Prediction-based decisions, which are often made by utilizing the tools of machine learning, influence nearly all facets of modern life. Ethical concerns about this widespread practice have given rise to the field of fair machine learning and a number of fairness measures, mathematically precise definitions of fairness that purport to determine whether a given prediction-based decision system is fair. Following Reuben Binns (2017), we take ‘fairness’ in this context to be a placeholder for a variety of normative egalitarian considerations. We (...) explore a few fairness measures to suss out their egalitarian roots and evaluate them, both as formalizations of egalitarian ideas and as assertions of what fairness demands of predictive systems. We pay special attention to a recent and popular fairness measure, counterfactual fairness, which holds that a prediction about an individual is fair if it is the same in the actual world and any counterfactual world where the individual belongs to a different demographic group (cf. Kusner et al. (2018)). (shrink)

A América e o mundo estão em processo de colapso devido ao crescimento excessivo da população, a maioria no século passado e agora tudo isso devido ao povo do 3º mundo. O consumo de recursos e a adição de mais um ou dois bilhões de ca. 2100 descontraírem a civilização industrial e provocarão fome, doenças, violência e guerra em escala impressionante. Bilhões morrerão e a guerra nuclear é quase certa. Na América, isso está sendo extremamente acelerado pela imigração maciça e (...) reprodução de imigrantes, combinado com abusos possibilitados pela democracia. A natureza humana depravada inexoravelmente transforma o sonho da democracia e da diversidade em um pesadelo de crime e pobreza. A causa principal do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata de se adaptar ao mundo moderno, o que leva as pessoas a tratar pessoas não relacionadas como se tivessem interesses comuns. Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva aos delírios da engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Poucos entendem que se você ajuda uma pessoa que você machuca outra pessoa — não há almoço grátis e cada item que alguém consome destrói a terra além do reparo. Consequentemente, as políticas sociais em todos os lugares são insustentáveis e uma por uma todas as sociedades sem controles rigorosos sobre o egoísmo entrarão em colapso em anarquia ou ditadura. Sem mudanças dramáticas e imediatas, não há esperança para evitar o colapso da América, ou qualquer país que siga um sistema democrático. Daí meu ensaio "Suicídio pela Democracia". Também está claro que os sete sociopatas que governam a China estão ganhando a 3ª Guerra Mundial, e assim o meu ensaio final sobre eles. A única ameaça maior é a Inteligência Artificial que eu comento brevemente. A chave para tudo sobre nós é a biologia, e é alheia que leva milhões de pessoas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky,Clinton, o Partido Democrata e o Papa a defender ideais utópicos suicidas que inexoravelmente levam direto ao Inferno na Terra. Como W observou, é o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos que é o mais difícil de ver. Vivemos no mundo do Consciente Sistema Linguístico Deliberativo 2, mas é inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 que governa. Esta é a fonte da cegueira universal descrita por The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker's Blank Slate e Tooby e Cosmides's Standard Social Science Model. O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma visão de como nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de ilusões teóricas. Nos três grupos seguintes, comento três das principais ilusões que impedem um mundo sustentável: tecnologia, religião e política (grupos cooperativos). As pessoas acreditam que a sociedade pode ser salva por elas, então eu forneço algumas sugestões no resto do livro sobre por que isso é improvável através de artigos curtos e resenhas de livros recentes de escritores conhecidos. Outra seção descreve a ilusão religiosa – que há algum super poder que nos salvará. A próxima seção descreve as ilusões digitais, que confundem os jogos linguísticos do Sistema 2 com os automatismos do Sistema um, e por isso não podem distinguir máquinas biológicas (ou seja, pessoas) de outros tipos de máquinas (ou seja, computadores). Outras ilusões digitais são de que seremos salvos do puro mal (egoísmo) do Sistema 1 por computadores/IA/robótica/nanotech/engenharia genética criada pelo Sistema 2. O diretor do Almoço Livre nos diz que haverá sérias e possivelmente fatais consequências. A última seção descreve A Única Grande Ilusão Familiar Feliz, ou seja, que somos selecionados para cooperação com todos, e que os ideais eufoniosos da Democracia, Diversidade e Igualdade nos levarão à utopia, se gerenciarmos as coisas corretamente (a possibilidade da política). Mais uma vez, o Princípio do Almoço Livre deve nos avisar que não pode ser verdade, e vemos em toda a história e em todo o mundo contemporâneo, que sem controles rigorosos, egoísmo e estupidez ganham vantagem e logo destroem qualquer nação que abrace essas ilusões. Além disso, a mente dos macacos desconta fortemente o futuro, e por isso cooperamos na venda da herança de nossos descendentes para confortos temporários, agravando muito os problemas. (shrink)

Conventionalists hold that the sorts of events that one survives—such as teletransportation, or a brain transplant—is at least partly determined by our attitudes. But if Conventionalism is true, whose attitudes directly determine whether one survives? Do the individual's attitudes do all the work as Private Conventionalists hold, or do the community's attitudes also factor in as Public Conventionalists hold? There has recently been a greater push towards Private Conventionalism, while explicit arguments for Public Conventionalism are difficult to come by. In (...) this paper, I attempt to rectify the situation by presenting my case for Public Conventionalism. (shrink)

Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso por el crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte del siglo pasado y ahora todo debido a la tercera gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de uno o dos mil millones más alrededor de 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y provocarán hambre, enfermedades, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es muy segura. En Estados Unidos esto está (...) siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinado con los abusos que hacen posible la democracia. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla del crimen y la pobreza. La causa fundamental del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si ayudas a una persona, dañas a otra persona, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una a una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en anarquía o dictadura. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza de impedir el colapso de Estados Unidos, ni de ningún país que siga un sistema democrático. De ahí mi ensayo "Suicidio por Democracia". También está claro ahora que los siete sociópatas que gobiernan China están ganando la Tercera Guerra Mundial, por lo que mi ensayo final sobre ellos. La única amenaza mayor es la Inteligencia Artificial, que comento brevemente. La clave de todo lo que nos pasa es la biología, y es el olvido lo que lleva a millones de personas educadas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton, el Partido Demócrata y el Papa a defender ideales utópicos suicidas que inexorablemente conducen directamente al Infierno en la Tierra. Como W señaló, es lo que siempre está ante nuestros ojos lo que es más difícil de ver. Vivimos en el mundo del sistema linguístico deliberativo consciente 2, pero es inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 lo que gobierna. Esta es la fuente de la ceguera universal descrita por La ilusión fenomenológica (TPI) de Searle, la pizarra en blanco de Pinker y Tooby y el modelo de ciencia social estándar de Cosmides. El primer grupo de artículos intenta dar una idea de cómo nos comportamos que está razonablemente libre de delirios teóricos. En los siguientes tres grupos comento tres de los principales delirios que impiden un mundo sostenible: la tecnología, la religión y la política (grupos cooperativos). La gente cree que la sociedad puede ser salvada por ellos, por lo que proporciono algunas sugerencias en el resto del libro sobre por qué esto es poco probable a través de artículos cortos y reseñas de libros recientes de escritores conocidos. Otra sección describe el delirio religioso – que hay algún superpoder que nos salvará. En la siguiente sección se describen los delirios digitales, que confunden los juegos de idiomas del Sistema 2 con los automatismos del Sistema Uno, y por lo tanto no pueden distinguir las máquinas biológicas (es decir, las personas) de otros tipos de máquinas (es decir, computadoras). Otros delirios digitales son que seremos salvados del mal puro (egoísmo) del Sistema 1 por computadoras/AI/robotics/nanotech/ingeniería genética creada por System 2. El director De No Free Lunch nos dice que habrá consecuencias graves y posiblemente fatales. La última sección describe The One Big Happy Family Delusion, es decir, que somos seleccionados para la cooperación con todos, y que los eufóricos ideales de Democracia, Diversidad e Igualdad nos llevarán a la utopía, si sólo manejamos las cosas correctamente (la posibilidad de la política). Una vez más, el Principio De No Almuerzo Libre debe advertirnos que no puede ser verdad, y vemos a lo largo de la historia y en todo el mundo contemporáneo, que sin estrictos controles, egoísmo y estupidez ganar ventaja y pronto destruir cualquier nación que abraza estos delirios. Además, la mente del mono descuenta el futuro, por lo que cooperamos en la venta de la herencia de nuestros descendientes para las comodidades temporales, exacerbando en gran medida los problemas. (shrink)

L'America e il mondo sono in procinto di collassare a causa di una crescita eccessiva della popolazione, la maggior parte per il secolo scorso e ora tutto a causa di persone del terzo mondo. Il consumo di risorse e l'aggiunta di uno o due miliardi in più di 2100 crolleranno la civiltà industriale e porterà alla fame, alle malattie, alla violenza e alla guerra su scala impressionante. Miliardi moriranno e la guerra nucleare è tutt'altro che certa. In America questo è (...) stato enormemente accelerato dalla massiccia immigrazione e dalla riproduzione degli immigrati, unite ad abusi resi possibili dalla democrazia. La natura umana depravata trasforma inesorabilmente il sogno della democrazia e della diversità in un incubo di criminalità e povertà. La causa principale del collasso è l'incapacità della nostra psicologia innata di adattarsi al mondo moderno, che porta le persone a trattare le persone non correlate come se avessero interessi comuni. Questo, oltre all'ignoranza della biologia e della psicologia di base, porta alle illusioni di ingegneria sociale dei parzialmente istruiti che controllano le società democratiche. Pochi capiscono che se aiuti una persona che fai del male a qualcun altro, non c'è pranzo gratuito e ogni singolo oggetto che qualcuno consuma distrugge la terra in modo irreparabile. Di conseguenza, le politiche sociali ovunque sono insostenibili e una dopo l'altra tutte le società senza rigorosi controlli sull'egoismo crolleranno nell'anarchia o nella dittatura. Senza cambiamenti drammatici e immediati, non c'è speranza di prevenire il crollo dell'America, o di qualsiasi paese che segua un sistema democratico. Da qui il mio saggio "Suicide by Democracy". È anche ormai chiaro che i sette sociopatici che governano la Cina stanno vincendo la terza guerra mondiale, e quindi il mio saggio conclusivo su di loro. L'unica minaccia più grande è l'Intelligenza Artificiale che commento brevemente. La chiave di tutto ciò che ci riguarda è la biologia, ed è l'ignarietà che porta milioni di persone intelligenti istruite come Obama, Chomsky,Clinton, il Partito Democratico e il Papa a sposare ideali utopici suicidi che portano inesorabilmente direttamente all'Inferno sulla Terra. Come W ha notato, è ciò che è sempre davanti ai nostri occhi che è il più difficile da vedere. Viviamo nel mondo del sistema linguistico deliberativo cosciente 2, ma è inconscio, automatico sistema riflessivo 1 che governa. Questa è la fonte della cecità universale descritta da The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI) di Searle, Pinker's Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides' Standard Social Science Model. Il primo gruppo di articoli cerca di dare un'idea di come ci comportiamo che è ragionevolmente privo di illusioni teoriche. Nei prossimi tre gruppi commento tre delle principali illusioni che impediscono un mondo sostenibile: tecnologia, religione e politica (gruppi cooperativi). La gente crede che la società possa essere salvata da loro, quindi fornisco alcuni suggerimenti nel resto del libro sul perché questo è improbabile attraverso brevi articoli e recensioni di libri recenti di scrittori ben noti. Un'altra sezione descrive l'illusione religiosa – che c'è qualche super potere che ci salverà. La sezione successiva descrive le illusioni digitali, che confondono i giochi linguistici del System 2 con gli automatismi del Sistema uno, e quindi non possono distinguere le macchine biologiche (cioè le persone) da altri tipi di macchine (cioè i computer). Altri illusioni digitali sono che saremo salvati dal male puro (egoismo) del Sistema 1 da computer/AI/robotica/nanotecnologia/ingegneria genetica creata dal System 2. Il principale Nessun pranzo libero ci dice che ci saranno conseguenze gravi e forse fatali. L'ultima sezione descrive The One Big Happy Family Delusion, cioè che siamo selezionati per la cooperazione con tutti, e che gli ideali euforici di Democrazia, Diversità e Uguaglianza ci condurranno all'utopia, se ne gestiamo le cose correttamente (la possibilità della politica). Ancora una volta, il No Free Lunch Principle dovrebbe avvertirci che non può essere vero, e vediamo nel corso della storia e in tutto il mondo contemporaneo, che senza controlli rigorosi,egoismo e stupidità guadagnano il sopravvento e presto distruggono qualsiasi nazione che abbracci queste illusioni. Inoltre, la mente scimmia sconti ripida il futuro, e così collaboriamo nel vendere il patrimonio del nostro discendente per comfort temporanei, esacerbando notevolmente i problemi. (shrink)

Dado que los problemas filosóficos son el resultado de nuestra psicología innata, o como Wittgenstein lo afirma, debido a la falta de perspicuidad del lenguaje, se ejecutan a lo largo del discurso y el comportamiento humano, por lo que hay una necesidad infinita de análisis filosófico, no sólo en el 'human ciencias de la filosofía, la sociología, la antropología, la ciencia política, la psicología, la historia, la literatura, la religión, etc., pero en las "ciencias duras" de la física, las matemáticas (...) y la biología. Es universal mezclar las preguntas del juego de idiomas con las verdaderas científicas en cuanto a cuáles son los hechos empíricos. El científico está siempre presente y Wittgenstein, posiblemente el psicólogo intuitivo más grande de todos los tiempos, lo ha antedicho hace mucho tiempo, comenzando con los Libros Azul y Marrón a principios de los años 1930. El lenguaje está programado en nuestros genes y está involucrado en casi todo nuestro comportamiento social. Filosofía en sentido estricto (es decir, filosofía académica), es como Wittgenstein nos mostró, el estudio de la forma en que se utiliza el lenguaje (juegos de idiomas) y lo considero como la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (es decir, casi todo lo que implica el lenguaje que a menudo se llama Sistema 2 o pensamiento lento). Sin embargo, como espero haber mostrado en mis escritos durante la última década, el comportamiento no linguístico o el Sistema 1 o el pensamiento rápido también se describe con el lenguaje y esto conduce a una confusión sin fin que he tratado de aclarar aquí y que se resume en las tablas que presento. Es mi afirmación que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que presenta prominentemente aquí describe más o menos con precisión, o al menos sirve como heurística para, cómo pensamos y nos comportamos, y por lo tanto no abarca simplemente filosofía y psicología, sino todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo veo, incluye tanto el Sistema Linguístico deliberativo consciente 2 como las acciones o reflejos inconscientes automatizados del Sistema 1 automatizado. Proporciono una encuesta crítica de algunos de los principales hallazgos de dos de los estudiantes más eminentes del comportamiento de los tiempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle, sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida El descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein -que todos los problemas verdaderamente "filosóficos" son los mismos —confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo tanto todas las soluciones son iguales— mirando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que su verdad condiciones (Condiciones de Satisfacción o COS) son claras. El problema básico es que se puede decir cualquier cosa, pero no se puede significar (indicar COS claro para) cualquier expresión arbitraria y significado sólo es posible en un contexto muy específico. Analizo varios escritos por y sobre ellos desde la perspectiva moderna de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (popularizados como 'pensar rápido, pensar lento'), empleando una nueva tabla de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Demuestro que se trata de una heurística poderosa para describir el comportamiento con revisiones críticas de los escritos de una amplia variedad de científicos del comportamiento (es decir, todos). El primer grupo de artículos intenta dar una idea de cómo nos comportamos que está razonablemente libre de delirios teóricos como lo muestran las reseñas de libros de autores destacados en filosofía y psicología, que como no tomio puede ser visto como la misma disciplina en muchas situaciones . En la siguiente sección comento confusiones muy básicas en las que menos se pueden esperar, en ciencias y matemáticas. A continuación, me dirijo a las confusiones en las que la mayoría de la gente las espera, en la religión (es decir, en grupos cooperativos formados para facilitar la reproducción). Por último, doy algunos puntos de vista sobre las áreas en las que todos los temas se unen: la economía y la política. La clave de todo lo que nos pasa es la biología, y es el olvido que lleva millones de personas educadas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton y el Papa para defender ideales utópicos suicidas que inexorablemente conducen directamente al infierno en la Tierra. Como señaló Wittgenstein, lo más difícil de ver es lo que siempre está ante nuestros ojos. Vivimos en el mundo del sistema linguístico deliberativo consciente 2, pero es inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 lo que gobierna. Esta es la fuente de la ceguera universal descrita por La ilusión fenomenológica (TPI) de Searle, La pizarra en blanco de Pinker y el modelo de ciencia social estándar de Tooby y Cosmides. Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso por el crecimiento excesivo de la población. La causa principal del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarnos al mundo moderno. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. De ahí mi ensayo "Suicidio por Democracia". También está claro ahora que los siete sociópatas que gobiernan China están ganando la Tercera Guerra Mundial, por lo que mi ensayo final sobre ellos. La única amenaza mayor es la Inteligencia Artificial, que comento brevemente en el último párrafo. (shrink)

Uma vez que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein disse, devido à falta de perspicuidade da linguagem, eles correm ao longo do discurso e comportamento humano, por isso há necessidade infinita de análise filosófica, não apenas no 'humano ciências' de filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, psicologia, história, literatura, religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, matemática e biologia. É universal misturar as questões do jogo de linguagem com as reais científicas sobre quais (...) são os fatos empíricos. O cientismo está sempre presente e Wittgenstein, indiscutivelmente o maior psicólogo intuitivo de todos os tempos, o colocou diante de nós há muito tempo, começando com os Blue and Brown Books no início dos anos 1930. A linguagem é programada em nossos genes e está envolvida em quase todo o nosso comportamento social. Filosofia no sentido rigoroso (ou seja, filosofia acadêmica), é como Wittgenstein nos mostrou, o estudo da forma como a linguagem é usada (jogos linguísticos) e eu a considero como a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de maior ordem (ou seja, praticamente tudo envolvendo linguagem que muitas vezes é chamado de Sistema 2 ou pensamento lento). No entanto, como espero ter mostrado em meus escritos ao longo da última década, comportamento não linguístico ou Sistema 1 ou pensamento rápido também é descrito com linguagem e isso leva a uma confusão sem fim que eu tentei esclarecer aqui e que é resumida nas tabelas que eu apresento. É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heuristica para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema 1. Eu forneço uma pesquisa crítica de algumas das principais descobertas de dois dos mais eminentes alunos de comportamento dos tempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, sobre a estrutura lógica da intencionalidade (mente, linguagem, comportamento), tomando como meu ponto de partida A descoberta fundamental de Wittgenstein – de que todos os problemas verdadeiramente "filosóficos" são os mesmos — confusões sobre como usar a linguagem em um contexto específico, e assim todas as soluções são as mesmas — olhando como a linguagem pode ser usada no contexto em questão para que sua verdade condições (Condições de Satisfação ou COS) são claras. O problema básico é que se pode dizer qualquer coisa, mas não se pode significar (COS claro pelo Estado) qualquer expressão arbitrária e significado só é possível em um contexto muito específico. Analiso vários escritos por e sobre eles da perspectiva moderna dos dois sistemas de pensamento (popularizados como "pensando rápido, pensando devagar"), empregando uma nova tabela de intencionalidade e nova nomenclatura de sistemas duplos. Eu mostro que este é um heurístico poderoso para descrever o comportamento com críticas dos escritos de uma grande variedade de cientistas comportamentais (ou seja, todos). O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma visão de como nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de ilusões teóricas, como mostrado por revisões de livros de autores líderes em filosofia e psicologia, que, como notei, podem ser vistos como a mesma disciplina em muitas situações. Na próxima seção eu comento sobre confusões muito básicas onde se poderia menos esperar - em ciências e matemática. Em seguida, recorro a confusões onde a maioria das pessoas as espera — na religião (ou seja, em grupos cooperativos formados para facilitar a reprodução). Finalmente, eu forneço alguns pontos de vista sobre áreas onde todas as questões se unem — economia e política. A chave para tudo sobre nós é a biologia, e é alheio a ela que leva milhões de pessoas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton e o Papa para defender ideais utópicos suicidas que inexoravelmente levam direto para o Inferno na Terra. Como Wittgenstein observou, é o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos que é o mais difícil de ver. Vivemos no mundo do Consciente Sistema Linguístico Deliberativo 2, mas é inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 que governa. Esta é a fonte do cegueira universal descrita por The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), de Searle, Pinker's Blank Slate e Tooby and Cosmides's Standard Social Science Model. A América e o mundo estão em processo de colapso devido ao crescimento excessivo da população. A causa principal do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata de se adaptar ao mundo moderno. Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva aos delírios da engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Daí meu ensaio "Suicídio pela Democracia". Também está claro que os sete sociopatas que governam a China estão ganhando a 3ª Guerra Mundial, e assim o meu ensaio final sobre eles. A única ameaça maior é a Inteligência Artificial que eu comento brevemente no último parágrafo. (shrink)

Ameryka i świat są w trakcie upadku z nadmiernego wzrostu populacji, większość z nich w ostatnim stuleciu, a teraz wszystko to ze względu na 3-cia ludzi świata. Konsumpcja zasobów i dodanie jednego lub dwóch miliardów więcej około 2100 upadnie cywilizacji przemysłowej i doprowadzić do głodu, chorób, przemocy i wojny na oszałamiającą skalę. Miliardy umrą, a wojna nuklearna jest pewna. W Ameryce jest to znacznie przyspieszone przez masową imigrację i reprodukcję imigrantów, w połączeniu z nadużyciami możliwymi przez demokrację. Zdeprawowana ludzka natura (...) nieubłaganie zamienia marzenie o demokracji i różnorodności w koszmar przestępczości i ubóstwa. Główną przyczyną upadku jest niezdolność naszej wrodzonej psychologii do przystosowania się do współczesnego świata, która prowadzi ludzi do traktowania osób niepowiązanych tak, jakby mieli wspólne interesy. To, plus nieznajomość podstawowej biologii i psychologii, prowadzi do złudzeń inżynierii społecznej częściowo wykształconych, którzy kontrolują demokratyczne społeczeństwa. Niewielu rozumie, że jeśli pomożesz jednej osobie, skrzywdzisz kogoś innego — nie ma darmowego lunchu, a każdy przedmiot, który ktoś zużywa, niszczy ziemię nie do naprawienia. W związku z tym polityka społeczna na całym świecie jest niezrównoważona i wszystkie społeczeństwa bez rygorystycznej kontroli egoizmów popadną w anarchię lub dyktaturę. Bez dramatycznych i natychmiastowych zmian nie ma nadziei na zapobieżenie upadkowi Ameryki ani żadnego kraju, który podąża za systemem demokratycznym. Stąd mój esej "Samobójstwo przez demokrację". Jest również teraz jasne, że siedmiu socjopatów, którzy rządzą Chinami, wygrywa 3 wojnę światową, a więc mój esej końcowy na ich temat. Jedynym większym zagrożeniem jest sztuczna inteligencja, którą krótko komentuję. Kluczem do wszystkiego o nas jest biologia, i to jest niepamięć do niego, że prowadzi miliony inteligentnych wykształconych ludzi, takich jak Obama, Chomsky,Clinton, Partii Demokratycznej i papieża do espouse samobójcze utopijne ideały, które nieubłaganie prowadzić prosto do piekła na Ziemi. Jak zauważył W, to, co jest zawsze na naszych oczach, że jest najtrudniejsze do zobaczenia. Żyjemy w świecie świadomego deliberacyjnego systemu językowego 2, ale rządzi nieświadomy, automatyczny system refleksyjny 1. Jest to źródło uniwersalnej ślepoty opisanej przez Searle's The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Blank Slate Pinkera oraz Tooby and Cosmides' Standard Social Science Model. Pierwsza grupa artykułów próbuje dać pewien wgląd w to, jak się zachowujemy, że jest w miarę wolny od teoretycznych urojeń. W kolejnych trzech grupach komentuję trzy główne urojenia uniemożliwiające zrównoważony świat: technologię, religię i politykę (grupy spółdzielcze). Ludzie wierzą, że społeczeństwo może być zapisane przez nich, więc podam kilka sugestii w pozostałej części książki, dlaczego jest to mało prawdopodobne poprzez krótkie artykuły i recenzje ostatnich książek znanych pisarzy. Inna sekcja opisuje religijne złudzenie – że jest jakaś super moc, która nas uratuje. W następnej sekcji opisano cyfrowe urojenia, które mylą gry językowe Systemu 2 z automatyzmami Systemu Pierwszego, a więc nie mogą odróżnić maszyn biologicznych (tj. ludzi) od innych rodzajów maszyn (tj. komputerów). Inne cyfrowe urojenia są takie, że zostaniemy zbawieni od czystego zła (egoizm) systemu 1 przez komputery / AI / robotyka / nanotech / inżynieria genetyczna stworzona przez System 2. No Free Lunch główny mówi nam, że będą poważne i ewentualnie śmiertelne konsekwencje. Ostatnia część opisuje "The One Big Happy Family Delusion", czyli to, że jesteśmy wybierani do współpracy ze wszystkimi, a eufonialne ideały Demokracji, Różnorodności i Równości doprowadzą nas do utopii, jeśli po prostu dobrze zarządzamy rzeczami (możliwością polityki). Ponownie, No Free Lunch Zasada powinna ostrzegać nas to nie może być prawdą, i widzimy w całej historii i na całym współczesnym świecie, że bez ścisłej kontroli, egoizm i głupota zdobyć przewagę i wkrótce zniszczyć każdy naród, który obejmuje te urojenia. Ponadto małpi umysł gwałtownie dyskontuje przyszłość, dlatego współpracujemy przy sprzedaży dziedzictwa naszego potomka dla tymczasowych udogodnień, znacznie pogłębiając problemy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I motivate ‘Origin Conventionalism’—the view that which facts about one’s origins are essential to one’s existence depends partly on our person-directed attitudes. One important upshot is that the view offers a novel and attractive solution to the Nonidentity Problem. That problem typically assumes that the sperm-egg pair from which a person originates is essential to that person’s existence; in which case, for many future persons that come into existence under adverse conditions, had those conditions not been realized, the individuals (...) wouldn’t have existed. This is problematic because it delivers the counter-intuitive conclusion that it’s not wrong to bring about such adverse conditions since they don’t harm anyone. Origin Conventionalism, in contrast, holds that whether a person’s sperm-egg origin is essential to their existence depends on their person-directed attitudes. I argue that this provides a unique and attractive way of preserving the intuition that the actions in the ‘nonidentity cases’ are morally wrong because of the potential harm done to the individuals in question. (shrink)

There has been a growing worry that perdurantism—and similarly ontologically abundant views—is morally untenable. For perdurantism posits that, coinciding with persons, are person-like objects, and giving them their moral due seems to require giving up prudentially driven self-sacrifice. One way to avoid this charge is to adopt consequentialism. But Mark Johnston has argued that the marriage of consequentialism and perdurantism is in moral trouble. For, depending on the nature of time, consequentialist perdurantists either are unable to do more than one (...) good act or they are morally obliged to adopt a repugnant form of ageism. I argue both that perdurantist consequentialism doesn’t have the latter implication, and that there’s at least one plausible form of consequentialism that perdurantists can adopt to avoid the former implication. (shrink)

The Growing Block Theory of time says that the metaphysical openness of the future should be understood in terms of there not being any future objects or events. But in a series of works, Ross Cameron, Elizabeth Barnes, and Robbie Williams have developed a competing view that understands metaphysical openness in terms of it being indeterminate whether there exist future objects or events. I argue that the three reasons they give for preferring their account are not compelling. And since the (...) notion of “indeterminate existence” suffers conceptual problems, the Growing Block is the preferable view. (shrink)

There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion that we are morally obliged to be feckless. I argue that this charge critically overlooks the epistemic situation—what I call the ‘veil of ignorance’—that perdurantists find themselves in. Though the veil of ignorance still requires an alteration of our commonsense understanding of the demands on action, I argue for two conclusions. The first is that the alteration that is required (...) isn’t a moral one, but rather an alteration of prudential reasoning. Second, and more importantly, this alteration isn’t necessarily a repugnant one. In fact, given that it prudentially pushes one towards greater impartiality, it may be seen as a point in favor of perdurantism. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how to educate toward democracy, which has as its defining trait the ability to self-correct. We draw on a study that investigated Deep Reflective Thinking (DRT) as a classroom method for cultivating collective doubt, which is essential for developing students’ capacity for self-correction in a community of inquiry.

This article offers a novel solution to the problem of material constitution: by including non-concrete objects among the parts of material objects, we can avoid having a statue and its constituent piece of clay composed of all the same proper parts. Non-concrete objects—objects that aren’t concrete, but possibly are—have been used in defense of the claim that everything necessarily exists. But the account offered shows that non-concreta are independently useful in other domains as well. The resulting view falls under a (...) ‘nonmaterial partist’ class of views that includes, in particular, Laurie Paul’s and Kathrin Koslicki’s constitution views; ones where material objects have properties or structures as parts respectively. The article gives reasons for preferring the non-concretist solution over these other non-material partist views and defends it against objections. (shrink)

The idea that God creates out of Himself seems quite attractive. Many find great appeal in holding that a temporally finite universe must have a cause, but I think there’s also great appeal in holding that there’s pre-existent stuff out of which that universe is created—and what could that stuff be but part of God? Though attractive, the idea of creation ex deo hasn’t been taken seriously by theistic philosophers. Perhaps this is because it seems too vague—‘could anything enlightening be (...) said about what those parts are?’—or objectionable—‘wouldn’t creating out of those parts lessen or destroy God?’ Drawing from Stephen Kosslyn and Michael Tye’s work on the ontology of mental images, I respond to the above questions by developing a theory on which God creates the universe out of His mental imagery. (shrink)

I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’, on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the ‘progression [Stufenleiter]’ of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be (...) confused with ‘knowledge [Wissen]’, insofar as knowledge represents the culmination of a separate orthogonal progression of acts of ‘holding-true’. Along the way, I show how having in focus the specific progression from representation, to consciousness, to cognition allows us to better appreciate the architectonic significance of the progression of Kant’s analysis in the first Critique, and also helps to illuminate the unity of Kant’s account of cognition itself across its variety of forms. (shrink)

Existentialism claims that propositions that directly refer to individuals depend on those individuals for their existence. I argue for two points regarding Existentialism. First, I argue that recent accounts of Existentialism run into difficulties accommodating the possibility of there being a lonely alien electron. This problem is distinct from one of the better-known alien problems—concerning iterated modal properties of aliens—and can’t be solved using a standard response to the iterated case. Second, though the lonely alien electron problem might seem to (...) be reason to reject the sort of Existentialist view at hand, there’s a plausible way to preserve the view: accept the existence of possible worlds that directly refer to individuals that don’t exist in those worlds. Such a solution might seem incompatible with Existentialism, but I show that Existentialists can avoid the incompatibility and should find the resulting view plausible. (shrink)

Presentism says that only present objects exist. But the view has trouble grounding past-tensed truths like “dinosaurs existed”. Standard Eternalism grounds those truths by positing the existence of past objects—like dinosaurs. But Standard Eternalism conflicts with the intuition that there is genuine change—the intuition that there once were dinosaurs and no longer are any. I offer a novel theory of time—‘The Imprint’—that does a better job preserving both the grounding and genuine change intuitions. The Imprint says that the past and (...) present exist, but where the present exhibits mass-energy, the past only consists of curved empty regions of spacetime. We therefore avoid saying that there are dinosaurs, since there is no mass-energy in the past; but the curvature of the past gives us a way to ground the truth that “dinosaurs existed”. (shrink)

Dualism about possible worlds says that merely possible worlds aren’t concrete objects, but the actual world is concrete. This view seems to be the natural one for ersatzers about merely possible worlds to take; yet one is hard-pressed to find any defenders of it in contemporary modal metaphysics. The main reason is that Dualism struggles with the issue of how merely possible worlds could have been actual. I explain that there are two different Dualist strategies that can be taken to (...) address the problem. Furthermore, one or other of these strategies should be plausible to anyone who accepts both Existentialism—which tells us that the existence of singular propositions depends on what they directly refer to—and Serious Actualism—which tells us that things must exist in order to instantiate properties. Though it has long been ignored, Dualism is a live option. (shrink)

A number of findings in the field of machine learning have given rise to questions about what it means for automated scoring- or decisionmaking systems to be fair. One center of gravity in this discussion is whether such systems ought to satisfy classification parity (which requires parity in accuracy across groups, defined by protected attributes) or calibration (which requires similar predictions to have similar meanings across groups, defined by protected attributes). Central to this discussion are impossibility results, owed to Kleinberg (...) et al. (2016), Chouldechova (2017), and Corbett-Davies et al. (2017), which show that classification parity and calibration are often incompatible. This paper aims to argue that classification parity, calibration, and a newer, interesting measure called counterfactual fairness are unsatisfactory measures of fairness, offer a general diagnosis of the failure of these measures, and sketch an alternative approach to understanding fairness in machine learning. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi 莊子 depicts persons as surviving their deaths through the natural transformations of the world into very different forms—such as roosters, cart-wheels, rat livers, and so on. It is common to interpret these passages metaphorically. In this essay, however, I suggest employing a “Conventionalist” view of persons that says whether a person survives some event is not merely determined by the world, but is partly determined by our own attitudes. On this reading, Zhuangzi’s many teachings urging us to embrace (...) transformation are not merely a psychological aid for dealing with death, but also serve as a tool for literally surviving it. (shrink)

Holm (2022) argues that a class of algorithmic fairness measures, that he refers to as the ‘performance parity criteria’, can be understood as applications of John Broome’s Fairness Principle. We argue that the performance parity criteria cannot be read this way. This is because in the relevant context, the Fairness Principle requires the equalization of actual individuals’ individual-level chances of obtaining some good (such as an accurate prediction from a predictive system), but the performance parity criteria do not guarantee any (...) such thing: the measures merely ensure that certain population-level ratios hold. (shrink)

In this chapter I will argue against both of these interpretations and will begin to develop an alternate account of imagination in experience. Against those who minimize imagination’s role, I will highlight the distinctive contribution of the imagination to experience. In particular, I will foreground the specific role that the imagination plays in making possible the distinct mental act, intermediate between intuition and experience, that Kant calls “perception [Wahrnehmung]” as the “empirical consciousness [Bewußtsein]” of appearances (cf. B207). Because perception involves (...) images essentially (cf. A120), and because Kant understands experience itself to be a “synthesis of perceptions” (cf. B218), this strongly suggests (against minimalists) that experience, too, will incorporate images into the manner in which it allows us to cognize physical objects. By highlighting the contribution of imagination prior to experience, my own account, therefore, overlaps in part with the readings that seek instead to maximize the role of imagination. Against maximalists, however, I will argue that imagination contributes only in (and after) the transition from intuition to perception, rather than already being at work in the stage of intuition itself. More specifically, I will argue that Kant takes the activity of imagination to make perception possible by acting on already-formed intuitions in order to bring about the consciousness of them, rather than to bring the intuitions about in the first place. I will also argue that this synthesis of intuitions should be kept distinct from the activity of understanding. (shrink)

New media (highly interactive digital technology for creating, sharing, and consuming information) affords users a great deal of control over their informational diets. As a result, many users of new media unwittingly encapsulate themselves in epistemic bubbles (epistemic structures, such as highly personalized news feeds, that leave relevant sources of information out (Nguyen forthcoming)). Epistemically paternalistic alterations to new media technologies could be made to pop at least some epistemic bubbles. We examine one such alteration that Facebook has made in (...) an effort to fight fake news and conclude that it is morally permissible. We further argue that many epistemically paternalistic policies can (and should) be a perennial part of the internet information environment. (shrink)

This paper examines the practice of using predictive systems to lengthen the prison sentences of convicted persons when the systems forecast a higher likelihood of re-offense or re-arrest. There has been much critical discussion of technologies used for sentencing, including questions of bias and opacity. However, there hasn’t been a discussion of whether this use of predictive systems makes sense in the first place. We argue that it does not by showing that there is no plausible theory of punishment that (...) supports it. (shrink)

Why is aesthetics important to Wittgenstein? What, according to him, is the function of the aesthetic? My answer consists of three parts: first, I argue that Wittgenstein finds himself in an aporia of normative consciousness – that is to say, a problem with regard to our awareness of the world in terms of its relation to a norm. Second, I argue that the function of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic writings is to deal with this aporia. Third, through a comparison with Friedrich Schlegel’s (...) writings on allegory, I try to show that the way in which Wittgenstein resolves the aporia renders him a Romanticist philosopher. The point of an aesthetic interaction, for Wittgenstein, is that it can render clear what cannot be described without running against the walls of our cage: the absolute. Through aesthetic interactions we are able to (indirectly) access a ground for norms by which we experience ourselves as unconditionally bound. (shrink)

There has been a tendency in some of the most influential recent interpretations of Hegel to downplay the theological characterizations that Hegel gives to the subject-matter of logic, and to emphasize, instead, certain continuities taken to exist between Hegel’s conception of logic and that of Kant. In the work of Robert Pippin and others, this has led to an ‘apperception’-oriented interpretation of Hegel’s logic, according to which Hegel follows Kant in taking logic to be primarily concerned with the nature of (...) human self-conscious subjectivity. Here I put pressure on this interpretation—first, by foregrounding textual and systematic evidence for taking the theological characterizations to accurately convey Hegel’s considered position on logic, as the science of the ‘absolute idea’, and then, secondly, by showing how Hegel’s arguments for the absolute formality and universality of logic point instead to a more fully-fledged rejection of Kant’s conception as too specifically psychological. (shrink)

Art-science, as its name suggests, combines art with science. The idea of combining art and science raises the question whether the outcome, art-scientific works, can succeed against a standard properly belonging to them. In other words: can there be such a thing as an art-scientific work, or do such works merely belong to either art or science while superficially seeming to belong to the other sphere as well? Surprisingly perhaps, these concerns overlap with a chief point of contention as regards (...) Adorno’s mature thinking, in particular his Aesthetic Theory ([1970] 2002): whether or not it is coherent to believe that knowledge can have an aesthetic form. This essay is motivated by the thought that Adorno’s reflections are useful for understanding contemporary art as well, and the burgeoning paradigm of art-science represents a welcome occasion to ask the reverse question: can art become theoretical? The first aim of this essay is, accordingly, to consider how Adorno’s negative dialectic of philosophy and art might illuminate the field of art-science, how its works might express sui generis truths. In turn, an examination of how the aestheticisation theme in Adorno might be appropriated for the business of art-science critique, might tell us something about the relationship between artistic content and philosophical interpretation, beauty and truth, in Adorno. (shrink)

When agents insert technological systems into their decision-making processes, they can obscure moral responsibility for the results. This can give rise to a distinct moral wrong, which we call “agency laundering.” At root, agency laundering involves obfuscating one’s moral responsibility by enlisting a technology or process to take some action and letting it forestall others from demanding an account for bad outcomes that result. We argue that the concept of agency laundering helps in understanding important moral problems in a number (...) of recent cases involving automated, or algorithmic, decision-systems. We apply our conception of agency laundering to a series of examples, including Facebook’s automated advertising suggestions, Uber’s driver interfaces, algorithmic evaluation of K-12 teachers, and risk assessment in criminal sentencing. We distinguish agency laundering from several other critiques of information technology, including the so-called “responsibility gap,” “bias laundering,” and masking. (shrink)

Algorithmic systems and predictive analytics play an increasingly important role in various aspects of modern life. Scholarship on the moral ramifications of such systems is in its early stages, and much of it focuses on bias and harm. This paper argues that in understanding the moral salience of algorithmic systems it is essential to understand the relation between algorithms, autonomy, and agency. We draw on several recent cases in criminal sentencing and K–12 teacher evaluation to outline four key ways in (...) which issues of agency, autonomy, and respect for persons can conflict with algorithmic decision-making. Three of these involve failures to treat individual agents with the respect they deserve. The fourth involves distancing oneself from a morally suspect action by attributing one’s decision to take that action to an algorithm, thereby laundering one’s agency. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: So far in this book, we have examined algorithmic decision systems from three autonomy-based perspectives: in terms of what we owe autonomous agents (chapters 3 and 4), in terms of the conditions required for people to act autonomously (chapters 5 and 6), and in terms of the responsibilities of agents (chapter 7). -/- In this chapter we turn to the ways in which autonomy underwrites democratic governance. Political authority, which is to say the ability of a government to exercise (...) power, may be justifiable or not. Whether it is justified and how it can come to be justified is a question of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is another way in which autonomy and responsibility are linked. This relationship is the basis of the current chapter, and it is important in understanding the moral salience of algorithmic systems. We will draw the connection as follows. We begin, in section 8.1, by describing two uses of technology: crime predicting technology used to drive policing practices and social media technology used to influence elections (including by Cambridge Analytica and by the Internet Research Agency). In section 8.2 we consider several views of legitimacy and argue for a hybrid version of normative legitimacy based on one recently offered by Fabienne Peter. In section 8.3 we will explain that the connection between political legitimacy and autonomy is that legitimacy is grounded in legitimating processes, which are in turn based on autonomy. Algorithmic systems—among them PredPol and the Cambridge Analytica-Facebook-Internet Research Agency amalgam—can hinder that legitimation process and conflict with democratic legitimacy, as we argue in section 8.4. We will conclude by returning to several cases that serve as through-lines to the book: Loomis, Wagner, and Houston Schools. -/- The link below is to an open-access copy of the chapter. (shrink)

The harms associated with wireless mobile devices (e.g. smartphones) are well documented. They have been linked to anxiety, depression, diminished attention span, sleep disturbance, and decreased relationship satisfaction. Perhaps what is most worrying from a moral perspective, however, is the effect these devices can have on our autonomy. In this article, we argue that there is an obligation to foster and safeguard autonomy in ourselves, and we suggest that wireless mobile devices pose a serious threat to our capacity to fulfill (...) this obligation. We defend the existence of an imperfect duty to be a ‘digital minimalist’. That is, we have a moral obligation to be intentional about how and to what extent we use these devices. The empirical findings already justify prudential reasons in favor of digital minimalism, but the moral duty is distinct from and independent of prudential considerations. (shrink)

The attention economy — the market where consumers’ attention is exchanged for goods and services — poses a variety of threats to individuals’ autonomy, which, at minimum, involves the ability to set and pursue ends for oneself. It has been argued that the threat wireless mobile devices pose to autonomy gives rise to a duty to oneself to be a digital minimalist, one whose interactions with digital technologies are intentional such that they do not conflict with their ends. In this (...) paper, we argue that there is a corresponding duty to others to be an attention ecologist, one who promotes digital minimalism in others. Although the moral reasons for being an attention ecologist are similar to those that motivate the duty to oneself, the arguments diverge in important ways. We explore the application of this duty in various domains where we have special obligations to promote autonomy in virtue of the different roles we play in the lives of others, such as parents and teachers. We also discuss the consequences of our arguments for employers, software developers, and policy makers. (shrink)

In this chapter, we turn our attention to the effects of the attention economy on our ability to act autonomously as a group. We begin by clarifying which sorts of groups we are concerned with, which are structured groups (groups sufficiently organized that it makes sense to attribute agency to the group itself). Drawing on recent work by Purves and Davis (2022), we describe the essential roles of trust (i.e., depending on groups to fulfill their commitments) and trustworthiness (i.e., the (...) property of a group that makes trusting them fitting) in autonomous group action, with particular emphasis on democratic institutions (which we view as group agents) and democratic legitimacy (which depends on trust and trustworthiness). We then explain how engagement maximization promotes polarization, which is detrimental to trust and trustworthiness and, in turn, democratic legitimacy and democratic institutions. We close by considering what groups might do to protect themselves from the threat posed to them by the attention economy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: One important criticism of algorithmic systems is that they lack transparency. Such systems can be opaque because they are complex, protected by patent or trade secret, or deliberately obscure. In the EU, there is a debate about whether the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) contains a “right to explanation,” and if so what such a right entails. Our task in this chapter is to address this informational component of algorithmic systems. We argue that information access is integral for respecting (...) autonomy, and transparency policies should be tailored to advance autonomy. -/- To make this argument we distinguish two facets of agency (i.e., capacity to act). The first is practical agency, or the ability to act effectively according to one’s values. The second is what we call cognitive agency, which is the ability to exercise what Pamela Hieronymi calls “evaluative control” (i.e., the ability to control our affective states, such as beliefs, desires, and attitudes). We argue that respecting autonomy requires providing persons sufficient information to exercise evaluative control and properly interpret the world and one’s place in it. We draw this distinction out by considering algorithmic systems used in background checks, and we apply the view to key cases involving risk assessment in criminal justice decisions and K-12 teacher evaluation. -/- The link below is to an open access version of the chapter. (shrink)

In this open access book, Timothy Aylsworth and Clinton Castro draw on the deep well of Kantian ethics to argue that we have moral duties, both to ourselves and to others, to protect our autonomy from the threat posed by the problematic use of technology. The problematic use of technologies like smartphones threatens our autonomy in a variety of ways, and critics have only begun to appreciate the vast scope of this problem. In the last decade, we have seen (...) a flurry of books making “self-help” arguments about how we could live happier, more fulfilling lives if we were less addicted to our phones. But none of these authors see this issue as one involving a moral duty to protect our autonomy. (shrink)

It has been widely accepted that intentional actions are “the actions to which “a certain sense of the question ‘why?’ is given application” (Anscombe 1957/2000: 9). But there are robust reasons for thinking that this claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which such questions are unsound. We have good reasons for thinking that the questions are not “given application” in these cases. Second, when these questions are “given application” this is best explained, it is argued, not in (...) terms of a necessary link between intentional action and this type of enquiry, but in terms of the fact that this is an enquiry that we pursue when we take an agent to have exercised certain of their rational capacities. (shrink)

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

The charge of hypocrisy is a peculiar kind of accusation: it is damning and ubiquitous; it is used to deny the hypocrite standing to speak; and it is levelled against a great variety of conduct. Much of the philosophical literature on hypocrisy is aimed at explaining why hypocrisy is wrongful and worthy of censure. We focus instead on the use of the accusation of hypocrisy and argue for a revisionary claim. People think that hypocrisy in politics is bad and that (...) calling it out is good. Our novel claim is that even if hypocrisy in politics is bad (and that is a big if), calling it out is worse. We give a feminist case as to why accusations of hypocrisy are problematic. We also go further and claim that hypocrisy is a ubiquitous and perhaps even a necessary and beneficial part of political debate in liberal democracies. We also consider and reject candour as a possible alternative solution to hypocrisy in public debate. We argue that requiring people to be candid is not necessarily a good solution because it will often require one to divulge what is private when there are good reasons not to do so. (shrink)

Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...) prior experiments showing failure to detect changes occurring simultaneously with saccades, flicker, or “mudsplashes” in the visual scene: Many changes were very hard to detect, and Marginal Interest changes were harder to detect than Central Interest changes. -/- Analysis of eye movements showed, as expected, that the probability of detecting a change depended on the eye’s distance from the change location. However a surprising finding was that both for Central and Marginal Interest changes, evenwhen observers were directly fixating the change locations (within 1 degree),more than 40% of the time they still failed to see the changes. It seems that looking at something does not guarantee you “ see” it. (shrink)

To hold an environmental ethic is to hold that non-human beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value. This seemingly straightforward claim has been the focus of much recent philosophical discussion of environmental issues. Its clarity is, however, illusory. The term ‘intrinsic value’ has a variety of senses and many arguments on environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these different senses: specimen hunters for the fallacy of equivocation will find rich pickings in the area. This (...) paper is largely the work of the underlabourer. I distinguish different senses of the concept of intrinsic value, and, relatedly, of the claim that non-human beings in the natural world have intrinsic value; I exhibit the logical relations between these claims and examine the distinct motivations for holding them. The paper is not however merely an exercise in conceptual underlabouring. It also defends one substantive thesis: that while it is the case that natural entities have intrinsic value in the strongest sense of the term, i.e., in the sense of value that exists independently of human valuations, such value does not as such entail any obligations on the part of human beings. The defender of nature’s intrinsic value still needs to show that such value contributes to the well-being of human agents. (shrink)

As part of educational reform now in progress in Vietnam, there is a desire to promote education research, particularly at teacher training institutions (TTUs). This paper examines the existing implementation of education research at eight prominent TTUs nationwide. Results from surveys indicate that academic staff at TTUs are currently facing various challenges to promote their research career. Lack of adequate time and financial support, the university hierarchy and complicated procedures, English language limitation, inexperience of research methodology and research ethics are (...) the main constraints of research implementation. Thus, TTUs should concentrate on human resource development and institutional capacity development to promote education research. (shrink)

This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.

. John Cottingham suggests that “only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives.” Two main reasons for endorsing this proposition are assessed: the religious origins of conscience, and the need to explain its normative authority. I argue that Graeco-Roman conceptions of conscience cast doubt on this first historical claim, and that secular moral realisms can account for the obligatoriness of conscience. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for an objective (...) foundation for conscience which emerges from these debates should be embraced by both secular and religious ethicists alike. (shrink)

A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful role (...) in truthmaker theory, by helping to explain the truth of certain propositions as precisely as possible. (shrink)

It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With regard to the (...) qualia theory, we argue that it fails to capture the sense in which pain 's affective phenomenology rationalises various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviours. Representationalism, in contrast, escapes both of these problems: it gets the order of explanation right and it explains how pain 's affective phenomenology can rationalise bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviours. For this reason, we argue that representationalism has a significant advantage in the debates about pain 's affective phenomenology. We end the paper by examining objections, including the question of what representationalists should say about so-called ‘disassociation cases’, such as pain asymbolia. (shrink)