There is growing interest in the use of technology to enhance the tracking and quality of clinical information available for patients in disaster settings. This paper describes the design and evaluation of the Wireless Internet Information System for Medical Response in Disasters (WIISARD).

The systematic study of supermatrices and super linear algebra has been carried out in 2008. These new algebraic structures find their applications in fuzzy models, Leontief economic models and data-storage in computers.

Guided by key insights of the four great philosophers mentioned in the title, here, in review of and expanding on our earlier work (Burchard, 2005, 2011), we present an exposition of the role played by language, & in the broader sense, λογοζ, the Logos, in how the CNS, the brain, is running the human being. Evolution by neural Darwinism has been forcing the linguistic nature of mind, enabling it to overcome & exploit the cognitive gap between an animal and its (...) world by recognizing environmental structures. Our work was greatly influenced by Heidegger’s lecture notes on metaphysics (Heidegger, 1935). We found agreement with recent progress in neuroscience, but also mathematical foundations of language theory, equating Logos with the mathematical concept of structure. The mystery of perception across the gap is analyzed as radiation and molecules impinging on sensory neurons that carry linguistic information about gross environmental structures, and only remotely about the physical reality of elementary particles. The most important logical brain function is Ego or Self, guiding the workings of the brain as a logos machine. Ego or Self operates from neurons in frontopolar cortex with global receptive fields. The logos machine can function only by availing itself of global context, its internally stored noumenal cosmos NK, and the categorical-conceptual apparatus CCA, updated continually through the neural default mode network (Raichle, 2005). In the Transcendental Deduction, Immanuel Kant discovered that Ego or Self is responsible for conscious control in perception relying on concepts & categories for a fitting percept to be incorporated intoNK. The entire CNS runs as a “movie-in-the-brain” (Parvizi & Damasio, 2001), at peak speed processing simultaneously in a series of cortical centers a stack of up to twelve frames in gamma rhythm of 25 ms intervals. We equate global context, or NK, with our human world, Heidegger’s Dasein being-in-the-world, and are able to demonstrate that the great philosopher in EM parallels neuro-science concerning the human mind. (shrink)

The principal thesis in this review-essay is that the key linguistic terms in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre especially have two main meanings that appear at first sight to be almost in contradiction or opposed to each other. The reader of Fichte therefore has to work hard to overcome any apparent conflicts in the “double sense” of his philosophical terminology. Accordingly, I argue that Fichte’s linguistic method and use of language should be seen as part of his chief philosophical method of synthesis, where (...) we have to carry out a similar procedure and attempt to reconcile opposites using the power of the imagination. This thesis is put forward by means of a number of practical examples and in the context of some critical reflections on the recently published Cambridge Companion to Fichte, eds. David James and Günter Zöller. Review essay published in Volume 15 (December, 2017) of the journal Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte (ed. Emiliano Acosta). (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea of "pure experience" within the context of the Buddhist tradition and in connection with the notions of emptiness and dependent origination via a reading of Dale Wright's reading of 'Huangbo' in his 'Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism'. The purpose is to appropriate Wright's text in order to engender a response to Steven Katz's contextualist-constructivist thesis that there are no "pure" (i.e., unmediated) experiences. In light of the Mahayana claim that everything is empty of substance, i.e., (...) originates dependently through conditions, contingencies, and contexts, what does the "purity" of the Enlightenment experience mean for Chan/Zen Buddhism? (shrink)

Vigorous debate over the moral propriety of cognitive enhancement exists, but the views of the public have been largely absent from the discussion. To address this gap in our knowledge, four experiments were carried out with contrastive vignettes in order to obtain quantitative data on public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement. The data collected suggest that the public is sensitive to and capable of understanding the four cardinal concerns identified by neuroethicists, and tend to cautiously accept cognitive enhancement even as they (...) recognize its potential perils. The public is biopolitically moderate, endorses both meritocratic principles and the intrinsic value of hard work, and appears to be sensitive to the salient moral issues raised in the debate. Taken together, these data suggest that public attitudes toward enhancement are sufficiently sophisticated to merit inclusion in policy deliberations, especially if we seek to align public sentiment and policy. (shrink)

There is an increase in the use of in-door wireless networking solutions via Wi-Fi and this increase infiltrated and utilized Wi-Fi enable devices, as well as smart mobiles, games consoles, security systems, tablet PCs and smart TVs. Thus the demand on Wi-Fi connections increased rapidly. Rule Based System is an essential method in helping using the human expertise in many challenging fields. In this paper, a Rule Based System was designed and developed for diagnosing the wireless connection problems and attain (...) a precise decision about the cause of the problem. SL5 Object expert system language was used in developing the rule based system. An Evaluation of the rule based system was carried out to test its accuracy and the results were promising. (shrink)

The purpose of the work is to study the definition and purpose of man for nature and cognition. The study was based on an article by K.R. Popper's «Evolutionary Epistemology». A critical analysis of Popper's theses and schemes for the evolution of theories is carried out. The importance of the emergence of a system of times of the language as a consequence of its descriptive function is noted. The problem with which the cycle of development of life and knowledge begins (...) is revealed. In the work of the scheme proposed by Popper, the language is included. As a result of the discussion, a key element of the essence of man is revealed: understanding the problem of death. This understanding makes it possible to relate oneself to the problem, which is the reason for the existence of the most general evaluation categories: «good» and «evil». So, a person can determine the goal of development - overcoming the problem, in contrast to nature, the development of which is aimed at avoiding the problem. Having reached the goal, a person will go beyond himself as a phenomenon defined by an understanding of the problem. In this case, self-transcendence is the transition of a person to a new quality. The role of philosophy in the processes of self-transcendence taking place in modern society is discussed. (shrink)

Future robots should have common sense about the world in order to handle the problems they will encounter. A large part of this commonsense knowledge must be naive physics knowledge, since carrying out even the simplest everyday chores requires familiarity with physics laws. But how should one start codifying this knowledge? What kind of skills should be elicited from the experts (each and every one of us)? This paper will attempt to provide some hints by studying the mental models of (...) force and motion. (shrink)

Though scholars of Chinese Theology have expanded the inter-religious dialogue between Christian theology and traditional Chinese philosophy and culture from Neo-Confucianism to other fields such as Taoism, the dialogue with Chinese Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism, has not been carried out yet. This article mainly reflects on the starting point of Leung In-sing’s Chinese Theology through the perspective of Dharma as Nonduality in Chan. Firstly, it briefly outlines the background and basic ideas of Chinese Theology formulated by Leung In- (...) sing, focusing on discussing the two fundamental theological categories: “Relationship” and “Rapport.” Then, it annotates and analyzes Huineng’s“Dharma as Nonduality.”Finally, from the perspective of Huineng, it rethinks the starting point of Chinese Theology itself and proposes further research questions. (shrink)

Arthur Kaufmann is one of the most prominent figures among the contemporary philosophers of law in German speaking countries. For many years he was a director of the Institute of Philosophy of Law and Computer Sciences for Law at the University in Munich. Presently, he is a retired professor of this university. Rare in the contemporary legal thought, Arthur Kaufmann's philosophy of law is one with the highest ambitions — it aspires to pinpoint the ultimate foundations of law by explicitly (...) proposing an ontology, a general theory of knowledge and concept of a person. Kaufmann's work derives, first of all, from the thinking of Gustav Radburch, his teacher, and then from ideas of Karl Engish and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The philosophy undertakes to pursue the ultimate foundation of law, law which is understood by Kaufmann, first of all, as a "concrete judgement" that is, what is right in a concrete situation. Justice belongs to the essence of law and "unjust law" is contradictio in adiectio. Kaufmann opposes all those theories, which as the only foundation for establishing just law (Recht) adopt legal norms (Gesetz). In Kaufmann's opinion , such theories are powerless in the face of all types of distortions of law rendered by political forces. He suggests that the basic phenomenon which needs to be explained and which cannot be disregarded by a philosopher of law is so-called "legal lawlessness" ("Gestzliches Unrecht"). "Legal lawlessness" which forms a part of life experience for the people of twentieth century totalitarian states. It proved "with the accuracy of scientific experiment" that the reality of law consists of something more than bare conformity with legal norms. The existence of lex corrupta indicates that law contains something "non-dispositive" which requires acknowledgment of both law-maker and judge. Kaufmann, accepting the convergent concept of truth and cognition, assumes that "non-dispositive" content, emerging as the conformity of a number of cognitive acts of different subjects (inter-subjective communicativeness and verifiability), indicates the presence of being in this cognition. The questions "What is law?" and "What are the principles of a just solution?" lead straight to the ontology of law, to the question about the ontological foundations of law. Kaufmann discerns the ontological foundations of law in the specifically understood "nature of things" and, ultimately, in a "person". He proposes a procedural theory of justice, founded on a "person". In my work, I undertake to reconstruct the train of thought which led Kaufmann to the recognition of a "person" as the ontological foundation of law. In the first part, the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, initial characteristics of law — of reality which is the subject of analysis, as well as, the requirements for proper philosophical explanation of law posed by Kaufmann are introduced. In the second, Kaufmann's reconstruction of the process of the realisation of law is presented. Next, the conception of analogy which Kaufmann uses when explaining law is analyzed. In the fourth part, Kaufmann's conception of ontological foundations of law is discussed. A critical analysis is carried out in which I demonstrate that the theory of the ontological foundation of law proposed by Kaufmann and the concept of a person included in it do not allow a satisfac¬tory explanation of the phenomenon of "legal lawlessness" and lead to a number of difficulties in the philosophical explanation of law. Finally, the perspectives of a proper formulation of the issue of the ontological foundations of law are drafted in the context of the analyzed theory. My interest is centered on the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, according to which the existence of the reality is inferred on the basis of a certain configuration of the content of consciousness, whereas at the point of departure of philosophy of law, the data to be explained is a certain process, which is, basically, a process of cognition, while the reality appears only as a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process. I wish to argue that the difficulties which appear in the explanation of law are a consequence of the assumed fundamental philosophical solu¬tions, which seem to be characteristic, though usually not assumed explicitly, in philoso¬phy and theory of law dominant at present in continental Europe. Thereby, I wish to show the significance of ontological and epistemological solutions to the possibility of a proper formulation of the problems posed by philosophy and theory of law. Kaufmann proclaims himself in favour of a philosophy which poses questions about the ultimate foundations of understanding of the reality. In epistemology, he assumes that answers to the questions "What is reality like?" and ultimately "What is real?" are inferred on the basis of uniformity of a cognitive acts of different subjects. Cognition of the reality is accomplished exclusively through the content of conceptual material. The two fundamental questions posed by philosophy of law are "What is just law?" and "How is the just law enacted?" The latter is a question about the process of achieving a solution to a concrete case. Since, in Kaufmann's opinion, law does not exist apart from the process of its realisation, an answer to the question about the manner of realisation of law is of fundamental significance to answering the question: "What is law?" and to the explanation of the question about the ontological grounding of law, which is, as well, the foundation of justice. The proper solution has to take into account the moment of "non-dispositive" content of law; its positiveness understood as the reality and, at the same time, it has to point to the principles of the historical transformation of the content. Law, in the primary meaning of the word, always pertains, in Kaufmann's opinion, to a concrete case. A legal norm is solely the "possibility" of law and the entirely real law is ipsa res iusta, that which is just in a given situation. Determination of what is just takes place in a certain type of process performed by a judge (or by man confronted with a choice). Kaufmann aims to reconstruct this process. A question about the ontological foundation of law is a question about the ontological foundations of this process. In the analyzed theory it is formulated as a question about the transcendental conditions, necessary for the possibility of the occurrence of the process: how the reality should be thought to make possible the reconstructed process of the realisation of law. Kaufmann rejects the model for finding a concrete solution based on simple subsump¬tion and proposes a model in which concrete law ensues, based on inference by analogy, through the process of "bringing to conformity" that which is normative with that which is factual. Kaufmann distinguishes three levels in the process of the realisation of law. On the highest level, there are the fundamental legal principles, on the second legal norms, on the third — concrete solutions. The fundamental principles of law are general inasmuch as they cannot be "applied" directly to concrete conditions of life, however, they play an important part in establishing norms. A judge encounters a concrete situation and a system of legal norms. A life situation and norms are situated on inherently different levels of factuality and normativeness. In order to acquire a definite law both a norm (system of norms) and a life situation (Lebenssachverhalt) should undergo a kind of "treatment" which would allow a mutual conformity to be brought to them. Legal norms and definite conditions of life come together in the process of analogical inference in which the "factual state" ("Tatbestand") — which represents a norm, and in the "state of things" ("Sachverhalt") — which represents a specific situation are constructed. A "factual state" is a sense interpreted from a norm with respect to specific conditions of life. The "state of things" is a sense constructed on the basis of concrete conditions of life with respect to norms (system of norms). Legal norms and concrete conditions of life meet in one common sense established during the process of realisation of law. Mutatis mutandis the same refers to the process of composition of legal norms: as the acquisition of concrete law consists in a mutual "synchronization" of norms and concrete conditions of life, so acquisition of legal norms consists of bringing to conformity fundamental principles and possible conditions of life. According to Kaufmann, both of these processes are based on inference through analogy. As this inference is the heart of these processes it is simultaneously a foundation finding just law and justice. How does Kaufmann understand such an inference? As the basis for all justice he assumes a specifically interpreted distributive justice grounded on proportionality. Equality of relations is required between life conditions and their normative qualification. Concrete conditions of life are ascribed normative qualification not through simple application of a general norm. More likely, when we look for a solution we go from one concrete normative qualified case to another, through already known "applications" of norms to a new "application". The relation between life conditions and their normative qualifica¬tion has to be proportional to other, earlier or possible (thought of) assignments of that which is factual to that which is normative. Law as a whole does not consist of a set of norms, but only of a unity of relations. Since law is a, based on proportion, relative unity of a norm and conditions of life, in order to explain law in philosophical manner, the question about ontological base of this unity has to be asked. What is it that makes the relation between a norm and conditions of life "non-dispositive"? What is the basis for such an interpretation of a norm and case which makes it possible to bring a norm and conditions of life into mutual "conformity"? This is a question about a third thing (next to norms and conditions of life), with respect to which the relative identity between a norm and conditions of life occurs, about the intermediary between that which is normative and that which is factual and which provides for the process of establishing of norms, as well as, finding solutions. It is the "sense" in which the idea of law or legal norm and conditions of life have to be identical to be brought to mutual "conformity". In Kaufmann's opinion such a sense is nothing else but the "nature of things" which determines the normative qualification of the reality. Since establishment of this "sense" appears to be "non-dispositive" and controlled inter-subjectively (namely, other subjects will reach a similar result) so, in conformity with the convergent concept of truth, the "nature of things" must be assigned a certain ontological status. According to Kaufmann this is a real relation which occurs between being and obligation, between the conditions of life and normative quality. However, it should be underlined that from the point of view of the analyzed system the "nature of things" is a correlate of constructed sense, a result of a construction which is based on the principle of consistent understanding of senses ("non-normative" and "normative") and is not a reality which is transcendent against the arrangement of senses. In Kaufmann's theory, inference from analogy appears to be a process of reshaping the concepts (senses) governed by tendency to understand the contents appearing in relations between that which is factual and that which is normative in a consistent way. The analogical structure of language (concepts) and recognition of being as composed of an essence and existence is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of the realisation of law, based on specifically understood inference from analogy. It is necessary to assume a moment of existence without content which ensures unity of cognition. Existence emerges thus as a condition of the possibility of cognition. According to Kaufmann, the "nature of things" is the heart of inference through analogy and the basis for establishment of finding of law. Inference from the "state of things" to a norm or from a norm to the "state of things" always means inference through the "nature of things". The "nature of things" is the proper medium of objective legal sense sought in every cognition of law. In Kaufmann's view, the question whether the "nature of things" is ultima ratio of interpretation of law or is only a means of supplement gaps in law or whether it is one of the sources of law, is posed wrongly. The "nature of things" serves neither to supplement the gaps nor is it a source of law as, for example, a legal norm may be. It is a certain kind of "catalyst" necessary in every act of making law and solving a concrete case. Owing to "nature of things" it is possible to bring to a mutual conformity the idea of law and possible conditions of life or legal norms and concrete conditions of life. In Kaufmann's conception the "nature of things" is not yet the ultimate basis for understanding the "non-dispositiveness" of law. The relation between obligation and being is determined in the process of the realisation of law. Both the process itself and that which is transformed in this process are given. A question about the ontological bases of "material" contents undergoing "treatment" in the process of the realisation of law and about being which is the basis of regularity of the occurrence of the process arises. Only this will allow an explanation that the result of the process is not optional. Thus, a question about reality to which law refers and about the subject realising the law has to be formed. To this, Kaufmann gives the following answer: that which is missing is man but not "empirical man" but man as a "person". A "person" understood as a set of relations between man and other people and things. A "person" is the intermediary between those things which are different — norm and case are brought to conformity. A "person" is that which is given and permanent in the process of the realisation of law. It determines the content of law, is "subject" of law; this aspect is described by Kaufmann as the "what" of the process of realisation of law. A "person" consists of precisely just these relations which undergo "treatment" in the process. On the other hand, a "person" is "a place" in which the processes of realisation of law occur, it is the "how" of normative discourse, a "person" is that which determines the procedure of the process, being "outside" of it. This aspect of a "person" is connected with the formal moment of law. A "person" being, at the same time, the "how" and the "what" of the process of the realisation of law, is also, to put it differently, a structural unity of relation and that which constitutes this relation (unity of relatio and relata). According to this approach a "person" is neither an object nor a subject. It exists only "in between". It is not substance. Law is the relation between being and obligation. That which is obligatory is connected with that which is general. That which is general does not exist on its own, it is not completely real. Accordingly, a "person" as such is also not real. It is relational, dynamic and historical. A "person" is not a state but an event. In Kaufmann's opinion, such a concept of a "person" helps to avoid the difficulties connected with the fungibility of law in classical legal positivism. A "person" is that which is given, which is not at free disposal and secures the moment of "non-dispositiveness" of law. Kaufmann concludes: "The idea (»nature«) of law is either the idea of a personal man or is nothing". Theory points at the structure of realising law and explains the process of adoption of general legal norms for a concrete situation. The analysis has shown however, that in this theory a satisfactory answer to the question about the ultimate foundations of law is not given. It seems that in the analyzed theory the understanding of human being takes place through understanding of law. What is good for man as a "person", what is just, what a "person" deserves may be determined only against the existing system of law. A "per¬son" adopted as a basis of law is the reality postulated in the analysis of the process of the realisation of law. It is a condition of possibility of this process ( explaining, on one hand, its unity and, on the other hand, the non-dispositive moments stated in this process). A "person" in the discussed theory is entirely defined by the structure of law, it can be nothing more than that which is given in law, what law refers to, what law is about. Being, which is a "person", is constituted by relations between people and objects, the relations which are based on fundamental links between norms and conditions of life established in a process of bringing them to conformity. It has to be assumed that man as a "person" is a subject of law only as far as realising law "treats" given senses according to their current configuration. The system of law is a starting point and it describes in content what man is as a "person". Moreover, being a "person" is the condition for entering legal relations. Consistently, Kaufmann writes that "empirical man" is not the subject of law, man is not "out of nature" a "person". People become "persons" due to the fact that they acknowledge each other as "persons" — acknowledging, at the same time, law. This acknowledgement is a con¬dition of existence, of the possibility of the occurrence of process of realisation of law and of constituting legal relations which ultimately constitute a "person". Kaufmann assumes, that law tends towards a moral aim: it may and must create an external freedom, without which the internal freedom to fulfil moral obligations cannot develop. However, this postulate is not based on the necessary structure of human being. From the point of view of his system, it is nothing more than only a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of the realisation of law — lack of freedom would destroy the "how" of this process. Thus, the postulate to protect the freedom of personal acts has to be interpreted, in accordance with the analyzed theory, as a postulate, the fulfilment of which aims ultimately at the accomplishment of the very same process of realisation of law itself and not the realisation of a given man. Kaufmann considers a "person" to be an element which unites the system of law as a whole. Law is a structure of relations, which are interdependent and inter-contingent. Consequently, a "person" which is to form the ontological basis of law has to be entity consisting of all relations. Being also the "how" of the process of realisation of law, if a "person" is to warrant its unity, it has to be a common source for all procedures. Hence, a single "person" would constitute a subject of law. Man appears to be only a moment of a certain entirety, realisation of which should be an aim of his actions. Law, creating a "person" as an object and subject of law becomes a primary entity. In the analyzed theory, the basis for determination of aims which law sets to man is not the allocation of man-subject to something which improves him but rather, such relation is only just constituted by law. A question appears, why should aims set in law also be the aims of "empirical man"? Why is this "empirical man" to be punished in the name of a "person" understood in such a way? If, however, it is assumed that what is man is determined by a system which is superior to him, then man has to be understood only as a part of a whole and there are no grounds to prohibit istrumental treatment of man and so the road to all aspects of totalitarianism might be opened. A problem of the application of created theory to the reality arises, the reality which the theory pretends to explain. Ultimately in his theory Kaufmann does not give any systemic grounds for a radical questioning of the validity of any legal norms. Every new norm becomes an equal part of system of norms. It is only its interpretation and application to given conditions of life that may be disputable, however, this refers to all norms without exception. Cohesive inter-pretation of norms and applications is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of just law. New norms have to be interpreted in the light of others, correspondingly, the other norms require reinterpretation in the light of the new ones. Contradiction in interpretation of a norm does not form a basis for questioning norms but may serve only to question the manner of their interpretation (understanding). Therefore, no grounds exist to assume any legal norm as criminal or unjust, and in consequence, to question any consistently realised system based on formally, properly established norms, as "legal lawlessness". As law and a "person" do not exist without the process of realisation of law, the role of legal safety becomes crucial as the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Denying legal safety would be tantamount to negation of law in general (also of moral law) as negation of safety takes away, at the same time, the basis for occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Moreover, any lack of legal safety would also mean lack of a basis for the existence of man as a "person". Kaufmann's thesis, that civil disobedience is legalized only when it has a chance to lead to success, consistent with his concept of the foundations of law, seems to point directly to conclusions which deny the facts taken under consideration and doubtlessly Kaufmann's own intentions, since it would have to be assumed that accordingly there are no grounds to question a legal system in force based on violence which secures its operation. Force finally seems to determine which one of the mutually irreconcilable normative systems constitute law and which does not. A legitimate position is one which leads to success, it is the weaker system which is negated. If so, then basically violent imposition of law is not an act directed against the law in force but, to the contrary, realisation of law. In the context of the new system the former system of law may be talked about as unjust solely in the sense of being incapable of being consistently united with the new. However, at the base, ultimately, lies force which reaffirms differences and excludes from the process of realisation of law certain norms and their interpretations. Kaufmann was aiming at grounding of that which is "non-dispositive" in a certain given framework of interpretation. Nevertheless, he does not provide foundations for the understanding of phenomena, which he undertakes to explain at a point of departure. Instead of explaining them the theory negates the possibility of their existence. The reality postulated in regard to "non-dispositive" moments of the reconstructed process of acquiring law consist of a specifically understood "person", which appears in Kaufmann's conceptions as a condition of the possibility of the realisation of law. According to this approach understanding of a "person" may be only a function of law. To understand "legal lawlessness" and foundations of justice it is necessary to look for such theory of law in which understanding of man as a "person" and being is not a function of understanding of law (in which a "person" is not only a condition for possibility of reconstructed process of realisation of law; for possibility of cognition processes). It seems necessary to start from theory of being and a "person" based on broader experience than the one assumed by Kaufmann and reconstruct the ontological foundations of the process of realisation of law only in such perspective. Kaufmann points out that that to which law refers is ipsa res iusta a concrete relation of man to other people and things. This relation, in his theory, appears to be basically only just constituted by law (normative senses "applied" to conditions of life). Therefore, understanding the relation between a given man and other people and things which constitute the aim of his actions, that is understanding of good, is enacted against the background of constitution of senses; constitution which is a result of a process aiming towards consistent understanding of particular contents (of nor¬mative and non-normative senses). "Being" is secondary towards constructed senses it is only their correlate. The primary relation consists of relation of a man to law (system of norms), while the secondary relation is one of man to something which is the aim of his action (relation between man and good). Considering such approach it is difficult to envision a satisfying answer to the fundamental question: why does law put concrete man under any obligation to obey it? The source of this problem can be seen in reduction of the base for understanding good to content of obligation formulated in auto-reflection. Such reduction seems to be a consequence of Kaufmann's adoption of "convergent concept of truth" and in con¬sequence his recognition of indirect, essentialistic grasp of reality formulated in concepts as the basic and only foundation of theory of being and of law. In view of such an approach, analogy of law, concepts and being is the condition for the possibility of the process of transformation of senses which aims at consistent interpretation of all law. Existence is postulated with respect to the possibility of unity of experience and cognition. However, also a different approach to understanding of the problem of being and good is possible. In spontaneous cognition being is affirmed, first of all, not as a certain, non-contradictory, determined content, but as something existing. Together with a cer¬tain content (passed indirectly through notions) existence of being is co-given. The basis for unity of being is not formed by the consistence of content, as it is in the case of the theories departing from the analysis of cognition processes, but by an act of existence realising content (essence). Such an approach makes it also possible to go beyond the convergent concept of truth. It is worth mentioning that allocation of an agent to good is realised not only by the content of duty. A statement that something is good is primary with respect to determination of this good in content. The recognised good always bears some content, however, there are no reasons to base the concept of good exclusively on indirect, formulated in concepts cognition. As primary, can be adopted the relation of man to good and not of man to law. Determination in content appears to be only an articulation of aspectual cognition of being, as an object of action. In such a case the basis for relative unity of norm and conditions of life is not the "nature of things" understood as correlate of sense but it is relation to good based on internal constitution of man as potential, not self-sufficient being. It does not mean, that the moments of the process of realisation of law singled out by Kaufmann are not important to determination of what is just. He, quite rightly, points to significant role played by norms in the evaluation of concrete situations, in man's search for closer specification in content of good innate to him. The structure of process of determining law for a concrete situation, to a great degree corresponds to the processes of determining law which take place not only in the legal sciences. Kaufmann's analyses of the process of realisation of law show the complexity of the structure of these processes and point towards important moments allowing a better understanding of law and man. Nevertheless, these analyses cannot be a basis for construction of philosophical theory of law, theory which hopes to point out the ultimate, ontological foundations for understanding law. Kaufmann's results may become fully valid only in a more general perspective including broader experience at the point of departure. (shrink)

The basis of analyzes carried out in the article is the work of Bernhard Welte: Meister Eckhart. Gedanken zu seinen Gedanken. The central subject of research is the idea Abgeschiedenheit (“isolation”). Following the interpretation of Welte it has been considerated a phenomeno‐ logical description on two ways. From the practical experience, as a modus vivendi a religious man, and from the theoretical, as speculative thought. Theoretical considerations consist of analysis of the concept of truth and goodness, which Eckhart identifies with (...) the idea of God. Welte shows that these concepts of medieval thinker at the starting point considerations are still sink in the schemes of metaphysical thinking, but in the next stages of its argumentation he overcome metaphysical discourse. The purpose of the article, guided by the suggestion Weltes interpretation, is to show ways of reaching the source forms of religious experience. At the same time the text raised the issue of problematic use formulas of mystical union and noticed parallels have been taking place between the method of phenomenological reduction and the idea of Abgeschiedenheit. (shrink)

The Shadow of God in the Philosopher’s Garden. The Parc de La Villette in Paris in the context of the philosophy of chôra I Bernard Tschumi’s project of the Parc de La Villette could have won the competition and was implemented thanks to the political atmosphere that accompanied the victory of the left-wing candidate in the French presidential elections in 1981. François Mitterand’s revision of the political programme and the replacement of radical reforms with the construction of prestigious architectural objects (...) and urban assumptions in the French capital gave Tschumi a unique opportunity to realise ideas that polemicised with traditional forms of social life, questioned the basic principles of architecture and included architectural work in the philosophical disputes over the issues of metaphysics. Tschumi’s theoretical assumptions put forward during the design of the Parc de La Villette highlighted the questions of conflict between the main components of the project and suggested that the intensification of differences was analogous to Jacques Derrida’s creation of the concept of différance. It was this philosopher who in a special commentary to Derrida’s project also introduced the concept of maintenant, which aimed at demonstrating that the architect’s polemical inclinations remain in a hidden balance with his inclinations to affirmation of architectural principles. During the discussion between Derrida and Peter Eisenman, who was to take part in the design of the Parisian park, the concept of the chôra was also put forward, which in the course of the debate led to an additional confusion of architectural and philosophical problems. II In the period from the Antiquity to the Renaissance, the dialogue Timaeus was the most frequently commented work of Plato. At present, the most frequently discussed is the issue of the chôra included in it, which aroused fascination among philosophers, researchers of rhetoric, religion, feminism, but also architecture. The work on the chôra also influenced the development of the interpretation of the Parc de La Villette, among which the topics related to the beginning and the change were highlighted. In early uses of the word chôra in Greek, as in Homer’s 18th Book of Iliad, it meant both dancing and a place to dance. On this occasion, it can be seen that it is not possible to determine which phenomenon took precedence in the creation of the name. It cannot be denied, however, that the word concerned a specific movement, as if circular and returning to an indefinable beginning. Despite gaining more and more general meanings, the word chôra has retained its connection with the dance of people on the threshing floor, the dance of bees (choros meliton) or the dance of stars (choros astron). In Timaeus, the chôra is a space filled with movement with an effect similar to shaking the sieve to husk the grain: it separates similar elements from the dissimilar ones. The juxtaposition of the Parc de La Villette and the chôra already at this stage leads to the suggestion that the park was treated by the architect as a place of dynamic changes leading to the establishment of new social solutions. In his statements, the architect confirmed that the park was to be a space of new politics and ethics. The book by Julia Kristeva La Révolution du langage poétique contributed to the spread of the belief that works of art can play a role as factors of political revolution. In this work, the author put forward the thesis that the chôra is a kind of space, the character of which has a destructive influence on attempts to conclude language games. The chôra gives beginning to words, but at the same time, by leaving a trace of this beginning it forces us to renew their meanings. The chôra understood in this way, turns out to be an irremovable beginning, to which one has to return all the time. Kristeva found manifestations of the chôra’s activity in avant-garde French poetry, to which she attributed the role of a mediator between criticism of metaphysics and aspirations for social change. The chôra, violating the language, introduces some voids into it, as if traces of the abyss, which direct the consciousness towards understanding the necessity of political changes. The Parc de La Villette was to pursue similar objectives in the city space. In his essays, Tschumi considered the problems of creating spaces that would give rise to a radical democracy. The proposed rebellious spaces should have the characteristics of a void, in which contradictory forces would occur as forms of pure activity. The means of achieving this goal was to concentrate contradictions and make them visible. The Parc de La Villette was supposed to collect differences as indelible and at the same time by showing them it was supposed to raise awareness of the social world as a conglomerate of differences. Saturation of the space of the park with subversive values results from the character of this space suppressed in the consciousness, as well as from the social diversity which has not been taken into account so far. The main contradictions contained in space relate to the division that exists between its presentation as a mental problem and a sensual one. The park was the deliberate creation of a place that transcends such a division and creates a separate space for negotiation between architectural theories and its practical applications. The purpose of the park was to become a place of future events, which would not hide their conflicting character coming from diversity of both space and society. The method of composition usually aimed at achieving a harmonious whole has been replaced by Tschumi with a system of juxtaposition of non-coherent elements or those resulting from variations and transformations. Tschumi did not seek direct influence on politics in the Parc de La Villette, but made room for thinking about the possibilities of the future. He introduced problems rather than showed solutions to them. The task of the park was to put the principles of architecture into a kind of vibration that would inspire users to participate in the new community. III Tschumi believes that the quality of architecture depends on the theoretical factor it contains. Such a view led to the creation of architecture that would achieve visibility and comprehensibility only after its interpretation. On his way to creating such an architecture he took on a purely philosophical reflection on the basic building block of architecture, which is space. In 1975, he wrote an essay entitled Questions of Space, in which he included several dozen questions about the nature of space. The questions he formulated could be regarded as analogous to the situation in the philosophy of the time, in which the interest in questioning the most obvious forms of understanding the world and intellectual categories increased. The research on space is an area common to many fields of natural sciences, humanities and artistic creation, but it also deals with other problems, such as issues of experience. The concept of space-time continuum proposed by Hermann Minkowski drew attention to the identity of time and space with the events taking place. Probably regardless of the postulates of physicists commenting on Albert Einstein’s discoveries, also in philosophy it increased the importance of the concept of the event which became dominant in Martin Heidegger’s latest work Contributions of Philosophy: Of the event. Furthermore, Tschumi’s reflections on space entered into relation with the problem of experience, which aroused the interest of a group of French philosophers trying to assimilate Georges Bataille’s concept of “inner experience”. Both Tschumi and Derrida referred to Bataille because his views could be used not only to modify the concept of the subject, but also to change the understanding of what constitutes the area of architecture. The discussion on experience has led to the recognition that the subject is not sovereign, but actually a form of what is on their outside. Such insights make it possible to treat the area of the Parc de La Villette as existing mainly when it is organised by its users. The decisive features of the park are its assumptions, according to which it is a variety of active void that leads to agreeing new social relations with it. The park does not force to participate in already existing moral or political communities, but tries to move into an unknown future in which the scope of free functioning of individuals will be increased. Doubts about the principles of functioning of the individual self and its discovery as a whole composed of non-coherent parts, as well as its dependence on its own depth full of disordered forces, influenced the understanding of architecture as a set of contradictions whose source is a fundamental void anticipating the empty phenomenal space. The use of this phenomenal void in architecture, as well as the rejection of the whole and unity, had a specific political purpose and drew its inspiration from political analyses. In the Parc de La Villette, metaphysics and politics were brought closer together because the philosophy of void was used to create new conditions for community action. It can be argued that the source of this philosophy was the perception of errors in existing societies dependent on the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics. Spacing (espacement) was one of the key terms in Derrida’s philosophy, which was also combined with the concepts of différance and chôra. The study of the nature of space, especially its transition from the level of pure possibility to the level of sensual phenomenon, also contributes to understanding how well designed space can have an impact on its audience. This explanation is based on Tschumi’s assumption that the space of the Parc de La Villette contradicts the integrating approaches and instead exposes contradictions, but it does so in a way that combines incompatible properties into a single piece of architecture. The specificity of such integration is similar to the invention of a musical phrase, which is an ideological message: moral and political. Such a thesis may raise doubts, however, if both the clearly adopted assumptions and those deduced from the work allow for their logically ordered presentation then to a limited extent it may be assumed that the work has achieved a connection between a specific philosophy of space and its practical application. Derrida combined the problem of spatiality with the problem of transcendental imagination in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who in the first version of Critique of Pure Reason assumed that pure imagination precedes the appearance of time and space, even in their transcendental forms. The imagination in such a situation can be described as a factor activating time and space, which indicates what function is played by movement in this activity. This leads us to recognize that the ultra originary source of pure forms of sensual intuition is movement, which in early Greek philosophy was identified with void and its lack of resistance to phenomena occurring in it. Derrida’s philosophy in search of a certain super-transcendental source of time and space pointed to différance which, like void or the chôra, does not have material features or even any other form of being. Différance is the primary cause of the disruption of motionlessness and the introduction of activity into motionless time and space, thus its activity can be described as spacing (espacement). Derrida’s discoveries in this respect are not entirely original, because Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel already pointed out when examining the present that it is primarily a differential relation (differente Beziehung), which, being seemingly neutral, influences the present with supernatural force and makes it unidentifiable with itself. Differente Beziehung must similarly influence the originary space, negating its initial character by multiplying its divisions and expanding its boundaries. Différance acts by revealing contradictions wherever there is apparent undifferentiation. Tschumi, composing the Parc de La Villette as a variety of void and a set of incompatible layers, followed the rules of différance or the chôra: he made void visible together with its saturation with contradictions. If space can be considered to be the result of the activity of difference, such activity has a certain regularity, which influences the behaviour of its observers. Differences or contradictions fall into a certain rhythm, which can be considered a manifestation of transcendent order. The problem is that what can be considered the source of such order, namely the logos or God, is partly disorder and error. According to descriptions contained in Timaeus, the world is a combination of forces that drive to order with forces of erroneous necessity that resounds in every order and forces it to return to disorder. Derrida denied the possibility of understanding différance as a theological value, even if it were a negative or apophatic theology, but no categorical denial could be perfect. The assumption that différance or the chôra are not endowed with any substance properties cannot deny their activity, and thus a certain force. Already since Democritus, philosophy has multiplied the names of such a force and the contradictory variety of its manifestations, never forgetting also the necessity for reason to withdraw from the possibility of giving its correct characteristics. Such a withdrawal may be interpreted as an expression of respect and, in certain situations, as a cult of the force that precedes reasonableness. The Parc de La Villette, which is an artistic divagation about the contradictions and forces behind them, can be considered as a place of their sublimation, and therefore as a variation of the temple of what differs from order and disorder. IV In the texts that presented the theoretical assumptions of the Parc de La Villette, Tschumi used a large number of terms that contradicted not only the traditional principles of composing architecture, but also negated the rules of social order and the foundations of Western metaphysics. Tschumi’s statements, which are a continuation of his leftist political fascinations from the May 1968 revolution, as well as his interest in the philosophy of French poststructuralism and his collaboration with Derrida, prove that terms such as “disruption”, “dissociation”, “disfunction”, “disjunction” and “dispersion” not only referred to architectural problems but also applied to political criticism and the deepest foundations of thinking itself. His collaboration with Derrida manifested itself primarily in the publication La Case Vide: La Villette 1985, in which the architect’s design drawings and texts explaining his concepts related to the Parc de La Villette were accompanied by an extensive essay by Derrida, which included theoretical problems taken up by Tschumi in a philosophical context. Architectural and philosophical issues were also combined during seven discussion meetings organised by Eisenman, invited by Tschumi to collaborate on the design of the Parc de La Villette. Eisenman, who, like Tschumi, invited Derrida to participate in the design of the park and also led to the publication of Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman, in which his ideas were confronted with Derrida’s philosophical text. In this case, Derrida’s essay was not a direct commentary on the architect’s concepts, but rather a reflection on the question of the chôra presented by Plato in Timaeus. During the discussion and in his essay, Derrida pointed out that the chôra is a component of the created world, yet it does not belong to it, but precedes it. The originality of the chôra is so radical that she also precedes all the factors of creating the world, including ideas and the Demiurge. Thus athesis appeared in the metaphysics of the West that the chôra is a form of active abyss, in relation to which all beings are secondary, both those perfect (as ideas or God) and those created, such as the world, things, people or language. This leads to the conclusion that the chôra does not exist, because all existence is a derivative of the chôra. Nor could the chôra be described, since it is a form of developing a space that is preceded by a lack of space characteristic of the chôra. Derrida intended the chôra to be an instance with an exceptional degree of transcendentalism, an anti-metaphysical instance, but also an a-theological one. However, this attempt failed, both in the field of secular philosophy and in the field of theology. Derrida’s characteristics of the chôra to strengthen its transcendentalism and negation of metaphysics had to be expressed in a language that immediately produces new concepts and a new metaphysics that reproduces the categories of the beginning, the origin or the foundation known from earlier philosophical traditions. All forms of criticism of metaphysics are also inspired by negative, apophatic and mystical theology. The undermining of many concepts of permanent meaning and the introduction of new concepts of unstable meaning, characteristic of the philosophy of deconstruction, had many features of originality, but it was directed towards problems whose solutions repeat, with the use of new vocabulary, the findings known in culture since Democritus. Thus, if apophatic philosophy can be regarded as deconstruction avant la lettre, then deconstruction itself in its late versions began to take on the features of a new religion. The exchange of inspiration between theology and deconstruction was manifested in a series of scientific conferences and publications in which Derrida’s philosophical concepts were interpreted within the scope of religious thought. Theological threads began to be found in such concepts of deconstruction as différance or the chôra, while at the same time Derrida himself undertook in his philosophy to study problems such as the Other (L’Autre) or the Impossible (Impossible), which belonged to newer theological traditions. As a consequence of the new problems, the deconstruction became closer to the features of a new religion. Philosophy, at least from Kant’s time, has tried to create a system that would take over from religion the tasks of setting moral and political goals. Similarly, Derrida has directed his interest towards the problems of democracy and ethics, which would enable their renewal. Attempts to create a new religion (cleared of old metaphors), a new community or a new democracy bring problems and threats which may be no less troublesome than the previous systems. All promises of freedom carry with them threats, the greater the more they strive for perfection. The renewal of existential orders, sometimes carried out by means of violent changes, is a certain repetitive feature of human cultures. Deep changes, however, do not protect against the return of both old gods and old demons. Tschumi and Derrida were shaped in their youth by the atmosphere of leftist rebellion against the moral and political limitations of ossified communities and the imperfections of democracy. The ethical theme distinguishes many of their works, including the Parc de La Villette. The opposition to the metaphysical traditions of philosophy and architecture contained in this park was prompted by specific political situations and resulted from bringing political issues to the level of philosophical considerations. Achievements made at the level of pure concepts were then subject to elevation, to a kind of sacralization, which made them religious concepts. The deconstruction reached for the status of the new religion especially when it found its followers and began to generate moral obligations. In the new situation, terms such as the chôra, l’Autre or the Impossible were absolutized and in relation to them a cult and attitude of adoration emerged. The Parc de La Villtette then gained new post-secular meanings, which allow it to be assigned the function of a Temple of Otherness (L’Autre) and Impossible. V In the traditional sense, a work of art creates an illustration of the outside world, or of a certain text or doctrine. Sometimes it is considered that such an illustration is not literal, but is an interpretation of what is visible, or an interpretation of a certain literary or ideological message. It can also be assumed that a work of art creates its own visual world, a separate story or a separate philosophical statement. Parc de La Villette represents the last of these possibilities: it is a philosophical statement that develops the premises derived from poststructuralist philosophies and the philosophy of deconstruction. The uniqueness of its being status, however, is that it does so not only at the level of the theoretical assumptions, but also through its functioning as an active philosophical work. This means that a park is a happening philosophy. Its activity, however, does not refer only to the present tense, but is also an attempt to penetrate the future, all otherness and impossibility. This kind of activity assumes that the work, in a sense, does not yet fully exist, but is also still produced in the processes of its interpretation. The theoretical foundations of the park included texts by Tschumi, in which he questioned traditional ways of creating a work of architecture, postulating in return the use of a long series of negations, which were comparable to the crisis of metaphysics characteristic of contemporary philosophy. It is therefore no coincidence that the publication containing Tschumi’s theoretical text on Parc de La Villette was accompanied by an essay by Derrida developing some of the architect’s concepts. The next step in integrating philosophy into the process of park design was a series of discussions between Eisenman and Derrida, who completely moved the creation of the park into the world of thoughts, without accentuating the need for their realization in the material reality. The main topic of these discussions was the problem of the chôra, which was taken up by later commentators and used to interpret the park as a work in which the philosophy of the beginning is manifested relating to issues of politics, morality and religion. The park was therefore interpreted as a space of invention within the scope of creating new rules of functioning of the community and democracy. Thinking about the political future may, however, exceed the horizon of ordinary expectations. Although philosophical thought is always connected with contemporary problems and metaphysics sometimes intertwines with current politics, yet at the same time the customs of philosophy also include crossing horizons and thinking about absolute otherness and impossibility. Initially, the chôra, différance, absolute otherness (tout autre) and the Impossible were concepts of pure philosophy of atheistic character, but with the further development of the discussion, more and more theological motifs began to emerge. One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the fact that radical negations of all being, which were contemplated in contemporary philosophy (by Heidegger and Derrida, among others), had previously been manifested in negative and apophatic theologies (by Master Eckhart, among others).Also the category of the “Other”, taken from Emmanuel Levinas, was clearly connected with the thought about God. A further reason for connecting the chôra with the theological thought was the interest in the philosophy of deconstruction expressed by some theologians. John Caputo in particular managed to persuade Derrida to participate in discussions on the current status of religion. In the late period of Derrida’s writing, further statements on religious topics appeared. All these reasons led to posing a question about the identity of the chôra and God. Although there were no satisfactory conclusions on this issue, the discussion was also important to create an interpretation of the park as a place of worship. The chôra, representing, according to Plato, the preoriginal emptiness is the place of every beginning, but it turns out that it is not neutral to the being created in it. The chôra deposits itself in every being as an irremovable beginning that interferes with its stability. The chôra, therefore, forces us into a palintropical movement, but it also turns out to be a pure compulsion, an erring necessity and a fundamental force from which, in the human perception, motifs useful to the individual and to the community are extracted. All definitions of this force, including its anthropomorphisation, are formulated in such a way that they allow for building private and collective morality upon them. Such definitions are changed depending on variable political situations. It is difficult to determine whether in the processes of changes in the formulation of “God’s names” any essential value is retained, which is not subject to change. The current definitions of the chôra (God?), which can be found, for example, in the philosophy of Caputo, stress that she is a combination of various and contradictory forces. This characteristic inherits much of Plato’s concept, reminds us of Master Eckhart’s views on Gottheit and, at the same time, is not unfamiliar to Tschumi, whose essays were an apologia of contradictions. The current concept of chôra, transferred into the sphere of politics, is the praise of social diversity and the protection of the difference from the forces of order. In the Parc de La Villette, the future community and democracy were elevated as a system of safe existence of individuals in all their singularity. The park is a temple of a future community in which individual beings have nothing in common. (shrink)

This paper contains a brief pastiche of analytic philosopher Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, responding to the sociological theories of Pierre Bourdieu.

Techne and Truth. The problem of techne in the dispute between Gorgias and Plato -/- The source of the problem matter of the book is the Plato’s dialogue „Gorgias”. One of the main subjects of the discussion carried out in this multi-aspect work is the issue of the art of rhetoric. In the dialogue the contemporary form of the art of rhetoric, represented by Gorgias, Polos and Callicles, is confronted with Plato’s proposal of rhetoric and concept of art (techne). The (...) ingenuous and dramatic structure of the dialogue composed of three acts, in each of which Socrates’ consecutive interlocutors emerge, is difficult to interpret. It seems, however, that even though the first conversation between Socrates and Gorgias constitutes a small part of the dialogue, it forms the foundations for the discussion. This part, dealing with such important issues as the subject of art, knowledge, power and relation between art and good, is the starting point for the conversations which follow. What do the differences between the Gorgias’ and Plato’s concepts of art consist in? Any attempt to answer the question requires presentation of the background for the discussion taking place in Plato’s work as well as the reconstruction of Gorgias’ vision of the art of rhetoric and art in general, defining the relation between art and knowledge. The latter may be undertaken on the basis of two paraphrases of the treatise “On Non-existence”, two epideictic speeches entitled “Helen” and “Palamedes” and some smaller fragments which have been preserved from Gorgias’ creative output. The treatise “On Non–existence”, very paradoxical in its philosophical meaning, testifies to new, sophistic thinking represented by Gorgias of Leontinoi. The treatise is the polemic and attack on Eleatism based on certain principles and methods elaborated by the Eleatics themselves. It also shows that Gorgias – using traditional Eleatic schemes – is opposed to this tradition. Even though the treatise does not discuss the problem of art directly, it anticipates the considerations from epideictic speeches. “Helen” and “Palamedes” constitute further stages in the development of Gorgias’ thought and concept of art combining typically epideictic elements with some philosophical convictions. Gorgias refers to the Eleatic theme considering the issues of truth, knowledge and belief, yet defining them in the empirical spirit. Solutions in the cognitive sphere determine the horizon of Gorgias’ rhetoric. The word is separated from the existence. Human cognition is limited and therefore the word and visual images affect the belief. This promotes the great importance of rhetoric, painting and sculpture, i.e. the areas which influence in a specific way – creating the “delusion” (ἀπάτη). Through idealization art provides pleasure, which is its objective. Therefore the task of art is to create delusion. The rhetor of Leontinoi discusses the issue of “how?” to use the word ‘rhetoric’. Gorgias is aware that rhetoric may be used to talk about what is unknown and that technical correctness of a rhetoric statement is not identical with the truthfulness of the proclaimed message. Mentioning it, Gorgias shows his respect to the truth as a value which should be respected in speech on the one hand, and on the other emphasizes that the truth in itself has no persuasive power. For this reason it is not enough to proclaim the truth, but, to convince the listeners, the orator should possess the skill of speaking. What is then the relation between truth and art emerging from epideictic speeches? Gorgias undoubtedly emphasizes the formal aspect of speech, as rhetoric is art, thus an ability based on certain principles. According to Gorgias, the truth is the value which should be respected in speeches. Rhetoric is able to create a fictive world, as a great range of reality remains outside direct human experience. Rhetoric does not oppose the truth but discussing not only what is directly given concerns the area outside the sphere of direct experience. This concept of rhetoric is the basis of the discussion about art carried out in the dialogue “Gorgias”. Even though the first of the discussions in the dialogue – the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias – is directly concerned with rhetoric itself, numerous remarks testify to its much wider character. This is best exemplified by the way of carrying out the conversation by Socrates, who, asking questions about rhetoric practised by Gorgias, throughout the whole conversation compares it with other skills. Additionally, the manner and the structure of the conversation prove that Plato considers the issue of rhetoric from a wider perspective determined by the issue of art. The specific feature of the conversation is ordering it around main issues – such notions as πρᾶγμα, ἐπιστήμη, δύναμις, each of which has its own meaning in Plato. In the first part of Gorgias Plato presents the principles previously occurring in other dialogues in a certain order, thus constructing the structure of the conversation with Gorgias. The notions are not novum in Plato but the fact that he clearly wants to systematise them and present a certain concept of art is a new and significant aspect. This tendency is of paramount importance for the discussion because Gorgias’ answers are evaluated by Plato from the perspective of this clearly set concept consisting of not only established notions but also certain principles. The discussion between Socrates and Gorgias introduces a theme which is crucial for the dialogue: the relation between art and good, i.e. the technical and ethical spheres. The issue is introduced by Gorgias, who mentions that rhetoric may be used for evil purposes. On this basis Socrates proves that if rhetoricians can use rhetoric for evil purposes, they have no knowledge concerning the subject of their art – justice, because one who knows what is just, always acts justly. Thus the relation between the technical and ethical spheres transpires to be the main point of contention. The question is whether a technician following the principles of the art he practices may act against good. This paradoxical statement based on the well-known Socrates’ principle "nemo sua sponte peccat" acquires philosophical foundations in the dialogue. In its remaining two parts Plato presents a justification, placing the principle within the framework of a certain concept of art, as a result of which not only rhetoric but also many other skills are criticised. The notions on which the conversation with Gorgias focuses are more precisely defined in the subsequent parts of the dialogue. Additionally, Plato presents twice the conditions which art should fulfill. They oblige the “technicians” to know the nature and purpose of the art and to know the causes of undertaken activities and to be able to justify them. These conditions determine the relation between the two spheres – technical and ethical. According to Plato, art may not act against good because it should be the objective of its activities. Certain concepts of good and knowledge outlined in the dialogue are the guarantees of “technicality”. Good, which should be respected by every art, is understood objectively and is contrasted with subjective pleasure. Knowledge, which should be the basis of art, opposes experience, which uses observation and recollection. Additionally, the definition of knowledge, significance of order in the world assuming the form of “geometrical equality”, significance of mathematics becoming the ideal of exactness indicate that Plato’s concept of knowledge is formed in Gorgias. These conclusions render it impossible that the results of any activity deserving the name of art should oppose good. And this is Plato’s main reproach of Gorgias’ concept, who wrote about false speeches possessing the power of conviction because they were written according to the principles proof of art or who defined tragedy as “a deceit, where he who cheats is more just than he who does not and the cheated is wiser than he who was not cheated”. Such determination of the relation between the technical and ethical sphere resulted from Gorgias’ concept of the world and fundamental philosophical principles. The whole concept of art described by Plato in the dialogue opposes the view presented by Gorgias. According to Plato, every technical activity has a defined object (ἔργον), is based on knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and is always aimed at the good of human soul or body. The danger revealed and presented in the dialogue by Plato exists in the very concept of art presented by Gorgias, i.e. in its empirical foundations and the resulting understanding of the relation between art and good. Gorgias’ concept of art based on empirical cognition, which concerns the world of phenomena and rejects the possibility of perfect knowledge, leads, according to Plato, to a dangerous falsification of the relation between art and good. Plato proves that this weakness of Gorgias’ concept is revealed when confronted with these representatives of “the magnificent art” who are not protected against radicalism by the adherence to the moral tradition. The comparison of two, completely contrasting concepts of art based on different philosophical understanding of knowledge and good is decisive for the criticism of rhetoric in Gorgias. The concept presented by Plato criticises contemporary rhetoric and sophistry but determines the direction of research of the real art of rhetoric. (shrink)

The book, which constitutes part of the current feminist research as broadly understood, deals in particular with issues related to the philosophical approach to women’s experience. The main thrust of the research is to ask questions such as: What is women’s experience? Is it generally possible to speak of women’s typical experiences? Does it influence knowledge, and if so, how? Does it influence women’s perception and interpretation of art, and if so, how? And finally, taking a broader perspective: can women’s (...) experience serve as a basis for distinguishing philosophical theories specific to women? Within the framework of feminist philosophy developed since the 1960s and 70s, researchers have employed the concept of women’s experience, but this concept has not yet been comprehensively elaborated and defined. Importantly, women’s experience also plays an essential role in the project of feminist esthetics, whose isolation from traditional esthetic reflection has been proposed by certain feminist authors. Therefore, the book also discusses the problem of the relationship of women’s experience in the feminist approach to the feminist esthetics postulated by researchers both male and female. The book takes the position that feminist philosophy is an integral part of traditional philosophical research, a part in which the feminist perspective is applied. This perspective is understood as a theoretical research tool, applied in the humanities and social sciences, in order to unmask the gender-related elements in traditional discourses and to determine their impact on the results of the conducted research, i.e., the knowledge obtained thereby. In this sense, the feminist perspective is of an evaluative and critical but also transformative nature, because the purpose of its application is to appreciate and highlight women and the phenomenon of womanhood as well as to incorporate gender-related categories within philosophical reflection and academic research. This goal is expressed in the practical demand for a transformation of sociopolitical practice and theory that takes women’s ways of experiencing reality into account. In this approach, the feminist perspective paradoxically brings us closer to the attainment of more universal, holistic, and gender-transcending knowledge. The order of the considerations presented in the book was dictated by their main objective: a philosophical approach to and description of women’s esthetic experiences. The first part comprises a reconstruction of the historical development of feminism, in which three waves of feminism―which, from the perspective of a contemporary researcher, constitute a historically complete field of research―are discussed in a synthetic manner. The first part of these considerations concludes the introduction to feminist philosophy, specifically through the reconstruction of selected critical arguments advanced by feminist researchers regarding the traditional theory of cognition. The second part of the book covers issues in the field of feminist philosophy. The considerations presented here are focused on the concept of women’s cognitive experience, of which women’s experience of an esthetic character constitutes a particular type. Hence, studies of feminist epistemology are presented first, followed by studies of feminist esthetics. Analysis of the esthetic experiences of women is carried out in two stages: first, through reference to a philosophical approach to women’s cognitive experiences, and second, on this basis, through indicating fundamental differences between feminist and androcentric understandings of esthetic experiences. Although critical references to feminist ideas and solutions appear in many places in the book, on the most general level the considerations presented here are consistent with the feminist ideal of merging theory and practice. Feminism, in essence, has grown from socio-political practice and evolved toward detailed philosophical and scientific theories. Importantly, these theories are continually being revised and creatively developed. Feminist researchers refer to women’s life practices because it is the latter that determines whether a given theory adequately addresses problems affecting women. Therefore, the research presented in the book is focused on women’s experiences, which, in the author’s opinion, constitute the reference point for any and all reflections taking the feminist perspective into account. -/- . (shrink)

„Ruch Filozoficzny” and the freedom of scientific research in Poland (in 1947-1957 years). Presented article refers to the situation in the Polish philosophy, which took place between 40-50 of the twentieth century. Author’s reflections are carried on the example of attempts to reactivate in the realities of war, the polish philosophical journal “Ruch Filozoficzny” founded in 1911 by Kazimierz Twardowski. Political conditions have made the magazine was renewed twice, at each time was the greatest merit of Tadeusz Czeżowski. He was (...) assisted by the other representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, who worked in various academic centers in Poland. The reconstruction of the history of the magazine in the postwar years, will be based on previously unpublished archival material. In its conclusions, the author tries to point out of great importance of independent from the political authorities publishers on development of Polish philosophy. (shrink)

A critical discussion of DAVID WILSON and WILLIAM DIXON, A History of Homo Economicus. The nature of the moral in economic theory, London and New York, Routledge, pp. xviii+123 ISBN 978-0-415-59568-1. I declare agreement with one basic idea in this book, that economic discourse is performative, or economic theory is not pure theorìa. I add several objections to the historical reconstruction carried out os such authors as Malthus and Ricardo and I object to the definition adopted of homo economicus.

In recent decades, perspectivism has developed into an independent epistemological research program. Perspectivism is based on the idea of perspective as an attempt to elucidate an object from a multitude of factors. Perspectivists are concerned with reconstructing and explaining these factors, identifying the conditioning of epistemic acts, using concepts such as “position”/“point of view,” “gaze,” “angle of view,” “horizon,” “focus,” “picture,” “relativity,” and “context”. Although these concepts are part of the perspectivist's toolkit, their content and interrelationship have not yet been (...) critically and comprehensively analyzed. The purpose of this article is to clarify the conceptual basis of perspectivism as an epistemological program, which began in the works of F. Kaulbach (1990) and W. Stegmaier (2008). For this purpose, a systematic conceptual analysis will be carried out, a detailed presentation of the logical content of perspectivist notions and their reduction into a single coherent model, which can become the conceptual basis of perspectivism. Perspectivist concepts constitute a “population” or matrix of the concept “epistemic situation”. Being consistently expounded and correlated in a conceptual model, they can be used as a tool for a detailed analysis of epistemic situations and their results (theories, positions, views, etc.). The final part of the article will formulate a number of significant implications of the new programmatic understanding of perspectivism: the status of perspectivist concepts, the distinction of perspectivism from similar epistemological programs, and the challenges for its further development. (shrink)

I’d like to begin, if I may, by repeating myself. When I spoke at the Institute’s official launch last June, I quoted W.V. Quine’s remark that logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one; and I commented that whatever the truth of this, it is undeniably true that philosophy is an old subject and has been a great one since the 5th century BC. The foundation of an institute of philosophy in the University of (...) London has been, in my opinion, a great thing for philosophy and for the University. Our mission is to promote and support philosophy of the highest quality in all its forms, inside and outside the university. With our programmes of events, fellowships and research facilitation, I think we have been carrying out this mission pretty well since our foundation in 2005. But I have already said enough in public about the Institute. Given the occasion, it is appropriate for me to say something instead about philosophy itself. (shrink)

To solve this problem , they usually use an intermediate layer of retarding materials such as Ta, w or Mo as a penetration barrier to improve the thermal stability of the Si/Cu layer . In the characterization of Si/Ta/Cu nanoparticles and multilayer systems, there is an effect of negative bias voltage on the improvement of the electrical and structural properties of the permeation barrier of the Ta sputtering layer in the Si/Ta system. Surface processes of the Si layer, including burning, (...) are carried out by plasma and ion beam technology. This kind of integrated circuits with their unique characteristics in the nanometer scale have various applications of mesoscopic systems. (shrink)

GAMETOGÊNESE -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- Os estudantes bem informados, estão a buscando conhecimento a todo momento. O estudante de Veterinária e Zootecnia, sabe que a Reprodução é uma área de primordial importância para sua carreira. Logo, o conhecimento da mesma torna-se indispensável. No primeiro trabalho da série fisiologia reprodutiva dos animais domésticos, foi abordado de forma clara, didática e objetiva os mecanismos de diferenciação (...) sexual dos embriões em desenvolvimento, quais os genes envolvidos nesse processo e tudo mais. Nesse segundo trabalho, a abordagem será teórica, mas também clara, sobre a formação primordial dos gametas femininos e masculinos, através da ovogênese nas fêmeas e a espermatogênese nos machos. Esse trabalho visa levar a importância do processo de formação dos gametas e a produção hormonal das gônadas, bem como o entendimento sobre as interações com o eixo hipotálamo-hipofisário. -/- •____INTRODUÇÃO -/- A reprodução sexual é um processo mediante a qual dois organismos da mesma espécie unem seu material genético para dar lugar a um organismo fixo com combinação única de genes; para isso, cada organismo produz células que contém a metade do material genético característico da espécie. Essas células haploides (1n) são denominadas gametas; ao combinar-se um gameta masculino com um feminino produz-se uma célula diploide (2n) (zigoto ou ovo) a partir da qual se forma o embrião. A grande maioria das espécies com reprodução sexual são anisogâmicas, o que significa que produzem dois tipos de gametas diferentes: os gametas masculinos são microscópios, móveis e produzem-se em grande quantidade, enquanto que os femininos são grandes, imóveis e produzem-se em menor quantidade. O tipo de gameta que um indivíduo produz é o que define seu sexo; sobre os animais o macho é o indivíduo que produz grandes quantidades de espermatozoides e a fêmea produz uma menor quantidade de óvulos, enquanto que nas plantas as gônadas masculinas são as produtoras pólen e as femininas produzem oosferas. Os gametas são diferentes do resto das células do organismo, as quais se chamam células somáticas; essas últimas são diploides porque contém dois pares de cromossomos, um par herdado do pai do indivíduo e o outro da mãe. As células somáticas, ademais, se dividem por mitose, ao qual os cromossomos se duplicam antes de cada divisão celular e cada uma das células filhas recebe um complemento diploide idêntico dos cromossomos, logo todas as células somáticas de um indivíduo possuem o mesmo material genético, embora cada tipo celular expresse diferentes combinações de genes. Em contraponto, os gametas são células haploides porque possuem somente um par de cromossomos e a metade do material genético característico da espécie. Cada um dos cromossomos em um gameta é resultado da recombinação dos genes contidos nos cromossomos paterno e materno do indivíduo que originam o gameta, e cada um destes possuem uma combinação única de genes. Os gametas se formam a partir das células germinais, que são células que em sua origem são diploides e elas de “comprometem” a manter-se como uma linha celular especial que em determinado momento sofrerá o processo de meiose para dar origem aos gametas haploides, sejam óvulos ou espermatozoides segundo o sexo do animal. Como descrito no trabalho sobre a diferenciação sexual, as células germinativas primordiais originam-se no epiblasto do embrião, e migram desde o saco vitelino até colonizar as cristas gonodais, onde, por sua vez, proliferam-se e se organizam junto com as células somáticas da gônada primitiva para formar o testículo ou o ovário. As células germinais masculinas e femininas tem a mesma origem embrionária. As gônadas indiferenciadas em um embrião possuem três tipos celulares: as células que dão origem aos gametas (ovogonia ou espermatogonia), as precursoras de células que nutrem os gametas em desenvolvimento (células da granulosa no ovário; células de Sertoli no testículo) e as precursoras de células que secretam hormônios sexuais (células da teca no ovário; células de Leydig no testículo). As células germinais são as únicas estruturas do organismo que têm a capacidade de dividir-se por meiose sofrendo uma redução no número de seus cromossomos, sendo responsável pela transmissão da carga genética aos descendentes. Em contraste, as células somáticas somente se dividem por mitose. A formação dos gametas compreende fases sequenciais de mitose, meiose e pós-meiose. Esses processos são altamente organizados e necessitam de um preciso e bem coordenado programa de expressão genética. Uma das características importantes da gametogênese é a redução cromossômica, que através da meiose, reduz pela metade o número de cromossomos e produz células distintas entre si, devido a trocas de material genético entre os pares de cromossomos provenientes do pai e da mãe, o que ocorre no processo de “crossing over” durante a primeira fase da meiose. A gametogênese é o processo mediante o qual as células germinais de cada sexo se multiplicam, dividem e diferenciam até formar os gametas. No caso da formação dos gametas masculinos o processo recebe o nome específico de espermatogênese, e para os gametas femininos é denominado como ovogênese. Embora os dois processos alcancem o objetivo comum de produção das células haploides, por onde compartilham algumas características, existem diferenças marcadas entre eles devido a necessidade de produzir um número muito distinto de gametas, de tamanho diferente, e com características de motilidade também distintas. -/- •___ESPERMATOGÊNESE -/- A espermatogênese é o processo mediante o qual se produz os gametas masculinos denominados espermatozoides. Durante a vida fetal as células germinais e as células somáticas do testículo em formação organizam-se em túbulos seminíferos que se derivam dos cordões sexuais primários e conformam a maior parte da medula do testículo. Na etapa fetal cada tubo seminífero é delimitado por uma membrana basal, recoberta na parte interior pelas células precursoras das células de Sertoli (um tipo de células somáticas). No exterior do túbulo localizam-se as células precursoras das células de Leydig ou intersticiais (figura 1), que também são células somáticas. Entre a membrana basal e as células de Sertoli encontram-se algumas células germinais denominadas espermatogonias de reserva A0 (denominadas gonócitos) que serão o único tipo de células germinais presentes no testículo enquanto o animal não alcançar a puberdade. As células de Sertoli estabelecem na região basal uniões oclusoras entre si, formando parte da barreira hemato-testicular. As espermatogonias A0 localizam-se por dentro da membrana basal do túbulo seminífero, embora fora da barreira hemato-testicular. Figura 1: fase neonatal. Nota-se a grande infiltração de tecido intersticial em quase 50% da seção originando que os túbulos sejam pequenos e redondos em sua maioria. O citoplasma e núcleo das células pré-Leydig são notadas claramente por essa ser uma espécie suína onde o tecido intersticial está claramente diferenciado. Hematoxilina-eosina (X 220.5). Fonte: Embrapa. -/- O número de células de Sertoli no testículo depende da influência do hormônio folículo estimulante (FSH) presente durante a vida fetal e as primeiras etapas de vida pós-natal. A população de células de Sertoli ao chegar a puberdade se manterá fixa durante o resto da vida do animal; existe uma relação positiva entre o tamanho e a população de células de Sertoli e a capacidade de produção de espermatozoides do testículo. As células de Sertoli são as únicas células somáticas que estão no epitélio seminífero, e sua função é a nutrição, sustentação e controle endócrino das células germinais. As células de Sertoli participam ativamente no processo de liberação dos espermatozoides para a luz do túbulo. Nesse momento, as células de Sertoli realizam a fagocitose de parte do citoplasma do espermatozoide dos chamados corpos residuais. As células de Sertoli também fagocitam as células germinais que se degeneram no curso normal da espermatogênese. Essas células ainda sintetizam grande quantidade de proteínas, como por exemplo as proteínas ABP (androgen hinding protein), que transportam andrógenos para todo o aparelho reprodutivo, transferrinas, que transportam ferro para a respiração celular das células germinais e também às inibinas, que regulam a liberação de FSH pela hipófise, através de um sistema de retroalimentação (feedback) negativa (figura 2). Figura 2: epitélio seminífero, células de Sertoli (flecha) (400 X). Fonte: Embrapa. -/- Antes da puberdade dos túbulos seminíferos observam-se ao corte como estruturas de diâmetro pequeno, sem luz, e conformados unicamente pelas células de Sertoli e espermatogonias de reserva e rodeados por abundante tecido intersticial, ao que estão presentes as células precursoras das células de Leydig. Ainda antes da puberdade, a diferenciação celular manifesta-se primeiro pela presença de espermatócitos primários, os quais se degeneram em geral na fase de paquíteno, por falta de estimulação hormonal. A partir de que o animal chega a puberdade inicia-se o processo de espermatogênese, que se manterá durante toda a vida do animal, exceto em espécies de animais silvestres muito estacionais, ao qual pode se suspender durante a época não reprodutiva para voltar e ser retomada na época ou estação reprodutiva. Depois da puberdade, os túbulos seminíferos possuem um diâmetro muito maior; em seu interior observa-se um grande número de células germinais de todos os tipos, diferentes estádios de divisão, e em seu lúmen contém líquido e espermatozoides. Ainda sobre o alcancei da puberdade, as espermatogonias começam a dividir-se aceleradamente por mitose, enquanto que no espaço intersticial as células mesenquimais também começam a se diferenciar e a dar origem as células de Leydig (figura 3). A partir dessa etapa as células de Leydig (totalmente diferenciadas) são também evidentes no exterior do túbulo, junto com as células mioides ou peritubulares que o rodeiam o que ao contrair-se são responsáveis por controlar o avanço dos fluidos e as células presentes no lúmen do túbulo. As células mioides estão situadas ao redor do túbulo, e é creditado a elas a promoção da contração e da integridade estrutural do túbulo. Esse tipo celular apenas se diferencia na puberdade pela ação dos andrógenos (figura 4). As interações entre as células de Sertoli e as mioides parecem ter um papel importante na manutenção das funções do testículo. Durante o processo de espermatogênese, as espermatogonias de reserva dividem-se periodicamente e enquanto algumas células fixas permanecem como espermatogonias de reserva, outras proliferam e sofrem uma seção de divisões mitóticas durante as quais se vão diferenciando até formarem espermatócitos primários (espermatocitogênese ou fase de mitose), logo sofrem divisões especiais mediante as quais reduzem seu número de cromossomos (fase de meiose), e ao final trocam de forma para converter-se em espermatozoides (espermatocitogênese) (figura 5). Cada uma dessas etapas da espermato- gênese será descrito detalhadamente adiante, antes é necessário a explicação de algumas características das células de Sertoli e de Leydig que ajudarão a entender seu papel durante a espermatogênese. Figura 3: células de Leydig no espaço intersticial do testículo bovino adulto PAS (400 X). Fonte: Embrapa. -/- Figura 4: o estabelecimento da puberdade pela presença de espermatozoides no túbulo. Hematoxilina-eosina (400 X). Fonte: Embrapa. Figura 5: fases mitóticas das espermatogonias (A0 e B) para formação de um espermatócito primário e as duas fases de meiose que se sucedem antes da espermatogênese. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- Ao início da espermatocitogênese as uniões oclusoras entre as células de Sertoli se abrem por etapas (como as comportas de um submarino) para permitir a passagem das espermatogonias em direção ao centro do túbulo seminífero sem que se estabeleça uma continuidade entre o exterior e o interior da barreira hemato-testicular. Uma vez ultrapassada essa barreira, as sucessivas gerações de espermatogonias, espermatócitos, espermátides e espermatozoides irão se localizar em direção ao interior do túbulo seminífero, em estreita associação com as células de Sertoli. Em consequência, as células de Sertoli dividem o túbulo seminífero em dois compartimentos; o compartimento basal (debaixo das uniões oclusoras das células de Sertoli), ao qual residem as espermatogonias de reserva, e o compartimento adluminal (em direção ao centro do túbulo), cujos espaços entre as células de Sertoli desenvolvem o resto do processo de espermatogênese (meiose e espermatocitogênese). Esse feito é importante porque durante a vida fetal as únicas células germinais existentes eram as espermatogonias de reserva, pelo que os antígenos expressados por gerações mais avançadas (espermatogonias intermediárias, secundárias, espermátides e espermatozoides) não são reconhecidos como próprios do corpo pelo sistema imunológico. Logo, o anterior implica que deve existir uma barreira entre eles e o sangue para evitar um ataque imunológico. Em todas as etapas da espermatogênese, as células de Sertoli atuam como células de suporte para as células germinais, que sempre permanecem recoberta pela membrana das células de Sertoli. Também atuam como células nutricionais já que proporcionam o meio em que as células germinais se desenvolvem e maturam, assim como as substâncias que regulam e sincronizam as sucessivas divisões e transformações das células germinais. As células de Sertoli produzem hormônios, como estrógenos e inibina que atuam sobre a hipófise para regular a secreção das gonadotropinas que controlam a espermatogênese. As células de Leydig que residem no exterior do túbulo seminífero também são importantes para a espermatogênese: produzem a testosterona que estimula e mantém a espermatogênese, bem como serve como substrato sobre o qual atua como aromatizador das células de Sertoli para transformá-las em estrógenos. Como supracitado, para seu estudo podemos dividir a espermatogênese em três fase: espermatocitogênese, meiose e espermiogênese (figura 6). Agora, serão descritas cada uma dessas etapas. Em algumas espécies, incluindo no homem, os macrófagos representam o segundo tipo celular intersticial mais numeroso no testículo, depois das células de Leydig. Os macrófagos e vários subtipos de linfócitos são identificados nós testículos de ovinos e ratos. Eles estão intimamente associados com as células de Leydig e atuam juntamente na regulação da esteroidogênese. Figura 6: fluxograma da espermatogênese. -/- Espermatocitogênese -/- A espermatocitogênese, também chamada de etapa proliferativa ou de mitose, consiste numa série de divisões mitóticas sofridas pelas células descendentes de uma espermatogonia de reserva. Uma vez que a célula se divide, abandona o estado de reserva e começa um processo de diferenciação. As espermatogonias de reserva (denominadas espermatogonias A0 na rata ou As nos humanos) são células que existem desde a vida fetal e que permanecem mitoticamente inativas durante a infância. Uma vez que alcançam a puberdade começam a dividir-se em intervalos regulares, e as células filhas podem permanecer como espermatogonias de reserva ou abandonar a reserva e ingressar na dita espermatocitogênese. Uma vez abandonada a reserva, as células filhas que vão se formando em cada divisão permanecem unidas por pontes citoplasmáticas, constituindo um clone que se divide sincronicamente. As células que se formam depois de cada divisão continuam sendo espermatogonias, porém cada geração é ligeiramente diferente da anterior. Na rata, por exemplo, as espermatogonias tipo A0 ao dividir-se originam espermatogonias do tipo A1, que em sucessivas divisões formam espermatogonias dos tipos A2, A3 e A4, as quais, por sua vez, sofrem outra mitose para formar espermatogonias intermediárias e uma mais para formar espermatogonias do tipo B. Essas últimas se diferenciam (sem se dividir) em espermatócitos primários, processo em que termina a fase de espermatocitogênese, que literalmente significa processo de geração de espermatócitos. As espermatogonias tipo A0 são a fonte para a contínua produção de gametas. A metade delas se dividem e formam células iguais (as chamadas células tronco) e a outra metade forma as espermatogonias A1, que sofre novas divisões mitóticas e formam os tipos 2, 3 e 4. O tipo A4 sofre mitose para formar a intermediária (A In), que por mitose, forma a tipo B (figura 6). Esses tipos de espermatogonias podem ser identificadas em evoluções histológicas de acordo com sua organização topográfica na membrana basal dos túbulos seminíferos ou mediante seu conteúdo de heterocromatina. Outra maneira de diferenciação se baseia em marcadores moleculares específicos que distinguem as espermatogonias tronco (A0) das demais, com os fins de isolamento, desenvolvimento in vitro e transplante. As tipo B passam por mitose para formarem os espermatócitos primários; estes iniciam a primeira etapa da meiose formando os espermatócitos secundários; na segunda etapa da divisão meiótica, cada espermatócito secundário se divide e formam as chamadas espermátides. Quando o testículo alcança seu desenvolvimento total, a meiose completa-se e as espermátides originadas se convertem em espermatozoides. Um dos maiores sinais característicos desse fenômeno é o alargamento das espermátides e sua migração em direção ao lúmen do túbulo seminífero (figuras 4, 7 e 8). Figura 7: espermatogonias marcadas por imuno-histoquímica, anticorpo monoclonal TGFa (400 x). Figura 8: fases de divisões meióticas (M), espermatócitos em paquíteno (PA) e espermatócitos secundários (ES). -/- Figura 9: estádio posterior a liberação dos espermatozoides na luz do túbulo. Hematoxilina-eosina (400 x). Mediante as seis divisões mitóticas que ocorrem durante a espermatocitogênese se forma potencialmente um clone de 64 espermatócitos primários a partir de cada espermatogonia A que ingressa sobre o processo. Não obstante, algumas células sofrem apoptose em cada uma das etapas do processo, ao qual o número real formado é menor. Em outras espécies produzem-se um transcurso similar de divisões mitóticas sucessivas durante a espermatocitogênese, embora a nomenclatura utilizada possa ser distinta, por exemplo nos bovinos as duas últimas divisões mitóticas dão origem as espermatogonias de tipo B1 e B2. -/- Meiose -/- Uma vez que as espermatogonias B se diferenciam em espermatócitos primários, esses iniciam a etapa de meiose, com uma nova divisão; desta vez a divisão é do tipo meiótica. Ao completar-se a primeira divisão meiótica (meiose I) se obtém os espermató-citos secundários, que ao sofrer a segunda divisão meiótica (meiose II) dão origem as espermátides. Vale salientar que a meiose é o processo mediante o qual reduz-se a metade do número de cromossomos, pelo que as espermátides que se obtém são células haploides (1n). Os espermatócitos secundários que se formam depois da primeira divisão meiótica contém a metade do número normal de cromossomos, porém a mesma quantidade de DNA já que cada cromossomo é duplo. As espermátides formadas na conclusão da segunda divisão meiótica (figura 7), por sua vez, contém a metade dos cromossomos, e esse já não são duplos, já que se trata de células 1n. Também deve-se enfatizar que durante a meiose é relevante o entrecruzamento dos cromossomos homólogos, pelo que cada espermátide possui uma combinação única e diferente de genes paternos e maternos. Outro ponto que deve ser levado em consideração é que cada espermátide somente possui um cromossomo sexual; a metade das espermátides contém o cromossomo X herdado da mãe do macho que está levando a cabo a espermatogênese e a outra metade contém o cromossomo Y herdado de seu pai. Para cada espermatócito primário que entra no processo de meiose obtém-se cerca de quatro espermátides, pelo qual ao ser completada a meiose potencialmente se poderiam formar até 256 espermátides por cada espermatogonia que abandona a reserva e ingressa na espermatocitogênese. -/- Espermiogênese -/- Durante a espermiogênese, também chamada de fase de diferenciação, as esper-mátides sofrem, sem se dividir, uma metamorfose que as transforma em espermatozoides, os quais finalmente são liberados das células de Sertoli em direção ao lúmen do túbulo seminífero. A espermiogênese é um processo complicado e longo já que a espermátide deve sofrer complexas trocas nucleares, citoplasmáticas e morfológicas que resultam na forma-ção dos espermatozoides. Algumas dessas mudanças incluem a condensação do material nuclear para formação de um núcleo plano e denso, a eliminação do citoplasma para a constituição de uma célula pequena, a formação de uma estrutura especializada denomi-nada acrossomo ou tampa cefálica, e a formação do pescoço e da cauda (flagelo) do esper-matozoide, do que depende a sua motilidade. Durante a maior parte da espermiogênese, as espermátides se mantém com uma estreita associação com as células de Sertoli; logo, chega-se a observar, então, flagelos que se projetam em direção a luz do túbulo que pare-cem sair das células de Sertoli, sendo na realidade os flagelos dos espermatozoides que ainda não tinham sido liberados pelo lúmen. Ao liberar os espermatozoides em direção a luz do túbulo, as células de Sertoli realizam a fagocitose de parte do citoplasma dos espermatozoides (corpos residuais). Também fagocitam os restos de todas as células germinais que sofrem apoptose ou degeneram-se durante a espermatogênese. Credita-se que ao realizar essas funções as células de Sertoli podem fazer uma monitoração eficiente da espermatogênese, o que lhes permitiria emitir sinais para colaborar na regulação desse processo em nível gonodal e a nível sistêmico através da secreção de hormônios como a inibina e o estradiol. Além da inibina e activina, as células de Sertoli sintetizam outras proteínas, como a ABP (proteína ligadora de andrógenos) que serve como uma molécula de transporte de andrógenos dentro dos túbulos seminíferos, ductos deferentes e epidídimo, ou a transfer-rina, que transporta o ferro necessário para a respiração celular. -/- Resultados da espermatogênese -/- O resultado da espermatogênese não significa apenas uma simples multiplicação das células germinais (até 256 espermatozoides a partir de cada espermatogonia A1), senão que através dela são produzidos gametas haploides pequenos, móveis e com grande diversidade genética entre eles, ao mesmo tempo que se mantêm uma reversa de células mãe (espermatogonias A0) a partir das quais se poderiam originar novos ciclos de esper-matogênese durante o resto da vida do animal. -/- Controle hormonal da espermatogênese -/- Como mencionado, o FSH reproduz um importante papel para o estabelecimento das células de Sertoli durante a vida fetal e início da vida pós-natal. O começo da esper-matogênese também é estimulado pelo FSH, que atua sobre as células de Sertoli para estimular sua função e a ativação de sinais dessas células em direção as células germinais, incluindo-as a abandonar a reserva e ingressar na espermatogênese. O FSH, assim mesmo, estimula a mitose durante o resto da espermatogênese e aumenta a eficiência do processo, já que reduz a apoptose e a degeneração de espermatogonias intermediárias e do tipo B. O FSH também estimula as células de Sertoli para produzirem inibina e ABP. Uma vez iniciada a espermatogênese somente requerem níveis baixos de FSH para se mantê-la. As células de Sertoli também devem ser estimuladas pela testosterona para funcio-nar de maneira adequada; se requer também do LH hipofisário: hormônio que estimula as células de Leydig para produzir testosterona. Por sua vez, a secreção de LH e FSH é regulada pelo GnRH hipotalâmico: esse neurohormônio também faz parte do mecanismo de regulação da espermatogênese. A espermatogênese também é modulada em nível local mediante a produção de determinados fatores e interações entre as células. Dentro dos fatores locais podemos mencionar o fator de crescimento parecido com a insulina 1 (IGF-1), o fator de crescimen-to transformante beta (TGF- β), activina, ocitocina e diversas citocinas. Entre as intera-ções celulares existem tanto uniões de comunicação entre as células de Sertoli e as células germinais, como pontes citoplasmáticas entre todas as células germinais que formam o clone de células descendentes de uma espermatogonia A1. Uma vez que as células de Sertoli iniciam sua função na puberdade é possível manter experimentalmente a espermatogênese somente com testosterona, sem ser requeri-dos nenhum outro hormônio. A quantidade de espermatozoides produzidos, no entanto, é maior quando há presença do FSH. Abaixo do estímulo do FSH as células de Sertoli produzem estradiol e inibina, hormônios que geram uma retroalimentação sobre o eixo hipotálamo-hipofisário para a regulação da secreção de gonadotropinas. Em particular, a inibina reduz a secreção de FSH, pelo qual é factível que sirva como um sinal que evite uma excessiva estimulação as células de Sertoli. -/- Ciclo do epitélio seminífero -/- Em cada espécie as espermatogonias de reserva iniciam um novo processo de divi-sões celulares em intervalos fixos: a casa 14 dias no touro; 12 dias no garanhão e a cada 9 dias no cachaço (reprodutor suíno). A nova geração de células que começam a proliferar sobre a base do tubo deslocam-se em direção ao centro do túbulo a geração anterior, que por sua vez deslocam-se as gerações anteriores. Devido as mudanças que vão sofrendo cada geração celular se ajustam a tempos característicos de cada etapa, já que rodas as células em uma determinada seção do túbulo estão sincronizadas entre si pelas células de Sertoli; em cada espécie somente é possível encontrar um certo número de combinações celulares: 14 diferentes combinações no caso da rata, 8 no touro e 6 no ser humano. A sucessão de possíveis combinações até regressar a primeira combinação se conhece como o ciclo do epitélio seminífero. Na maioria das espécies os espermatozoides que são libera-dos em direção a luz do túbulo provém das células que entraram no processo de esperma-togênese quatro gerações antes que a geração que está ingressando nesse momento, pelo que a espermatogênese no touro dura ao redor de 60 dias e um pouco menos em outras espécies domésticas. Significa que os efeitos negativos das alterações na espermatogêne-se podem estar presentes até dois meses depois de que se produziram essas alterações. Como supracitado, geralmente se observa a mesma combinação celular em toda a área de uma determinada secção transversal do túbulo seminífero. No entanto, se fizermos uma série de secções, observa-se que ao longo do túbulo há uma sucessão ordenada de combinações (a primeira em uma determinada secção; a segunda combinação na seguinte secção, e assim sucessivamente em secções subsequentes até regressar a primeira combi-nação. Teremos, então, que ao início da divisão das espermatogonias A1 se produz de forma sincronizada em uma secção do túbulo, e vai-se transmitindo como uma onda peristáltica as secções adjacentes. Esse processo é denominado como onda do epitélio seminífero e graças à esse túbulo seminífero sempre tem secções em todas as etapas da espermatogênese, com o que se alcança uma produção constante de espermatozoides. -/- Alterações da espermatogênese -/- Nas espécies estacionais a espermatogênese, como já mencionado, pode reduzir-se ou inclusive suspender sua atividade fisiológica durante a época não reprodutiva dessas espécimes, porém esse processo fisiológico não pode ser considerado como uma altera-ção. No entanto, a espermatogênese só pode ser alterada pelas enfermidades ou por fatores externos. A principal causa de alterações na espermatogênese é o aumento da temperatura testicular. Por isso, os testículos são localizados na saco escrotal e são “caídos” para fora do corpo como pode-se observar nos bovinos, caprinos, ovinos, caninos e no próprio homem. A temperatura testicular deve estar cerca de 2 a 6 °C abaixo da temperatura corporal normal. As células germinais masculinas são sensíveis ao calor, pelo qual na maioria dos mamíferos os testículos se encontram fora da cavidade abdominal e existe um sofisticado sistema de termorregulação para mantê-los a uma temperatura menor que a corporal. Se a temperatura corporal for elevada ou se os testículos permanecerem na cavidade abdominal, ou ainda se os sistemas termorreguladores do testículo sejam afetados por fatores inflamatórios como edema ou falta de mobilidade testicular dentro do escroto, a temperatura do tecido testicular aumentará e a espermatogênese sofrerá alterações proporcionais ao excesso de temperatura e a duração da elevação. A espermatogênese também pode ser afetada pela exposição a hormônios ou a outras substâncias. É possível que a causa mais comum (sobretudo no homem) seja o uso de esteroides anabólicos, que elevam a concentração de andrógenos na circulação, provo-cando um feedback negativo sobre a secreção de gonadotropinas. Ao deixar de estimular-se o testículo pelas gonadotropinas, este deixará de produzir testosterona, e as concentra-ções de andrógeno exógeno nunca alcançará as altíssimas concentrações de testosterona que normalmente estão presentes a nível do tecido testicular por ser o local onde se produz o hormônio. Também se supõe que diversas substâncias com propriedades estrogênicas derivadas de processos industriais (indústria dos plásticos, hidrocarbonetos etc.) e presentes no ambiente (fatores xenobióticos) podem ser responsáveis pelas alterações na espermatogênese em diversas espécies, entre as quais se inclui o ser humano. -/- • OVOGÊNESE E FOLICULOGÊNESE -/- A ovogênese é o processo seguido pelas células germinais da fêmea para a forma-ção dos óvulos, que são células haploides. Durante a vida fetal as células germinais proliferam-se no ovário por mitose, formando um grande número de ovogonias, algumas das quais se diferenciam em ovócitos primários que iniciam sua primeira divisão meiótica para deter-se na prófase da divisão. Somente alguns desses ovócitos primários retornarão e concluirão a primeira divisão meiótica em algum momento da vida adulta do animal, dando origem a um ovócito secundário e a um corpo polar. O ovócito secundário inicia a sua segunda divisão meiótica, a qual volta a ficar suspensa até receber um estímulo apropriado, já que somente os ovócitos secundários que são ovulados e penetrados por um espermatozoide retornam e concluem a segunda divisão meiótica, dando origem a um óvulo (figura 10). O processo de ovogênese é realizado dentro dos folículos ovarianos, que também tem que sofrer um longo transcurso de desenvolvimento e diferenciação denominado foliculogênese pelo que a ovogênese como tal realiza-se dentro do marco desse último processo. Por essa razão, na seguinte seção descreverei tanto a ovogênese como a folicu-logênese, e a relação que existe entre ambos. Figura 10: representação da ovogênese. Na etapa de proliferação, as células germinais se diferen-ciam por mitose. A meiose I se caracteriza por uma prófase prolongada, ocorrendo a duplicação do DNA. Nas duas divisões, que ocorrem antes da ovulação e depois da fertilização, a quantidade de DNA é reduzida a 1n, com o fim de que a fusão dos pronúcles (singamia) pós-fertilização, seja gerado um zigoto com um número de cromossomos de 2n (diploide). -/- Geração de ovócitos primários e folículos primordiais Tanto a ovogênese como a foliculogênese iniciam-se durante a vida fetal, quando as células germinais primordiais provenientes do saco vitelino colonizam a gônada primitiva e, junto com as células somáticas z organizam-se para a formação dos cordões sexuais secundários, que se desenvolvem principalmente no córtex do ovário. Nesse período, as células germinais que colonizaram o ovário sofrem até 30 divisões mitóticas, proliferando-se até formar milhares ou milhões de ovogonias, que inicialmente formam “ninhos” constituídos cada um deles por um clone de várias ovogonias que descendem da mesma célula precursora e que se mantêm unidas por pontes citoplasmáticas, sincronizan-do suas divisões mitóticas. Nessa etapa alcança-se a máxima população de células germinais no ovário, que antes de nascer se reduzirá drasticamente por apoptose. No ovário do feto humano chegam a haver até sete milhões de células germinais que ao nascimento se reduzem a dois milhões. Os ovários fetais do bovino, de maneira análoga, chegam a ter até 2.100.000 células germinais, que ao nascimento reduzem para 130.000 aproximadamente. A redução no número de ovogonias produz-se ao mesmo tempo que essas células, que vêm dividindo-se por mitose e estão agrupadas em ninhos, iniciam sua primeira divisão meiótica para se transformarem em ovócitos primários: células germinais que se encontram em uma etapa de suspensão (diplóteno) da prófase da primeira divisão meiótica. Nesse período produz-se uma grande proporção de células germinais; as células somáticas dos cordões sexuais, por sua vez, emitem projeções citoplasmáticas que separam a isolam os ovócitos primários sobreviventes, ficando cada um deles rodeados por uma capa de células aplanadas da (pré) granulosa. Ao mesmo tempo em que se forma uma membrana basal entre as células da granulosa e o tecido intersticial do ovário. Ao ovócito primário rodeado de uma capa de células da (pré) granulosa aplanadas e delimita-das por uma membrana basal denomina-se de folículo primordial (figura 11). Nas vacas os folículos primordiais bem formados já estão presentes nos ovários a partir do dia 90 da gestação. A maioria dos folículos primordiais com os que nasce uma fêmea se manterão inativos durante um longo tempo; muitos deles durante toda a vida do animal. Nos folículos primordiais inativos tanto os ovócitos primários como as células da granulosa conservam sua forma original e mantém um metabolismo reduzido estritamente ao mínimo necessário para manter-se viáveis. Por essa razão, ao realizar um corte histológico de qualquer ovário as estruturas mais numerosas que se observam serão os folículos primordiais. No entanto, cada dia da vida de um animal, inclusive desde a vida fetal, um certo número de folículos primordiais reiniciam seu desenvolvimento, e a partir desse momento um folículo exclusivamente pode ter dois destinos: o primeiro, prosseguir seu desenvolvi-mento até chegar a ovular, e o segundo (que é muito mais frequente) encontrar em algum momento condições inadequadas que fazem fronteira com ele para parar seu desenvolvi-mento, levando-o a sofrer atresia e degenerar até desaparecer do ovário. Figura 11: sequência da foliculogênese apresentando as diferentes estruturas que podemos encontrar em cada fase. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. Culminação da ovogênese A ovogênese somente se completará quando um ovócito primário reinicia a meio-se; completa sua primeira divisão meiótica para formar um ovócito secundário e um primeiro corpo polar e, quando, finalmente sofrer uma segunda divisão meiótica para formar um óvulo e um segundo corpo polar. Os óvulos são as células 1n que constituem os gametas femininos, pouco numerosos, grandes e imóveis. A grande maioria dos ovóci-tos primários, como veremos mais adiante, nunca retomam a meiose e, em consequência, não chegam a formar ovócitos secundários, e muitos dos ovócitos secundários tampouco sofrem uma segunda divisão meiótica, pelo que não chegam a formar os óvulos. Ao longo da vida de uma fêmea, na maioria das espécies, menos de 0,1% dos ovócitos primários (um a cada mil) chega a terminar a ovogênese, dando origem a um óvulo. O supracitado deve-se a que a ovogênese somente pode retomar-se e ser completa-da em ovócitos primários que se encontram dentro dos folículos primordiais que (uma vez ativados) vão alcançando diversas etapas de seu desenvolvimento em momentos precisos aos que encontram as condições ideais de oxigenação, nutrição, vascularização e exposição a fatores parácrinos e a exposição a concentrações de hormônios que se requerem para que o folículo continue em cada etapa de seu desenvolvimento com o processo de foliculogênese até chegar a ovular. Qualquer folículo que não esteja nessas condições ao longo do desenvolvimento sofrerá degeneração e atresia, pelo que o ovócito primário em seu interior nunca chegará ao ponto em que pode retomar a primeira divisão meiótica. No que resta da presente seção revisaremos o processo de foliculogênese em cujo marco se desenvolve a ovogênese; havemos que tomar de conta que essa última se limita ao que ocorre nas células germinais (ovogonia, ovócito primário, secundário e óvulo), pelo qual depende intimamente do desenvolvimento do folículo de que essas células formam parte. Em um princípio a ativação do folículo primordial e o desenvolvimento folicular são independentes das gonadotropinas: não se conhecem os mecanismos precisos median-te os quais um folículo primordial se ativa e reinicia seu desenvolvimento, nem como se decide quais folículos, dentre as dezenas de milhares de ou centenas de milhares presentes em um ovário se reativarão em um dia em particular. A reativação trata-se de uma liberação de influência de fatores inibidores, já que os folículos primordiais se reativam espontaneamente quando cultivados in vitro, isolados do resto do tecido ovariano. Uma vez que um folículo primordial se ativa, inicia-se um longo processo de desenvolvimento que somente depois de vários meses (ao redor de cinco meses no caso dos bovinos) o levará a um estádio em que seu desenvolvimento posterior requer a presença das gonado-tropinas; daí que se diz que as primeiras etapas do desenvolvimento são independentes das gonadotropinas. Durante a fase independente de gonadotropinas, um folículo primordial que tenha sido ativado e tenha começado a crescer; passará primeiro para a etapa de folículo primá-rio, caracterizada por conter um ovócito primário que está rodeado, por sua vez, por uma capa de células da granulosa, que não são planas, e sim cúbicas. Depois, se o folículo continuar crescendo se transformará em um folículo secundário, ao qual as células da granulosa começam a proliferar (aumentando em número) e se organizam em duas ou mais capas que rodeiam o ovócito primário. Entre o ovócito e as células da granulosa que o rodeiam se forma nesta uma zona pelúcida; ainda assim o ovócito mantém contato direto com essas células, mediante o estabelecimento de pontes citoplasmáticas que atravessam a zona pelúcida. Através dessas pontes citoplasmáticas as células da granulosa podem passar nutrientes e informação ao ovócito primário. O volume e o diâmetro do ovócito primário aumentam ao mesmo tempo que as células da granulosa proliferam-se, para incrementar as capas ao redor do ovócito. De maneira gradual o citoplasma do ovócito primário aumenta até 50 vezes seu volume e a proliferação das células continua. Esses folículos que possuem cada vez mais células e portanto mais capas de células da granulosa se denominam folículos secundários. Para evitar confusões, há a necessidade de nomen-clatura ao qual o folículo vá mudando de nome de primordial a primário e logo, de secun-dário, a terciário, por sua vez, o ovócito que encontra-se em seu interior, a todo momento, segue sendo um ovócito primário. Durante a etapa dependente de gonadotropinas, os folículos secundários começam a formar um espaço cheio de líquido, o antro folicular, desse modo se convertem em folí-culos terciários. Com a utilização de outra nomenclatura, a formação do antro marca a transição entre folículos pré-antrais (sem antro) e folículos antrais (com antro). Em algum momento dessa transição entre folículo secundário e terciário, também aparece a depen-dência de folículos em direção as gonadotropinas, pelo qual somente podem seguir crescendo na presença do hormônio luteinizante (LH) e do hormônio folículo estimulante (FSH). Nos bovinos e em outras espécies (para seu estudo), os folículos antrais são dividi-dos em pequenos, médios e grandes. Embora todos eles possuam um antro folicular, dependendo do seu grau de desenvolvimento requerem diferentes concentrações de gona-dotropinas para continuar o crescimento. Os folículos antrais mais pequenos somente re-querem concentrações baixas de LH e FSH, pelo qual podem continuar crescendo em qualquer momento do ciclo estral inclusive em animais que não estão ciclando (fêmeas em anestro pré-puberal, gestacional, lactacional, estacional). Nas etapas posteriores os folículos antrais requerem primeiro concentrações elevadas de FSH, e nas etapas finais somente podem continuar crescendo na presença de pulsos frequentes de LH, pelo qual somente os folículos que encontram-se sob concentrações apropriadas desses hormônios podem seguir crescendo. Por essa razão, nos animais que se encontram em anestro de qualquer tipo somente é possível encontrar folículos antrais pequenos ou médios, segundo a espécie, e nos animais que se encontram ciclando (estro) o maior tamanho folicular encontrado em um determinado dia do ciclo dependerá das concentrações de FSH e LH presentes nesse momento e nos dias anteriores. Um folículo que chega ao estado máximo de desenvolvimento, conhecido como folículo pré-ovulatório, ao final, somente chegará a ovular se for exposto a um pico pré-ovulatório de LH. Como supracitado, cada dia na vida de uma fêmea inicia seu desenvolvimento um certo número de folículos; a grande maioria sofrem atresia, mas depois da puberdade em cada dia do ciclo estral um ou vários folículos vão encontrando ao longo do seu desenvol-vimento concentrações hormonais que lhes permite chegar na etapa de folículo pré-ovula-tório. Somente nestes folículos, e como consequência de um pico pré-ovulatório de LH, se reinicia e completa-se a primeira divisão meiótica do ovócito primário, produzindo duas células distintas. Uma delas é o ovócito secundário, que retém praticamente todo o citoplasma. Contém, assim mesmo, em seu núcleo um par de cromossomos duplos, a outra é o primeiro corpo polar, que é exclusivamente um núcleo com uma quantidade mínima de citoplasma. Na maioria das espécies ovula-se um ovócito secundário que se encontra, então, suspendido na segunda divisão meiótica. Esta segunda divisão meiótica somente reinicia-rá e completarar-se uma vez que o espermatozoide começa a penetrar sob o ovócito secundário. Ao concluir-se a divisão se forma o segundo corpo polar e completa-se a ovogênese com o qual se obtém o óvulo, célula 1n que constitui o gameta feminino. No entanto, o óvulo existe pouco tempo como tal, já que em poucos minutos/horas (depen-dendo da espécie) se produzirá a fusão do núcleo do mesmo (pró-núcleo feminino) com o do espermatozoide (pró-núcleo masculino), com o qual se completa a fertilização e se forma um novo indivíduo (o ovo ou zigoto). -/- Ondas foliculares -/- Como mencionado supra, todos os dias um determinado número de folículos pri-mordiais se ativam e começam a crescer, os quais crescem em um ritmo característico em cada espécie. Isso provoca que em qualquer momento existam nos ovários folículos pri-mordiais (que começam a crescer em alguns dias ou semanas), assim como folículos secundários em diversas etapas do desenvolvimento, os quais iniciaram seu desenvolvi-mento em semanas ou inclusive meses (segundo o grau de desenvolvimento atual). Também em qualquer momento poderá haver folículos antrais nas etapas iniciais de seu desenvolvimento (com antros que já se podem detectar em cortes histológicos mas não são visíveis macroscopicamente). Todos esses folículos chegaram até seu estado de de-senvolvimento atual (primário, secundário ou antral pequeno), independente da etapa do ciclo estral em que sejam observados ou encontrados. Nos bovinos, os folículos que chegam ao início da etapa antral iniciaram seu desenvolvimento cinco meses antes, e todavia requerem ao redor de 42 dias para chegar ao estado pré-ovulatório. Para continuar seu desenvolvimento, os folículos antrais pequenos devem encon-trar concentrações altas de FSH, que os estimulam para prosseguir o crescimento. Cada vez que se produz uma elevação nas concentrações de FSH, esse hormônio estimula o desenvolvimento de um grupo de folículos antrais pequenos, que começaram a crescer muito tempo antes e que o dia da elevação de FSH tenha alcançado o grau de desenvolvi-mento preciso para responder com eficiência a este hormônio, o qual atuará através de seus receptores nas células da granulosa para estimular a produção de estradiol, a secreção de inibina, a produção de líquido folicular e a proliferação das células da granulosa. Um grupo de folículos antrais pequenos é assim recrutado pelo FSH para acelerar seu cresci-mento e aumentar sua produção de estradiol e inibina (figura 12). Mediante um seguimento ultrassonográfico dos ovários é possível identificar pou-cos dias depois um certo número de folículos, que por haver sido recrutados começam um período de crescimento acelerado. Durante alguns dias vários folículos crescem juntos, porém depois um deles é selecionado para continuar crescendo, enquanto que o restante do grupo deixam de fazê-lo e terminam sofrendo atresia. Através da ultrassom é possível identificar o folículo selecionado, agora chamado folículo domi-nante, já que sua trajetória de crescimento sofre um desvio com respeito a seguida pelo restante do grupo. Os folículos que não foram selecionados deixam de crescer e sofrem atresia já que deixam de possuir o suporte gonadotrópico de FSH, uma vez que as concentrações desse hormônio são suprimidos pela inibina e o estradiol produzidos pelo conjunto de folículos que conformam a onda folicular (figura 12), porém o folículo mais desenvolvido do grupo se converterá em dominante. A inibina atua diretamente a nível hipofisário para reduzir a secreção de FSH. Figura 12: onda folicular e relação dos níveis de FSH, estradiol e LH. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- Figura 13: Recrutamento, seleção e dominação folicular na espécie ovina e influência do FSH e LH nas fases. Fonte: SILVA, E. I. C. da, 2019. -/- A razão pela qual o folículo dominante é capaz de continuar seu desenvolvimento apesar da baixa nas concentrações de FSH é que o folículo é o único que alcançou o grau de progresso necessário para que apareçam os receptores para LH em suas células da granulosa. Esse processo permite ao folículo dominante ser estimulado pela LH, e que requeira baixas concentrações de FSH para manter seu desenvolvimento. A secreção de LH em forma de pulsos de baixa frequência (um pulso a cada quatro a seis horas), característica da fase lútea do ciclo estral; é suficiente para permitir que um folículo dominante continue crescendo por mais dias depois da sua seleção e que mais tarde mantenha-se viável durante alguns dias embora não aumentem de tamanho. Contu-do, se durante o período viável desse folículo não seja finalizada a fase lútea e não diminuam as concentrações de progesterona, o folículo terminará sofrendo atresia devido a exigência de um padrão de secreção acelerada de LH (aproximadamente um pulso por hora) durante o desenvolvimento pré-ovulatório, que somente pode ser produzido com a ausência da progesterona. Uma vez que um folículo dominante sofre atresia deixa de produzir inibina, pelo qual as concentrações de FSH podem elevar-se novamente para iniciar o recrutamento de outro grupo de folículos a partir da qual se origina uma nova onda folicular. Durante o ciclo estral de uma vaca podem gerar-se dois ou três ondas foliculares; somente em raros casos quatro. A etapa de dominância folicular da primeira onda na grande maioria dos casos não coincide com a regressão do corpo lúteo, pelo qual o primei-ro folículo dominante quase invariavelmente termina em atresia. Em algumas vacas o fo-lículo dominante da segunda onda ainda está viável quando se produz a regressão do corpo lúteo e acelera-se a secreção de LH, pelo qual esse segundo folículo dominante se converte em folículo pré-ovulatório e, ao final ovula. Em outros animais o segundo folícu-lo dominante também perde a sua viabilidade antes da regressão do corpo lúteo, por onde nesses animais se inicia uma terceira onda folicular, da qual surge o folículo que finalmen-te ovulará depois de produzir-se a regressão do corpo lúteo. Sem importar a onda em que se origine, uma vez que um folículo dominante é ex-posto a alta frequência de secreção de LH que se produz depois da regressão do corpo lúteo, aumenta ainda mais sua secreção de estradiol até que as altas concentrações desse hormônio comecem a exercer um feedback positivo para a secreção do LH. Isso provoca-rá a aceleração da frequência de secreção do LH até que os pulsos são tão frequentes que começam a ficar por cima e produzir-se o pico pré-ovulatório de LH, que é responsável pela realização da ovulação e a maturação final do ovócito. -/- •___DIFERENÇAS ENTRE ESPERMATOGÊNESE E OVOGÊNESE -/- Enquanto que na fêmea a ovogênese inicia-se durante a vida fetal, no macho a es-permatogênese começa na puberdade. Na fêmea, a partir de um ovócito primário se origi-na um óvulo; no macho, de um espermatócito primário se produzem, teoricamente, quatro espermatozoides. Outra característica interessante é que enquanto a fêmea já conta desde o nasci-mento com todos os ovócitos que necessitará na vida adulta, o macho necessitará chegar a puberdade para iniciar o desenvolvimento das células sexuais, já que ao nascer somente possui gonócitos precursores das células germinais, células de Sertoli e intersticiais. Na vida adulta de uma fêmea, o número de células germinais desaparece paulati-namente. Uma vez iniciada a espermatogênese no macho, a cada ciclo do epitélio seminí-fero as células germinais são renovadas mantendo a provisão para toda a vida reprodutiva. Na fêmea, a meiose sofre duas interrupções em seu transcurso, e no macho é ininterrupta. Figura 14: representação em diagramação comparativa do desenvolvimento da gametogênese. -/- Principais pontos abordados sobre as diferenças entre a gametogênese masculina e feminina: ❙ Na ovogênese a meiose contêm-se em duas ocasiões esperando acontecimentos externos para prosseguir. Já na espermatogênese não existe a suspensão da meiose. ❙ A espermatogênese é um processo contínuo, enquanto que a ovogênese pode completar exclusivamente um óvulo em cada ciclo estral; já que só pode ser completada por mais de um nas espécies que ovulam vários ovócitos no caso das porcas, cadelas, gatas etc. ❙ Na espermatogênese existem células de reserva que permitem a continuação du-rante toda a vida, enquanto que na ovogênese o número de ovócitos primários é limitado. A fêmea somente conta com os que nasceu, e eles não se dividem. ❙ Na espermatogênese obtém-se até 256 espermatozoides para cada espermatogo-nia que inicia o processo, enquanto que na ovogênese somente se obtém um óvulo a partir de cada ovócito primário. ❙ Durante a espermatogênese se produz uma metamorfose que transforma as es-permátides em espermatozoides. Na ovogênese não ocorre um processo análogo. ❙ Na espermatogênese, durante a meiose produzem-se quatro espermátides a partir de cada espermatócito primário. Na ovogênese se produz somente um óvulo a partir de cada ovócito primário; produz, ademais, dois corpos polares. ❙ Todos os óvulos que se produzem durante a ovogênese contém um cromossomo X, enquanto que a metade dos espermatozoides possuem um cromossomo Y e a outra metade um cromossomo X. ❙ Na espermatogênese produzem-se centenas ou dezenas de milhões de esperma-tozoides por dia, enquanto que na ovogênese se produz um ou alguns óvulos a cada ciclo estral. ❙ A espermatogênese produz gametas macroscópicos e com motilidade própria, enquanto que a ovogênese produz gametas grandes e imóveis. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ABDEL-RAOUF, Mohammed et al. The postnatal development of the reproductive organs in bullswith special reference to puberty.(Including growth of the hypophysis and the adrenals). Acta endocrinologica, n. Suppl No. 49, 1960. ADONA, Paulo Roberto et al. Ovogênese e foliculogênese em mamíferos. Journal of Health Sciences, v. 15, n. 3, 2013. AERTS, J. M. J.; BOLS, P. E. J. Ovarian follicular dynamics: a review with emphasis on the bovine species. Part I: Folliculogenesis and pre‐antral follicle development. Reproduction in domestic animals, v. 45, n. 1, p. 171-179, 2010. AERTS, J. M. J.; BOLS, P. E. J. Ovarian follicular dynamics. A review with emphasis on the bovine species. Part II: Antral development, exogenous influence and future prospects. Reproduction in domestic animals, v. 45, n. 1, p. 180-187, 2010. ALBERTINI, David F.; CARABATSOS, Mary Jo. Comparative aspects of meiotic cell cycle control in mammals. Journal of molecular medicine, v. 76, n. 12, p. 795-799, 1998. AUSTIN, Colin Russell; SHORT, R. Reproduction in mammals. Cambridge, 1972. BAKER, T. G. Oogenesis and ovulation. In. Reproduction in Mammals I Germ Cells and Fertilization, p. 29-30, 1972. BEARDEN, Henry Joe et al. Reproducción animal aplicada. México: Manual Moderno, 1982. BIGGERS, John D.; SCHUETZ, Allen W. Oogenesis. University Park Press, 1972. BINELLI, Mario; MURPHY, Bruce D. Coordinated regulation of follicle development by germ and somatic cells. Reproduction, Fertility and Development, v. 22, n. 1, p. 1-12, 2009. CHIARINI-GARCIA, Helio; RUSSELL, Lonnie D. High-resolution light microscopic characterization of mouse spermatogonia. Biology of reproduction, v. 65, n. 4, p. 1170-1178, 2001. CHOUDARY, J. B.; GIER, H. T.; MARION, G. B. Cyclic changes in bovine vesicular follicles. Journal of animal science, v. 27, n. 2, p. 468-471, 1968. CLERMONT, Yves; PEREY, Bernard. Quantitative study of the cell population of the seminiferous tubules in immature rats. American Journal of Anatomy, v. 100, n. 2, p. 241-267, 1957. COSTA, DEILER SAMPAIO; PAULA, T. A. R. Espermatogênese em mamíferos. Scientia, v. 4, 2003. CUNNINGHAM, James. Tratado de fisiologia veterinária. Elsevier Health Sciences, 2011. CUPPS, Perry T. (Ed.). Reproduction in domestic animals. Elsevier, 1991. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. 2020. Acervo pessoal. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. 2020. Acervo pessoal. DUKES, Henry Hugh; SWENSON, Melvin J.; REECE, William O. Dukes fisiologia dos animais domésticos. Editora Guanabara Koogan, 1996. EPIFANO, Olga; DEAN, Jurrien. Genetic control of early folliculogenesis in mice. Trends in Endocrinology & Metabolism, v. 13, n. 4, p. 169-173, 2002. ERICKSON, B. H. Development and senescence of the postnatal bovine ovary. Journal of animal science, v. 25, n. 3, p. 800-805, 1966. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- FELDMAN, Edward C. et al. Canine and feline endocrinology-e-book. Elsevier health sciences, 2014. FUSCO, Giuseppe; MINELLI, Alessandro. The Biology of Reproduction. Cambridge University Press, 2019. GALINA-HIDALGO, Carlos Salvador. A study of the development of testicular function and an evaluation of testicular biopsy in farm animals. 1971. Tese de Doutorado. Royal Veterinary College (University of London). GALLICANO, G. Ian. Composition, regulation, and function of the cytoskeleton in mammalian eggs and embryos. Front Biosci, v. 6, p. D1089-1108, 2001. GILBERT, Scott F. Biología del desarrollo. Ed. Médica Panamericana, 2005. GNESSI, Lucio; FABBRI, Andrea; SPERA, Giovanni. Gonadal peptides as mediators of development and functional control of the testis: an integrated system with hormones and local environment. Endocrine reviews, v. 18, n. 4, p. 541-609, 1997. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HEDGER, Mark P. Testicular leukocytes: what are they doing?. Reviews of reproduction, v. 2, n. 1, p. 38-47, 1997. HUTSON, James C. Testicular macrophages. In: International review of cytology. Academic Press, 1994. p. 99-143. HYTTEL, P. Gametogênese. In. HYTTEL, Poul; SINOWATZ, Fred; VEJLSTED, Morten. Embriologia veterinária. São Paulo: Elsevier Brasil, 2012. JOHNSON, Martin H. Essential reproduction. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2018. JONES, Richard E.; LOPEZ, Kristin H. Human reproductive biology. Academic Press, 2013. KIERSZENBAUM, Abraham L.; TRES, Laura L. Primordial germ cell‐somatic cell partnership: A balancing cell signaling act. Molecular Reproduction and Development: Incorporating Gamete Research, v. 60, n. 3, p. 277-280, 2001. MATZUK, Martin M. et al. Intercellular communication in the mammalian ovary: oocytes carry the conversation. Science, v. 296, n. 5576, p. 2178-2180, 2002. MCLAREN, Anne. Germ and somatic cell lineages in the developing gonad. Molecular and cellular endocrinology, v. 163, n. 1-2, p. 3-9, 2000. MCKINNON, Angus O. et al. (Ed.). Equine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2011. MERCHANT-LARIOS, Horacio; MORENO-MENDOZA, Norma. Onset of sex differentiation: dialog between genes and cells. Archives of medical research, v. 32, n. 6, p. 553-558, 2001. MINTZ, Beatrice et al. Embryological phases of mammalian gametogenesis. Embryological phases of mammalian gametogenesis., v. 56, n. Suppl. 1, p. 31-43, 1960. MORALES, M. E. et al. Gametogénesis. I. Revisión de la literatura, con enfoque en la ovogénesis. Medicina Universitaria, v. 8, n. 32, p. 183-9, 2006. NAKATSUJI, NORIO; CHUMA, SHINICHIRO. Differentiation of mouse primordial germ cells into female or male germ cells. International Journal of Developmental Biology, v. 45, n. 3, p. 541-548, 2002. NILSSON, Eric; PARROTT, Jeff A.; SKINNER, Michael K. Basic fibroblast growth factor induces primordial follicle development and initiates folliculogenesis. Molecular and cellular endocrinology, v. 175, n. 1-2, p. 123-130, 2001. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- NORRIS, David O.; LOPEZ, Kristin H. The endocrinology of the mammalian ovary. In: Hormones and reproduction of vertebrates. Academic Press, 2011. p. 59-72. PEDERSEN, Torben. Follicle growth in the immature mouse ovary. European Journal of Endocrinology, v. 62, n. 1, p. 117-132, 1969. PINEDA, Mauricio H. et al. McDonald's veterinary endocrinology and reproduction. Iowa state press, 2003. ROSER, J. F. Endocrine and paracrine control of sperm production in stallions. Animal Reproduction Science, v. 68, n. 3-4, p. 139-151, 2001. RUSSELL, Lonnie D. et al. Histological and histopathological evaluation of the testis. International journal of andrology, v. 16, n. 1, p. 83-83, 1993. RÜSSE, I.; SINOWATZ, F. Gametogenese. Lehrbuch der Embryologie der Haustiere, p. 42-92, 1991. SAITOU, Mitinori; BARTON, Sheila C.; SURANI, M. Azim. A molecular programme for the specification of germ cell fate in mice. Nature, v. 418, n. 6895, p. 293-300, 2002. SALISBURY, Glenn Wade et al. Physiology of reproduction and artificial insemination of cattle. WH Freeman and Company., 1978. SAWYER, Heywood R. et al. Formation of ovarian follicles during fetal development in sheep. Biology of reproduction, v. 66, n. 4, p. 1134-1150, 2002. SCARAMUZZI, R. J.; MARTENSZ, N. D.; VAN LOOK, P. F. A. Ovarian morphology and the concentration of steroids, and of gonadotrophins during the breeding season in ewes actively immunized against oestradiol-17β or oestrone. Reproduction, v. 59, n. 2, p. 303-310, 1980. SEIDEL JR, G. E. et al. Control of folliculogenesis and ovulation in domestic animals: puberal and adult function. In: 9th International Congress on Animal Reproduction and Artificial Insemination, 16th-20th June 1980. II. Round tables. Editorial Garsi., 1980. p. 11-16. SKINNER, Michael K. Cell-cell interactions in the testis. Endocrine Reviews, v. 12, n. 1, p. 45-77, 1991. SMITZ, J. E.; CORTVRINDT, Rita G. The earliest stages of folliculogenesis in vitro. Reproduction, v. 123, n. 2, p. 185-202, 2002. SORENSEN, Anton Marinus. Reproducción animal: principios y prácticas. México, 1982. SUTOVSKY, Peter; MANANDHAR, Gaurishankar. Mammalian spermatogenesis and sperm structure: anatomical and compartmental analysis. In. The sperm cell: Production, maturation, fertilization, regeneration, p. 1-30, 2006. TAZUKE, Salli I. et al. A germline-specific gap junction protein required for survival of differentiating early germ cells. Development, v. 129, n. 10, p. 2529-2539, 2002. VAN STRAATEN, H. W. M.; WENSING, C. J. G. Leydig cell development in the testis of the pig. Biology of Reproduction, v. 18, n. 1, p. 86-93, 1978. TURNBULL, K. E.; BRADEN, A. W. H.; MATTNER, P. E. The pattern of follicular growth and atresia in the ovine ovary. Australian Journal of Biological Sciences, v. 30, n. 3, p. 229-242, 1977. WASSARMAN, Paul M. Gametogenesis. Londres: Academic Press, 2012. WROBEL, K.-H.; SÜß, Franz. Identification and temporospatial distribution of bovine primordial germ cells prior to gonadal sexual differentiation. Anatomy and embryology, v. 197, n. 6, p. 451-467, 1998. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ZARCO, L. Gametogénese. In. PORTA, L. R.; MEDRANO, J. H. H. Fisiología reproductiva de los animales domésticos. Cidade do México: FMVZ-UNAM, 2018. ZIRKIN, Barry R. et al. Endocrine and Paracrine Regulation of Mammalian Spermatogenesis. In: Hormones and Reproduction of Vertebrates. Academic Press, 2011. p. 45-57. -/- REALIZAÇÃO -/- . (shrink)

Aristotle’s analysis of language is, firstly, on the basis of co-positing and positing away: this is the starting point of analysis: what is asserted in language either involves a co-positing or does not (Cat. , 2, 1a16-17). Although he does not explain what he means by co-positing, we can see that he considers something like a sentence (his examples: man runs, man wins) and not merely a co-positing of two words like not-man, which he calls an indefinite noun (OI., 2, (...) 16a30-32). Aristotle and his contemporaries had no word for ‘word.’ The closest words for ‘word’ are ὄνομα and λόγος. ὄνομα is distinguished from ῥῆμα (verb) and, thus, cannot mean word. λόγος means a sentence or statement. Daniel W. Graham (Aristotle’s Two Systems, 1987, Oxford University Press, 38, fn.27) renders λεγομενον as ‘word.’ The problem with this suggestion is that, as Aristotle asserts in Categories, it is used both for single words and the composition of several words and even sentences. Aristotle distinguishes a noun from all the followings: a) A co-positing of words: noun is a word that is said without co-positing. (Cat., 2, 1a16-19) b) Inarticulate sounds: the sounds like those that brutes produce are not considered as nouns, though Aristotle believes that they are significant. (OI., 2, 16a28-29) c) Verbs: words that carry with them the notion of time. (OI., 2, 16b6-8) So far, a noun is a word said without co-positing, without the notion of time and distinguished from inarticulate sounds. What remains in language, however, is not necessarily a proper noun, though it is related with noun. What remain are different kinds of names: 1) Noun (ὄνομα) or definite noun: a sound that is significant by convention and of which no part is significant from the rest (OI., I, 1, 16a19-20) unless not having an independent meaning, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole (OI., I, 1, 16a22-27). This latter condition is indeed a division made by Aristotle between two kinds of nouns: a. Simple nouns: a word in which the part is in no way significant. b. Composite nouns: a word in which though the part may be significant, i) it contribute to the meaning of the whole and ii) it does not have an independent meaning. 2) Indefinite noun: expressions like ‘not-man’ that i) have no recognized term by which denote the expression and ii) are not a sentence or denial by themselves (OI, 2, 16a28-29; 10, 19b8-10). 3) Cases of a noun. This is what used in languages like Greek language that have different cases. They show the senses that are asserted by other elements like prepositions in languages like English in a form or case of the name. Thus, e.g. Φίλωνος means ‘of Philo’ while Φίλωνι means ‘to Philo’. The cases of a noun have the same definition as the noun itself. However, they are not able to combine with any of the different tenses of the verb ‘is’ so that a true or false preposition results. (OI., 2, 16ab4-5). Aristotle thinks convention (συνθήκην) is the basis of the formation of nouns: ‘The limitation ‘by convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun- it is only so when it becomes a symbol.’ (OI., I, 1, 16a27-28) In Greek language, Francesco Ademollo notes (B508, 34), onoma has a close etymological connection with any transitive verb. Thus, it seems that an onoma is essentially ‘an expression that names or refers to something. It is strange that Aristotle does not distinguish proper from improper noun. We find no text in which Aristotle made such a distinction. In fact, it seems nouns are essentially improper for him: ‘A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly, a child begins by calling all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother’ but later on distinguishing each of them.’ (Phy., A, 1) Nouns necessarily are applicable to others: ‘If one were defining you, he would say ‘an animal which is lean’ or ‘white’ or something else which will apply to someone other than you.’ (Met., Z, 1040a12-14) -/- . (shrink)

It is not by thinking that we create worlds. It is by understanding the world that we learn to think. Cosmovision is a term that should mean a set of foundations from which emerges a systemic understanding of the Universe, its components as life, the world we live in, nature, human phenomena, and their relationships. It is, therefore, a field of analytical philosophy fed by the sciences, whose objective is this aggregated and epistemologically sustainable knowledge about everything that we are (...) and contain, that surrounds us, and that relates to us in any way. It is something as old as human thought, and, in addition to using elements of scientific cosmology, it encompasses everything in philosophy and science that refers to the universe and life. A cosmovision is not a set of ideas, hypotheses, and assumptions but a system based on observation, analysis, evidence, and demonstration. No cosmovision intends to define, establish, or propose but only to understand, analyse, and interpret. Each of us builds and transports his cosmovision throughout life, without establishing forms, as a background for our thinking and behaviour. Linguistically, the term “cosmovision” would derive from the German, equivalent to the concept of “ Weltanschauung,” as used by several philosophers. However, this linguistic relationship is not applicable because it contradicts what we propose as a cosmovision. This German word refers to a pre-logical or proto- experimental vision of reality, with an intuitive context and far from critical knowledge still non-existent at the time of its formulation. Undoubtedly, cosmovisions, in the sense in which we understand them, house and use these proto-experimental or pre-logical elements that include history, the collective unconscious, and all the archetypes we carry. However, in the concept that we apply here, the cosmovision goes far beyond this content, firstly by constantly submitting it to present critical thinking, and finally by making the analytic experience ( and not the thought itself or intuition) its actual universe. António Lopes expose the breadth of this content: -/- "Cosmovisions are not the product of thought. They do not spring from the simple desire to know. The apprehension of reality is an important moment in its configuration, but, nevertheless, it is only one. It comes from the vital conduct, from the experience of life's evaluation, and from the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, in the valuation, and in the volitional reality is the slow and arduous work that humanity has done in the development of the conceptions of life. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)”(1) -/- In this work, we seek to outline a cosmovision based on the realities that science offers today. We do not propose, at any time, to do science; or theorise philosophy, but we will always seek to be supported by them or, at least, protected by them from the cognitive distortions that we usually carry. ________________________________________________ (1) Lopes , Antonio – “ Weltanschauung (Cosmovision)” (2009 ) in Carlos Ceia's E-Dictionary of Literary Terms. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred meta-method is interested in the role of (...) qualia in some arguments for non-physicalism; the event-centred metamethod is interested in the role of qualia as some natural events whose nature is hidden and must be uncovered empirically. We will argue that the event-centred metamethod is the most promising route to a comprehensive scientific conception of qualia because of the flexibility of ontological and methodological assumptions it can provide. We also reveal the hidden influences of the different meta-methods and in doing so show why consideration of meta-methods has value for the study of consciousness. (shrink)

The Humility Thesis is a persistent thesis in contemporary metaphysics. It is known by a variety of names, including, but not limited to, Humility, Intrinsic Humility, Kantian Humility, Kantian Physicalism, Intrinsic Ignorance, Categorical Ignorance, Irremediable Ignorance, and Noumenalism. According to the thesis, we human beings, and any knowers that share our general ways of knowing, are irremediably ignorant of a certain class of properties that are intrinsic to material entities … Continue reading Humility Regarding Intrinsic Properties →.

Without doctors being able to explain medical decisions to patients, I argue their use of black box AIs would erode the effective and respectful care they provide patients. In addition, I argue that physicians should use AI black boxes only for patients in dire straits, or when physicians use AI as a “co-pilot” (analogous to a spellchecker) but can independently confirm its accuracy. I respond to A.J. London’s objection that physicians already prescribe some drugs without knowing why they work.

While environmental claims are increasingly used by companies to appeal consumers, they also attract greater scrutiny from independent parties interested in consumer protection. Consumers are now able to compare corporate environmental claims against external, often disconfirming, information to form their brand attitudes and purchase intentions. What remains unclear is how the level of information specificity of both the environmental claims and external disconfirming information interact to influence consumer reactions. Two experiments address this gap in the CSR communication literature. When specific (...) claims are countered by specific external information, consumers report more negative brand attitudes and lower purchase intentions. The effect is serially mediated by skepticism toward the claims and lack of corporate credibility. We conclude by discussing strategies that firms can utilize to avoid information dilution and ensure that external disconfirming information percolates to consumers as specific. (shrink)

I contend there exists a platonistic good that all other good (excellent) things must resemble, supplementing this theory with Aristotelian features. Something’s goodness holds in virtue of the thing’s own properties being such as to satisfy its kind-based standards, and those K-standards resembling the platonic good. As for the latter condition, the K-standards resemble it firstly with respect to requiring activities, and secondly also at the level of what teleology those activities are directed towards.

Could Christians and Muslims be referring to the same God? Consider Gareth Evans’s causal theory of reference, on which a name refers to the dominant source of information in the name’s “dossier”. I argue that information about experiences, in which God is simply the object of acquaintance, can dominate the dossier. Thus, this "demonstrative" use of names offers a promising alternative avenue by which users of the divine names can refer to the same referent despite having different conceptions of God.

Russellian monism – an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (1927/1992) – is roughly the view that the natural sciences can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not about their categorical properties, and, moreover, that our qualia are constituted by categorical properties. Recently, Stoljar (2001a, 2001b), Strawson (2008), Montero (2010, 2015), Alter and Nagasawa (2012), and Chalmers (2015) have attempted to develop this doctrine into a version of physicalism. Russellian monism faces the (...) so-called combination problem, according to which it is difficult to see how categorical properties could collectively constitute qualia. In this paper, I suggest that there is an insufficiently discussed aspect of the combination problem which I call the difference-maker problem. Taking the difference-maker problem into account, I argue that the combination problem – whether or not it can be solved – results in a dilemma for the project of developing Russellian physicalism. That is, Russellian monism is either physicalistically unacceptable or it is implausible; hence, Russellian monism and physicalism are incompatible. (shrink)

Set aside fanciful doomsday speculations about AI. Even lower-level AIs, while otherwise friendly and providing us a universal basic income, would be able to do all our jobs. Also, we would over-rely upon AI assistants even in our personal lives. Thus, John Danaher argues that a human crisis of moral passivity would result However, I argue firstly that if AIs are posited to lack the potential to become unfriendly, they may not be intelligent enough to replace us in all our (...) jobs. If instead they are intelligent enough to replace us, the risk they become unfriendly increases, given that they would not need us and humans would just compete for valuable resources. Their hostility will not promote our moral passivity. Secondly, the use of AI assistants in our personal lives will become a problem only if we rely on them for almost all our decision-making and motivation. But such a (maximally) pervasive level of dependence raises the question of whether humans would accept it, and consequently whether the crisis of passivity will arise. (shrink)

The disciplinary characterisation (DC) is the most popular approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and physicalism. It defines metaphysical naturalism with reference to scientific theories and defines physicalism with reference to physical theories, and suggests that every entity that exists is a posited entity of these theories. DC has been criticised for its inability to solve Hempel’s dilemma and a list of problems alike. In this paper, I propose and defend a novel version of DC that can be called a historical (...) paths approach. The idea is (roughly) that metaphysical naturalism can be defined with reference to the historical ideas that current scientific ideas descend from. I argue that it is not rendered implausible by the above problems, and hence that DC is more defensible and attractive than it may first appear. I then argue that the approach also provides a useful framework for the naturalisation of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology. (shrink)

Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that physics can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not their categorical (or intrinsic) properties, whereas our qualia are constituted by those categorical properties. In this paper, I will discuss the relation between Russellian monism and a seminal paradox facing epiphenomenalism, the paradox of phenomenal judgment: if epiphenomenalism is true—qualia are causally inefficacious—then any judgment (...) concerning qualia, including epiphenomenalism itself, cannot be caused by qualia. For many writers, including Hawthorne (Philos Perspect 15:361–378, 2001), Smart (J Conscious Stud 11(2):41–50, 2004), and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (The philosophy of mind and cognition, Blackwell, Malden, 2007), Russellian monism faces the same paradox as epiphenomenalism does. I will assess Chalmers’s (The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) and Seager’s (in: Beckermann A, McLaughlin BP (eds) The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) defences of Russellian monism against the paradox, and will put forward a novel argument against those defences. (shrink)

Aristotelian theory, as found in Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, claims that to be good is to be good as a member of that kind. However, I contend that something can satisfy kind-relative standards but nonetheless be bad—I propose a hypothetical Ebola-like microbe that meets its kind-standards of being destructive for its own sake, but it would plausibly be bad for doing so. I anticipate an Aristotelian objection that evaluations should only be made from "within" the lifeform conception rather than (...) from without. (shrink)

Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors. We also suggest (...) that, in response to some factors, the necessity relation may run from responsibility to free will. (shrink)

What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for (...) both types of intentional state. (shrink)

One question of the bounds of cognition is that of which things have it. A scientifically relevant debate on this question must explain the persistent and selective use of psychological predicates to report findings throughout biology: for example, that neurons prefer, fruit flies and plants decide, and bacteria communicate linguistically. This paper argues that these claims should enjoy default literal interpretation. An epistemic consequence is that these findings can contribute directly to understanding the nature of psychological capacities.

Alexander Bird (2001; 2002; 2007) offers a powerful argument showing that, regardless of whether necessitarianism or contingentism about laws is true, salt necessarily dissolves in water. The argument is that the same laws of nature that are necessary for the constitution of salt necessitate the solubility of salt. This paper shows that Bird’s argument faces a serious objection if the possibility of emergentism – in particular, C. D. Broad’s account – is taken into account. The idea is (roughly) that some (...) emergent laws in some possible worlds may disrupt the solubility of salt without disrupting its constitution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Lewtas [2017] recently articulated an argument claiming that emergent conscious causal powers are impossible. In developing his argument, Lewtas makes several assumptions about emergence, phenomenal consciousness, categorical properties, and causation. We argue that there are plausible alternatives to these assumptions. Thus, the proponent of emergent conscious causal powers can escape Lewtas’s challenge.

Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one‐to‐one structure‐function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience‐based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. †To contact the author, (...) please write to: Department of Philosophy, 260 English‐Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; e‐mail: carrie‐[email protected]. (shrink)

In a recent article, Marilyn Baffoe-Bonnie offers three arguments for conducting CRISPR/Cas9 biotechnology research to cure sickle-cell disease (SCD) based on addressing historical and current injustices in SCD research and care. I show that her second and third arguments suffer from roughly the same defect, which is that they really argue for something else rather than for conducting CRISPR/Cas9 research in particular. For instance, the second argument argues that conducting this gene therapy research would improve the relationship between SCD sufferers (...) (who are mostly of African descent) and health care providers. But really what is essential in improving this relationship is for those providers to genuinely care and be concerned, and this could be lacking even with the CRISPR research being done. Indeed, this relationship could be improved even without that research being done, as long as there is genuine concern. Thus, this argument actually argues for the need for genuine concern. As for the third argument, one (of two) problems arises because it claims that CRISPR research for SCD should be pursued because the benefits would be shared by even non-research-participants, as non-participants would be encouraged. However, this argues for any research for SCD, not for CRISPR research in particular. I conclude that a better justice-based argument will use only Baffoe-Bonnie’s first argument, which is based on historic neglect of an actual cure for SCD (going beyond merely management or transplant therapies). (shrink)

Monism is our name for a range of views according to which the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is intimate and necessary, or on which there are no categorical bases at all. In contrast, Dualist views hold that the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is distant and contingent. This paper is a defence of Monism against an influential conceivability argument in favour of Dualism. The argument suggests that the apparent possibility of causal behaviour coming apart from (...) categorical bases is best explained by Dualism. We argue that Monism can explain the apparent possibility as well, if we take metaphysically alien laws — namely, laws whose metaphysical nature is alien to the actual world — into account. (shrink)

This paper outlines three broad conceptual schemes currently in play in the sciences concerned with explaining cognitive abilities. One is the anthropocentric scheme – human cognition – that dominated our thinking about cognition until very recently. Another is the cybernetic-computational scheme – cybernetic cognition – rooted in cognitive science and flourishing in such fields as artificial intelligence, computational neuroscience, and biocybernetics. The third is an evolutionary biological scheme – phylogenetic cognition – that conceptualizes cognition in terms of the phylogeny-based approach (...) we take to all other traits of evolved organisms. It shows how these conceptions ground different research questions and methods, and how their relationship is still in flux. (shrink)

On 25 May 2020, Officer Derek Chauvin asphyxiated George Floyd in Minneapolis — a murder that was captured in a confronting nine-minute bystander video that set off a firestorm of activity on online social networks, in the streets of the United States, and even worldwide. These protests captured the collective rage, dissatisfaction, and resentment personally and vicariously experienced towards the widespread systematic injustice and mistreatment of African Americans by police and vigilantes. The scale of these protests, both online and in (...) the streets, has been estimated to have far exceeded the civil rights marches of the 1960s (Buchanan et al. 2020). Considering the widespread extent of these protests, our research aims to analyse conflictual intergroup moral dynamics in terms of the reactive attitudes expressed by distinct online communities on Twitter. This paper examines the extent to which the Strawsonian (1962) reactive attitudes framework is applicable to the Twitter discourse around the Black Lives Matter protests reignited by the murder of George Floyd. In particular, we argue that the Strawsonian framework is inadequate to understand a range of prevalent attitudes expressed in this discourse — attitudes that we call reactionary as opposed to merely reactive. Reactionary attitudes include counter-indignation on behalf of the accused rather than Strawsonian indignation on behalf of the victim of a moral wrong. We document the expression of such attitudes among the right-wing participants in the online discourse about the Black Lives Matter movement. (shrink)

I argue that an explicit distinction between cognitive characters and cognitive phenotypes is needed for empirical progress in the cognitive sciences and their integration with evolution-guided sciences. I elaborate what ontological commitment to characters involves and how such a commitment would clarify ongoing debates about the relations between human and nonhuman cognition and the extent of cognitive abilities across biological species. I use theoretical proposals in episodic memory, language, and sociocultural bases of cognition to illustrate how cognitive characters are being (...) introduced in scientific practice. (shrink)

Coffee and tea are two beverages commonly-consumed around the world. Therefore, there is much research regarding their physiological effects. However, less is known about their psychological meanings. Derived from a predicted lay association between coffee and arousal, we posit that exposure to coffee-related cues should increase arousal, even in the absence of actual ingestion, relative to exposure to tea-related cues. We further suggest that higher arousal levels should facilitate a concrete level of mental construal as conceptualized by Construal Level Theory. (...) In four experiments, we find that coffee cues prompted participants to see temporal distances as shorter and to think in more concrete, precise terms. Both subjective and physiological arousal explain the effects. We situate our work in the literature that connects food and beverage to cognition or decision-making. We also discuss the applied relevance of our results as coffee and tea are among the most prevalent beverages globally. (shrink)

Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and its similarity with common justifications of within-species discrimination.

The 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a philosophical shift that would help pave the way for modern science, a shift from metaphysical theories of material objects to other views embracing only the empirically-accessible parts of material things. One much-debated topic in the course of this shift was regarding prime matter. The late scholastic Jacobus Zabarella (1533-1589) arrived upon his views about prime matter via his version of the regressus method, a program for a sort of scientific reasoning. In his De (...) rebus naturalibus, Zabarella defends the position that prime matter is extended. However, it is less clear how he accounts for its extension. There is an important text where he apparently suggests that prime matter is extended in and of itself. However, there are two other texts apparently stating that matter is extended in virtue of a distinct accident in the category of quantity. I argue that a decisive reading based solely upon any particular texts is not available. Nevertheless, examining Zabarella’s writing on the topic as a whole, the trajectory of his overall argument is remarkably sympathetic to Averroes, who famously took the accidentally quantified position. Thus, from this systematic feature, the accidentally quantified reading is more reasonable. (shrink)

In Aristotle’s writings regarding the biology of embryology, especially in the Generation of Animals, he contends that the mother’s menstrual fluids provide the material for the generation of the offspring, and the father’s form determines its formation as a member of that species (e.g. human). The katamenia (menstrual fluids) of the mother are said to be potentially all the body parts of the offspring, though actually none of them. So, the fluids are potentially the offspring. But are they a first (...) potentiality or second potentiality (first actuality) of a human, in the terminology of De Anima II? In this paper I will argue that katamenia are a first potentiality of a human. My first argument is that katamenia do not have the potential for human activities such as thinking, but rather the potential of becoming something having the potential for those activities. I answer the objection that katamenia are not even a first potentiality, by appealing to an important text contending that for any x whose source of becoming is external, x is potentially y if nothing in x with respect to matter needs to be changed in order for an external principle to make x into y. (shrink)