El presente artículo se encarga de ampliar la afirmación kantiana según la cual la unidad analítica presupone la unidad sintética (Kant, KrV, B 133) a una discusión en torno a la conciencia de dicha unidad sintética. Sostendré que muchas posiciones han incomprendido la naturaleza de esta forma de conciencia, debido a una concepción errónea de la relación entre la unidad de la experiencia y sus partes. Veremos como cualquier consideración que propone describir o delimitar un objeto u evento (...) supone la comprensión de su unidad, la cual rebasa siempre la pretendida delimitación inicial. (shrink)

Es mi afirmación que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que presenta prominentemente aquí describe más o menos con precisión, o al menos sirve como heurística para, cómo pensamos y nos comportamos, y por lo tanto no abarca simplemente filosofía y psicología, sino todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo veo, incluye tanto el Sistema Linguístico deliberativo consciente (...) 2 como las acciones o reflejos inconscientes automatizados del Sistema 1 automatizado. -/- Proporciono una encuesta crítica de algunos de los principales hallazgos de dos de los estudiantes más eminentes de comportamiento de los tiempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle, sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein -que todos los problemas verdaderamente "filosóficos" son los mismos—confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo tanto todas las soluciones son las mismas— mirando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que sus condiciones de verdad (Condiciones de Satisfacción o COS) son claras. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa, pero no se puede significar (indicar COS claro para) cualquier expresión arbitraria y significado sólo es posible en un contexto muy específico. Analizo varios escritos por y sobre ellos desde la perspectiva moderna de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (popularizados como 'pensar rápido, pensar lento'), empleando una nueva tabla de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Demuestro que esta es una heurística poderosa para describir el comportamiento. -/- Por lo tanto, todo comportamiento está íntimamente conectado si uno toma el punto de vista correcto. La Ilusión Fenomenológica (olvido a nuestro Sistema automatizado 1) es universal y se extiende no sólo a lo largo de la filosofía, sino a lo largo de la vida. Estoy seguro de que Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg y el Papa serían incrédulos si se les dijera que sufren del mismo problema que Hegel, Husserl y Heidegger, (o que difieren sólo en grado de los adictos a las drogas y el sexo en estar motivados por la estimulación de sus cortices frontales por la entrega de dopamina (y más de 100 otros productos químicos) a través del tegmentum ventral y el núcleo accumbens),pero es claramente cierto. Mientras que los fenomenólogos sólo desperdiciaron mucho el tiempo de la gente, están desperdiciando la tierra y el futuro de sus descendientes. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo resume algunos comentarios - como se han expuesto en mi libro La Existencia en busca de la razón. Apuntes sobre la filosofía de Karl Jaspers, Editorial Académica Española, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing GmbH & Co. KG, Alemania , 2012- sobre el significado de las situaciones-límite en la filosofía de Karl Jaspers, como un punto de giro con respecto a la fenomenología de Husserl y a la filosofía trascendental de Kant . Para Jaspers, el significado de las situaciones-límite (...) como estructura de la Existenz subraya la posibilidad del riesgo en la historicidad individual, que rompe el " flujo" de la reflexividad y, al mismo tiempo , apela a una apertura de la eticidad -sin sacrificar la universalidad del imperativo categórico . Palabras clave: Fenomenología de la conciencia, conciencia enferma, auto-conciencia reflexiva, situaciones-límite, pensamiento trascendiente, método rascendental, aclaración existencial, historicidad individual. (shrink)

Hegel ofrece dos formas -en su filosofía en último análisis complementarias- de caracterizar al idealismo: La primera es próxima a la concepción habitual de idealismo previa a Kant, a saber: como una posición que considera que aquello que conocemos es una modificación de la propia conciencia. La segunda descansa en la tesis de la nulidad de lo finito; según esto, ?idealista? es la filosofía que considera que lo finito no tiene en cuanto tal realidad; ?realista?, a la inversa, es (...) la filosofía que toma el ser de las cosas determinadas como algo fijo y definitivo. Hegel denomina a este idealismo ?absoluto?.El idealismo absoluto es el modelo teórico que interrelaciona la tesis del carácter intrínsecamente ideal de los objetos de conocimiento y la tesis de que las cosas singulares que constituyen el mundo real surgen como una autodeterminación del ser. La premisa que permite tal vínculo es la tesis defendida por Hegel de que ser y pensar nunca se han separado y que su separación es el resultado de una concepción posterior errónea de la mente humana sobre la naturaleza de su actividad cognitiva. La hipostasiación de la disociación que la forma cognitiva de la representación introduce en la unidad indiferenciada de ser y pensar de la que parte la actividad de conocimiento en el sentimiento y la intuición sensibles es para Hegel la que provoca la ilusión retroactiva de que ambos -ser y pensar, mundo conocido y mente que conoce- se diferencian y contraponen. Por el contrario, desde el momento que la sensación es también ella misma un modo particular de la actividad continua e ininterrumpida del pensamiento, en el itinerario que va de la percepción sensible a la comprensión del objeto no hay para Hegel un punto en donde pueda introducirse una fractura que disuelva la unidad primigenia entre el ser y el pensar. En esta precisa medida, el momento final de la actividad de conocimiento, es decir, la actividad de comprender el mundo, es a un tiempo la singularización de los contenidos universales que constituyen la teoría del sujeto sobre el mundo y la autodeterminación de la unidad ser-pensar de la que parte y en todo momento permanece el sujeto que elabora esa teoría. Arribados al punto de vista del concepto, la dicotomía realismo-idealismo queda develada como un corolario de la autoconcepción representacionalista de la subjetividad cognoscente. Esta concepción define al paradigma general del realismo, el cual incluye para Hegel como el anverso y reverso de un mismo modelo teórico tanto lo que tradicionalmente ha sido entendido como realismo como al idealismo que resulta de una universalización de la idealidad de la conciencia singular, ya sea en la variante propuesta por Berkeley, ya sea en la del idealismo trascendental de Kant. A ojos de Hegel, por el contrario, el idealismo no puede ser sino absoluto, es decir, debe incluir en sí mismo el momento del ser y, con él, la realidad de las cosas que el sujeto conoce: la tarea esencial de la filosofía no consiste para Hegel más que en tomar conciencia de la co-pertenencia y unidad intrínseca de ambos. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection between the extended mind thesis and transhumanism, with a particular focus on how technology may influence, alter, or enhance human cognitive abilities. The extended mind thesis posits that external elements can become integral components of cognitive processes. Drawing on this notion, the paper contends that transhumanism adopts such perspective in advocating for the possibility of cognitive enhancement. In this sense, it assesses whether technology can truly improve cognitive function or whether it might, instead, induce a (...) specific type of ignorance by diminishing cognitive phenomenology—the lived, experiential dimension of mental processes or the phenomenal aspect of cognitive consciousness. The assumption that cognitive technologies inherently enhance independent mental performance is challenged, with the argument that overreliance on technology may impair the ability to execute cognitive tasks autonomously. The analysis concludes that the integration of technological artifacts with human cognition can indeed lead to a specific form of ignorance by compromising cognitive phenomenology. It also suggests that such ignorance signals that the excessive use of technology may undermine the ability to perform cognitive tasks independently. These two conclusions invite reconsideration of the transhumanist claim that technology can improve human cognition. -/- El artículo explora la intersección entre la tesis de la mente extendida y el transhumanismo, enfocándose, específicamente, en cómo las tecnologías pueden influir, alterar o expandir nuestras capacidades y habilidades cognitivas. A través de un análisis de la tesis de la mente extendida, que propone que algunos elementos externos pueden formar parte constitutiva de nuestros procesos cognitivos, se argumenta que el transhumanismo adopta dicha tesis al tratar el asunto del mejoramiento cognitivo, y se examina si la tecnología puede realmente mejorar nuestras capacidades mentales, o si, por el contrario, podría inducir a un tipo específico de ignorancia al hacernos perder la fenomenología cognitiva, es decir, la vivencia de nuestros procesos mentales o el aspecto fenoménico de nuestra conciencia cognitiva. Se cuestiona, además, si el acoplamiento con tecnologías cognitivas disminuiría nuestra capacidad de realizar tareas mentales de forma autónoma, sugiriendo que una dependencia excesiva de la tecnología podría reducir nuestra habilidad para realizar procesos cognitivos sin ayuda de artefactos tecnológicos. Luego del análisis, el artículo concluye que, efectivamente, nuestro acoplamiento con artefactos tecnológicos puede conducirnos a un tipo específico de ignorancia al eliminar nuestra fenomenología cognitiva. También determina que dicha ignorancia es síntoma de que el uso excesivo de tecnologías puede despojarnos de nuestra habilidad de realizar tareas cognitivas sin asistencia tecnológica. Estas dos conclusiones deberían minar, o al menos replantear, las aspiraciones transhumanistas acerca del mejoramiento tecnológico de nuestra mente. (shrink)

Mặc dù 3 điểm nêu trên chưa phải đã đủ, nhưng chắc chắn không thể giải đáp. Vì vậy, khó mà tin vài lập luận đơn giản về “tính khả thi” lại có thể mang ra áp dụng cho cộng đồng trên không gian sinh thái rộng lớn.

Tết đã về với mọi nẻo đường quê hương [thân yêu]. Năm nay nhân dân cơ bản đón Tết Giáp Thìn (2024) trong vui tươi, ấm áp, hạnh phúc. Nhìn ở cấp vĩ mô, vượt qua chừng 4 năm khó khăn thách thức [vừa qua], thế đất nước ngày một lên cao, lực quốc gia ngày càng tăng tiến và có nhiều cơ hội bứt phá trong năm nay và những năm tới...

Tết đã về với mọi nẻo đường quê hương [thân yêu]. Năm nay nhân dân cơ bản đón Tết Giáp Thìn (2024) trong vui tươi, ấm áp, hạnh phúc. Nhìn ở cấp vĩ mô, vượt qua thời gian [chừng 4 năm] khó khăn thách thức [vừa qua], thế đất nước ngày một lên cao, lực quốc gia ngày càng tăng tiến và có nhiều cơ hội bứt phá trong năm nay và những năm tới.

¿Cómo objetivar la subjetividad sin caer en subjetivismos inmanentistas ni en objetivismos ajenos a la existencia personal? Desde el realismo filosófico la clave parece encontrarse en la adecuada articulación entre conciencia y subjetividad. Estudiaremos las teorías de la conciencia de Antonio Millán-Puelles y Karol Wojtyła desde la onto-fenomenología para hallar el modo de superar esta aporía. -/- How to objectify subjectivity without falling into either immanent subjectivisms or objectivisms foreign to personal existence? From the perspective of realist philosophy (...) the key seems to be found in an appropriate articulation between consciousness and subjectivity. We are going to study the theories of consciousness in Antonio Millán-Puelles and Karol Wojtyła from onto-phenomenology in order to find the way to overcome this aporia. (shrink)

It is, without a doubt, a difficult task to address at once the state of philosophy as embodied by the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and the place of one’s own thought within it. This is the task that a co-director’s address tries to fill. Whether with a critical reexamination of the phenomenological mode of seeing distinctive of SPEP, of philosophical progress, or of the place of transcontinental philosophy, prior co-directors found ways to subtly chart the windings and turns (...) of the many streams that assemble to form this society.We seem to be, however, at a different juncture, so that another... (shrink)

After viewing a painting, reading a novel, or seeing a film, audiences often feel that they improve their cognitive standing on the world beyond the canvas, page, or screen. To learn from art in this way, I argue audiences must employ high degrees of epistemic autonomy and creativity, engaging in a process I call ‘insight through art.’ Some have worried that insight through art uses audience achievements to explain an artwork’s cognitive and artistic value, thereby failing to properly appreciate the (...) cognitive and artistic achievements of artists. I move against this worry by arguing that in order to learn via insight through art audiences must collaborate with artists, sharing the labour and credit for the cognitive achievements they co-produce. I claim this co-productive outlook reveals that our appreciation of art’s cognitive and artistic value involves far more audience participation than has hitherto been realised. (shrink)

In this paper I want to introduce and defend what I call the "subject mode account" of collective intentionality. I propose to understand collectives from joint attention dyads over small informal groups of various types to organizations, institutions and political entities such as nation states, in terms of their self-awareness. On the subject mode account, the self-consciousness of such collectives is constitutive for their being. More precisely, their self-representation as subjects of joint theoretical and practical positions towards the world – (...) rather than as objects of such positions – makes them what they are. Members of such collectives represent each other as co-subjects of such positions and thus represent the world from the point of view of the collective. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se reflexiona sobre dos propuestas de Arturo Andrés Roig: la conciencia de la alteridad y el a priori antropológico para reconocer sus posibilidades de cara al progreso de la ideas y programas filosóficos. Para ello, se muestran las insuficiencias y posibilidades. Las primeras emergen al adoptar uno de los principios más importantes que sostienen el programa filosófico de la modernidad: el mantenimiento del ser humano como fundamento del mundo. Las posibilidades de sus aportes cobran fuerza (...) a la luz de las nuevas propuestas filosóficas que pretenden superar los postulados de la modernidad. (shrink)

This paper considers logics which are formally dual to intuitionistic logic in order to investigate a co-constructive logic for proofs and refutations. This is philosophically motivated by a set of problems regarding the nature of constructive truth, and its relation to falsity. It is well known both that intuitionism can not deal constructively with negative information, and that defining falsity by means of intuitionistic negation leads, under widely-held assumptions, to a justification of bivalence. For example, we do not want to (...) equate falsity with the non-existence of a proof since this would render a statement such as “pi is transcendental” false prior to 1882. In addition, the intuitionist account of negation as shorthand for the derivation of absurdity is inadequate, particularly outside of purely mathematical contexts. To deal with these issues, I investigate the dual of intuitionistic logic, co-intuitionistic logic, as a logic of refutation, alongside intuitionistic logic of proofs. Direct proof and refutation are dual to each other, and are constructive, whilst there also exist syntactic, weak, negations within both logics. In this respect, the logic of refutation is weakly paraconsistent in the sense that it allows for statements for which, neither they, nor their negation, are refuted. I provide a proof theory for the co-constructive logic, a formal dualizing map between the logics, and a Kripke-style semantics. This is given an intuitive philosophical rendering in a re-interpretation of Kolmogorov’s logic of problems. (shrink)

For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. (...) But there are preferences which it maximizes to adopt and co-operate from. (shrink)

We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...) co–operating in game–theoretic terms and submit that the co–operative strategy of games that involve shared representations of future goals may provide new equilibrium solutions. (shrink)

En el presente ensayo se analiza sucintamente el origen de la palabra bíblica [συνείδησις — syneidēsis] conciencia y la posible relación filológica con el término [συντήρησιν — syntêrêsin] sindéresis. Posteriormente se aborda el concepto de la conciencia y la sindéresis haciendo una diferenciación en el voluntarismo de san Buenaventura y el intelectualismo de santo Tomás de Aquino. Uno ambos conceptos en el término vocātiō y concluyo que la conciencia es mucho más que un super-yo freudiano sino que (...) tiene profundas implicaciones en la búsqueda y construcción del ser del hombre, socorrido por el vínculo con la ley natural e incluso con la ley eterna que se establece indisolublemente a través de la sindéresis. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan algunos aspectos fenomenológicos de la experiencia del miedo como experiencia de la temporalidad y de la conciencia de la identidad, en el contexto de la experiencia ordinaria y en el de la ficción. Se propone también una clasificación instrumental del miedo articulada con criterios y hallazgos de la fenomenología, la filosofía analítica y la neurociencia, entre otras disciplinas. El objetivo es doble: por una parte, se trata de presentar una ordenación operativa de la variedad (...) del miedo y, por otra, de mostrar en ese ejercicio la posible conexión entre conceptos de disciplinas que todavía muestran cierto recelo recíproco; por una parte, defender un esquema del miedo basado en una causalidad circular entre los diversos factores del cerebro, la mente, la conciencia y la subjetividad, y, por otra, ejemplificar el diálogo posible entre aquellas disciplinas. (shrink)

TCCS (16/3/2011) - Cổ phần hóa doanh nghiệp nhà nước (DNNN) là một bước đi mạnh dạn và cho đến nay có thể khẳng định là đúng đắn. Tuy nhiên, quá trình đó cũng đã diễn ra với nhiều thăng trầm, cam go và khó khăn, trắc trở, nhưng cũng đã đem lại bước phát triển mang tính đột phá đối với nhiều doanh nghiệp.

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Se exponen las tesis fundamentales de la concepción marxista de la conciencia en vínculo estrecho con la teoría leninista del reflejo. De manera didáctica se abordan los siguientes subtemas: a) El reflejo como propiedad universal de la materia; b) Desarrollo evolutivo del reflejo; c) Surgimiento de la conciencia; d) Lo material y lo ideal en su acepción marxista; e) Conciencia social y conciencia individual; f) Análisis marxista de la conciencia y concepción materialista de la historia.

I shall be dealing, throughout this book, with a set of related problems: the relationship between morality and reasoning in general, the way in which moral reasoning is properly to be carried on, and why morality is not arbitrary. The solutions to these problems come out of the same train of argument. Morality is not arbitrary, I shall argue, because the acceptance of certain qualities of character as virtues and the rejection of others as vices is forced on us by (...) the co-operative basis of human life. The co-operation in human life is unavoidable; the alternative is a literal Hobbesian state of nature, and that is impossible. It is not that co-operation between people is a good thing or even a very good thing; it is simply unavoidable in human life, and it is impossible unless the qualities of character counted as virtues are encouraged and are at least fairly common. The possibility of human life presupposes a theory of human nature, and working out that theory of human nature is the main job of moral philosophy. These virtues or qualities of character or attitudes lead us towards a theory of reasons. A person with a sense of justice is a person inclined to accept certain sorts of facts as reasons for acting, and if the virtues are presupposed by human life then the acceptance of those sorts of facts as reasons for acting is presupposed by human life. A condition of the life of reasoning beings (a more accurate term here than 'human beings') is that moral reasons are reasons for acting and are at the very basis of reasoning. And from this it follows that properly conducted moral reasoning is ultimately guided by the virtues rather than ultimately guided by a set of rules. (shrink)

This article examines the ontology and politics of Peter Sloterdijk's Spheres trilogy, focusing in particular upon the notion of microspherical enclosure explicated in the first volume of this series. Noting Sloterdijk's unusual alignment of his philosophy with media theory, three main contentions are put forward. Firstly, that Sloterdijk's reconfiguration of Heidegger's fundamental ontology represents a largely unacknowledged renunciation of the primacy of Being-towards-death in the authentic existence of Dasein, foregrounding instead an originary co-belonging between mother and child. Secondly, that Sloterdijk (...) borrows from media theory a concern regarding the facticity of all communication, grounding philosophical discourse in the determinate locality of its origin, but does so while exalting a pre-natal communicative immediacy that would seem to disparage the everydayness of Dasein. Finally, that Sloterdijk's oft-justified scepticism regarding globalization often retreats into an anti-cosmopolitanism that, in its nostalgia for the comfort, security and immediacy of the matrixial co-belonging, evinces a covert but potentially noxious politics of exclusion. (shrink)

Durante siglos, se consideró un deber del buen cristiano obligar, a todos los hombres a entrar en el seno de la Iglesia, puesto que de ello dependía su salvación eterna. Esta doctrina presupone que existe una nítida diferencia entre verdad religiosa y error. Para Bayle, sin embargo, la creencia religiosa solo puede aspirar a convertirse en una verdad putativa, sustentada en la convicción subjetiva del fiel, concepción que le permite desdibujar el propio concepto de herejía y criticar las persecuciones religiosas (...) de su tiempo. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person or one child per couple – in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the claim that population size is a matter of justice, by explaining that we have a duty of justice towards the current generation of children to pass on to them a sustainable population. But instead of, or, more likely, alongside with, having fewer children in in (...) each family, we could also create families with more than two parents. I explore this possibility by pointing out the ways in which multi-parenting can advance children’s interests: in higher levels of well-being, in non-monopolistic child-rearing, and in a future opportunity to become themselves parents. (shrink)

Cơ sở lý luận về vai trò kinh tế của nhà nước.

Celem opracowania jest dookreślenie tego, czym jest prywatność. Interesuje mnie prywatność w aspekcie nor¬matywnym, jako coś, co uważamy za nasze dobro; coś, czego się domagamy, co jest naszym prawem, i to nie tylko w sensie moralnym, ale także chronionym prawem pozytywnym. Prywatność jest czymś relacyjnym, i to przynajmniej w dwojakim znaczeniu. Po pierwsze, konstytuowana jest poprzez relację oddzielenia od czegoś - państwa, zakładu pracy (pracodawcy), rozmaitych instytucji. Po drugie, to, co prywatne z punktu widzenia jednych relacji - np. relacji jednostki (...) do państwa, do sprawowanych urzędów - nie musi być prywatne z punktu widzenia pracy zawodowej. Prywatność nie jest oparta na prostej opozycji pomiędzy tym, co społeczne, grupowe, a tym, co osobiste, indywidualne; podmiotem prywatności może być podmiot zbiorowy i nie wobec każdej grupy społecznej można się sensownie domagać prywatności. Prywatność pozwala w pełni dysponować tym, co „moje”. Sfera prywatna daje szczególne możliwości realizacji moich własnych celów, uzyskuję przestrzeń indywidualizacji, realizacji siebie jako niepowtarzalnej jednostki, której też sam jestem autorem. W sferze prywatnej podmioty stają się też podmiotami tworzącymi przestrzeń normatywną, uznając reguły rozpoznawane jako wyraz tego, co naturalne, zastane, i tworząc lub współtworząc z innymi uczestnikami tej sfery własne reguły, realizując przez to istotny wymiar autonomii osoby. Prywatność daje wreszcie przestrzeń dla rozwoju relacji ściśle osobowych, opartych na wyłączności tego, co między osobami się rozgrywa. Mając na uwadze zbieżność dążenia do ograniczania prywatności z wprowadzaniem elementów totalitarnych, można także zauważyć, że ochrona prywatności nie tylko chroni jednostki, ale i potrzebna jest sferze publicznej jako jeden ze środków przeciwko wadom rozwiązań totalitarnych. (shrink)

In Islamic Arabic /Persian thought speculations about ethics may be divided into textual / scriptural; theological; religious; and philosophical too. The “philosophical ethics” has within itself Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian and neo-Platonic trends and versions with such main thinkers such as Farabi; Avicenna; and Averroes. Here we will concentrate on Farabi and those aspects of his speculations that are Aristotelian and can be reordered and arranged around “practical reasoning”.

Recently, a group of researchers from Pontificia Universidad Javeriana-Cali, Colombia—Diana Escandon-Barbosa, Jairo Salas-Paramo, and Luis Fernando Caicedo—published a significant study on virtual tourism technology in Current Psychology. Their work examines the relationship between social factors, mindfulness, technology, and value co-creation within the virtual tourism industry.

Al final de su libro “La conciencia inexplicada”, Juan Arana señala que la nomología, explicación según las leyes de la naturaleza, requiere de una nomogonía, una consideración del origen de las leyes. Es decir, que el orden que observamos en el mundo natural requiere una instancia previa que ponga ese orden específico. Sabemos que desde la revolución científica la mejor manera de explicar dicha nomología ha sido mediante las matemáticas. Sin embargo, en las últimas décadas se han presentado algunas (...) propuestas basadas en modelos matemáticos que fundamentarían muchos aspectos de la realidad. Dos claros ejemplos provienen de Roger Penrose y Max Tegmark. Esto lleva a pensar en una posición no solo nomológica sino además nomogónica de la matemática. ¿Puede la Naturaleza estar fundada por las matemáticas como señalan algunos físico-matemáticos? Y en ese caso, ¿sería pertinente buscar una nomo-génesis de esta índole en la constitución de la conciencia? -/- At the end of his book “La conciencia inexplicada”, Juan Arana points out that nomology, explanation according to the laws of nature requires a nomogony, an account of the origin of the laws. This means that the order that we can observe in the natural World demands something prior to posit that specific order. Since the scientific revolution we know that the best way to explain that nomology has been through mathematics. Anyway, in recent decades a number of proposals based on mathematical models that found many aspects of reality has been offered. Two clear examples come from Roger Penrose and Max Tegmark. This drives us to think of a position of mathematics as not only nomological but also nomogonical. Can Nature be founded by mathematics as some physicists and mathematicians point out? And, in this case, would be relevant this kind of approach to search a nomo-genesis in the constitution of consciousness? (shrink)

In this paper, I will explore a concept of person in Kant based on two features: the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of the numerical identity of one’s body in time. The reason for choosing these features is that I take as my starting point the notion of personhood from rational psychology that appears in the major premise of the third paralogism (A361). I will focus on the second feature in order to show that since Kant it is possible (...) to think of the body not merely as an object, but as a subject, i.e., that bodily awareness is self-awareness. I will explain this on the basis of what I will denominate the thesis of corporeality. To develop this thesis, I will draw on passages from Kant’s work and contemporary considerations of bodily awareness, specifically the immunity to error through misidentification. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explore co-creation as a form of societal interaction of science. We approach co-creation as a goal-oriented form of dynamic interaction aiming at mutual benefit of all parties. As such, we exclude technology transfer and other linear societal interaction forms that follow a closed-model innovation format. We argue that focusing solely on tapping the needs of researchers and ‘pure’ science would lead to ignoring the broader context in which researchers work. An excessive focus on meeting the needs (...) of external stakeholders could jeopardize the preconditions of science. Hence, this chapter explores how researcher-company co-creation can be nurtured in a heavily institutionalized setting, where established rules govern the process of knowledge production and protect research integrity. The co-creation process is analyzed by combining Nonaka’s SECI model and Strober’s interdisciplinary interaction model for knowledge creation. We find that the core of this process lies facilitated dialogue, which is seen as open knowledge sharing between equal participants. (shrink)

The overall objective of the study was to examine the pros and cons of the participatory approach adopted in natural resource management in the ecologically protected areas of the Sundarbans mangrove of Bangladesh. A comparative study was done between the people who are involved and non-involved in this approach. Empirical data was collected through personal interviews with a structured questionnaire. The Gini coefficient was measured first and then embedded with the Lorenz curve to draw a line between perfect equality and (...) inequality vis-a-vis. The study revealed that the co-management built awareness in favor of biodiversity conservation and the efficient use of natural resources. Contradictorily, a segment of different hierarchical committees was involved in destructive activities like poisoning the wetlands for fishing. Therefore, a mixed outcome was found. The findings will help the policymakers in identifying the pitfalls and bottlenecks rooted in co-management. Hence, the study recommends revising the approach to ensure the community’s active participation on an equal basis and take action against them who degrade those resources. Exploring profitable alternative income-generating activities is warranted to narrow down the dependency on the Sundarbans mangrove’s natural resources. In order to address the tragedy of the commons, the study advocates for the unity of all knowledge ranging from science to humanistic scholarship for sound policymaking. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as (...) its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes of our dispositions. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions. (shrink)

Today a change is imperative in approaching global problems: what is needed is not arm-twisting and power politics, but searching for ways of co-evolution in the complex social and geopolitical systems of the world. The modern theory of self-organization of complex systems provides us with an understanding of the possible forms of coexistence of heterogeneous social and geopolitical structures at different stages of development regarding the different paths of their sustainable co-evolutionary development. The theory argues that the evolutionary channel to (...) the observed increasing complexity is extremely narrow and only certain discrete spectra of relatively stable self-maintained structures are feasible in complex systems. There exists a restricted set of ways of assembling a complex evolutionary whole from diverse parts. The law of nonlinear synthesis of complex structures reads: the integration of structures in more complex ones occurs due to the establishment of a common tempo of their evolution. On the basis of the theory, we can see not only desirable but also attainable futures. (shrink)

Thomas Hurka’s recursive account of value appeals to certain intuitions to expand the class of intrinsic values, placing concepts of virtue and desert within the realm of second and third order intrinsic goods, respectively. This is a formalization of a tradition of thought extending back to Aristotle and Kant via the British moralists, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross. However, the evidential status of such intuitions vis a vis the real, intrinsic value of virtue and desert is hostage to (...) alternative explanations. If there is a plausible competing explanation for these intuitions, then the (putative) fact that desert and virtue are intrinsic (rather than instrumental or derivative) goods seems a much less obvious choice for the best explanation. As it turns out, there are plausible evolutionary explanations for these intuitions about desert and virtue. These evolutionary explanations suggest that it is adaptive to value desert and virtue separately from their instrumentality for other goods. Consequently, these explanations debunk intuitions about the intrinsic value of desert and virtue. (shrink)

The climate change mitigation effort is being translated into several actions and discourses that make collateral benefits and their rationale increasingly relevant for sustainability, in such a way that they are now a constant part of the political agenda. Taking a broader and consensual perspective, co-benefits are considered here to be emerging advantages of implementing measures to lower greenhouse gases. Starting with the analysis of policy documents referring to two European urban transportation strategies, the emergent co-benefits are problematized and discussed (...) to better understand their moral aspect. Further ethical reflection is conducted after an analysis of some unintended consequences of the co-benefits rationale arising from the examples. The discussion focuses primarily on the challenges of an integrative moral justification for co-benefits and also for their role in the climate change mitigation effort. We also discuss the limitations of the current normative models that frame a co-benefits rationale, both from a moral viewpoint and in relation to the overall climate change mitigation strategy. In this article, we propose the concepts of well-being and freedom, as portrayed by the Capability Approach, as possible guiding notions for the moral and social evaluation of goodness of these emergent benefits as well as their rationale. Additionally, some preliminary conclusions are drawn regarding the potential of the presented concepts to support climate change mitigation action. Finally, we outline a scenario where the Capability Approach is the moral guideline for a co-benefits rationale and illustrates its potential in terms of enhancing climate change mitigation strategy. (shrink)

Tiết trời oi nồng cuối tháng 7. Chờ tắt nắng. Chờ thời tiết mát hơn. Vậy thử xem AI sau suốt vài tháng cãi cọ, có công năng đủ để giúp làm cho việc viết lách (cho xuất bản) được sinh động hơn hay không.

Translation based on: Y. Katz, Noam Chomsky on Where Artificial Intelligence Went Wrong, The Atlantic, November 1, 2012.

Pronpongo una nueva manera de concebir la aceptación de proposiciones y su relación con la creencia y la inferencia. Argumento además que adoptar esta propuesta nos permite resolver de manera relativamente sencilla algunas paradojas aparentemente tan disímbolas cómo la del prefacio, la lotería y el sorites. Según esta propuesta, el error detrás de la paradoja sorítica es pensar que quién cree que hay una línea divisoria entre lo que cae dentro de la extensión de un término y lo que cae (...) fuera de él debe creer también de algún lugar que ahí se encuentra dicha línea divisoria. Espero convencerlos de que no es así, y que por lo tanto, nuestros juicios de sentido común no nos llevan a ninguna contradicción. (shrink)

Socio-Economic Impacts of Co-operative Societies: An Empirical Study -/- Author / Authors :Md. Ruhul Amin and Mohammed Mahin Uddin Page no.179-193 Discipline : Applied Economics/ Management/ Commerce Script/language : English/Roman Category : Research paper Keywords: Co-operative, Development, Society, Constrains, Constitution, Comilla.

Even though co‐parenthood is one of the most significant close personal relationships that people can have, there is relatively little philosophical work on the moral duties that co‐parents owe each other. This may be due to the increasingly questionable assumption, still common in our societies, that co‐parenthood arises naturally from marriage or romantic coupledom and thus that commitment to a co‐parent evolves from a commitment to a marital or romantic partner. In this article, we argue that co‐parenthood should be seen (...) as a relationship in its own right, which generates specific moral duties. Co‐parents should come to explicit agreements with each other regarding the most important areas of potential conflict between them. Such agreements may have to be renegotiated over time. We explore some possible non‐negotiable co‐parental duties such as the duties not to alienate the child from the other parent(s) and not to trap a co‐parent in a particularly vulnerable situation. We consider some legal and societal implications of our argument and, finally, suggest some pragmatic benefits of our proposal. (shrink)

Lexical semantics has a problem. As Allesandro Lenci put it, the problem is that it cannot distinguish semantic from non-semantic relationships within its data. (2008, 2014). The data it relies on are patterns of co-occurrence of lexemes within linguistic corpora. But patterns of co-occurrence can reflect either our knowledge of what the world is like or our knowledge of what words mean -- matters of fact or matters of meaning. -/- In this essay, I develop a semantic theory which draws (...) this distinction in a way which makes it discernible in lexical semantics and cognitive science research. In doing so, this theory unifies truth-functional and structuralist approaches to semantics, and provides an integrated explanation of meaning and reference. -/- I base this semantic theory on linguistic dispositions to pair words with words, and to pair words with things, both based on learned patterns of association. These dispositions manifest themselves in verbal behavior, and (in Part 2) I propose a new neurophysical model to account for these dispositions which underlie both the intensional and extensional patterns in that behavior. (shrink)

Meet Tega. Blue, fluffy, and AI-enabled, Tega is a relational robot: a robot designed to form relationships with humans. Created to aid in early childhood education, Tega talks with children, plays educational games with them, solves puzzles, and helps in creative activities like making up stories and drawing. Children are drawn to Tega, describing him as a friend, and attributing thoughts and feelings to him ("he's kind," "if you just left him here and nobody came to play with him, he (...) might be sad"). Scholars and members of the public alike have raised the alarm about relational robots, worrying that the relationships that people, and especially children, form with such robots are objectionably inauthentic. We, members of an interdisciplinary team that developed and studies Tega, make this inauthenticity worry precise and offer practical recommendations for addressing it. We distinguish two kinds of (in)authenticity -- inauthenticity as unreality, and inauthenticity as deception -- arguing that neither is just what others have thought it is. With our distinction in hand, we argue that the authenticity concern can be met only through co-design methods -- methods that give stakeholders of all kinds (e.g. parents, educators, and children themselves) a genuine say in how relational robots are built. (shrink)

Historia y conciencia de clase es considerado un libro decisivo en el surgimiento de diversas problemáticas filosóficas, políticas y estéticas a principio de siglo XX. Su repercusión puede apreciarse en filosofías y perspectivas que, desde otros ámbitos teóricos, reconocieron en esta obra el abordaje de temas determinantes de la modernidad. El artículo se detiene al análisis de tres núcleos teóricos considerados medulares en Historia y conciencia de clase, y que se discurre ayudan a leer críticamente el mundo contemporáneo, (...) a saber: vida cotidiana, tiempo abstracto y cosificación. Se profundizarán estas tres vías de acceso como posibilidades de reapropiación crítica de la propuesta lukácsiana, tomando como marco analítico la óptica de la “Crítica del valor”, algunos planteos de Karl Marx y la presentación de ciertas críticas a su proyecto, todo para demostrar la vigorosidad y pertinencia del escrito para comprender dinámicas sustanciales de la realidad social presente. (shrink)

In this paper we track the ‘body positivity’ movement from its origins, promoting radical acceptance of marginalized bodies, to its co-optation as a push for self-love for all bodies, including those bodies belonging to socially dominant groups. We argue that the new focus on the ‘body positivity’ movement involves a single-minded emphasis on beauty and aesthetic adornment, and that this undermines the original focus of social and political equality, pandering instead to capitalism and failing to rectify unjust institutions and policies. (...) As such, we argue that the ‘body positivity’ movement ultimately marginalises further the bodies for which it initially sought justice and acceptance. (shrink)