- (1 other version)Knowledge is Closed Under Analytic Content.Samuel Elgin - manuscriptdetails
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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The Toxin and the Dogmatist.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740.details
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Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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The Psychology of Epistemic Judgment.Jennifer Nagel & Jessica Wright - forthcoming - In Sarah K. Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, 2nd Edition.details
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Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):264-270.details
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The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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What's the Point of Authors?Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Options must be external.Justis Koon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1175-1189.details
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The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935.details
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On the Possibility of Hallucinations.Farid Masrour - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):737-768.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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The Gettier Problem.Ian M. Church - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge. pp. 261-271.details
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The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.details
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Diagnosing Sorites arguments.Robert Stalnaker - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3):509-520.details
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Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.details
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What's the point of knowing how?Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.details
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Predictive coding and religious belief.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3).details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge.Dustin Stokes - 2019 - Avant: Special Issue-Thinking with Images 10 (2).details
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(1 other version)Plato's Theory of Knowledge.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In David Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer & Christopher Shields (eds.), Virtue, Happiness, Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.details
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Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (4):347-361.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.details
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How to do things with modals.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (1):115-138.details
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The inscrutability of reference.Robert Williams - 2005 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Holistic Conditionalization and Underminable Perceptual Learning.Brian T. Miller - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):130-149.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo sin saber que las creo.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Critica 49 (146):37-60.details
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(1 other version)The Power of Appearances.Nenad Popovic - forthcoming - Brill.details
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On the Blameworthiness of Forgetting.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 241-258.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Grounding-based formulations of physicalism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - Topoi 37 (3):495-512.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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What ‘must’ adds.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (3):225-266.details
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Embedded Attitudes.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (3):377-406.details
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What is ‘mental action’?Yair Levy - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):971-993.details
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Representation without Thought: Confusion, Reference, and Communication.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2015 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Centerdetails
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Is Kant's Critique of Metaphysics Obsolete?Nicholas Stang - manuscriptdetails
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Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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(1 other version)On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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