Results for 'Raven Paradox'

954 found
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  1. Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation.Barry Ward - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):360-377.
    Simple random sampling resolutions of the raven paradox relevantly diverge from scientific practice. We develop a stratified random sampling model, yielding a better fit and apparently rehabilitating simple random sampling as a legitimate idealization. However, neither accommodates a second concern, the objection from potential bias. We develop a third model that crucially invokes causal considerations, yielding a novel resolution that handles both concerns. This approach resembles Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and relates the generalization’s confirmation to confirmation (...)
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  2. Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
    According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. (...)
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  3. An Asymmetry in the Raven Paradox.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    Peter Godfrey-Smith writes in the section 3.3 “The Ravens Problem” of his book “Theory and Reality” [chapter “Induction and Confirmation”]: “First, the logical empiricists were concerned to deal with the case where generalizations cover an infinite number of instances. In that case, as we see each raven we are not reducing the number of ways in which the hypothesis might fail”. Infinite sets and finite sets have different properties and follow different rules. For example: let’s call “bag X” a (...)
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  4. Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox.Chenguang Lu - 2020 - Entropy 22 (4):384.
    After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based (...)
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  5. A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.
    The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the (...)
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  6. Hempel’s Raven Revisited.Andrew Bollhagen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (3):113-137.
    The paper takes a novel approach to a classic problem—Hempel’s Raven Paradox. A standard approach to it supposes the solution to consist in bringing our inductive logic into “reflective equilibrium” with our intuitive judgements about which inductive inferences we should license. This approach leaves the intuitions as a kind of black box and takes it on faith that, whatever the structure of the intuitions inside that box might be, it is one for which we can construct an isomorphic (...)
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  7. A Neglected Response to the Paradoxes of Confirmation.Murali Ramachandran - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):179-85.
    Hempel‘s paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation, Goodman‘s 'grue‘ paradox and the 'tacking‘ (or 'irrelevant conjunct‘) paradox. What these paradoxes (...)
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  8. Understanding the 'Six Paradoxes of Post-Colonial Violence' as the Ontology of Insecurity in Nigeria.Omobola Olufunto Badejo & Abidemi Israel Ogunyomi - 2021 - Journal of Oriental and African Studies 30:369-388.
    It is incontrovertible that the problem of insecurity is part of the ravening realities in the current civil society. It is a general problem facing the whole world. However, it is more pronounced in some parts of the world than in others. In African countries, especially in Nigeria, insecurity has been a seemingly insurmountable problem. It has rendered all attempts made by the government and individuals to stabilize the country thereby strengthening the principle of social co-operation, harmony and peaceful coexistence (...)
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  9. Confirmation versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
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  10. On the equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:32-42.
    Historically, Nelson Goodman’s paradox involving the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ has been taken to furnish a serious blow to Carl Hempel’s theory of confirmation in particular and to purely formal theories of confirmation in general. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s paradox is no more serious of a threat to Hempel’s theory of confirmation than is Hempel’s own paradox of the ravens. I proceed by developing a suggestion from R. D. Rosenkrantz into an argument for the (...)
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  11. Formal Methods.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    (This is for the Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Marcus Rossberg) In this handbook entry, I survey the different ways in which formal mathematical methods have been applied to philosophical questions throughout the history of analytic philosophy. I consider: formalization in symbolic logic, with examples such as Aquinas’ third way and Anselm’s ontological argument; Bayesian confirmation theory, with examples such as the fine-tuning argument for God and the paradox of the ravens; foundations of mathematics, with examples such (...)
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  12. Semantic Information Measure with Two Types of Probability for Falsification and Confirmation.Lu Chenguang - manuscript
    Logical Probability (LP) is strictly distinguished from Statistical Probability (SP). To measure semantic information or confirm hypotheses, we need to use sampling distribution (conditional SP function) to test or confirm fuzzy truth function (conditional LP function). The Semantic Information Measure (SIM) proposed is compatible with Shannon’s information theory and Fisher’s likelihood method. It can ensure that the less the LP of a predicate is and the larger the true value of the proposition is, the more information there is. So the (...)
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  13. The Doomsday Argument and Hempel's Problem.Paul Franceschi - 1999 - [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 29 (1):139-156.
    English translation of a paper originally published in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy under the title 'Comment l'urne de Carter et Leslie se déverse dans celle de Hempel'. In this paper, I present firstly a solution to Hempel's Problem. I recall secondly the solution to the Doomsday Argument described in my previous Une Solution pour l'Argument de l'Apocalypse (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1998) and remark that both solutions are based on a similar line of reasoning. I show thirdly (...)
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  14. A Puzzle for Social Essences.Michael J. Raven - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):128-148.
    The social world contains institutions, groups, objects, and more. This essay explores a puzzle about the essences of social items. There is widespread consensus against social essences because of problematic presuppositions often made about them. But it is argued that essence can be freed from these presuppositions and their problems. Even so, a puzzle still arises. In a Platonic spirit, essences in general seem detached from the world. In an Aristotelian spirit, social essences in particular seem embedded in the world. (...)
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  15. Etic Theorizing Unanchored.Michael J. Raven - forthcoming - Journal of Social Ontology.
    Etic theorizing uses the theorist’s social notions to theorize about their subject. This theorist may claim that Genghis Khan was a war criminal even though his actions predate the enactment of the Geneva Conventions. Brian Epstein considers a modal etic theorist who claims that Genghis Khan would have been a war criminal even if the Geneva Conventions were never enacted. Epstein argues that this has metaphysical import: it requires postulating a novel metaphysical notion of “anchoring”. Drawing from some familiar issues (...)
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  16. The bases of truths.Michael J. Raven - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2153-2174.
    This paper concerns a distinction between circumstantial truths that hold because of the circumstances and acircumstantial truths that hold regardless of, or transcend, the circumstances. Previous discussions of the distinction tended to focus on its applications, such as to modality, logical truth, and essence. This paper focuses on developing the distinction largely, but not entirely, in abstraction from its potential applications. As such, the paper’s main contribution is to further clarify the distinction itself. An indirect contribution is to help guide (...)
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  17. Fundamentality without Foundations.Michael J. Raven - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):607-626.
    A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. But a puzzle arises. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim that the fundamental (...)
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  18. Explaining essences.Michael J. Raven - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1043-1064.
    This paper explores the prospects of combining two views. The first view is metaphysical rationalism : all things have an explanation. The second view is metaphysical essentialism: there are real essences. The exploration is motivated by a conflict between the views. Metaphysical essentialism posits facts about essences. Metaphysical rationalism demands explanations for all facts. But facts about essences appear to resist explanation. I consider two solutions to the conflict. Exemption solutions attempt to exempt facts about essences from the demand for (...)
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  19. What Physicalism Could Be.Michael J. Raven - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The physicalist credo is that the world is physical. But some phenomena, such as minds, morals, and mathematics, appear to be nonphysical. While an uncompromising physicalism would reject these, a conciliatory physicalism needn’t if it can account for them in terms of an underlying physical basis. Any such account must refer to the nonphysical. But won’t this unavoidable reference to the nonphysical conflict with the physicalist credo? This essay aims to clarify this problem and introduce a novel solution that relies (...)
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  20. Physicalism and its Challenges in Social Ontology.Michael J. Raven - forthcoming - In Stephanie Collins, Brian Epstein, Sally Haslanger & Hans B. Schmid (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter will discuss the relation of physicalism to social ontology, and explores problems that social ontology raises for physicalism. Physicalism is often understood to be the view that all facts—the social ones included—are physical facts, or at least are exhaustively determined by physical facts. While this view is widely endorsed, social phenomena challenge physicalism in several ways, both challenging the coherence of claims of physicalism and raising potential counterexamples.
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  21. The paradox of anthropology at home and solutions to it: a handout and review.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This is a one page handout reconstructing the paradox and identifying four solutions in the literature, as well as some concerns about them.
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  22. Pain, paradox and polysemy.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):461-470.
    The paradox of pain refers to the idea that the folk concept of pain is paradoxical, treating pains as simultaneously mental states and bodily states. By taking a close look at our pain terms, this paper argues that there is no paradox of pain. The air of paradox dissolves once we recognize that pain terms are polysemous and that there are two separate but related concepts of pain rather than one.
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  23. Benardete paradoxes, patchwork principles, and the infinite past.Joseph C. Schmid - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):51.
    Benardete paradoxes involve a beginningless set each member of which satisfies some predicate just in case no earlier member satisfies it. Such paradoxes have been wielded on behalf of arguments for the impossibility of an infinite past. These arguments often deploy patchwork principles in support of their key linking premise. Here I argue that patchwork principles fail to justify this key premise.
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  24. From Periodic Decline to Permanent Rebirth: Alexander Raven Thomson on Civilization, Pathology, and Violence.Rory Lawrence Phillips - 2022 - Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence 6 (2):37-52.
    Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson’s Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson’s change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This (...)
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  25. Knowability paradox, decidability solution?William Bondi Knowles - 2024 - Ratio 37 (2-3):102-111.
    Fitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch (...)
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  26. Benardete Paradoxes, Causal Finitism, and the Unsatisfiable Pair Diagnosis.Joseph C. Schmid & Alex Malpass - forthcoming - Mind.
    We examine two competing solutions to Benardete paradoxes: causal finitism, according to which nothing can have infinitely many causes, and the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis (UPD), according to which such paradoxes are logically impossible and no metaphysical thesis need be adopted to avoid them. We argue that the UPD enjoys notable theoretical advantages over causal finitism. Causal finitists, however, have levelled two main objections to the UPD. First, they urge that the UPD requires positing a ‘mysterious force’ that prevents paradoxes from (...)
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  27. Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.
    Paradoxes have played an important role both in philosophy and in mathematics and paradox resolution is an important topic in both fields. Paradox resolution is deeply important because if such resolution cannot be achieved, we are threatened with the charge of debilitating irrationality. This is supposed to be the case for the following reason. Paradoxes consist of jointly contradictory sets of statements that are individually plausible or believable. These facts about paradoxes then give rise to a deeply troubling (...)
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  28. A paradox of failure.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I present a paradox concerning a person who desires to fail to achieve the goal that matters most to them. I recently encountered a similar paradox, but radical solipsism is a solution to it. This is not a solution to the paradox that I present.
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  29. Paradox University by La*ra R*ding.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I present a vision of a university in which each of the departments is based on having solved a paradox (especially for those who think that philosophers on here lack vision, in a grand sense!). I do so imitating a notable modernist writer, apologies for any political incorrectness.
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  30. Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.
    Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.
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  31. Das Paradoxe in Goodmans Paradox. Die Vernachlässigung des Funktionscharakters von Naturgesetzen als Grund der Paradoxie.Dieter Wandschneider - 2000 - In Dirk Greiman & Constanze Peres (eds.), Wahrheit - Sein - Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. New York: Georg Olms. pp. 231–245.
    Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox. As a consequence, the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of the temporal change of unique (...)
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  32. The paradox of decrease and dependent parts.Alex Moran - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):273-284.
    This paper is concerned with the paradox of decrease. Its aim is to defend the answer to this puzzle that was propounded by its originator, namely, the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. The main trouble with this answer to the paradox is that it has the seemingly problematic implication that a material thing could perish due merely to extrinsic change. It follows that in order to defend Chrysippus’ answer to the paradox, one has to explain how it could be (...)
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  33. Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2007 - In Jan Lloyd Jones (ed.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing. pp. 172--189.
    I distinguish paradoxes and hypodoxes among the conundrums of time travel. I introduce ‘hypodoxes’ as a term for seemingly consistent conundrums that seem to be related to various paradoxes, as the Truth-teller is related to the Liar. In this article, I briefly compare paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel with Liar paradoxes and Truth-teller hypodoxes. I also discuss Lewis’ treatment of time travel paradoxes, which I characterise as a Laissez Faire theory of time travel. Time travel paradoxes are impossible according (...)
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  34. Paradoxical hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  35. Paradoxical Desires.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):335-355.
    I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable (...)
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  36. The paradox of the artificial intelligence system development process: the use case of corporate wellness programs using smart wearables.Alessandra Angelucci, Ziyue Li, Niya Stoimenova & Stefano Canali - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    Artificial intelligence systems have been widely applied to various contexts, including high-stake decision processes in healthcare, banking, and judicial systems. Some developed AI models fail to offer a fair output for specific minority groups, sparking comprehensive discussions about AI fairness. We argue that the development of AI systems is marked by a central paradox: the less participation one stakeholder has within the AI system’s life cycle, the more influence they have over the way the system will function. This means (...)
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  37. Aboutness Paradox.Giorgio Sbardolini - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (10):549-571.
    The present work outlines a logical and philosophical conception of propositions in relation to a group of puzzles that arise by quantifying over them: the Russell-Myhill paradox, the Prior-Kaplan paradox, and Prior's Theorem. I begin by motivating an interpretation of Russell-Myhill as depending on aboutness, which constrains the notion of propositional identity. I discuss two formalizations of of the paradox, showing that it does not depend on the syntax of propositional variables. I then extend to propositions a (...)
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  38. On Russell's Paradox with Nails and Strings.Ferenc András - manuscript
    The Russell's paradox concerns the foundations of naive set theory. This short short paper is about how it can be interpreted in other contexts and has significance in the world of commands. Understanding the paper assumes that the reader is broadly familiar with the foundations of set theory and its history. The text contains many formulas and therefore the reader should be comfortable in the world of logical formulas. My example is somewhat similar to the barber paradox. There, (...)
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  39. Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):11-23.
    In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, (...)
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  40. The Paradox of Counterfactual Tolerance.Daniel Berntson - manuscript
    Counterfactuals are somewhat tolerant. Had Socrates been at least six feet tall, he need not have been exactly six feet tall. He might have been a little taller—he might have been six one or six two. But while he might have been a little taller, there are limits to how tall he would have been. Had he been at least six feet tall, he would not have been more than a hundred feet tall, for example. Counterfactuals are not just tolerant, (...)
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  41. Solutions to the Knower Paradox in the Light of Haack’s Criteria.Mirjam de Vos, Rineke Verbrugge & Barteld Kooi - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (4):1101-1132.
    The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of (...)
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  42. The mirage of a "paradox" of dehumanization: How to affirm the reality of dehumanization.Maria Kronfeldner - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper argues that the so-called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization is a mirage arising from misplaced abstraction. The alleged ‘paradox’ is taken as a challenge that arises from a skeptical stance. After reviewing the history of that skeptical stance, it is reconstructed as an argument with two premises. With the help of an epistemologically structured but pluralistic frame it is then shown how the two premises of the Skeptic’s argument can both be debunked. As part of that it emerges (...)
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  43. Paradoxes of the Infinite Rest on Conceptual Confusion.Jeremy Gwiazda - manuscript
    The purpose of this paper is to dissolve paradoxes of the infinite by correctly identifying the infinite natural numbers.
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  44. Proof Paradoxes, Agency, and Stereotyping.Aness Kim Webster - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):355-373.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 355-373, October 2021.
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  45. The paradox of self-blame.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):111–125.
    It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?”. But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for (...)
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  46. Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability.Stephen Barker - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
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  47. Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
    This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning---one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions---and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system---ST---that conservatively extends (...)
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  48. The Liar Paradox - A Case of Mistaken Truth Attribution.Jasper Doomen - 2023 - Axiomathes 33 (1):1-11.
    A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point (...)
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  49. The paradox of ineffability.Gäb Sebastian - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (3):1-12.
    Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable – or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some (...)
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  50. A Paradox for Tiny Probabilities and Enormous Values.Nick Beckstead & Teruji Thomas - forthcoming - Noûs.
    We begin by showing that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. _Reckless_ theories recommend giving up a sure thing, no matter how good, for an arbitrarily tiny chance of enormous gain; _timid_ theories permit passing up an arbitrarily large potential gain to prevent a tiny increase in risk; _non-transitive_ theories deny the principle that, if A is better than B and B is better than C, then A must be better than (...)
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