- Attitude in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.details
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Scepticism and Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 581-591.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - New York: Palgrave.details
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Agent Centeredness, Agent Neutrality, Disagreement, and Truth Conduciveness.Michael DePaul - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 202.details
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The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge: Why Philosophers are Not Entitled to Their Beliefs.János Tőzsér - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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What should we do when we disagree?Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 274-93.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.details
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Rational Disagreement Defended.Earl Conee - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
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Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - In James H. Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 139-148.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements.Steven D. Hales - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):63-82.details
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Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - Springer Verlag.details
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Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment.John Pittard - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity.Alastair Wilson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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Armchair Disagreement.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):527-549.details
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Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?Mark Walker - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):285-316.details
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Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl G. Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):25-46.details
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A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.details
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Undermining, circularity, and disagreement.Andrew Rotondo - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):563-584.details
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The Case against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of F ear of Knowledge.Gideon Rosen - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):10-29.details
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Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.details
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