According to Steiner (1998), in contemporary physics new important discoveries are often obtained by means of strategies which rely on purely formal mathematical considerations. In such discoveries, mathematics seems to have a peculiar and controversial role, which apparently cannot be accounted for by means of standard methodological criteria. M. Gell-Mann and Y. Ne׳eman׳s prediction of the Ω− particle is usually considered a typical example of application of this kind of strategy. According to Bangu (2008), this prediction is apparently based on (...) the employment of a highly controversial principle—what he calls the “reification principle”. Bangu himself takes this principle to be methodologically unjustifiable, but still indispensable to make the prediction logically sound. In the present paper I will offer a new reconstruction of the reasoning that led to this prediction. By means of this reconstruction, I will show that we do not need to postulate any “reificatory” role of mathematics in contemporary physics and I will contextually clarify the representative and heuristic role of mathematics in science. (shrink)

Descartes argued that the passions of the soul were immediately felt in the body, as the animal spirits, affected by the movement of the pineal gland, spread through the body. In Leibniz the effect of emotions in the body is a different question as he did not allow the direct interaction between the mind and the body, although maintaining a psychophysical parallelism between them. -/- In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general inclinations, passions, pleasures and (...) pains belong only to the mind or to the soul (NE II, xxi, §72). He is also keen to point out that our passions derive mostly from our bodies. However, like Spinoza (Ethics III, prop. XI, Scholium) he thought that some emotions such as joy can produce pleasures which can be described also in bodily terms. For example, in a short memoir Felicity he says that music can be a pleasure for the ears and symmetry can be a pleasure for the eyes. These more intellectual emotions are actions in the sense that they represent perfection emanating from their source, the absolutely perfect being, that is, God. The feeling of perfection may produce a state of well-being which concerns both the soul and the body. -/- In my paper I will trace instances of Leibniz’s remarks on how these kind of emotions affect the body. I will also discuss the different ways the body gives rise to passions in the soul. My primary source is Nouveaux essais, book II, chapter xx and xxi, but I will also discuss various other writings by Leibniz. (shrink)

[a chapter in a volume edited by DENNES (Maryse), Ó MAIOLEARCA (John), SCHMID (Anne-Françoise) (dir.), a Philosophie non-standard de François Laruelle , p. 127-135 La révolte ou la rébellion immanente est sans but, parce que sa seulesource et sa seule tendance est de se protéger contre la violence de l’aliénation,afin de défendre l’homme-en-homme qui est déterminé par sa vulnérabilitéradicale. Toute lutte politique émane du diktat de la rébellion immanente,celle du vécu radicalement solitaire. La lutte est une singularité radicale ce quine (...) veut pas dire qu’elle ne puisse pas établir solidarité ou qu’elle soitindividualiste. (shrink)

L’article de Francis Dupuis-Déri commenté ici et qui tente de réconcilier l’action directe avec la théorie délibérative pose un certain nombre de questions. En premier lieu, pourquoi concéder aux théories libérales un contenu démocratique alors que ces théories démontrent plutôt une mise à l’écart de l’agir collectif démocratique. En ce sens, les régimes libéraux ne sont pas tant élitistes que profondément oligarchiques. Une fois cette précision apportée au débat, il est possible de lire l’article de F. Dupuis-Déri comme opposant deux (...) visions distinctes du monde, l’une émanant de l’extension du marché économique à toutes les sphères de la vie et l’autre exigeant un monde plus égalitaire. La question du populisme devient alors essentielle pour bien comprendre les raisons qui motivent à dépeindre un groupe comme étant violent et anti-démocratique. Il importe ainsi de bien nommer les phénomènes et, en particulier, de comprendre la nature oligarchique des régimes libéraux pour légitimer les actions directes. (shrink)

In Hellenistic philosophy, one can find contrasting evaluations of the argumentative use of merely conceivable states of affairs. On the one hand, Epicureans discard any proposal that has no plausibility from the point of view of someone in possession of the relevant expertise. On the other hand, Sceptics regularly invoke views which one might conceivably hold, irrespective of the view’s epistemic credentials or whether or not it has or has ever had actual proponents. Since thought experiments often introduce scenarios involving (...) merely conceivable but non-actual states of affairs, the positions of Epicureans and Sceptics regarding conceivability can be transposed into different attitudes towards the method of thought experiments. (shrink)

This text is the introduction to V. Amit & N. B. Salazar, Pacing Mobilities. Timing, Intensity, Tempo & Duration of Human Movements, New York/Oxford, Berghahn, 2020, 202 p. It is also available on Berghahn publisher website.

Every person has his/her own unique signature that is used mainly for the purposes of personal identification and verification of important documents or legal transactions. There are two kinds of signature verification: static and dynamic. Static(off-line) verification is the process of verifying an electronic or document signature after it has been made, while dynamic(on-line) verification takes place as a person creates his/her signature on a digital tablet or a similar device. Offline signature verification is not efficient and slow for a (...) large number of documents. To overcome the drawbacks of offline signature verification, we have seen a growth in online biometric personal verification such as fingerprints, eye scan etc. In this paper we created CNN model using python for offline signature and after training and validating, the accuracy of testing was 99.70%. (shrink)

According to perceptualism, fluent comprehension of speech is a perceptual achievement, in as much as it is akin to such high-level perceptual states as the perception of objects as cups or trees, or of people as happy or sad. According to liberalism, grasp of meaning is partially constitutive of the phenomenology of fluent comprehension. I here defend an influential line of argument for liberal perceptualism, resting on phenomenal contrasts in our comprehension of speech, due to Susanna Siegel and Tim Bayne, (...) against objections from Casey O'Callaghan and Indrek Reiland. I concentrate on the contrast between the putative immediacy of meaning-assignment in fluent comprehension, as compared with other, less ordinary, perhaps translation-based ways of getting at the meaning of speech. I argue this putative immediacy is difficult to capture on a non-perceptual view (whether liberal or non-liberal), and that the immediacy in question has much in common with that which applies in other, less controversial cases of high-level perception. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of acquaintance construes perceptual awareness as at once constitutively independent of conceptual thought and yet a source of propositional knowledge. Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and other conceptualists object that this is a ‘myth’: perception can be a source of knowledge only if conceptual capacities are already in play therein. Proponents of a relational view of experience, including John Campbell, meanwhile voice sympathy for Russell’s position on this point. This paper seeks to spell out, and defend, a claim that (...) offers the prospects for an attractive, unacknowledged element of common ground in this debate. The claim is that conceptual capacities, at least in a certain minimal sense implicit in McDowell’s recent work, must be operative in perceptual experience, if it is to rationalize judgement. The claim will be supported on the basis of two premises, each of which can be defended drawing, inter alia, on considerations stressed by Campbell. First, that experience rationalizes judgement only if it is attentive. Second, that attention qualifies as a conceptual capacity, in the noted, minimal sense. The conjunction of the two premises might be dubbed ‘attentional conceptualism’. (shrink)

Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...) _Pace_ Beck and Phillips, however, I argue a function of stimulus-control is insufficient for perceptual as opposed to cognitive status. One consideration in favour of such insufficiency, noted but (I argue) not convincingly rebutted by these theorists, concerns perpetually grounded demonstrative thought. Two other considerations trade on the fact that a function of stimulus-control can arise not from blind nature but intentional design or social institutions, where so-functioning processes may but need not be perceptual. I offer two cases where such processes are cognitive, viz. skilful play-by-play announcing of ongoing events, and voluntary visualizing of ongoing events under the guidance of apt play-by-play announcements, dubbed announcement-driven visualizing (ADV). The cognitive status of these three diverse phenomena cannot be explained by an absence of a perception-like representational format or content (for ADV has such) or by a presence of personal-level mental states causally mediating between stimuli and outputs (for perception has such). A bettter explanation invokes, I argue, the non-modular character of the generating process. (shrink)

The paper addresses the phenomenology of inference. It proposes that the conscious character of conscious inferences is partly constituted by a sense of meaning; specifically, a sense of what Grice called ‘natural meaning’. In consciously drawing the (outright, categorical) conclusion that Q from a presumed fact that P, one senses the presumed fact that P as meaning that Q, where ‘meaning that’ expresses natural meaning. This sense of natural meaning is phenomenologically analogous, I suggest, to our sense of what is (...) said in fluently comprehending everyday utterances in our first language. The proposal that conscious inference involves a sense of natural meaning is compared with views according to which conscious inference involves taking the premises (i) to be good reasons for the conclusion (as defended by Thomson and Grice), (ii) to support it (as argued by Audi and, recently, Boghossian), or (iii) to imply it (as lately contended by Broome). I argue our proposal can explain certain phenomena handled by alternatives (i) and (ii), but that some further phenomena is handled by our account but not these alternatives. In relation to alternative (iii), I argue that, in so far as implicational and natural-meaning relations come apart, the latter are a better fit for what we sense or take to be so in conscious inference. (shrink)

According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition that p. (...) For example, one might respond to a query for directions to the station by saying ‘I believe it is down the first street on your left.' Often, when we reply in this way, it would have been pragmatically preferable simply to assert that p, had we been epistemically warranted in doing so. One's guarded reply thus suggests one is not so warranted. Nevertheless, if one believes what one, at face value, says one believes, one believes p. Contrary to what might seem to be suggested by the Same Norm View, one does not seem to portray oneself as irrational or epistemically beyond the pale in replying in this way. The paper develops this puzzle in detail, and examines a variety of options for a resolving it consistently with the Same Norm view. The most promising of these options, I argue, is to see ‘I believe' guarded affirmations as a form merely approximately correct speech. They would, though, be a form of such speech that interestingly differs from paradigm cases of loose use or conventional hyperbole in that speakers would be comparatively unaware of engaging in approximation. I conclude ‘I believe’—guarded affirmations either show the Same Norm View to be false or must be recognised as such an interestingly distinctive form of merely approximately correct speech. (shrink)

It is often supposed one can draw a distinction, among the assumptions on which an inference rests, between certain background assumptions and certain more salient, or foregrounded, assumptions. Yet what may such a fore-v-background structure, or such structures, consist it? In particular, how do they relate to consciousness? According to a ‘Boring View’, such structures can be captured by specifying, for the various assumptions of the inference, whether they are phenomenally conscious, or access conscious, or else how easily available they (...) are to such consciousness. According to an ‘Interesting View’, there are fore-v-background structures over and above such classifications. The chapter gestures at reasons for thinking that an Interesting View at least merits exploration. The paper discusses some recent contributions to such a view in analytical philosophy; some remarks in Husserl on what he dubbed the horizonal dimension of acts of consciousness; and psychological work on the role of gist or schema representations in perception and memory. It is proposed that background assumptions can figure in consciousness by being as it were condensed into a consciously, though inattentively, entertained notion of their overall thematic gist, where this thematic gist gives the drift of a possible elucidation of how or why such-and-such salient grounds mean that so-and-so conclusion holds. (shrink)

The second article, in which the author suggests an analysis of other three authors' state of nature models and tries to define the role of the models in their respective law concepts. The analysis demonstrates that all three models share same basic idea, which is the concept of an independent reasonable individual; this very idea is what these different models are based upon. The concept of an individual itself does not have a substantiation.

ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...) their phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)

The question of cosmic beginning has always attracted considerable attention from serious thinkers past and present. Among many contesting theories that have emerged, that of emanation was appropriated by Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sînâ in order to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of matter with the teaching of al-Qur’ân on the One Creator-God. According to this theory, the universe, which comprises a multitude of entities, is generated from a transcendent Being, the One, that is unitary, through the medium (...) of a hierarchy of immaterial substances. While the ultimate source is undiminished, the beings which are emanated are progressively less perfect as they are further removed from the first principle. The process is conceived as being atemporal and often compared to the efflux of light from a luminous body, or to water flowing from a spring. This metaphysical theory has enabled Ibn Sînâ to solve the vexed problem: given an eternally existing world and one eternally existing God, how can the two necessarily co-exist without having the perfect, simple unity of God destroyed by contact with the multiplicity of material things? The following essay delineates and evaluates both Ibn Sînâ’s arguments as well as the counter-arguments of his critics. (shrink)

This essay investigates a particular form of “affection” that has been neglected by the phenomenological tradition. This particular phenomenon is often referred to as the vibe, vibrations, or some variation thereof. This essay rearticulates “the vibe” as bodily emanation: human beings emanate feeling that is experienced by and through our bodies. My study of bodily emanation begins with Edmund Husserl’s notion of affectivity and then moves to Eugene T. Gendlin’s notion of the sentient body. This discussion enables my own argument: (...) Our bodies do not simply respond to the world in a sentient fashion, but also solicit sentience from one another. This solicitation of sentience is the basis of bodily emanation. I explicate bodily emanation through two realms of experience: the pre-conscious and the conscious. The first realm designates the manner in which our bodies summon emanation from one another in a continuous, multilateral fashion. Such preconscious solicitation precedes our conscious control and recognition. The second realm designates our ability to willfully project and direct particular vibes for particular purposes. This latter realm is what most people think of when they refer to “the vibe.” In general, this essay provides a detailed account of a particular phenomenon that most of us experience, but do not fully consider or attend to. (shrink)

The subject of this essay is propria and their relation to essence. Propria, roughly characterized, are those real properties of a thing which are natural but nonessential to it, and which are said to “flow from” the thing’s essence, where this “flows from” relation is understood to designate a kind of explanatory relation. For example, it is said that Socrates’s risibility flows from his essential humanity; and it is said that salt’s solubility in water flows from the essential natures of (...) both salt and water. The question I raise and attempt to answer in this essay is: In what sense do propria “flow from” essences? What kind of explanatory relation is this exactly? Some suggest that it is a relation of logical consequence ; others, of grounding ; and still others, of formal causation. In this essay, I reintroduce and defend a view suggested by the late scholastic Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez, who in 1597 wrote that effluence is best understood as a very special kind of efficient causation, which we can call the relation of emanation. The thesis of this essay, then, is that propria emanate from essences. Along the way, this paper offers a new taxonomy of types of propria; it explains the significance of propria for the metaphysics and epistemology of essences; it discusses at length varieties of efficient causation ; and then it offers an extensive abductive argument in favor of Suárez’s account, whereby the former accounts of effluence are critiqued, each in turn, and Suárez’s view is motivated and ultimately shown to be superior to its competitors. (shrink)

Il est notoire que dans l’histoire de l’esprit à la constitution de laquelle Fontenelle participe activement, Descartes occupe une place toute particulière, notamment en ce qui a trait à la fabrication du concept de modernité et de la philosophie qui y est associée. Pourtant, et c’est ce que nous nous proposons d’explorer ici, il faut encore prendre la mesure de ce qui, dans la philosophie cartésienne, correspond au sens propre à cette modernité et le départager de ce qui ne sert (...) qu’à tracer le portrait d’une figure exemplaire constitutive de l’écriture de l’histoire à l’âge classique. Ce que nous proposons, donc, c’est de distinguer trois registres discursifs faisant jouer au nom « Descartes » des fonctions différentes et attachées à des enjeux philosophiques hétérogènes, lesquels permettent de saisir les tensions à l’œuvre dans le traitement réservé à Descartes par Fontenelle. Le premier de ces registres concerne la figure historique de Descartes en tant que fondateur d’une manière de penser qui définirait la modernité elle-même ; le second porte sur la nature de cette fondation, qui est constamment rapportée par Fontenelle à la question de la méthode, alors même qu’il en détourne l’esprit ; le troisième, enfin, intéresse le contenu de la philosophie cartésienne et les raisons de l’attachement de Fontenelle à la théorie des tourbillons en dépit du progrès du newtonianisme chez ses contemporains. (shrink)

Thiên lệch né tránh hối tiếc (regret aversion bias) là một loại thiên kiến tâm lý xảy ra khi các nhà đầu tư tránh thực hiện quyết định vì sợ sẽ cảm thấy hối tiếc nếu kết quả không như mong đợi. Thay vì đưa ra lựa chọn tối ưu, họ thường giữ nguyên trạng thái hiện tại để tránh rủi ro và nỗi sợ hối tiếc. Bằng cách áp dụng các phương pháp từ lý thuyết Mindsponge, nhà đầu tư (...) có thể xây dựng một hệ thống ra quyết định linh hoạt, tự tin và ít bị ảnh hưởng bởi thiên kiến né tránh hối tiếc, từ đó tối ưu hóa hiệu quả đầu tư trong dài hạn. (shrink)

The term biodiversity, also known as the diversity of life, is often used to mean the diversity of the living beings in the biosphere. By diversity of the living beings, it is meant mostly living things as individuals. In addition, it is possible to discuss the diversity of species, ecosystems, and hereditary characteristics. In this study, answers were sought to questions such as ‘Is biodiversity a value, can it be measured, what does it mean for our country and the world, (...) what is the lack or lack of biodiversity’. Thus, it was emphasized that biodiversity should be accepted as a value per se. In direct connection with biodiversity, it has been argued that ecosystems should be protected through a combination of intervening and non-intervening methods. In addition, by referring to the nature - culture dichotomy, nature's being the source of culture is underlined. It was mentioned that ecosystems should be protected in order to protect the number of species, and for this reason, intensive consumption of biosphere resources should be prevented. It has been argued that the point of distinction in conservation studies should be determined as ens viva, the concept of being alive. As a result, a proposal consisting of nine items has been put forth in order that it should be considered while drawing a possible roadmap. (shrink)

Brentano (1874) described intentionality in a number of different ways: as ‘the intentional inexistence of an object’, ‘reference to a content’, ‘direction towards an object’, and ‘immanent objectivity’. All these phrases were intended to mean the same thing, but such elegant variation can give rise to confusion. In my Elements of Mind (2001) I tried to give a simpler description: intentional states all involve directedness upon an object and what I call (following Searle 1992) aspectual shape. My aim in doing (...) this was to introduce an understanding of intentionality that (a) allows theorists of intentionality to agree on the fundamentals of the phenomenon, but disagree about the details; and (b) leaves the question open whether all mental states are intentional. (shrink)

Il problema della rappresentazione, connaturato ad ogni mediazione linguistica del rapporto di mente e mondo, è nelle sue molteplici forme un tema antico della riflessione filosofica. La rappresentazione letteraria appartiene alla stessa categoria e pone problemi analoghi al pensiero. Che cosa significa rappresentare poeticamente? Il concetto di finzione letteraria può avere solo un senso peggiorativo o limitante nei confronti della comunicazione dell’universale, o ne può essere una modalità? Il tema del saggio è il rapporto tra realtà e finzione letteraria che (...) pare emergere da I falsari di André Gide. Seguendo le intuizioni e i suggerimenti dello scrittore, si proverà a tracciare le linee principali di un’interpretazione positiva della finzione letteraria, che ne riconosca la potenza espressiva senza soffocarne i caratteri distintivi. Non è detto, poi, che ciò che vale per la rappresentazione poetica non possa avere un senso anche sotto punti di vista più generali. (shrink)

A comparison between the thinking of Hans Jonas and Joseph Ratzinger on Darwinism and Intelligent Design.

In his early metaphysics, Leibniz interprets the results of Santorio’s quantitative methods as supporting the possibility of the natural immortality of human beings. A closer look into Santorio’s more theoretically oriented medical writings reveals that he vehemently rejected the idea of natural immortality. Still, it may be interesting to ask what the theoretical differences between the natural philosophies of Santorio and the early Leibniz are that could explain their diverging attitudes toward the possibility of natural immortality. I will argue for (...) two claims: (1) Santorio but not the early Leibniz, makes use of emergentist ideas along lines developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Galen. (2) The early Leibniz, but not Santorio, uses the concept of emanative causation to characterize the relation between the soul and its potencies. (shrink)

Proza e shkurtër në këtë vëllim, e ribashkuar nën titullin „Me duar në xhepa të qepur”, tërheq konflikte midis ekzistencës dhe thelbit, duke projektuar ngërçe, aporie identitare dhe shëmbëlltyra komunikimi. 1-0 (?) është një satirë për futbollin dhe aranzhimet - në favor të skuadrave apo lojtarëve të caktuar - që u prodhuan intensivisht gjatë periudhës socialiste, të dominuara nga gënjeshtra, mistifikimi dhe faji. GIONÍ diskuton për komplekset adoleshente-adoleshente të disa krijesave me status të pasigurt, të përhumbur nga dështimi dhe dështimi, (...) të cilat autori, në frymën amerikane, i shpëton në fund, duke i dërguar në punë (pa na shpjeguar sesi do të ishte i mundur shpëtimi ontologjik). Mekanizmi epik në XHAMANTANI BOJËALLI duket i huazuar nga Mircea Eliade, i zbatuar vetëm në dimensione deterministe, ndër të cilat zbulimi I paautenticitetit të një martese është më pak problematik. Tek KU ISHA NË VEND, strategjitë e fiksionit autobiografik funksionojnë me mjeshtëri, autori rikujtues na çon nëpër labirintin e fatit drejt arratisjes në brendësi. Katër tekstet e fundit (në anglisht) janë drafte për më vonë. Një sërë ilustrimeve mbështesin tekstet dhe, në tensionin e ideve, gjarpërimet e rrëfimit të Florentin Smarandache befasojnë këndshëm, duke shkaktuar keqardhje që autori, shumë më i tërhequr nga shkenca, por edhe nga avangarda, nuk kërkonte një konservator fati letrar në prozë. Kam bindjen se do të jetë një sukses. (shrink)

Samuel Buchoul, dans « Homo Scribens : vers une bio-graphie qui ne recherche plus rien », cherche à articuler écriture et vie en se demandant pourquoi la vie écrit-elle. Dès lors que les concepts de biographie et de biologie s’entrelacent tout au long de La vie la mort, Buchoul interroge le concept derridien d’écriture à travers l’étude croisée de Jacob, Heidegger, Nietzsche et Freud, et le relit à la lumière de quelques arguments de Jean-Paul Sartre et de Bernard Stiegler. Son (...) analyse débouche sur l’hypothèse d’une liaison conceptuelle aussi bien qu’historique entre la pratique de l’écriture et la condition existentielle de l’homme. (shrink)

According to Antony Kenny, history of philosophy is a special discipline “because the link between philosophy and its history is a far closer one” – i.e. closer than the history of other disciplines. In order to promote philosophical and historico-philosophical understanding, philology is recommended as a tool against history of philosophy intended as a collection of either heroes or mistakes.

Les savoirs de sens commun sont solidement ancrés dans les usages, notamment grâce à l’habitude et à la sécurité ontologique qu’ils engendrent. Cet article examinera d’abord pourquoi les savoirs disciplinaires appris à l’école ne sont pas automatiquement réinvestis dans des contextes de nature extrascolaire et pourquoi les savoirs de sens commun résistent à leur déconstruction. La première partie de l’analyse sera marquée par le croisement de discours épistémologiques concernant la nature et la place des savoirs de sens commun dans les (...) conceptions familières de la science. Cet article explorera ensuite les dynamiques qui marquent les relations qu’entretiennent les savoirs disciplinaires scolaires et les savoirs de sens commun en contexte scolaire. Le langage propre à la seconde partie se rattachera davantage aux débats en éducation sur l’importance prépondérante des savoirs de sens commun dans l’apprentissage disciplinaire par concepts. Enfin, nous montrerons qu’il existe des stratégies d’enseignement qui peuvent optimiser l’appropriation intellectuelle des savoirs disciplinaires scolaires et leur transfert dans les interactions quotidiennes. (shrink)

In con­nec­tion with the po­le­mics bet­we­en Mi­ha­i­lo Mar­ko­vić and Alek­san­dar Pr­njat the aut­hor puts in­to qu­e­sti­on the usual dis­tinction be­et­wen know­led­ge and fa­ith. He ad­du­ces the phe­no­menon of mysti­cal know­led­ge as an agu­ment that re­li­gion can­not be re­du­ced to fa­ith. Alt­ho­ugh the su­pra­ra­ti­o­nal know­led­ge is very hard to at­tain be­ca­u­se it im­pli­es the over­co­ming of ego, its possi­bi­lity re­fu­tes nar­ro­wing of know­led­ge to me­re un­der­stan­ding.

Batı’da teorik felsefe; Analitik Felsefe (AF), Kıta Felsefesi (KF) ve Felsefe Tarihi (FT) olmak üzere üçe ayrılır. Fakat üçünde de işler yolunda değildir. AF, felsefenin bir bilim olabileceği iddiasından kuşku duyduğu için gerçek dünyayla ilgilenmiyorken başından beri uygun bir teorik yöntem izlemeyen Kıta Felsefesinin uygulanışı, belirli politik ve etik yargılara hizmet edecek şekilde özelleştirilmiştir. FT çalışmalarının gidişatı ise eldeki eserin nesnel değerinden daha çok ilgili filozofun ait olduğu ulus veya kültüre göre bölgesel bir temelde gelişmiştir. Felsefede ilerleme sağlanacaksa bu ancak (...) bahsi geçen tuzaklardan kaçınılarak gerçekleşebilir. (shrink)

This thesis explores the party system and political parties in the post-communist Albania. The overarching question of the thesis is what kind of party system has developed and what is the structure and organization of the Albanian political parties. The study analyses the period 1991-2013, that is the period between the first and the last general elections. I argue and test that the Albanian party system is stable and that the Albanian political parties are mass clientelist parties with deep territorial (...) penetration. The members of the parties have ceased to paly their traditional roles of the era of mass party and their attachment tot he party is not ideological but aims to ensure material benefits in return for the support provided to the party in elections times. As parties don't have many tools at hand they use their organizational structure to stabilize electorate, which explains the low level of electoral volatility in Albania and as consequence the stability of the party system. The thesis ahs an institutional embedded and a historically structured framework according to which party strategies are shaped by both the institutional context and the historical setting in which parties are created and operate. Following this line of reasoning, the weak societal roots of parties do not allow for party identification or voter alignment; the early access to public funding reduces the incentives of parties to create strong links with the members and society to collect financial resources and; in line with the features of the patrimonial communism which is characterized by clientelism and nepotism, the Albanian political parties develop the same relationships between the higher echelons of the party and the lower strata of the party structure. On the other hand the lack of media access in the early phase of organization and the need to stabilize the electorate, encourage the Albanian political parties to seek a deep territorial penetration which results in the creation of mass clientelist parties. In order to test the hypothesis I have undertaken three steps: a) the analyses of the Effective Number of Parties and Electoral Volatility; b) the internal distribution of power, the role of the membership and the relationship of the organization with society and; c) the identification of financial resources of the political parties. (shrink)

We have good reason to believe that Nicomachean Ethics VI. 2 is a Nicomachean revision of an originally Eudemian text. Aristotle seems to have inserted lines 1139a31-b11 by means of a marginal note, which the first editor then mistakenly added in the wrong place, and I propose that we move these lines so that they follow the word κοινωνεῖν at 1139a20. The suggested note appears to be Nicomachean for several reasons but most importantly because it contains a desire-based account of (...) the practical intellect as teleologically oriented to action. The NE articulates consequences of this account regarding practical philosophy’s methodology and teleological orientation to action. The EE does not articulate such consequences, and instead seems to assume an object-based account of the practical intellect. Consequently, it would seem that, between the EE and the NE, Aristotle revised his conception of the practical intellect and consequently his conception of practical philosophy. (shrink)

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

Bilkent Üniversitesi'nde bu yıl [2003] açılan Felsefe Bölümü’nün başkanlığını yürüten ve ana ilgi alanı yapay zekâ olan Prof. Dr. Varol Akman, yapay zekâyla felsefenin ilişkisini ve Felsefe Bölümü'nün özelliklerini anlattı. (An interview published in Bilkent Magazine about the then new Bilkent Philosophy Department.).

Bu çalışmada, bitkibilimde kullanılan bir terim olan liken kelimesine, kök anlamına sadık kalarak Türkçe yeni bir karşılık önerilmektedir. Bu önerinin mantıksal çerçevesi, Antik Yunancadan, Orta Çağ Arapçasına, Orta Çağ Latincesine ve nihayetinde de Türkçeye kadar uzanan bir yelpazede, konuya esas teşkil eden tarihî metinlere ve onların kaydedildiği elyazmalarına dayanmaktadır. Türkçe metinlerde liken terimi yerine yalaç teriminin kullanımı öneri lmektedir. Bu öneri ülkemizdeki dilbilim, onomastik ve bitkibilim uzmanlarının eleştirel dikkatine sunulmaktadır.

In this article, it has been aimed to examine Nietzsche’s main critique towards different understandings of morals in his era. With this criticism, it is aimed to integrally understand the opinions -which are articulated directly or metaphorically- towards morals which have been encountered. In here, while keeping in mind the difference between the concepts of immoralism and amoralism, Nietzsche’s views are interpreted. Being parallel to that aim mentioned above, it has been investigated if there is a thinking in Nietzsche which (...) can be seen as a kind of understanding of morals (maybe as the understanding of morals without morals) or not. And finally, it has been thought that if Nietzsche’s views on morals have any value for the 21st century and upcoming 22nd century human or not, whether there’s something left to learn for this human from his critiques or not. (shrink)

In this article, we reconsider the syntactical analysis as well as the categorial status of two Medieval French elements, et and ne. In this connection, we illustrate and compare various approaches which principally differ with regard to the assignment of a unique category or of various categories to these elements. In the context of this comparison, we address some of the questions pertaining to their motivations and the evidence which has been offered in their favor, showing that approaches which assign (...) a unique category to et and ne, respectively, prove to be empirically more adequate. (shrink)

Karl Popper, ca raționalist critic, a fost un oponent al tuturor formelor de scepticism, convenționalism și relativism în știință. Multe dintre argumentele sale sunt îndreptate împotriva membrilor "Cercului Vienez". Popper este de acord cu aceștia cu privire la aspectele generale ale metodologiei științifice și neîncrederea lor în metodologia filosofică tradițională, dar soluțiile sale au fost semnificativ diferite. A contribuit semnificativ la dezbaterile privind metodologia științifică generală, demarcarea științei de pseudoștiință, natura probabilității și metodologia științelor sociale. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27356.85127/1 .

The main purpose of the thesis is to identify and fill some gaps that are regularly found in the analysis of the Platonic concept of ἐξαίφνης. The word ἐξαίφνης, which appears 36 times in the Platonic dialogues, has primarily been examined and discussed in relation to what is said in Parmenides and, more rarely, in Symposium, Republic and Seventh Letter. However, as is known, the word is also found in Gorgias, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Statesman and Laws. Moreover, it is worth noting (...) that a history of criticism about the concept of ἐξαίφνης has never been provided, mainly due to the chronological and interpretive difficulties relating to Parmenides. This absence brought on a fragmentation and discontinuity in the study of the concept and it often prompted specialists to see in this notion a secondary or imprecise aspect of the Platonic theory. Regardless of the correctness of interpretations that have been proposed over the centuries, my work clearly shows that all these exegeses share two fundamental limits: the former is a necessarily partial analysis, almost exclusively based on what is written in Parmenides, the latter is the absence of a historical perspective . Cette thèse portant sur le concept d’ἐξαίφνης tel qu’on le trouve dans les textes de Platon se propose de combler les lacunes existantes relatives à l’analyse de ce concept. En effet, le terme d’ἐξαίφνης, dont on trouve trente-six occurrences dans les dialogues de Platon n’a été jusqu’à présent principalement envisagé et examiné qu’à travers ce qui en est dit dans le Parménide et, plus rarement, dans le Banquet, la République et la Lettre VII. Le terme, comme on le sait, se trouve pourtant aussi dans le Gorgias, le Cratyle, le Théétète, le Politique et les Lois. En outre, en raison notamment des difficultés chronologiques et interprétatives liées au dialogue du Parménide, aucune histoire critique du concept d’ἐξαίφνης n’a été entreprise. Cette absence d’histoire critique a pour effet une fragmentation et une discontinuité des études portant sur ce concept, effets qui ont souvent conduit les spécialistes à ne voir dans cette notion qu’un aspect secondaire ou à tout le moins imprécis de la théorie que développe Platon à son sujet. Aussi la thèse s’est-elle attachée à entreprendre une étude préalable de l’histoire de ces interprétations. Quelle que soit la justesse et la valeur des interprétations qui se sont succédées au cours des siècles, cette étude s’emploie à montrer clairement que ces tendances exégétiques se heurtent à deux limites fondamentales que la thèse s’applique à lever : la première est le caractère nécessairement partiel d’une analyse menée presque exclusivement à partir du Parménide, la seconde est l’absence de mise en perspective historique. (shrink)

Tốc độ tăng của tổn thất kinh tế gây ra bởi nạn xâm nhập sinh học cao hơn gấp 2 lần so với các loại tổn thất khác do thiên nhiên gây ra.

Interjú az Új Symposion örökségéről, Jugoszláviáról, a vajdasági magyarság baloldali radikális hagyományáról, az avantgárdról stb.

The following article aims to reconstruct the philosophical-political content of Primo Levi's 1976 essays "About Obscure Writing", focusing especially on the anthropological question of inequality.

This study is an attempt to analyze the factors that have contributed towards the success of the Democratic Party of Albania. It seeks to introduce new dimensions in measuring the success of a political party. The study rejects the elements of ‘office-holding’ and ‘policy – or performance-based’ measures of success, because they are determined by a complex array of economic, political, social and institutional factors. The concept of “party success” is defined in terms of: ‘breadth’ and ‘durability’. At the same (...) time the study aims at ‘emancipating’ the political parties from the past and macro-institutional factors, to which very often are ascribed the reasons for the perceived failure of politics in Albania. The approach used in this study has regarded the political parties as the real political actors that as such should assume the responsibility for the perceived failures. Neither the lack of political culture, nor the communist system, are the main factors to shape the activity and development of political parties in Albania. Both macro-institutional and historical structural approach has limited explanatory power for the success of the Democratic Party. Its success is a direct consequence of the decisions that the political parties themselves, including Democratic Party as one of the key actors, have taken. The research showed that the Democratic Party of Albania has been successful because and when its elite have been able to craft inclusive ideological programs and because of its extensive penetration in the country, which it owes to its structure as a mass party. The party has established patronage linkages with its sympathizers, the rank and file and militants and consequently has ensured their loyalty and maintained an extensive electoral penetration in country. (shrink)