Results for 'logicism'

71 found
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  1. Logicism, Interpretability, and Knowledge of Arithmetic.Sean Walsh - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):84-119.
    A crucial part of the contemporary interest in logicism in the philosophy of mathematics resides in its idea that arithmetical knowledge may be based on logical knowledge. Here an implementation of this idea is considered that holds that knowledge of arithmetical principles may be based on two things: (i) knowledge of logical principles and (ii) knowledge that the arithmetical principles are representable in the logical principles. The notions of representation considered here are related to theory-based and structure-based notions of (...)
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  2. Neo-Logicism and Its Logic.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (1):82-95.
    The rather unrestrained use of second-order logic in the neo-logicist program is critically examined. It is argued in some detail that it brings with it genuine set-theoretical existence assumptions and that the mathematical power that Hume’s Principle seems to provide, in the derivation of Frege’s Theorem, comes largely from the ‘logic’ assumed rather than from Hume’s Principle. It is shown that Hume’s Principle is in reality not stronger than the very weak Robinson Arithmetic Q. Consequently, only a few rudimentary facts (...)
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  3. Neo-Logicism and Gödelian Incompleteness.Fabian Pregel - 2023 - Mind 131 (524):1055-1082.
    There is a long-standing gap in the literature as to whether Gödelian incompleteness constitutes a challenge for Neo-Logicism, and if so how serious it is. In this paper, I articulate and address the challenge in detail. The Neo-Logicist project is to demonstrate the analyticity of arithmetic by deriving all its truths from logical principles and suitable definitions. The specific concern raised by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is that no single sound system of logic syntactically implies all arithmetical truths. I (...)
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  4. Neo-Logicism and Russell's Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2012 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 32 (2):127-159.
    Certain advocates of the so-called “neo-logicist” movement in the philosophy of mathematics identify themselves as “neo-Fregeans” (e.g., Hale and Wright), presenting an updated and revised version of Frege’s form of logicism. Russell’s form of logicism is scarcely discussed in this literature and, when it is, often dismissed as not really logicism at all (in light of its assumption of axioms of infinity, reducibility and so on). In this paper I have three aims: firstly, to identify more clearly (...)
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  5. Logicism and the ontological commitments of arithmetic.Harold T. Hodes - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):123-149.
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  6. Arithmetic, Logicism, and Frege’s Definitions.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - International Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):5-25.
    This paper describes both an exegetical puzzle that lies at the heart of Frege’s writings—how to reconcile his logicism with his definitions and claims about his definitions—and two interpretations that try to resolve that puzzle, what I call the “explicative interpretation” and the “analysis interpretation.” This paper defends the explicative interpretation primarily by criticizing the most careful and sophisticated defenses of the analysis interpretation, those given my Michael Dummett and Patricia Blanchette. Specifically, I argue that Frege’s text either are (...)
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  7. Russell on Logicism and Coherence.Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2011 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31 (1):63-79.
    According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell’s logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as aprioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell’s explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on (...)
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  8. Logicism, Ontology, and the Epistemology of Second-Order Logic.Richard Kimberly Heck - 2018 - In Ivette Fred Rivera & Jessica Leech (eds.), Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 140-169.
    In two recent papers, Bob Hale has attempted to free second-order logic of the 'staggering existential assumptions' with which Quine famously attempted to saddle it. I argue, first, that the ontological issue is at best secondary: the crucial issue about second-order logic, at least for a neo-logicist, is epistemological. I then argue that neither Crispin Wright's attempt to characterize a `neutralist' conception of quantification that is wholly independent of existential commitment, nor Hale's attempt to characterize the second-order domain in terms (...)
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  9. Logicism, Formalism, and Intuitionism.A. P. Bird - 2021 - Cantor's Paradise (00):00.
    This paper objectively defines the three main contemporary philosophies of mathematics: formalism, logicism, and intuitionism. Being the three leading scientists of each: Hilbert (formalist), Frege (logicist), and Poincaré (intuitionist).
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  10. Logic, Logicism, and Intuitions in Mathematics.Besim Karakadılar - 2001 - Dissertation, Middle East Technical University
    In this work I study the main tenets of the logicist philosophy of mathematics. I deal, basically, with two problems: (1) To what extent can one dispense with intuition in mathematics? (2) What is the appropriate logic for the purposes of logicism? By means of my considerations I try to determine the pros and cons of logicism. My standpoint favors the logicist line of thought. -/- .
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  11. Logicism, Possibilism, and the Logic of Kantian Actualism.Andrew Stephenson - 2017 - Critique.
    In this extended critical discussion of 'Kant's Modal Metaphysics' by Nicholas Stang (OUP 2016), I focus on one central issue from the first chapter of the book: Stang’s account of Kant’s doctrine that existence is not a real predicate. In §2 I outline some background. In §§3-4 I present and then elaborate on Stang’s interpretation of Kant’s view that existence is not a real predicate. For Stang, the question of whether existence is a real predicate amounts to the question: ‘could (...)
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  12. Russell's Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2018 - In Russell Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. London, UK: BloomsburyAcademic. pp. 151-178.
    Bertrand Russell was one of the best-known proponents of logicism: the theory that mathematics reduces to, or is an extension of, logic. Russell argued for this thesis in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and attempted to demonstrate it formally in Principia Mathematica (PM 1910–1913; with A. N. Whitehead). Russell later described his work as a further “regressive” step in understanding the foundations of mathematics made possible by the late 19th century “arithmetization” of mathematics and Frege’s logical definitions of (...)
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  13. Russell's Logicism through Kantian Spectacles [review of Anssi Korhonen, Logic as Universal Science: Russell’s Early Logicism and Its Philosophical Context ].Kevin C. Klement - 2014 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 34 (1):79-84.
    Review of Logic as Universal Science: Russell’s Early Logicism and Its Philosophical Context, by Anssi Korhonen (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
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  14. Le questionnement logiciste et les conflits d’interprétation.Jean-Claude Gardin - 1997 - Enquête. Anthropologie, Histoire, Sociologie 5 (Débats et controverses):35-54.
    L’analyse logiciste des constructions savantes a pour but de mettre à nu leurs composantes symboliques : une base de données (observations et présuppositions) et un ensemble d’opérations de réécriture exprimant le raisonnement qui relie cette base aux thèses de la construction. Les travaux inspirés de ce programme depuis une vingtaine d’années soulèvent des questions intéressantes dans les perspectives d’une épistémologie pratique maintes fois exposées. L’étude des conflits d’interprétation y tient une large place ; elle s’apparente à l’analyse des controverses scientifiques (...)
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  15. On Ramsey’s reason to amend Principia Mathematica’s logicism and Wittgenstein’s reaction.Anderson Nakano - 2020 - Synthese 2020 (1):2629-2646.
    In the Foundations of Mathematics, Ramsey attempted to amend Principia Mathematica’s logicism to meet serious objections raised against it. While Ramsey’s paper is well known, some questions concerning Ramsey’s motivations to write it and its reception still remain. This paper considers these questions afresh. First, an account is provided for why Ramsey decided to work on his paper instead of simply accepting Wittgenstein’s account of mathematics as presented in the Tractatus. Secondly, evidence is given supporting that Wittgenstein was not (...)
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  16. C. S. Peirce: Pragmatism and Logicism.Jaime Nubiola - 1996 - Philosophia Scientiae 1 (2):109-119.
    This paper has two separate aims, with obvious links between them. First, to present Charles S. Peirce and the pragmatist movement in a historical framework which stresses the close connections of pragmatism with the mainstream of philosophy; second, to deal with a particular controversial issue, that of the supposed logicistic orientation of Peirce's work.
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  17. Logical Form and the Development of Russell’s Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2022 - In F. Boccuni & A. Sereni (eds.), Origins and Varieties of Logicism. Routledge. pp. 147–166.
    Logicism is the view that mathematical truths are logical truths. But a logical truth is commonly thought to be one with a universally valid form. The form of “7 > 5” would appear to be the same as “4 > 6”. Yet one is a mathematical truth, and the other not a truth at all. To preserve logicism, we must maintain that the two either are different subforms of the same generic form, or that their forms are not (...)
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  18. Gödel Mathematics Versus Hilbert Mathematics. II Logicism and Hilbert Mathematics, the Identification of Logic and Set Theory, and Gödel’s 'Completeness Paper' (1930).Vasil Penchev - 2023 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 15 (1):1-61.
    The previous Part I of the paper discusses the option of the Gödel incompleteness statement (1931: whether “Satz VI” or “Satz X”) to be an axiom due to the pair of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory after interpreting them as logical negations to each other. The present Part II considers the previous Gödel’s paper (1930) (and more precisely, the negation of “Satz VII”, or “the completeness theorem”) as a necessary condition for (...)
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  19. Linguistique et psychanalyse : pour une approche logiciste.Jean-Jacques Pinto - 2004 - Marges Linguistiques 2 (novembre 2004):pp. 88-113.
    Nous envisagerons dans cet article la possibilité d'un abord pratique de la relation entre linguistique et psychanalyse : la modélisation linguistique des données mises au jour par la psychanalyse à partir de corpus tirés du discours courant. La validation de tels modèles d'après les critères requis par l'« approche logiciste » de J.-C. Gardin et J. Molino sera examinée sur un exemple précis que nous exposerons en détail : l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives, modèle développé, publié et enseigné par nous depuis (...)
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  20. Frege's Intellectual Life As a Logicist Project. [REVIEW]Joan Bertran-San Millán - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 39:127-138.
    I critically discuss Dale Jacquette’s Frege: A Philosophical Biography. First, I provide a short overview of Jacquette’s book. Second, I evaluate Jacquette’s interpretation of Frege’s three major works, Begriffsschrift, Grundlagen der Arithmetik and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik; and conclude that the author does not faithfully represent their content. Finally, I offer some technical and general remarks.
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  21. Russell: a guide for the perplexed.John Ongley & Rosalind Carey - 2013 - New York: Continuum. Edited by Rosalind Carey.
    Contents: Introduction / Naïve Logicism / Restricted Logicism / Metaphysics (Early, Middle, Late) / Knowledge (Early, Middle, Late) / Language (Early, Middle, Late) / The Infinite.
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  22. Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic is Not Conservative.Stephen Mackereth & Jeremy Avigad - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):1199-1232.
    Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume’s Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A long-standing problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck’s Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that it (...)
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  23. Říká logicismus něco, co se říkat nemá?Vojtěch Kolman - 2010 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 32 (1):37-57.
    The objective of this paper is to analyze the broader significance of Frege’s logicist project against the background of Wittgenstein’s philosophy from both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The article draws on two basic observations, namely that Frege’s project aims at saying something that was only implicit in everyday arithmetical practice, as the so-called recursion theorem demonstrates, and that the explicitness involved in logicism does not concern the arithmetical operations themselves, but rather the way they are defined. It thus represents (...)
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  24. Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze.Richard Kimberly Heck - 2019 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 497-537.
    A speculative investigation of how Frege's logical views change between Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze and how this might have affected the formal development of logicism.
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  25. The Potential in Frege’s Theorem.Will Stafford - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):553-577.
    Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the (...)
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  26. Frege's Changing Conception of Number.Kevin C. Klement - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):146-167.
    I trace changes to Frege's understanding of numbers, arguing in particular that the view of arithmetic based in geometry developed at the end of his life (1924–1925) was not as radical a deviation from his views during the logicist period as some have suggested. Indeed, by looking at his earlier views regarding the connection between numbers and second-level concepts, his understanding of extensions of concepts, and the changes to his views, firstly, in between Grundlagen and Grundgesetze, and, later, after learning (...)
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  27. Russell’s method of analysis and the axioms of mathematics.Lydia Patton - 2017 - In Sandra Lapointe Christopher Pincock (ed.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105-126.
    In the early 1900s, Russell began to recognize that he, and many other mathematicians, had been using assertions like the Axiom of Choice implicitly, and without explicitly proving them. In working with the Axioms of Choice, Infinity, and Reducibility, and his and Whitehead’s Multiplicative Axiom, Russell came to take the position that some axioms are necessary to recovering certain results of mathematics, but may not be proven to be true absolutely. The essay traces historical roots of, and motivations for, Russell’s (...)
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  28. Gödel mathematics versus Hilbert mathematics. I. The Gödel incompleteness (1931) statement: axiom or theorem?Vasil Penchev - 2022 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 14 (9):1-56.
    The present first part about the eventual completeness of mathematics (called “Hilbert mathematics”) is concentrated on the Gödel incompleteness (1931) statement: if it is an axiom rather than a theorem inferable from the axioms of (Peano) arithmetic, (ZFC) set theory, and propositional logic, this would pioneer the pathway to Hilbert mathematics. One of the main arguments that it is an axiom consists in the direct contradiction of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory. (...)
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  29. On The Sense and Reference of A Logical Constant.Harold Hodes - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):134-165.
    Logicism is, roughly speaking, the doctrine that mathematics is fancy logic. So getting clear about the nature of logic is a necessary step in an assessment of logicism. Logic is the study of logical concepts, how they are expressed in languages, their semantic values, and the relationships between these things and the rest of our concepts, linguistic expressions, and their semantic values. A logical concept is what can be expressed by a logical constant in a language. So the (...)
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  30. Who needs (to assume) Hume's principle?Andrew Boucher - manuscript
    Neo-logicism uses definitions and Hume's Principle to derive arithmetic in second-order logic. This paper investigates how much arithmetic can be derived using definitions alone, without any additional principle such as Hume's.
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  31. Mathematics as the Science of Pure Structure.John-Michael Kuczynski - manuscript
    A brief but rigorous description of the logical structure of mathematical truth.
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  32. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 82-3.George Boolos & Richard G. Heck - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of mathematics today. New York: Clarendon Press.
    A close look at Frege's proof in "Foundations of Arithmetic" that every number has a successor. The examination reveals a surprising gap in the proof, one that Frege would later fill in "Basic Laws of Arithmetic".
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  33. "Cała matematyka to właściwie geometria". Poglądy Gottloba Fregego na podstawy matematyki po upadku logicyzmu.Krystian Bogucki - 2019 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 44:1 - 20.
    Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of objects in arithmetic. In (...)
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  34. Robotlar ve planlama.Varol Akman & Erkan Tin - 1993 - Elektrik Mühendisliği 391:37-43.
    Planlama --- bir amaca ulaşmak üzere bir aksiyonlar bütünü tasarlamak --- yapay zekadaki en temel problemlerden biridir. Bu yazıda, robotikte planlama konusuna mantıkçı (logicist) yaklaşım ele alınmaktadır. [Planning --- devising a plan of action to reach a given goal --- is a fundamental problem in AI. This paper reviews the logicist approach to planning in robotics.].
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  35. A Theory of Necessities.Andrew Bacon & Jin Zeng - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (1):151-199.
    We develop a theory of necessity operators within a version of higher-order logic that is neutral about how fine-grained reality is. The theory is axiomatized in terms of the primitive of *being a necessity*, and we show how the central notions in the philosophy of modality can be recovered from it. Various questions are formulated and settled within the framework, including questions about the ordering of necessities under strength, the existence of broadest necessities satisfying various logical conditions, and questions about (...)
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  36. Objectivity in the Natural Sciences [Chapter 3 of Objectivity].Guy Axtell - 2016 - In Objectivity. Cambridge, UL; Malden, MA: Polity Press; Wiley. pp. 69-108.
    Chapter 3 surveys objectivity in the natural sciences. Thomas Kuhn problematized the logicist understanding of the objectivity or rationality of scientific change, providing a very different picture than that of the cumulative or step-wise progress of theoretical science. Theories often compete, and when consensus builds around one competitor it may be for a variety of reasons other than just the direct logical implications of experimental successes and failures. Kuhn pitted the study of the actual history of science against what Hans (...)
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  37. The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number.Richard Kimberly Heck - 2019 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-30.
    An overview of what Frege accomplishes in Part II of Grundgesetze, which contains proofs of axioms for arithmetic and several additional results concerning the finite, the infinite, and the relationship between these notions. One might think of this paper as an extremely compressed form of Part II of my book Reading Frege's Grundgesetze.
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  38. The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint.Gila Sher - 1991 - MIT Press.
    The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her (...)
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  39. Frege's Principle.Richard Heck - 1995 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Foundations of Mathematics. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This paper explores the relationship between Hume's Prinicple and Basic Law V, investigating the question whether we really do need to suppose that, already in Die Grundlagen, Frege intended that HP should be justified by its derivation from Law V.
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  40. LOGIC TEACHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY.John Corcoran - manuscript
    We are much better equipped to let the facts reveal themselves to us instead of blinding ourselves to them or stubbornly trying to force them into preconceived molds. We no longer embarrass ourselves in front of our students, for example, by insisting that “Some Xs are Y” means the same as “Some X is Y”, and lamely adding “for purposes of logic” whenever there is pushback. Logic teaching in this century can exploit the new spirit of objectivity, humility, clarity, observationalism, (...)
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  41.  76
    Wittgenstein contra la Metamatemática.Axel Barceló - manuscript
    En este texto retomo una pregunta importante que había quedado abierta al final del segundo capítulo de mi (2019): ¿cuáles son los límites del análisis? Sabemos que por obvias limitaciones materiales, todo análisis siempre será incompleto y por lo tanto, limitado. A estos límites les hemos llamado “metodológicos”, para distinguirlos de los metafísicos. Si el análisis tiene límites en este segundo sentido, aun si termináramos de analizar por completo un concepto, no podremos estar seguros de conocer todas sus propiedades esenciales (...)
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  42. A Notion of Logical Concept Based on Plural Reference.Carrara Massimiliano & Martino Enrico - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):19-33.
    In To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice the authors defended Boolos’ thesis that plural quantification is part of logic. To this purpose, plural quantification was explained in terms of plural reference, and a semantics of plural acts of choice, performed by an ideal team of agents, was introduced. In this paper, following that approach, we develop a theory of concepts that—in a sense to be explained—can be labeled as a theory of logical concepts. (...)
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  43. PSYCHOLOGISM.John Corcoran - 2007 - In John Lachs and Robert Talisse (ed.), American Philosophy: an Encyclopedia. ROUTLEDGE. pp. 628-9.
    Corcoran, J. 2007. Psychologism. American Philosophy: an Encyclopedia. Eds. John Lachs and Robert Talisse. New York: Routledge. Pages 628-9. -/- Psychologism with respect to a given branch of knowledge, in the broadest neutral sense, is the view that the branch is ultimately reducible to, or at least is essentially dependent on, psychology. The parallel with logicism is incomplete. Logicism with respect to a given branch of knowledge is the view that the branch is ultimately reducible to logic. Every (...)
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  44. Gottlob Frege.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - In Dean Moyar (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 858-886.
    A summary of the philosophical career and intellectual contributions of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), including his invention of first- and second-order quantified logic, his logicist understanding of arithmetic and numbers, the theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) of language, the third-realm metaphysics of “thoughts”, his arguments against rival views, and other topics.
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  45. Frege on the Relations between Logic and Thought.Simon Evnine - manuscript
    Frege's diatribes against psychologism have often been taken to imply that he thought that logic and thought have nothing to do with each other. I argue against this interpretation and attribute to Frege a view on which the two are tightly connected. The connection, however, derives not from logic's being founded on the empirical laws of thought but rather from thought's depending constitutively on the application to it of logic. I call this view 'psycho-logicism.'.
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  46. A Logic for Frege's Theorem.Richard Heck - 1999 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Frege’s Theorem: An Introduction. The Harvard Review of Philosophy.
    It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view that, say, (...)
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  47. Pascal's Wager is a possible bet (but not a very good one): Reply to Harmon Holcomb III.Graham Oppy - 1996 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (2):101 - 116.
    In "To Bet The Impossible Bet", Harmon Holcomb III argues: (i) that Pascal's wager is structurally incoherent; (ii) that if it were not thus incoherent, then it would be successful; and (iii) that my earlier critique of Pascal's wager in "On Rescher On Pascal's Wager" is vitiated by its reliance on "logicist" presuppositions. I deny all three claims. If Pascal's wager is "incoherent", this is only because of its invocation of infinite utilities. However, even if infinite utilities are admissible, the (...)
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  48. Frege's Theorem in Plural Logic.Simon Hewitt - manuscript
    We note that a plural version of logicism about arithmetic is suggested by the standard reading of Hume's Principle in terms of `the number of Fs/Gs'. We lay out the resources needed to prove a version of Frege's principle in plural, rather than second-order, logic. We sketch a proof of the theorem and comment philosophically on the result, which sits well with a metaphysics of natural numbers as plural properties.
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  49. Frege on the Foundation of Geometry in Intuition.Jeremy Shipley - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (6).
    I investigate the role of geometric intuition in Frege’s early mathematical works and the significance of his view of the role of intuition in geometry to properly understanding the aims of his logicist project. I critically evaluate the interpretations of Mark Wilson, Jamie Tappenden, and Michael Dummett. The final analysis that I provide clarifies the relationship of Frege’s restricted logicist project to dominant trends in German mathematical research, in particular to Weierstrassian arithmetization and to the Riemannian conceptual/geometrical tradition at Göttingen. (...)
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  50. The Latest Frege.Nikolay Milkov - 1999 - Prima Philosophia 12:41-48.
    Many authors believe that the manuscripts Frege wrote in 1924–1925 are not theoretically of interest. They are rather a product of his emotional despair and theoretical dead-end which he reached in the last years of his life. Such is also the judgement of Michael Dummett delivered in his seminal book Frege: Philosophy of Language. According to Dummett, “the few fragmentary writings of Frege’s final period—1919–1925—are not of high quality: they are interesting chiefly as showing that Frege did, at least at (...)
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