August 2013), 460-464, Johan E. Gustafsson contends that if Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes’ diachronic money-pump argument in their "Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I," Philosophy of Science 22 (1955), 140-160 is valid, so is the synchronic argument Gustafsson himself offers. He concludes that the latter renders irrelevant diachronic choice considerations in general, and the two best-known diachronic solutions to the money pump problem (...)
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  42.  44
    Hyperboolean Algebras and Hyperboolean Modal Logic.Valentin Goranko & Dimiter Vakarelov - 1999 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 9 (2):345-368.
    Hyperboolean algebras are Boolean algebras with operators, constructed as algebras of complexes (or, power structures) of Boolean algebras. They provide an algebraic semantics for a modal logic (called here a {\em hyperboolean modal logic}) with a Kripke semantics accordingly based on frames in which the worlds are elements of Boolean algebras and the relations correspond to the Boolean operations. We introduce the hyperboolean modal logic, give a complete axiomatization of it, and show that it lacks the finite model property. (...)
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  43.  60
    Classes and Theories of Trees Associated with a Class of Linear Orders.Valentin Goranko & Ruaan Kellerman - 2011 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 19 (1):217-232.
    Given a class of linear order types C, we identify and study several different classes of trees, naturally associated with C in terms of how the paths in those trees are related to the order types belonging to C. We investigate and completely determine the set-theoretic relationships between these classes of trees and between their corresponding first-order theories. We then obtain some general results about the axiomatization of the first-order theories of some of these classes of trees in terms (...)
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  44.  51
    The Modal Logic of the Countable Random Frame.Valentin Goranko & Bruce Kapron - 2003 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 42 (3):221-243.
    We study the modal logic M L r of the countable random frame, which is contained in and `approximates' the modal logic of almost sure frame validity, i.e. the logic of those modal principles which are valid with asymptotic probability 1 in a randomly chosen finite frame. We give a sound and complete axiomatization of M L r and show that it is not finitely axiomatizable. Then we describe the finite frames of that logic and show that it has (...)
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  45.  26
    "The Taste Approach?. Governance Beyond Libertarian Paternalism.Tor Otterholt - 2010 - Revue de Philosophie Économique 11 (1):57.
    Well-being can be promoted in two ways. Firstly, by affecting the quantity, quality and allocation of bundles of consumption (the Resource Approach), and secondly, by influencing how people benefit from their goods (the Taste Approach). Whereas the former is considered an ingredient of economic analysis, the latter has conventionally not been included in that field. By identifying the gain the Taste Approach might yield, the article questions whether this asymmetry is justified. If successfully exercised, the Taste Approach might not only (...)
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  46.  79
    Dynamic Tableaux for Dynamic Modal Logics.Jonas De Vuyst - 2013 - Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
    In this dissertation we present proof systems for several modal logics. These proof systems are based on analytic (or semantic) tableaux. -/- Modal logics are logics for reasoning about possibility, knowledge, beliefs, preferences, and other modalities. Their semantics are almost always based on Saul Kripke’s possible world semantics. In Kripke semantics, models are represented by relational structures or, equivalently, labeled graphs. Syntactic formulas that express statements about knowledge and other modalities are evaluated in terms of such models. -/- This dissertation (...)
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  47. The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Berlin: Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.
    In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’. Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic. In the US, they have advised Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David Cameron's camp (Chakrabortty 2008). I will consider the following questions. What (...)
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  48. Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Christin List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
    This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...)
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  49. Computability and Human Symbolic Output.Jason Megill & Tim Melvin - 2014 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (4):391-401.
    This paper concerns “human symbolic output,” or strings of characters produced by humans in our various symbolic systems; e.g., sentences in a natural language, mathematical propositions, and so on. One can form a set that consists of all of the strings of characters that have been produced by at least one human up to any given moment in human history. We argue that at any particular moment in human history, even at moments in the distant future, this set is finite. (...)
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  50. Decision Theory.Lara Buchak - 2016 - In Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hajek (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Decision theory has at its core a set of mathematical theorems that connect rational preferences to functions with certain structural properties. The components of these theorems, as well as their bearing on questions surrounding rationality, can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Philosophy’s current interest in decision theory represents a convergence of two very different lines of thought, one concerned with the question of how one ought to act, and the other concerned with the question of what action consists (...)
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