Behavioral genetic (BG) research has yielded many important discoveries about the origins of human behavior, but offers little insight into how we might improve outcomes. We posit that this gap in our knowledge base stems in part from the epidemiologic nature of BG research questions. Namely, BG studies focus on understanding etiology as it currently exists, rather than etiology in environments that could exist but do not as of yet (e.g., etiology following an intervention). Put another way, they focus exclusively (...) on the etiology of “what is” rather than “what could be”. The current paper discusses various aspects of this field-wide methodological reality, and offers a way to overcome it by demonstrating how behavioral geneticists can incorporate an experimental approach into their work. We outline an ongoing study that embeds a randomized intervention within a twin design, connecting “what is” and “what could be” for the first time. We then lay out a more general framework for a new field—experimental BGs—which has the potential to advance both scientific inquiry and related philosophical discussions. (shrink)

The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, (...) To this end, the approaches of Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific research programmes. (shrink)

A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.

Christian theology on the Eucharist, already since the Gospel of John refers to the scarcity and abundance of food, by linking this Sacrament to the hunger suffered by the Israelites in the desert and their further satiation with manna from heaven. Saint Albert the Great, in his reflection on the Eucharist, includes several ideas taken from his scientific knowledge, especially from Aristotle. These considerations build one of his personal contributions to theological understanding of the spiritualis manducatio that takes place (...) in the Holy Mass. These explanations will be explored in order to understand in which sense the Eucharist is true food and true drink. (shrink)

In these pages, we expose the main traits of St. Albert the Great’s doctrine of providence and fate, considered by Palazzo the keystone of his philosophical system. To describe it we examine his systematic works, primarily his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced over the centuries by theological tradition. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius (...) or Saint John of Damascus but, in his Summa he incorporates to his reflections also the noteworthy book of Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis, which includes some pages on providence. Albert gives his personal solution to the complex questions of providence, destiny and contingency of the world. His conception of providence is developed in the frame of the creative power of the almighty God. God’s knowledge is necessary and inerrant and his providential purposes are infallible, but that does not mean that every event is necessary. He does not communicate His own proprieties to the creatures. In order to understand this problem, Albert recalls the notion of hypothetical necessity coined by Boethius in an Aristotelian framework and the difference between 'necessitas consequentis' and 'necessitas consequentiae' proposed by Alexander of Hales. He also develops his account of providence, closely linked to the topic of fate. However, it would be exaggerated to deem his position deterministic. (shrink)

Is it possible for me to refer to someone other than myself with the word "I"? Or somewhere other than where I am with the word "here"? Or some time other than the present with the word "now"? David Kaplan, who provides the best worked out semantics for pure-indexical terms like "I," "here," and "now" suggests, quite intuitively, that I could not. Put simply, "I am here now" looks as though I can never utter it and have it turn (...) out false. But, intuitive as this seems, one need only hear the answering machine message, "Sorry! I am not here now," to see that there may be problems. If! can't fail to refer to where I am and when I'm there with "here" and "now," why is my apparently contradictory assertion so readily comprehensible? Many have been quick to abandon Kaplan's account of pure-indexicals in the face of such problems. The focus of this paper, though, is those who develop sophisticated accounts of how we determine different contexts for applying pure-indexicals. The hope is that this handles problem cases while allowing us to retain most of Kaplan's theory. However, this paper introduces and examines some additional uses of pure-indexicals which pose an interesting problem for the context-determination adaptation of Kaplan's account. It is argued that context-determination theorists cannot explain these cases in the same way that they explain standard problem cases, and that any reason they can offer for denying the relevance of such cases to accounts of pure-indexicals will apply equally well to the cases that motivate their theories, thus rendering context-determination accounts superfluous. In what follows, then, there is a brief summary of Kaplan's account, the problem cases that threaten it, and the context-determination theorist's response to these problem cases. The interesting and problematic uses of pure-indexicals that context-determination accounts cannot explain are then introduced, and an explanation is given of why there is no way for the context-determination theorist to exclude these cases from our accounts of pure-indexicals without also excluding the cases that motivate their own theory. (shrink)

This paper offers both a theoretical and an experimental perspective on the relationship between connectionist and Classical (symbol-processing) models. Firstly, a serious flaw in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument against connectionism is pointed out: if, in fact, a part of their argument is valid, then it establishes a conclusion quite different from that which they intend, a conclusion which is demonstrably false. The source of this flaw is traced to an underestimation of the differences between localist and distributed representation. It has (...) been claimed that distributed representations cannot support systematic operations, or that if they can, then they will be mere implementations of traditional ideas. This paper presents experimental evidence against this conclusion: distributed representations can be used to support direct structure-sensitive operations, in a man- ner quite unlike the Classical approach. Finally, it is argued that even if Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument that connectionist models of compositionality must be mere implementations were correct, then this would still not be a serious argument against connectionism as a theory of mind. (shrink)

Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible metaethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This paper assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as (...) a non-cognitivist. Non-cognitivism can mean various things and so some attempt is made to lay out the various kinds of non-cognitivism one might ascribe to Nietzsche. As part of the overall assessment of the plausibility of a non-cognitivist Nietzsche, the paper considers in detail the arguments of Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick on behalf of a non-cognitivist reading. It argues, however, that there is insufficient evidence to justify the interpretation and that the analogy to Hume is unhelpful. (shrink)

We investigate the theory IΔ 0 + Ω 1 and strengthen [Bu86. Theorem 8.6] to the following: if NP ≠ co-NP. then Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas is not provable in bounded arithmetic. i.e. $I\delta_0 + \Omega_1 + \nvdash \forall b \forall c (\exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a.c) \wedge \forall = \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf} (z.b))\\ \rightarrow \operatorname{Prov} (\ulcorner \exists a(\operatorname{Prf}(a. \bar{c}) \wedge \forall z \leq a \neg \operatorname{Prf}(z.\bar{b})) \urcorner)).$ Next we study a "small reflection principle" in bounded arithmetic. We prove that for (...) all sentences φ $I\Delta_0 + \Omega_1 \vdash \forall x \operatorname{Prov}(\ulcorner \forall y \leq \bar{x} (\operatorname{Prf} (y. \overline{\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner}) \rightarrow \varphi)\urcorner).$ The proof hinges on the use of definable cuts and partial satisfaction predicates akin to those introduced by Pudlak in [Pu86]. Finally, we give some applications of the small reflection principle, showing that the principle can sometimes be invoked in order to circumvent the use of provable Σ-completeness for witness comparison formulas. (shrink)

The 'complexity' approach can be positive and very helpful for General Linguistics theory because departs from: a) the idea that knowledge or meaning can exist without a being who produces them, b) the fragmented and reductionist view of reality and its too mechanistic oriented images, c) the 'linear' causality models, d) the tendency to dichotomise the categories about reality, e) the 'third excluded' Aristotelian principle (binary logic: if something is here it is not there), f) the disappearance of the mind (...) in some 'higher' social sciences, g) an inadequate approach of the relationships between the whole and its parts, and, h) a perspective on creativity too much based on logic and not on 'artistic' intuition and imagination in science. (shrink)

This paper presents the Spanish translation of the only two texts of Franz Brentano which deal specifically with St. Thomas Aquinas. The first text is a section about St. Albert the Great and Aquinas in an article published during Brentano’s youth, “The History of Ecclesiastical Sciences” (1867). The second text is an article, “Thomas Aquinas” (1908), written at the end of his life. Both texts reveal the immense value that Brentano saw in Aquinas. They also show that he regarded (...) Aquinas mainly as an important interpreter of Aristotle rather than as a philosopher in his own right. Brentano’s approach here also gives us some insight into his own conception of philosophical hermeneutics. The differences between the two texts are evident; for instance, in the second one, there is a Brentano’s manipulation of Aquinas’ thought to justify his leaving the Catholic Faith. The texts are also preceded by a little introduction of mine. Original titles: «Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaften», in: Johann Adam Möhler (ed.), 'Kirchengeschichte', Band 2 (Regensburg: Manz, 1867), pp. 550-556 and «Thomas von Aquin», 'Neue Freie Presse' 15683 (18/4/1908): 1-5. (shrink)

An annotated anthology of translations of traditional Chinese commentaries on the Daoist Classics Zhuangzi. (In Czech) -/- Kniha předkládá výbor a komentovaný překlad čtyř tradičních komentářů k vybraným pasážím významného díla klasického taoismu z období Válčících států (ca 4.-3. stol. př. n. l.). Komentáře pocházejí ze čtyř různých období čínských dějin od raného středověku až po poslední dynastii císařské Číny. Cílem práce je představit komentáře jako texty, které zasluhují bližší pozornost jednak proto, že nechávají nahlédnout do různorodých dějinných kontextů, jednak (...) proto, že jde o svébytné a filosoficky originální interpretace jednoho z nejvýznačnějších textů čínského myšlení. Komentáře nesou neklamnou pečeť historických období, ve kterých vznikly, zároveň se však vztahují k témuž textu, jsou součástí jedné interpretační tradice a v jistém smyslu se svou různorodostí doplňují. Publikace je určena jak sinologům či studentům sinologie, tak i filosofům či zájemcům o čínské myšlení bez znalosti klasické čínštiny. (shrink)

This article aims to address the widespread thesis according to which medieval scholastics would not handle the idea of fine art. Based on a suggestion by Anzulewicz, the author shows how Albert the Great did understand the peculiarity of fine arts and put them in close relationship with liberal arts. There are fine arts, such as music, which are sought after for their own sake and can, therefore, be considered as fully liberal. In contrast to them, there are other (...) arts called mechanical, whose purpose is utilitarian. In the third place, there are other arts which, although also possessing some utility, are chosen for their own sake and are therefore partly liberal; we should place fine arts such as architecture in that group. The more art participates in reason and the beauty of the soul, the more it will be fine and liberal. The product is called to be a metaphor for the honest good of virtue. The very contemplation of this beauty embodied by art evokes an aesthetic enjoyment. In this way, we can see that Albert, no less than Aquinas, speaks of the pleasure linked to the contemplation of beauty. (shrink)

The late Middle Ages witnessed a recapitulation of medieval reflection on beauty. Jean Gerson is an important representative of these philosophical and theological contributions, although he has been largely neglected up to this time. A first dimension of his ideas on beauty is the incorporation of beauty (pulchrum) into the number of transcendentals, i.e., the concepts “convertible” with the notion of being (ens), that is, unity, truth, and goodness (unum, verum and bonum). This article revisits Monica Calma’s study on Gerson’s (...) theory of beauty and suggests new hypothetical sources that may have inspired this aspect of his thought. The second aspect emphasised here is Gerson’s classification of beauty, which entails some similarities to the one of Ulrich of Strasbourg, but also differs from it. Moreover, its incorporation of a division entirely devoted to artistic beauty is highly remarkable. (shrink)

In these pages, we expose the main traits of the doctrine of providence of Saint Albert the Great, according to his systematic works, mainly his Summa of Theology. His discussion follows clearly the guidelines of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, in order to delve into the set of problems faced by theological tradition over the centuries. Albert also restates the reflections of different authors like Boethius or Saint John of Damascus and he gives his personal solution to (...) the complex questions of providence, destiny and contingency of the world. (shrink)

Albert the Great understands wisdom principally as a characteristic of human science, not principally as a feature of revealed theology. The article deals with the texts of his comments on Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics in order to know how he understands this knowledge.

Although St. Albert the Great is known for his assimilation of Aristotle’s thought, he holds Plato in high regard. Yet Aristotle largely guides Albert’s understanding of Plato and Aristotelian criticism against him is repeated along Albert’s work. The objections raised in the first book of the Metaphysics are especially recurrent. Therefore to study Albert’s commentary on such objections in some detail, as we do in these pages, has considerable interest. Criticism against Plato focuses on his conception (...) of the universal and the separation of ideas. Moreover, Albert assimilates several platonic doctrines because, like many other Christian authors, he sees in the Timaeus a metaphysical approach, which is susceptible to be combined with his faith. Albert also believes to find a substantial agreement between the views of Plato and Aristotle at various points, including the question of form, despite differences in their expositions. (shrink)

A little essay on the notion of person in Albert the Great. He bases on Alexander of Hales and develops his notion of person from the classical definition of Boethius.

Tarihte herhalde çok az soru Tanrı’nın varlığı sorusu kadar sık sorulmuş, çok yanıtlanmış ve verilen birbirinden farklı onca yanıta rağmen kesin bir sonuca ulaştırılamayıp tartışılmaya devam etmiştir. Yine de geçmişe dönüp baktığımızda bu soruya verilen farklı yanıtların farklı uygarlıkların inşa edilmesine, bazılarının yıkılmasına, acımasız çatışmalara ve her şeye rağmen kucaklaşmalara da vesile olduğunu görüyoruz. Tanrı var mı? Varsa onu nasıl bilebiliriz? Tanrı yoksa her şey mubah mı? İnsan aklı ilahi olanı kavrayabilir mi? Tanrı’nın varlığı ahlaklı olmanın şartı mı? Evren akıllı (...) bir tasarımcının imzasını taşıyor mu? Bu kitapta felsefeci William David Beck, bu sorulara tarihte verilen yanıtları ve bu konudaki tartışmaları ele alarak meselenin genel ve tarihsel bir tablosunu bize sunuyor. Platon, Aristoteles, Marcus Aurelius gibi Eski Yunan ve Roma düşünürlerinden Anselmus, Thomas Aquinas, Augustinus ve Yahudi-Hıristiyan geleneğine, Doğu’nun bilgelerine, İbni Rüşd, Fârâbî ve Gazzâlî gibi İslam düşünürlerinden Alvin Plantinga, Graham Oppy, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Max Tegmark gibi Batılı modern ilahiyatçılara, bilim insanlarına ve Yeni Ateizm hareketine kadar uzanan bir çizgide “Tanrı var mı?” sorusuna verilen çeşitli yanıtları ve bu yanıtlara sunulan akılcı gerekçeleri ortaya koyarak soruya felsefece bir yanıt vermenin nasıl bir iş olduğunu da gösteriyor. (shrink)

David Miller v pracích Critical Rationalism a Out of Error se jako jeden z mála Popperových žáků snaží nejen o vysvětlení a obhájení Popperova kritického racionalismu, ale zároveň i o jeho další rozvinutí. Millerovo znovunastolení kritického racionalismu ovšem předpokládá, že k racionálnímu jednání není třeba žádných „dobrých důvodů“, ale jen argumentů. Uvedená stať se zaměřuje právě na tuto otázku existence tzv. „dobrých důvodů“ ve spojení s racionalitou a racionálním rozhodováním a ukazuje, že Millerův požadavek neexistence „dobrých důvodů“ je nejen (...) příliš radikální, ale i nepřijatelný z hlediska Popperova nebo Musgravova pojetí kritického racionalismu. (shrink)

David Albert has recently argued that classical electromagnetic theory (EM) is not time reversal invariant (non-TRI), while David Malament rejects this argument and maintains the orthodox result, that EM is TRI. Both Albert's and Malament's arguments are analysed, and both are found wanting in certain respects. It is argued here that the result really depends on the choice of theoretical ontology choosen to interpret EM theory, and there is more than one plausible choice. Albert and (...) Malament have choosen different plausible ontologies; but neither shows that their choice of interpretation is definitive. Deeper principles about this choice are examined. The extension to EM theory with magnetic monopoles is also examined. It is concluded that, despite certain flaws in his account, Albert's analysis does reveal serious problems in the orthodox account, which Malament's response does not adequately address. (shrink)

Gözlemlenenlerden gözlemlen(e)meyenlere diğer bir deyişle genel yasalara ulaşma imkânı veren çıkarım yöntemi olarak tümevarımsal ya da endüktif akıl yürütmenin rasyonel olarak temellendirilmesinin imkanına yönelik soruşturma tarih içerisinde tümevarım sorunu ya da endüksiyon problemi olarak tezahür etmiştir. Bu sorunun temel argümanı tarihsel okumalara baktığımızda İskoç ampirist filozof David Hume tarafından öne sürülmüştür. Hume, tümevarımsal çıkarımlar temelinde, gözlenmeyen meseleler hakkındaki inançlarımıza hangi gerekçelerle ulaştığımızı soruşturmaktadır. Hume soruşturmasının sonucunda gözlemlenenden gözlemlen(e)meyen durumlara ilişkin yapılan olgu meseleleri ile ilgili bütün tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerin dolaylı (...) ya da dolaysız olarak nedensellik ilişkisine ve bu ilişkinin temelinde yer alan doğanın düzenliliği ilkesi ya da “gelecek her zaman geçmişe benzer” önermesine dayandığını ifade ederek bütün tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerde ortak olan geleceğin her zaman geçmişe benzeyeceği ifadesinin rasyonel olarak temellendirilmesinin mümkün olmadığını belirtmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada tümevarımsal akıl yürütme sonucunda ulaşılan sonuca inanmanın hiçbir rasyonel temelinin olamayacağı yönündeki Hume’un görüşü argüman formunda yeniden yapılandırılarak ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

Obwohl dieser Band ein wenig datiert ist, gibt es nur wenige aktuelle populäre Bücher, die sich speziell mit der Psychologie des Mordes beschäftigen und es ist ein schneller Überblick für ein paar Dollar, also noch wert die Mühe. Es macht keinen Versuch, umfassend zu sein und ist stellenweise etwas oberflächlich, wobei der Leser erwartet, die Lücken aus seinen vielen anderen Büchern und der umfangreichen Literatur über Gewalt zu füllen. Für ein Update siehe z.B. Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) S. 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 und Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) P 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 und Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). Er gehört seit mehreren Jahrzehnten zu den beste Evolutions psychologen und deckt in seinen Arbeiten ein breites Spektrum an Verhaltensweisen ab, aber hier konzentriert er sich fast ausschließlich auf die psychologischen Mechanismen, die einzelne Menschen zum Mord führen, und ihre mögliche evolutionäre Funktion im EWR (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation – d.h. die Ebenen Afrikas in den letzten Millionen Jahren oder so). -/- Buss beginnt mit der Erkenntnis, dass wie bei anderen Verhaltensweisen "alternative" Erklärungen wie Psychopathologie, Eifersucht, soziales Umfeld, Gruppendruck, Drogen und Alkohol usw. nicht wirklich erklären, da die Frage nach wie vor bleibt, warum diese mörderische Impulse erzeugen, d.h. sie sind die nahen Ursachen und nicht die ultimativen evolutionären (genetischen) Ursachen. Wie immer läuft es unweigerlich auf inklusive Fitness (genetische Fitness von Verwandten) und damit auf den Kampf um den Zugang zu Kumpels und Ressourcen hinaus, der die ultimative Erklärung für das gesamte Verhalten in allen Organismen ist. Soziologische Daten (und der gesunde Menschenverstand) machen deutlich, dass jüngere ärmere Männchen am ehesten töten. Er präsentiert seine eigenen und andere Morddaten aus Industrienationen und Stammeskulturen, konspeziertes Töten von Tieren, Archäologie, FBI-Daten und seine eigene Forschung über die Mordfantasien normaler Menschen. Viele archäologische Beweise häufen sich weiterhin von Morden, einschließlich der von ganzen Gruppen oder von Gruppen abzüglich junger Frauen, in prähistorischen Zeiten. -/- Nachdem ich Buss' Kommentare untersucht habe, präsentiere ich eine sehr kurze Zusammenfassung der absichtlichen Psychologie (die logische Struktur der Rationalität), die in meinen vielen anderen Artikeln und Büchern ausführlich behandelt wird. -/- Diejenigen, die viel Zeit haben, die eine detaillierte Geschichte mörderischer Gewalt aus evolutionärer Perspektive wollen, können Steven Pinkers "The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined" (2012) und meineRezension, leicht im Netz und in zwei meiner jüngsten Bücher lesen. Kurz, Pinker stellt fest, dass Mord hat stetig und dramatisch um den Faktor etwa 30 seit unseren Tagen als Forager gesunken. Obwohl Waffen es jetzt für jeden extrem einfach machen, zu töten, ist Tötung viel seltener. Pinker glaubt, dass dies auf verschiedene soziale Mechanismen zurückzuführen ist, die unsere "besseren Engel" hervorbringen, aber ich denke, es ist hauptsächlich auf die vorübergehende Fülle von Ressourcen durch die gnadenlose Vergewaltigung unseres Planeten zurückzuführen, gepaart mit erhöhter Polizeipräsenz, mit Kommunikations- und Überwachungs- und Rechtssystemen, die es viel wahrscheinlicher machen, bestraft zu werden. Dies wird jedes Mal deutlich, wenn es sogar eine kurze und lokale Abwesenheit der Polizei gibt. -/- Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Žádnému tématu – s výjimkou historie Anglie – nevěnoval David Hume více pozornosti než náboženství. Jak už to ale s Humovým filosofickým odkazem bývá, i jeho teorie náboženství byla podrobena celé řadě mnohdy naprosto protikladných interpretací – a právě těm bude věnována první část mého článku. Došlo totiž k pokusům představit jej jako teistu, fideistu, deistu, agnostika nebo ateistu. Ve druhé části budu obhajovat hypotézu, podle níž je úsilí zařadit Huma do jediného údajně správného výkladu liché, protože každá taková (...) snaha naráží na nepřekonatelné terminologické spory, interpretační potíže a argumentační pochybení. Nemusí nás ovšem zajímat, co si Hume ve skutečnosti o náboženství myslel, případně za jaký typ věřícího či nevěřícího se považoval. Mnohem přínosnější je pochopit, jakým způsobem Humova koncepce předchází a obohacuje současnou ateologii. Ve třetí části proto představím textovou evidenci z primárních pramenů, v nichž se Hume zabýval kritikou zjeveného i přirozeného náboženství, morálních i psychologických aspektů religiozity. Závěrem se krátce zamyslím nad Humovou koncepcí „pravého náboženství“ a jejím uplatněním v sekulární společnosti. (shrink)

David Hume jest powszechnie uważany za prekursora metaetycznego nonkognitywizmu, a jego filozofia moralności jest traktowana jako klasyczny przykład motywacyjnego internalizmu. W artykule omawiam poglądy Hume'a na problem motywacji do działania moralnego odwołując się do cnót naturalnych i sztucznych. Dochodzę do wniosku, że choć Hume może być traktowany jako nonkognitywista, to jest to nonkognitywizm bardzo różny od współczesnych wersji tego stanowiska. Główna różnica polega na tym, że Hume nie uważał, by poczucie powinności z konieczności motywowało do działania.

Bu makalede David Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların akılsal gerekçelendirilmesine karşı eleştirileri incelenecek ve bu eleştirilerin geleneksel metafiziğin olanaklılığına dair temel bir probleme işaret ettiği savunulacaktır. Hume’un nedensellik ilkesine ve bu ilkenin ima ettiği zorunlu nedensel ilişkilerin varlığına dair eleştirel argümanları ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilerek, nedensellik probleminin nasıl olup da bizi tümevarımsal çıkarımlarımızın gerekçelendirilmesiyle ilgili olan tümevarım problemine götürdüğü gösterilecektir. Görüleceği gibi, Hume’a göre nedensellik ve tümevarımsal çıkarımların ortak problemi her ikisinin de genel geçer doğrular olarak kabul edilen (...) ancak akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyen nedensellik ilkesi ile doğanın tekdüzeliği ilkelerini doğru varsaymasıdır. Bu ilkelerin akılsal olarak gerekçelendirilemeyeceğini göstererek, Hume aslında daha büyük çaplı bir problemin, yani metafizik probleminin varlığına dikkat çekmektedir. Hume’un asıl ilgilendiği soru metafiziğin temelinde yer aldığı düşünülen ilke ve idelerin akılsal temellendirilmesinin olanaklılığı sorusudur. Bu da bir nevi metafizik bilginin temellendirilmesi ve bu bilginin olanaklılığı ile ilgili olan metafizik problemidir. Dolayısıyla Hume’un nedensellik ve tümevarım problemlerini geleneksel anlamda metafizik anlayışına karşı bir eleştiri olarak okumak mümkündür. (shrink)

Öz David Hume İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme’de ben idesinin bilgikuramsal temellerini araştırırken, bir yandan hiç kuşku duyulmaksızın kabul edilen ben’e ilişkin bilgimizin güvenilir temellere dayanmadığını göstermeye çalışıyor, diğer yandan da bu tür bir araştırmanın ancak bir bilim aracılığıyla yapılması gereğine dikkat çekiyordu. Ben idesi için görgül kanıt arayışı, oluşturmaya çalıştığı insan biliminin deneysel temelleri olması gerektiği gibi insan doğasına ilişkin araştırmalar için yeni bir uslamlamayı da imliyordu. Hume’un önerdiği uslamlama yöntemi, geleneksel felsefenin insan zihnine dair yaklaşımının artık savunulamaz (...) olduğunun bir göstergesidir. Bu yazıda Hume’un ben idesi öğretisini oluştururken, zihinsel etkinlikleri doğal bir süreç içerisinde kalarak açıklama girişimi irdelenecek, ortaya koyduğu kavramsal ve ilkesel yeniliklerin günümüzde bilişsel bilimler olarak tanımlanan alanın doğuşunda etkili olduğu savunulacaktır. Bu amaçla, ben idesinin oluşumundaki bilgi kuramsal temeller, kişi-özdeşliği öğretisine ve bu tür bir özdeşliği düşünmemizi olanaklı kılan belleğin rolüne dikkat çekerek çözümlenecektir. -/- Abstract While Hume investigates the epistemological basis of the idea of self in his book 'A Treatise of Human Nature', on the one hand he tries to show that our knowledge about the self that is accepted without any doubt does not have reliable basis, on the other hand he draws our attention that any research in this field should be conducted through a science. The search for the emprical evidence for the idea of self is both required for the experimental basis of the newly formed human sciences, and implies a new reasoning for the researches concerning the human nature. Hume’s method of reasoning indicates that the approaches of the traditional philosophy concerning human mind are no longer tenable. In this paper it is examined that while Hume establishes the doctrine of the idea of self, he attempts to explain the mental activities remaining in a natural course, and it is argued that Hume’s epoch-making conceptual and principal contributions in this area have an undeniable impact upon the cognitive sciences of our age. Thus, the epistemological basis of the formation of the idea of self will be analysed by drawing our attention to the personal identity and to memory which makes possible to think such an identity. (shrink)

We criticize the bare theory of quantum mechanics -- a theory on which the Schrödinger equation is universally valid, and standard way of thinking about superpositions is correct.

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual's views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey (...) also suggest that many of the results of the survey are surprising: philosophers as a whole have quite inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of philosophical views in the profession. (shrink)

The idea of self-measurement by a quantum-mechanical automaton is presented, and the conclusions that are typically reached about what we can come to know from doing self-measurements are shown to be mistaken. Specifically, it is shown that, while we are capable of _predicting_ and _measuring_ the values of two incompatible observables, we are incapable of _knowing_ both these values simultaneously. This is an example of the interesting limitations quantum mechanics places on knowledge.

I argue against the claim, advanced by David Albert and Barry Loewer, that all non-fundamental laws can be derived from those required to underwrite the second law of thermodynamics.

The subject of this essay-based dissertation is Hume’s natural philosophy. The dissertation consists of four separate essays and an introduction. These essays do not only treat Hume’s views on the topic of natural philosophy, but his views are placed into a broader context of history of philosophy and science, physics in particular. The introductory section outlines the historical context, shows how the individual essays are connected, expounds what kind of research methodology has been used, and encapsulates the research contributions of (...) the essays. The first essay treats Newton’s experimentalist methodology in gravity research and its relation to Hume’s causal philosophy. It is argued that Hume does not see the relation of cause and effect as being founded on a priori reasoning, similar to the way in which Newton criticized non-empirical hypotheses about the causal properties of gravity. Contrary to Hume’s rules of causation, the universal law does not include a reference either to contiguity or succession, but Hume accepts it in interpreting the force and the law of gravity instrumentally. The second article considers Newtonian and non-Newtonian elements in Hume more broadly. He is sympathetic to many prominently Newtonian themes in natural philosophy, such as experimentalism, critique of hypotheses, inductive proof, and the critique of Leibnizian principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility. However, Hume is not a Newtonian philosopher in many respects: his conceptions regarding space and time, the vacuum, the specifics of causation, the status of mechanism, and the reality of forces differ markedly from Newton’s related conceptions. The third article focuses on Hume’s Fork and the proper epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics. It is shown that the epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics, such as those concerning laws of nature, is that of matters of fact. The reason for this is that the propositions of mixed mathematics are dependent on the Uniformity Principle. The fourth article analyzes Einstein’s acknowledgement of Hume regarding special relativity. The views of the scientist and the philosopher are juxtaposed, and it is argued that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts and a relationist ontology regarding space and time. (shrink)

This twelfth volume of Collected Papers includes 86 papers comprising 976 pages on Neutrosophics Theory and Applications, published between 2013-2021 in the international journal and book series “Neutrosophic Sets and Systems” by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 112 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 21 countries: Abdel Nasser H. Zaied, Muhammad Akram, Bobin Albert, S. A. Alblowi, S. Anitha, Guennoun Asmae, Assia Bakali, Ayman M. Manie, Abdul Sami Awan, Azeddine Elhassouny, Erick González-Caballero, D. Dafik, Mithun Datta, Arindam (...) Dey, Mamouni Dhar, Christopher Dyer, Nur Ain Ebas, Mohamed Eisa, Ahmed K. Essa, Faruk Karaaslan, João Alcione Sganderla Figueiredo, Jorge Fernando Goyes García, N. Ramila Gandhi, Sudipta Gayen, Gustavo Alvarez Gómez, Sharon Dinarza Álvarez Gómez, Haitham A. El-Ghareeb, Hamiden Abd El-Wahed Khalifa, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ibrahim M. Hezam, German Acurio Hidalgo, Le Hoang Son, R. Jahir Hussain, S. Satham Hussain, Ali Hussein Mahmood Al-Obaidi, Hays Hatem Imran, Nabeela Ishfaq, Saeid Jafari, R. Jansi, V. Jeyanthi, M. Jeyaraman, Sripati Jha, Jun Ye, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Abdullah Kargın, J. Kavikumar, Kawther Fawzi Hamza Alhasan, Huda E. Khalid, Neha Andalleb Khalid, Mohsin Khalid, Madad Khan, D. Koley, Valeri Kroumov, Manoranjan Kumar Singh, Pavan Kumar, Prem Kumar Singh, Ranjan Kumar, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, A.N. Mangayarkkarasi, Carlos Rosero Martínez, Marvelio Alfaro Matos, Mai Mohamed, Nivetha Martin, Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Mohamed Talea, K. Mohana, Muhammad Irfan Ahamad, Rana Muhammad Zulqarnain, Muhammad Riaz, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Saqlain, Muhammad Shabir, Muhammad Zeeshan, Anjan Mukherjee, Mumtaz Ali, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Iqra Nawaz, Munazza Naz, Roan Thi Ngan, Necati Olgun, Rodolfo González Ortega, P. Pandiammal, I. Pradeepa, R. Princy, Marcos David Oviedo Rodríguez, Jesús Estupiñán Ricardo, A. Rohini, Sabu Sebastian, Abhijit Saha, Mehmet Șahin, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, A.A. Salama, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Sajana Shaik, Soufiane Idbrahim, S. Sowndrarajan, Mohamed Talea, Ruipu Tan, Chalapathi Tekuri, Selçuk Topal, S. P. Tiwari, Vakkas Uluçay, Maikel Leyva Vázquez, Chinnadurai Veerappan, M. Venkatachalam, Luige Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Young Bae Jun, Wadei F. Al-Omeri, Xiao Long Xin.‬‬‬‬‬‬. (shrink)

Yirminci yüzyıl bilimde büyük değişim ve dönüşümlerin gerçekleştiği bir dönemdir. Bu yüzyıl içerisinde moleküler biyoloji, kuantum fiziği, genetik mühendisliği ve biyoteknoloji gibi çeşitli bilimlerin temellerinin atıldığı, bilimsel keşifler ve yenilikler neticesinde kuramların ve teknolojilerin hızla geliştiği ve bu gelişmelerin insanlık tarihini köklü bir şekilde etkilediği bir dönem olmuştur. Yirminci yüzyılda bilimsel ilerleme önceki dönemlerden çok daha hızlı bir oranda gerçekleşmiş ve toplumsal yaşam üzerindeki etkisinin daha derin olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu nedenle yirminci yüzyıl genellikle icatların ve teknolojik gelişmelerin yüzyılı olarak adlandırılmaktadır (...) çünkü bilimsel keşiflerin sayısı artmakla birlikte çok sayıda bilim insanı mevcut teknolojiyi daha etkin bir şekilde kullanarak çalıştıkları alanlarda kapsamlı sonuçlara ulaşmışlardır. Dolayısıyla bilim ve teknoloji bu süre zarfında geçmişte olduğundan çok daha yakın hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, bilimin ilerlemesinin hızlı bir şekilde devam etmesi ve mevcut araştırmaların önemli bir kısmının tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla incelenemeyecek kadar yeni ve çok sayıda olması nedeniyle bu yüzyıldaki bütün bilimsel gelişmelerden ve disiplinlerden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Bu sebeple yazının kapsamını daraltmak açısından yirminci yüzyılda bilimi ve teknolojiyi en çok etkileyen alan olan fizik bilimindeki önemli konulara değinmek bu dönemin ruhunu anlamak ve bilimin dönüşümüne yönelik bir kavrayışa sahip olmak açısından daha uygun gözükmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada Dünya’mızı ve evreninin işleyişini anlama konusunda başvurduğumuz disiplinlerden biri olan fizik biliminde yirminci yüzyılda devrimsel bir düşünce olarak karşımıza çıkan Albert Einstein’ın özel ve genel görelilik kuramına yer verilmekle birlikte aynı zamanda günümüzde etkileri bilimsel ve teknolojik düzeyde devam eden kuantum mekaniğine yönelik genel bir perspektif sunulmaktadır. (shrink)

Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.

Although some ancient sources relate Parmenides to the religious doctrine of fate, this concept is not usually prominent in the scholarly presentation of the Eleatic thinker. Here, we offer a tentative interpretation of the notion of necessity in Parmenides’ poem, as a peculiar philosophical understanding of the presence of fate in reality. Necessity, divinised by Parmenides, implies that all things are bound together by the chains of fate. Therefore, his philosophical proposal consists in understanding this unity of reality originated by (...) the connexion of fatal necessity. However, this presence of fate in all things is not bad news, but also means that everything is connected by Love. (shrink)

Philosophy is inserted as a pedagogical novelty, a sort of renewal of the preparation of young people for adult life. However, what begins as an educational reform ends up representing a genuine intellectual approach: the formulation of scientific knowledge emerges from it. Philosophy goes beyond the originally narrow boundaries of paideia, understood as education of the young, to become a way of life also for adults. However, this does not prevent Greek and Roman philosophy can be understood as a community (...) of life, if not always between “teachers and disciples”, at least between “lovers of knowledge”, philosophers, who are also among themselves lovers, i.e. “friends”. For these reasons, these pages begin with a brief consideration of the Greek paideia, from traditional religion to philosophy. Second, the paper exposes the important imitative character of Greek education inherited by philosophy. Third, the article pays attention to a privileged context for the development of imitation, the philosophical friendship, the discipleship among philosophers itself. In friendship we will find a context that overcomes some of the limitations posed by education founded on imitation. (shrink)

The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...) possessing content that is indeed indicative, but also, crucially, evaluative. (shrink)

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)

We are quickly passing through the historical moment when people work in front of a single computer, dominated by a small CRT and focused on tasks involving only local information. Networked computers are becoming ubiquitous and are playing increasingly significant roles in our lives and in the basic infrastructure of science, business, and social interaction. For human-computer interaction o advance in the new millennium we need to better understand the emerging dynamic of interaction in which the focus task is no (...) longer confined to the desktop but reaches into a complex networked world of information and computer-mediated interactions. We think the theory of distributed cognition has a special role to play in understanding interactions between people and technologies, for its focus has always been on whole environments: what we really do in them and how we coordinate our activity in them. Distributed cognition provides a radical reorientation of how to think about designing and supporting human-computer interaction. As a theory it is specifically tailored to understanding interactions among people and technologies. In this article we propose distributed cognition as a new foundation for human-computer interaction, sketch an integrated research framework, and use selections from our earlier work to suggest how this framework can provide new opportunities in the design of digital work materials. (shrink)

The Bare Theory was offered by David Albert as a way of standing by the completeness of quantum mechanics in the face of the measurement problem. This paper surveys objections to the Bare Theory that recur in the literature: what will here be called the oddity objection, the coherence objection, and the context-of-the-universe objection. Critics usually take the Bare Theory to have unacceptably bizarre consequences, but to be free from internal contradiction. Bizarre consequences need not be decisive against (...) the Bare Theory, but a further objection—dubbed here the calibration objection—has been underestimated. This paper argues that the Bare Theory is not only odd but also inconsistent. We can imagine a successor to the Bare Theory—the Stripped Theory—which avoids the objections and fulfills the original promise of the Bare Theory, but at the cost of amplifying the bizarre consequences. The Stripped Theory is either a stunning development in our understanding of the world or a reductio disproving the completeness of quantum mechanics. The Bare Theory The usual objections The calibration objection Beyond the Bare Theory. (shrink)

This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism.

Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative political theory are hindered for want of a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier. To address this shortfall, I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and then develop a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then show that this model has significant methodological implications for political philosophy. On the Target View, a political ideal (...) presents a long-term goal for morally progressive reform efforts and, thus, serves as an important reference point for our specification of normative political principles. I use the model to show that we can- not reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 51, Issue 4, Page 373-412, Fall 2023.

The singularity hypothesis is a radical hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on scientifically implausible growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis (Chalmers 2010, Bostrom 2014) fail (...) to overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical implications of this discussion for our understanding of consciousness, personal identity, digital minds, existential risk, and ethical longtermism. GPI Working Paper No . 19-2022. (shrink)

There have recently been a number of strong claims that normative considerations, broadly construed, influence many philosophically important folk concepts and perhaps are even a constitutive component of various cognitive processes. Many such claims have been made about the influence of such factors on our folk notion of causation. In this paper, we argue that the strong claims found in the recent literature on causal cognition are overstated, as they are based on one narrow type of data about a particular (...) type of causal cognition; the extant data do not warrant any wide-ranging conclusions about the pervasiveness of normative considerations in causal cognition. Of course, almost all empirical investigations involve some manner of ampliative inference, and so we provide novel empirical results demonstrating that there are types of causal cognition that do not seem to be influenced by moral considerations. (shrink)

This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This (...) can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack details present in clear experiences. I argue that since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that do not, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a change in content. This applies to perceptual distortions due to blur, double vision, perspective, and illumination conditions. (shrink)

Placeholder essentialism is the view that there is a causal essence that holds category members together, though we may not know what the essence is. Sometimes the placeholder can be filled in by scientific essences, such as when we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. We challenge the view that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences. On our view, if placeholders are elaborated, they are elaborated Aristotelian essences, a telos. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments (...) used by traditional essentialists—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), acquired traits (study 3) and inferences about offspring (study 4)—we find support for the view that essences are elaborated by a telos. And we find evidence (study 5) that teleological essences may generate category judgments. (shrink)