- Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
|
|
Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
|
|
Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
|
|
Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
|
|
Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
|
|
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
|
|
The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Believing at will.Barbara Winters - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):243-256.details
|
|
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
|
|
Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
|
|
Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
|
|
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
|
|
Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
|
|
Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
|
|
How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
|
|
Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
|
|
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.details
|
|
The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.details
|
|
Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism.Nishi Shah - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):436-445.details
|
|
Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
|
|
On belief and the captivity of the will.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):77-103.details
|
|
The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
|
|
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|
Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
|
|
Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
|
|
Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will.Dana Radcliffe - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145-151.details
|
|
Epistemology and Probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65.details
|
|
Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65-67.details
|
|
Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):231-252.details
|
|
II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
|
|
The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.details
|
|
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
|
|
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306.details
|
|
Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
|
|
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
|
|
A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
|
|
Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
|
|
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
|
|
Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
|
|
Radical interpretation.David K. Lewis - 1974 - Synthese 23 (July-August):331-344.details
|
|
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
|
|
Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
|
|
On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View.Matthew Lee - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):143-158.details
|
|