- Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity.Alastair Wilson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Armchair Disagreement.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):527-549.details
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Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?Mark Walker - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):285-316.details
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Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl G. Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):25-46.details
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A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of F ear of Knowledge.Gideon Rosen - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):10-29.details
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Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.details
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Evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off.William Roche - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):119-124.details
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Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.details
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Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective.Gurpreet Rattan - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12887.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
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Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
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Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
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Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.details
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Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):327-328.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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Resolute conciliationism.John Pittard - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):442-463.details
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Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism.John Pittard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5009-5038.details
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Disagreement, reliability, and resilience.John Pittard - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4389-4409.details
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief.Rik Peels & Anthony Booth - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):75-88.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):179-196.details
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A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1253-1261.details
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Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.details
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Independence and new ways to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):65-79.details
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Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
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