- Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
|
|
Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis.Jie Gao - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1238-1257.details
|
|
Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
|
|
Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
|
|
Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
|
|
On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
|
|
The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
|
|
The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1.Andrew del Rio - 2022 - Analysis 83 (1):31-39.details
|
|
Should agents be immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
|
|
Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
|
|
Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
|
|
Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
|
|
Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.details
|
|
I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):24-43.details
|
|
Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. [REVIEW]Bob Beddor - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):394-398.details
|
|
Shifty evidence and shifty books.Bob Beddor - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):193-198.details
|
|
Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.details
|
|
Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
|
|
The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
|
|
Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
|
|
On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - unknown - Cambridge University Press | Under Contract.details
|
|
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
|
|
Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
|
|
Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
|
|
Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
|
|
Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
|
|
Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
|
|
Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
|
|
The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
|
|
Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
|
|
Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
|
|
The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Headaches for epistemologists.Brian Talbot - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):408-433.details
|
|
Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.details
|
|
How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
|
|
Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
|
|
No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.details
|
|
Extreme Betting.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):32-41.details
|
|
What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
|
|
Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
|
|
The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
|
|
Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
|
|
Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
|
|