By rethinking the meaning of a central idiom in the Great Learning, this essay intends to open up a new horizon for the hermeneutics of early Confucian thinking, which has little to do with metaphysics. Through a careful etymological study of ge wu and a dialogue between the Great Learning and Heidegger's phenomenology of human affection, I demonstrate the critical position of the human heart in early Chinese thinking. This new interpretation of early Confucian moral teachings also recovers an invigorating (...) possibility for contemporary discourse on the question of ethics. (shrink)

In recent years, genetically engineered (GE) mosquitoes have been proposed as a public health measure against the high incidence of mosquito-borne diseases among the poor in regions of the global South. While uncertainties as well as risks for humans and ecosystems are entailed by the open-release of GE mosquitoes, a powerful global health governance non-state organization is funding the development of and advocating the use of those bio-technologies as public health tools. In August 2016, the US Food and Drug Agency (...) (FDA) approved the uncaged field trial of a GE Aedes aegypti mosquito in Key Haven, Florida. The FDA’s decision was based on its assessment of the risks of the proposed experimental public health research project. The FDA is considered a global regulatory standard setter. So, its approval of the uncaged field trial could be used by proponents of GE mosquitoes to urge countries in the global South to permit the use of those bio-technologies. -/- From a public health ethics perspective, this paper evaluates the FDA’s 2016 risk assessment of the proposed uncaged field trial of the GE mosquito to determine whether it qualified as a realistic risk evaluation. -/- The FDA’s risk assessment of the proposed uncaged field trial did not proximate the conditions under which the GE mosquitoes would be used in regions of the global South where there is a high prevalence of mosquito-borne diseases. -/- Given that health and disease have political-economic determinants, whether a risk assessment of a product is realistic or not particularly matters with respect to interventions meant for public health problems that disproportionately impact socio-economically marginalized populations. If ineffective public health interventions are adopted based on risk evaluations that do not closely mirror the conditions under which those products would actually be used, there could be public health and ethical costs for those populations. (shrink)

Die aktuellen Entwicklungen von Digitalisierung, Klimawandel, Globalisierung und Migration führen an die Grenzen von Rechtsnormen und werfen die Frage nach der Gerechtigkeit im Recht neu auf. Inwiefern das Recht gerecht ist und gerecht sein soll, ist vor allem ein Thema der Ethik (Lindner 2016). Sozialethik „erarbeitet und begründet Maßstäbe gerechter Praxis“. Sie fragt also danach, wie gesellschaftliche Prozesse, Institutionen, rechtliche und politische Entscheidungen gerecht gestaltet werden können (Heimbach-Steins 2004, 7f.). Die Frage nach der Gerechtigkeit im Recht wirft auch ein Licht (...) auf das Verhältnis von Recht und Moral. Recht und Moral sind unterschiedliche Formen und Quellen von Normativität, die sich in ihrer Begründung, Verbindlichkeit und Durchsetzung voneinander unterscheiden (Lindner 2016). In welcher Beziehung stehen Recht und Moral zueinander? Außerdem ist für die Sozialethik interessant, wie Recht das Verständnis von Normativität in der Gesellschaft prägt. Und nicht selten klaffen Rechtsprechung und das Gerechtigkeitsempfinden in der Gesellschaft auseinander. -/- Puzio, Anna: Alles, was (ge)recht ist? Gerechtigkeit im Recht als Herausforderung der Christlichen Sozialethik. In: Amosinternational 14/4 (2020) (Konfessionelle Wohlfahrt im Umbruch), S. 50–51. (shrink)

Artwork of astounding genius requires a spectator (and not just anyone will do!). The materialist magic worked by an artistic genius only affects others; each genius is impervious to their own magic. Diderot's thought is wonderful and really deserves wider attention (if any thought really does deserve attention ...): a masterpiece is incomplete without one who can appreciate it. -/- This is a talk presented (a few years ago) to an audience of nearly none at a conference. I only post (...) it in case there is anyone out there who enjoys Diderot, art, French, hardcore materialism and magic. (shrink)

Four propositions relative to the laws of nature in the classical period must be noted. 1. Certain regularities in phenomena had been discovered. 2. A concept of law had emerged. 3. Classical science is characterized by the introduction of the notion of the legality of nature. 4. New uses of the word «law» had appeared in scientific texts. This article is devoted to the analysis of only this last proposition, that is to say to a terminological problem. First we will (...) describe the semantic uses of the word «law» that may have contributed to the constitution of its classical meaning: its specific usage, disciplinary usage, usage in physics, in mathematics, in metaphysics. Second we will analyze the various moments of the diffusion of the word in the sciences in the xviith century. The general thesis defended in the end is that if the term «law» had indeed been used in science with no reference to a law-giving God prior to the xviith century, only this reference, that is, the coming together of its physical and its metaphysical usage, allowed its generalization in the period between the xviith and xviiith centuries. (shrink)

The main purpose of the thesis is to identify and fill some gaps that are regularly found in the analysis of the Platonic concept of ἐξαίφνης. The word ἐξαίφνης, which appears 36 times in the Platonic dialogues, has primarily been examined and discussed in relation to what is said in Parmenides and, more rarely, in Symposium, Republic and Seventh Letter. However, as is known, the word is also found in Gorgias, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Statesman and Laws. Moreover, it is worth noting (...) that a history of criticism about the concept of ἐξαίφνης has never been provided, mainly due to the chronological and interpretive difficulties relating to Parmenides. This absence brought on a fragmentation and discontinuity in the study of the concept and it often prompted specialists to see in this notion a secondary or imprecise aspect of the Platonic theory. Regardless of the correctness of interpretations that have been proposed over the centuries, my work clearly shows that all these exegeses share two fundamental limits: the former is a necessarily partial analysis, almost exclusively based on what is written in Parmenides, the latter is the absence of a historical perspective . Cette thèse portant sur le concept d’ἐξαίφνης tel qu’on le trouve dans les textes de Platon se propose de combler les lacunes existantes relatives à l’analyse de ce concept. En effet, le terme d’ἐξαίφνης, dont on trouve trente-six occurrences dans les dialogues de Platon n’a été jusqu’à présent principalement envisagé et examiné qu’à travers ce qui en est dit dans le Parménide et, plus rarement, dans le Banquet, la République et la Lettre VII. Le terme, comme on le sait, se trouve pourtant aussi dans le Gorgias, le Cratyle, le Théétète, le Politique et les Lois. En outre, en raison notamment des difficultés chronologiques et interprétatives liées au dialogue du Parménide, aucune histoire critique du concept d’ἐξαίφνης n’a été entreprise. Cette absence d’histoire critique a pour effet une fragmentation et une discontinuité des études portant sur ce concept, effets qui ont souvent conduit les spécialistes à ne voir dans cette notion qu’un aspect secondaire ou à tout le moins imprécis de la théorie que développe Platon à son sujet. Aussi la thèse s’est-elle attachée à entreprendre une étude préalable de l’histoire de ces interprétations. Quelle que soit la justesse et la valeur des interprétations qui se sont succédées au cours des siècles, cette étude s’emploie à montrer clairement que ces tendances exégétiques se heurtent à deux limites fondamentales que la thèse s’applique à lever : la première est le caractère nécessairement partiel d’une analyse menée presque exclusivement à partir du Parménide, la seconde est l’absence de mise en perspective historique. (shrink)

Dieser Band versammelt Beiträge zu den drei klassischen Disziplinen der Philosophie – dem Wahren, dem Guten, dem Schönen. Ihre Autoren zeichnet aus, dass sie aus dem akademischen Umfeld Michael Sukales zu seiner Zeit am Institut für Philosophie an der Carl-von-Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg stammen. Ihm ist dieses Buch zum Abschied von seiner aktiven Lehrtätigkeit in Oldenburg gewidmet. Die thematische Vielfalt der enthaltenen Texte spiegelt die Bandbreite seines philosophischen Schaffens wider.

Genetically engineered (GE) insects, such as the GE OX513A Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, have been designed to suppress their wild-type populations so as to reduce the transmission of vector-borne diseases in humans. Apart from the ecological and epidemiological uncertainties associated with this approach, such biotechnological approaches may be used by individual governments or the global community of nations to avoid addressing the underlying structural, systemic causes of those infections... We discuss here key ethical questions raised by the use of GE mosquitoes, (...) with the aim of fostering discussion between the public, researchers, policy makers, healthcare organizations, and regulatory agencies at the local, national, and international levels. We affect that goal by outlining a procedural approach to decision-making about the use of the “biotechnology” that goes beyond “community engagement.” The protocol we advocate for entails informed deliberations and decision-making at the community level. It is designed to ensure that the voices of the marginalized and vulnerable groups that would be disproportionately affected by the decision are heard during the community-wide discussions. Moreover, we make the case that the values embedded in the risk assessment should be identified so that the community can make an informed decision about the use of GE insects. In addition, we advocate for the involvement of a variety of actors whose responsibility would be to ensure that the community has the opportunity to make an informed decision based on deliberations about the use of the “biotechnology.”. (shrink)

In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much (...) discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called 'transmission failure'—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one's justification for believing the premises. (shrink)

In the proof-theoretic semantics approach to meaning, harmony , requiring a balance between introduction-rules (I-rules) and elimination rules (E-rules) within a meaning conferring natural-deduction proof-system, is a central notion. In this paper, we consider two notions of harmony that were proposed in the literature: 1. GE-harmony , requiring a certain form of the E-rules, given the form of the I-rules. 2. Local intrinsic harmony : imposes the existence of certain transformations of derivations, known as reduction and expansion . We propose (...) a construction of the E-rules (in GE-form) from given I-rules, and prove that the constructed rules satisfy also local intrinsic harmony. The construction is based on a classification of I-rules, and constitute an implementation to Gentzen’s (and Pawitz’) remark, that E-rules can be “read off” I-rules. (shrink)

This paper is about the so-called meta-grounding question, i.e. the question of what grounds grounding facts of the sort ‘φ is grounded in Γ ’. An answer to this question is pressing since some plausible assumptions about grounding and fundamentality entail that grounding facts must be grounded. There are three different accounts on the market which each answer the meta-grounding question differently: Bennett’s and deRosset’s “Straight Forward Account” (SFA), Litland’s “Zero-Grounding Account” (ZGA), and “Grounding Essentialism” (GE). I argue that if (...) grounding is to be regarded as metaphysical explanation (i.e. if unionism is true), (GE) is to be preferred over (ZGA) and (SFA) as only (GE) is compatible with a crucial consequence of the thought that grounding is metaphysical explanation. In this manner the paper contributes not only to discussions about the ground of ground but also to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between ground, essence, and explanation. (shrink)

Cross-cultural comparisons face several methodological challenges. In an attempt at resolving some such challenges, Nathan Sivin has developed the framework of “cultural manifolds.” This framework includes all the pertinent dimensions of a complex phenomenon and the interactions that make all of these aspects into a single whole. In engaging with this framework, Anna Akasoy illustrates that the phenomena used in comparative approaches to cultural and intellectual history need to be subjected to a continuous change of perspectives. Writing about comparative history, (...) Warwick Anderson directs attention to an articulation between synchronic and diachronic modes of inquiry. In addition, he asks: If comparative studies require a number of collaborators, how does one coordinate the various contributors? And how does one ensure that the comparison is between separate entities, without mutual historical entanglement? Finally, how does comparative history stack up against more dynamic approaches, such as connected, transnational, and postcolonial histories? Gérard Colas, for his part, claims that comparisons cannot allow one to move away from the dominant Euroamerican conceptual framework. Should this indeed be the case, we should search for better ways of facilitating a “mutual pollination” between philosophies. Finally, Edmond Eh first asserts that Sivin fails to recognize the difference between comparisons within cultures and comparisons between cultures. He then argues that the application of generalism is limited to comparisons of historical nature. (shrink)

The study aimed to analyze lexical items underpinned in the textbooks used in the current teaching of ESP and GE. Using content analysis, a systematic evaluation of texts to examine nuances to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative data. This was such of importance, however, difficult to study due to issues of interest like in the study, frequency of lexical items in ESP, and GE textbooks. Results found 13,713 lexical items in Hospitality Management, 17,561 in Criminology, 4576 in Tourism, (...) 7167 in Marine Engineering, and 512 in Information Technology. Furthermore, the overall percentage of ESP lexical items fell in Tier 2 (with multiple-meaning while the least was in Tier 3, specifically on context-specific vocabulary. It is the core of vocabulary learning to ensure English language teaching. It is its goal to help learners better understand language, allowing them to understand others as they want to express themselves as well. This applies not only in speaking but also in writing and reading. Wilkins (1972, p. 111-112) stated that without grammar very little understanding can be acquired and without vocabulary there can be no learning at all. Thus, even without good grammar, so long as you equipped with useful words and expression, one can still manage to communicate. Lewis (1993) argued that “lexis is the heart of language” and that it develops a better fluency and expression in English. He also added the significance to the learners of acquiring a more productive vocabulary knowledge, also, their eagerness to develop their own personal vocabulary strategies. Thus, a proposed bridge model program was recommended to highlight the study findings using the lexicons found from the different respective courses. (shrink)

is one of the world's oldest bibles written in Ge'ez and Amharic. It includes 81 books, and the broader cannon also adds 9 more books on top of that. Their language is often rendered as one of the eldest's written languages and a possible candidate for the original language spoken by Adam along with the hieroglyphs and pre-hieratic languages of ancient Egypt. Ethiopia is considered the heart of Africa by many and is a prominent center for Orthodoxy and Christianity. The (...) Holy See of Tekle Haymanot is considered representative of the kingship or restoration of the Solomonic dynasty. The love story of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba holds high significance to them, as Sheba could be an ancient Ethiopian city. The Ethiopian Tewahedo Bible is difficult to find an authentic copy of online (especially when not written in Amharic) due to copies including the non-canonical version of Enoch over its canonical version or heterodox Rastafarian copies that are heretical to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. There have been some efforts in modern scholarship and pop culture to promote the usage of the Ethiopian Tewahedo Bible or bibles like the Monastic Coptic Bible (which include the Septuagint or Canonical Greek to Coptic translations). These efforts may include advocating for their usage(s) over the protestant KJV bible. The KJV may have been favored due the Gutenberg Press and the Gutenberg Bible leading to the KJV bible winning in popularity. Outside of the political ramifications, accessibility or largely scaled printing was a race in which these ancient translations didn't win for mass adoption. (shrink)

La réflexion sur l’éthique et la participation des jeunes et des enfants à l’aménagement com- porte au moins deux dimensions : d’une part, les justifications d’une telle participation ; d’autre part, les problèmes que la pratique participative fait émerger et face auxquels les cadres de réfé- rence conventionnels (non participatifs) ne sont pas toujours utiles. Le présent article aborde ces deux dimensions et explore leurs liens à la lumière de trois méthodes distinctes en matière de théorie morale, soit l’éthique déontologique, (...) l’éthique conséquentialiste et l’éthique de la vertu. Sur la base d’une expérience participative d’aménagement inscrite dans le programme Grandir en Ville de l’UNESCO, certaines contradictions entre les principes d’une pratique participative avec des enfants et la manière dont les problèmes éthiques sont parfois gérés sont mises en évidence. (shrink)

An essentialist claim often made about organisms is that they could not have originated in different gametes. The thesis of gametic essentialism (GE) is usually understood either as a particular case of material origin essentialism, or as genetic essentialism. This paper argues that it should instead be understood in terms of the numerical identity of the gametes. Since gametes are living cells, their identity conditions should be the same as those of other living beings, and therefore involve neither specific material (...) composition, nor specific genes, but continuity of the same life. Understood in this way, GE is a particular case of biological antecedents essentialism (BAE), a kind of origin essentialism that is better justified in the light of the metaphysical nature of organisms as objects that inherit life from previously existing living organisms. BAE overcomes many objections facing other origin essentialist accounts, and it recognises the importance of the gametes in transmitting not just genes, but actively functioning physical structures necessary for life. If we wish to maintain an origin essentialism principle for organisms, we should prefer BAE. (shrink)

Some conditions are given to ensure that for a jump homogeneous Markov process $\{X(t),t\ge 0\}$ the law of the integral functional of the process $T^{-1/2} \int^T_0\varphi(X(t))dt$ converges to the normal law $N(0,\sigma^2)$ as $T\to \infty$, where $\varphi$ is a mapping from the state space $E$ into $\bbfR$.

Alexius von Meinong hat eine eigene Philosophie der Emotionen entwi-ckelt, die mit Blick auf die heutige Debatte über Gefühle höchst aktuell erscheint. Laut Meinong zeichnen sich die Emotionen durch drei Merkma-le aus: Sie sind leibliche Erfahrungen der Lust oder Unlust; sie gründen in kognitiven Akten wie Wahrnehmungen, Phantasien, Urteilen und Annah-men; und sie intendieren Werte. In diesem Aufsatz wird eine systematische Untersuchung von Meinongs Philosophie der Gefühle sowie von ihrem Einfluss auf die Grazer Schule und ihrer Bedeutung für die aktuelle (...) Debat-te unternommen. Schwerpunkte der Arbeit ist erstens die Verbindung zwi-schen Emotionen und Werten, die stark von den unterschiedlichen Wert-konzeptionen, die Meinong im Laufe seines Werkes vertreten hat, abhän-gig ist. Zweitens geht es um die exemplarische Untersuchung von zwei Ge-fühlsarten, die für den heutige Diskussion von besonderer Bedeutung sind, nämlich Urteilsgefühlen und Phantasiegefühlen. (shrink)

Until the late 19th century scientists almost always assumed that the world could be described as a rule-based and hence deterministic system or as a set of such systems. The assumption is maintained in many 20th century theories although it has also been doubted because of the breakthrough of statistical theories in thermodynamics (Boltzmann and Gibbs) and other fields, unsolved questions in quantum mechanics as well as several theories forwarded within the social sciences. Until recently it has furthermore been assumed (...) that a rule-based and deterministic system was also predictable if only the rules were known, but this assumption has now been undermined by modern chaos-theory describing rule-based and deterministic, but unpredictable systems, while catastrophe-theory delivers a set of types describing various kinds of instability and conditions for the stability of a given system. Hence the main trait in the theoretical development in the 20th-century science can be described as a basic modification and limitation of some of the fundamental and strong assumptions forwarded in the previous epochs of modern science. Ironically, the very same process has been a process in which the human capacity to intervene in nature has expanded dramatically and mainly with the help of the very same theories, and not least because they allow nature to be described and made manipulable on a lower level and a more fine-grained scale. While the overall theoretical consistency between the various theories has gone, the reach of human intervention in nature has increased based on quite new dimensions whether in the area of physics (e.g.: energy technologies, chemical technologies, nanotechnologies etc.) or biology (ge¬netic manipulation) or in the area of psychology, sociology and culture (artificial simulations of mental processes, new means of communication, implying changes in the social infrastructure and cultural behaviour etc.). While some of these changes and new conditions can be reflected from within the conceptual framework of rule-based systems, albeit more complex than formerly recognized, others seem to give rise to the question of whether there are »systems« and relations between different systems in the world which are not rule-based? For instance, it seems to be obvious that the notion of instability represents a major conceptual break with former theories of rule-based systems, as the stability of the latter is an axiomatically given property implied in the very notion of rule-based systems, while instability can only be the result of external influence which should be explained as the result of another rule-based sy¬stem. While there are no difficulties implied concerning the stability of rule-based systems, the notion of unstable states of a system raises the question of how there can be a system at all if there are no invariant stabilising principles? This is the first question which I will address. And I shall do so by taking two examples of such systems as my point of departure. The first example will be the computer and the second will be ordinary language. In both cases I will argue that the stability of these systems (which are both defined by the existence/presence of human intentions) are provided by the help of - differently organised - redundancy functions which both allow the maintenance of systems in unstable macro-states, suspension of previous rules, underdetermination and overdetermination and generation/emergence/creation of new rules more or less independent of previous rules by the help of optional recursions to the permanently accessible underlying levels as for instance the level of binary representation in computers. Since the notion of redundancy is both controversial as such and often avoided, the concept is discussed (as defined in Claude Shannon's mathematical theory of information and in the semiotic framework of J. J. Greimas) and leading to a more general definition in which the redundancy functions serve to overcome noisy conditions, but at the cost of rule-based stability, determination, and predictability. A second question will be how the notion of rule-generating systems relates to the notion of anticipatory systems and it will be argued that rule-generating systems share some features with an¬ticipatory systems and that the former from a certain viewpoint can be seen as a subclass of the latter, although anticipative features are not necessarily a part of the definition of rule-generating systems. On the other hand, it will be discussed whether anticipatory systems which are not rule-generating systems can exist and it will be argued that the capacity to anticipate is strongly limited if it is not part of a rule-generating system. Therefore, it is concluded that the most powerful anticipatory systems need to be rule-generating systems. (shrink)

In this paper I highlight two opposing models of the notion of divine revelation: the propositional and the radical. The propositional understanding of revelation was central to theology and philosophy until the 19th century. Since then, a number of other models of revelation have emerged. I define as radical the understanding of revelation which emphasizes two features of revelation: (1) God’s existence is per se revelatory; (2) God’s revelation is per se self-revelation. I propose too an assessment of the notion (...) of propositional revelation as presented by Richard Swinburne. And I offer detailed analyses of two representatives of the early understanding of divine revelation as self-revelation: the views of Bernard Bolzano and Anton Günther. Bolzano, the renowned mathematician, was also a philosopher of religion; and Günther, one of the most ingenious writers in Austrian philosophy, was not only a theologian but also a philosopher comparable to the important figures of 19th-century Ge. (shrink)

Many authors believe that the manuscripts Frege wrote in 1924–1925 are not theoretically of interest. They are rather a product of his emotional despair and theoretical dead-end which he reached in the last years of his life. Such is also the judgement of Michael Dummett delivered in his seminal book Frege: Philosophy of Language. According to Dummett, “the few fragmentary writings of Frege’s final period—1919–1925—are not of high quality: they are interesting chiefly as showing that Frege did, at least at (...) the very end of his life, acknowledge the failure of the logicist programme” (Dummett 1981, p. 664). In this paper we will try to show that the widely accepted negative assessment of Frege’s latest writings is due to a lack of understanding of their true idea. In fact, the change in Fre-ge’s mind in the last two or three years of his life was result of long deliberations on a severe tension in his founding intuitions. The change itself made his logico-philosophical project more coherent and, thus, is of utmost theoretical importance. (shrink)

Ziel der Untersuchung ist zu zeigen, inwiefern Hegels Charakterisierung des Schönen als ‚das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee‘ auch für die Deutung des Naturschönen Erklärungswert hat. Vorausgesetzt ist die für den Idea- lismus Hegelscher Prägung zentrale Doktrin, derzufolge der Natur Ideel- les zugrunde liegt. Schön sind dann Naturphänomene, in denen jener ideelle Grund der Natur durchscheint. Das Erfassen von Ideellem scheint ein Privileg geistiger Wesen zu sein. Dem stehen evolutionsbiologische Argumente entgegen, die dem Schönen einen positiven Selektionswert, etwa bei der sexuellen (...) Partnerwahl, zusprechen. Auch der Mensch hat stammesgeschichtliche Wurzeln, die in ihm weiter wirken. Doch sobald der Geist auf der evolutionären Bühne erscheint, herrscht das Biologische nicht länger mit der uneingeschränkten Macht, die es im Rahmen natürli- cher Selektion hat. Hegels Deutung des Schönen, auch des Naturschönen, ist wesentlich bezogen auf den Geist. Ich verdeutliche dies an einigen Exempeln (Schneekristall, musikalische Harmonie, Abendhimmel, Ge- birgslandschaft, organische Blüten- und Körperformen). Aber wodurch sind Naturschönheit und Kunstschönheit dann voneinander unterschie- den? Die Hervorbringungen der Natur sind lediglich Zufallskonstellatio- nen. Allerdings, so Hegel, hat der Zufall es ‘recht’ gemacht, d.h. hat er etwas reizend Stimmiges gefügt, gewahrt der Geist darin das im Sinnli- chen durchscheinende Ideelle. Eben darin wird, mit Adorno gesprochen, die gemeinsame Wurzel des Kunstschönen und des Naturschönen erkennbar. Wer das Naturschöne preist, begebe sich „an den Rand der Afterpoe- sie“, des Kitsches, meint Adorno. Gleichwohl sei es wahr zu sagen, „die Landschaft der Toscana sei schöner als die Umgebung von Gelsenkirchen“ (Adorno 1993, 110, 112). In der Tat. Doch was meinen wir, wenn wir Landschaften, Blumen, Sonnenuntergänge ‘schön’ nennen, und welche Kriterien bringen wir dafür in Anschlag? Im Folgenden möchte ich darle- gen, inwiefern Hegels Charakterisierung des Schönen als „das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee“ diesbezüglich erhellend und klärend ist. Hinweise auf Adornos ästhetische Theorie ergänzen diese Überlegungen. Dem stehen evolutionsbiologische Argumente entgegen, die zunehmend Einfluss auf die ästhetische Diskussion gewinnen. (shrink)

W dziełach Arystotelesa, lub z medievals, jak również w pismach późniejszych zdroworozsądkowe filozofów, takich jak Thomas Reid czy GE Moore’a, możemy znaleźć rodzinę różnych prób uporania się ze strukturami rozsądku i wspólnego -sense świat, który jest nam dany w normalnym, doświadczenie pre-teoretycznym. Będziemy argumentować, co wynika, że ​​teoria takich struktur stanowi ważny i dotychczas niedoceniany związek między wczesnym psychologii Gestalt z jednej strony, oraz współczesnych osiągnięć w filozofii i sztucznej inteligencji badań na innych.

Come è emerso dall’analisi filosofica e dalla ricerca nelle scienze cogni- tive, la maggior parte dei concetti, tra cui molti concetti medici, esibisce degli “effetti prototipici” e non riesce ad essere definita nei termini di condizioni necessarie e sufficienti. Questo aspetto rappresenta un problema per la pro- gettazione di ontologie in informatica, poiché i formalismi adottati per la rap- presentazione della conoscenza (a partire da OWL – Web Ontology Langua- ge) non sono in grado di rendere conto dei concetti nei (...) termini dei loro tratti prototipici. Nel presente articolo ci concentriamo sulla classe dei disordini mentali facendo riferimento alle descrizioni che ne vengono date nel DSM-5. L’idea è quella di proporre un approccio ibrido, in cui i formalismi delle ontologie sono combinati a una rappresentazione geometrica della conoscenza basata sugli spazi concettuali. (shrink)

Förståelse kan sägas vara den högsta formen av medveten insikt. Kunskap om ett fenomen behöver inte i sig vara tillräcklig för förståelse - de tidiga människorna visste att solen gick upp i öster, men de förstod inte att detta berodde på att jorden är rund och roterar. Förståelsebegreppet är centralt för all vetenskaplig aktivitet, men har mest studerats och tillämpats inom human- och samhällsvetenskaperna. Inom naturvetenskapen har ”förståelse” fått träda i skymundan för ”förklaring”. Vi skall se att detta är olyckligt (...) och att förståelsebegreppet verkligen är av högsta relevans även för naturvetenskapen. Vi får här ett verktyg för att bedöma de yttersta gränserna för våra insikter i omvärlden. Analysen i detta arbete utgår ifrån en ny teori för förståelse, där de två fundamentala elementen är abstraktion och jämförelse. Ett antal intressanta konsekvenser följer, exempelvis visar vi att vissa fenomen aldrig kommer att kunna förstås och att lärandeprocessen ges nya möjligheter. (shrink)

This is a translation of an article published in the journal Argeiaki Ge, which was asked from me by the scientific journal Journal of Classical Studies Matica Srpska. The Argive Hapocration was a philosopher and commentator from the second century A.D. His origin is not disputed by any source. However, there is still a potential possibility that he might have descended from a different Argos: namely that which is in Amfilochia, Orestiko or that in Cyprus. Yet, the absence of any (...) additional geographical designation in his name in ancient sources is likely to disprove such claims. Simply mentioning ‘Argos’ can only indicate the most notable of the cities with this name, namely the Argive Argos. As will be revealed later in this paper, the close relationship between Hapocration with the Atticus family may well support his Argive origin. I support that it is obvious to assume that there is a close affinity of philosophical activity in Phlius and in Argos which remains to be investigated in more detail in the future. The research of written and archaeological sources can flourish further still. I hope that in the near future there will be evidence enough for a fuller presentation of philosophical activity in ancient Argos. (shrink)

This paper delves into one particular topic within this Buddhist theory of cognition. I examine a single argument by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) contained within his famous epistemology text, the Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel, drawing out the philosophical implications that this argument has on his theory of cognition and his account of ontological dependence. I make the case that Phywa pa’s argument fails to explain adequately the nature of the relation between certain cognitive episodes and (...) the contents of those episodes. In addition, I will show that Phywa pa is forced to accept an arguably dubious version of externalism about mental content. (shrink)

»Aber wenn ich höre, alles andere habe vor dem Schutz des Lebens zurückzutreten, dann muss ich sagen: Das ist in dieser Absolutheit nicht richtig. Grundrechte beschränken sich gegenseitig. Wenn es überhaupt einen absoluten Wert in unserem Grundgesetz gibt, dann ist das die Würde des Menschen. Die ist unantastbar. Aber sie schließt nicht aus, dass wir sterben müssen.« So äußerte sich Wolfgang Schäuble im April 2020 im Zusammenhang mit den Maßnahmen gegen die Corona-Pandemie. Die fundamentale Stellung der Menschenwürde, die Schäuble in (...) seiner Aussage hervorhob, steht außer Streit. Der Schutz der Würde des Menschen bildet so etwas wie den Ankerpunkt, das Umwillen der Rechtsordnung. Was die Menschenwürde genau bedeutet, ist jedoch alles andere als klar. In der juristischen Literatur kommt die Schwierigkeit, die bei der Bestimmung des Begriffs besteht, vielfach zum Ausdruck. In den Kommentaren zum Grundgesetz wird etwa festgestellt, dass es einen allgemein akzeptierten, dogmatisch präzisen Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde nicht gebe. Ein operabler Begriff der Menschenwürde harre immer noch der Entwicklung. Das Zusammentreffen von fundamentaler Bedeutung und inhaltlicher Unbestimmtheit ruft nach theoretischer Reflexion. Dabei ist klar, dass gerade in der relativen Unschärfe und Offenheit des Begriffs der Menschenwürde auch ein Vorzug liegt. Gerade weil dieses Konzept so vage ist, kann es einen konsensfähigen Grund kollektiver Ordnung bilden. Die folgenden Überlegungen wollen dem Rechnung tragen und sind nicht von der Absicht geleitet, den Begriff abschließend zu definieren. Eher liegt das Ziel der Studie in einer Annäherung an den begrifflichen Gehalt der Menschenwürde. Disziplinär ist die folgende Untersuchung in erster Linie der Philosophie zuzuordnen, insbesondere der Rechts- und Moralphilosophie. Es handelt sich nicht um eine rechtswissenschaftlich-dogmatische Arbeit. Das Ziel der Arbeit besteht mithin nicht darin, den Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde auszulegen. Jedoch hat die Studie auch eine rechtlich-praktische Zielrichtung. Sie soll, auf philosophischer Grundlage, auch den Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde besser verstehen helfen und damit auch der juristischen Interpretation dienlich sein. Im dritten Teil wird die Arbeit daher Bezüge zum positiven Recht herstellen und eine juristische Interpretation des Begriffs vorschlagen. Bevor die Untersuchung einsetzt, ist eine kurze Verständigung darüber nötig, von welchem Begriff der Menschenwürde im Folgenden ausgegangen wird. Der Begriff kann unterschiedlich verstanden werden. Insbesondere bestehen Vorstellungen einer (wie man sagen kann) inhärenten und einer kontingenten Würde. Nach der ersten Vorstellung hat jeder Mensch eine Würde, die er nicht verlieren kann. Nach der zweiten Vorstellung ist Würde dagegen etwas, das ein Mensch je nachdem in größerem oder kleinerem Ausmaß besitzt. Die folgenden Überlegungen gehen von der Idee der inhärenten Würde aus. Diese Würde kann verletzt oder missachtet werden, sie kann dem Menschen aber nie eigentlich genommen werden. Die Menschenwürde auch in diesem Sinn basiert jedoch auf einer Zuschreibung. Der Mensch hat Würde nicht, wie er zwei Beine hat. Die menschliche Gemeinschaft schreibt sie ihm als unverlierbar zu. Es handelt sich bei dieser Zuschreibung mithin nicht um eine deskriptive, sondern um eine präskriptive Aussage. Gerade darin manifestiert sich der unverlierbare Gehalt der menschlichen Würde – denn in einem deskriptiven Sinn verstanden, kann diese durchaus verloren gehen. Ein Mensch kann faktisch unwürdig leben, entwürdigt werden, seiner Würde verlustig gehen. Das präskriptive Verständnis dagegen statuiert eine Würde, die alle faktischen Gegebenheiten überdauert und in jedem Fall besteht. Die folgenden Untersuchungen wollen diese Würde erläutern, aber nicht begründen. Denn nach hier vertretenem Verständnis bildet die Menschenwürde selbst den Grund der normativen Forderungen von Moral und Recht. Es gibt insoweit nichts weiter zu begründen – während die Würde, wie aufgezeigt werden soll, tatsächlich den Grund der Menschenrechte bildet. Insoweit – beim Verhältnis zwischen Menschenwürde und Menschenrechten – liegt ein Begründungsverhältnis vor. Dieses wird vor allem im zweiten Teil der Arbeit näher diskutiert. Im ersten Teil soll versucht werden, in einem allgemeinen, moralphilosophischen Sinn ein Verständnis der menschlichen Würde zu gewinnen. Dazu ist es zunächst nötig, sich die wichtigsten bestehenden Theorien zur Menschenwürde zu vergegenwärtigen. Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Theorien wird ein Defizit aufzeigen. Diesen Analysen schließt sich eine eigene Interpretation an, die am Schluss des ersten Teils mit einigen möglichen Gegenargumenten konfrontiert werden soll. (shrink)

Faulkner a bâti une partie de sa renommée sur la violence parfois controversée de ses récits. Mais l’acte criminel retient moins son attention que son contexte et sa signification morale. L’objet premier de la littérature, selon Faulkner, ce sont les conflits de l’homme, ou du cœur humain, avec eux-mêmes. Le propos de cet article est de mettre en évidence la façon dont Faulkner subvertit le modèle du roman noir, et substitue à l’enjeu traditionnel des histoires policières, celui des faits et (...) de l’identité du coupable, un problème moral. Il donne quelques indications sur la structure générale des rapports crime-culpabilité dans l’œuvre de Faulkner, avant de montrer comment cette thématique se décline dans ses « histoires de crime » au sens propre, c’est-à-dire dans L’Intrus (Intruder in the dust, 1948) et Le Gambit du cavalier, et irrigue la reconstitution faulknérienne de la société du Sud et de l’histoire des États-Unis. (shrink)

Debemos distinguir el pensamiento del conocimiento, en particular en lo que respecta a la Modernidad, desde el Renacimiento italiano, que vio emerger el conocimiento objetivante (Koyré, 1977), que es siempre nuestro ideal de conocimiento, incluso en la época de la escritura numérica. El pensamiento, como lo recuerda H. Arendt (1993), es un flujo natural ilimitado que habita a cada uno de nosotros, sin relación con la cultura, la instrucción, el género sexual, la clase social, los modos de legitimación de los (...) discursos e, incluso, las cosméticas. Es lo que indicaba Lenin cuando reivindicaba el comunismo como la posibilidad de un conserje de hacer política. Rancière no dice algo diferente cuando evoca la igualdad de las inteligencias. (shrink)

How does philosophy learn to speak a new language? That is, how does some particular language come to serve as the means for the expression of philosophical ideas? In this paper, I present an answer grounded in four historical case studies and suggest that this answer has broad implications for contemporary philosophy. I begin with Jonathan Rée’s account of philosophical translation into English in the sixteenth century, and the debate between philosopher-translators who wanted to acquire – wholesale or with modifications (...) – foreign terms, and those who wished to take existing words and transform them from their ordinary to a philosophical use. I sketch how these twin processes of ‘acquisition’ and ‘transformation’ manifested themselves in philosophical translations from Greek to Latin, Greek to Arabic and both Greek and Arabic to Gə’əz and argue that comparative work in this vein could yield interesting and significant results. I suggest that not only is Rée’s approach useful for thinking about philosophical translation historically, but that philosophical translation between very different languages is important for contemporary philosophy insofar as it reveals the linguistic presuppositions of philosophical theories expressed in some particular language, and that this constitutes an argument against the prevailing monolingualism in philosophy. (shrink)

I. Kant’s Critique of Judgment is a maintext to catch the epistemological tensions created by the emerging notion of life . By investigating the specific causality of life in order to explain the phenomenon of self-organization of the living, Kant uses the remarkable concept of technique of nature , thus establishing a strong analogy between technique and life.The consequences of this analogy affect not only the epistemology of life, but also the modern conception of technique.To a technicization of life corresponds (...) a vitalization of technique. A new hybrid territory is thus discovered – that of technical life – in whichstands the possibility of a biological archaeology of modern technique. (shrink)

In der Wissenschaft wie im alltaglichen Leben tritt oft die Frage vor uns: was ist die Bedeutung dieses oder jenes Ausdrucks? Eine erschöpfende Antwort auch nur in einem Einzelfalle ist jedoch unmöglich, ehe die dahinter verborgene allgemeinere prinzipielle Frage gelost ist: was ist überhaupt Bedeutung, was wird darunter verstanden resp. was ist darunter zu verstehen? Die Sprachphilosophie und Sprachforschung der letzten Zeit hat sich reichlich damit abgemüht, den Begriff Bedeutung in seinem Wesen zu erfassen. Jedoch sind wir der Meinung, dass (...) die Sache noch nicht in genügendem Masse allseitig geklärt worden ist. (shrink)

On Crimmins and Perry’s account of propositional attitude ascription (1989), beliefs are concrete cognitive structures—particulars ("things in the head") that belong to an agent and that have a lifetime. They are related to the world and to other cognitive structures and abilities, allowing one to classify the latter by propositional content. Containing ideas and notions as constituents, beliefs are structured entities. The difference between notions and ideas is the difference between an agent’s ways of thinking about individuals vs. properties.

In this commentary I criticise Doris Gerber's intentionalistic reading of history. While an intentionalistic philosophy of history has some plausibility, a *purely* intentionalistic view is often irreconcilable with the most elementary common sense. For example, that history ought to be considered exclusively as the history of human action and not of things that simply happen to humans as well - like the outbreak of the volcano Vesuv in the year 79 which lead to the destructions of Pompeii. Or that historical (...) value judgments should always be judgments about the reasons for human action, which raises the questions if and how the unintended consequences of human action are to be judged. (shrink)

A history of representations of readers and reading acts in images (paintings, prints, drawings, postcards) from the Middle Ages to the 20th century. It includes a bibliography and 42 illustrations.

Popper restricted his definition of falsifiability to consistent theories through what we may call his requirement of consistency. His main argument was that an inconsistent theory does not distinguish the sentences that corroborate it from those that contradict it, for all sentences follow from it. I propose to replace this requirement by the more basic requirement that the classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers of a theory do not overlap. This results not only in an unrestricted definition of falsifiability but (...) also in some inconsistent theories being falsifiable whenever that inconsistency is not located among its observational statements. Although this assumes a restriction of the principle of explosion or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECQ), it does not depend on any particular system or approach of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I propose to define the class of potential refuters of a theory, which is obtained by subtracting the class of potential corroborators from the class of potential falsifiers. Given that, by definition, the classes of potential refuters and corroborators of a theory do not overlap, it immediately follows that some observationally inconsistent theories are refutable in this sense. This establishes the bases for a new and more general formal theory of falsifiability of scientific factual/empirical theories. (shrink)

Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Gettier-Problems der kritischen Prüfung unterzogen. Der vierte Abschnitt diskutiert die reliabilistische Antwort auf das Gettier-Problem. Es wird gezeigt, dass (...) sich mit Hilfe des Reliabilismus nicht alle Gettier-Fälle ausschließen lassen. Im fünften Abschnitt wird eine neue Lösung des Gettier-Problems entwickelt. (shrink)

In the essay 'Donner la mort' (1992) Jacques Derrida develops a new concept for the philosophical category of the subjectivity. In particular, he crucially connects the genesis of the subject with the experience of the absolute responsibility that, for Derrida, also represents the beginning of the religion itself: the religion comes to light fundamentally as history of the responsibility. The symbol of the absolute responsibility is the biblical figure of Abraham in the shocking pericope of Genesis 22, where God demands (...) the sacrifice of Isaac. This paper aims to analyze the structure of the absolute responsibility as genesis of the subject in Derrida’s reconstruction of the biblical text. The responsibility itself turns out to be the common foundation of those religions that share the figure of Abraham and provides also a base for a philosophy of monotheism. (shrink)

Artykuł w głównej mierze poświęcony jest analizie późnego eseju Norberta Eliasa Über die Einsamkeit der Sterbenden in unseren Tagen (1982). W pierwszej części autorka rozpatruje socjologiczne refleksje Eliasa nad zmianami we współczesnej percepcji umierania – choroby, starości, śmierci. Zdaniem Eliasa fenomen śmierci podlega systematycznemu wykluczeniu z centrum życia społecznego – z codzienności -, co stanowi o nowej wersji jego „zaczarowania”. W części drugiej przedstawiona jest jedna z najważniejszych tez niniejszego artykułu, tj. idea rozumu anamnetycznego. Autorka skupia się tu na Eliasowskich (...) pojęciach komunikacji, zaangażowania i balansu w strukturze ja-my (resp. ja-ty). Elisowska formuła Ich-Wir-Balance, jako proces uczenia się, ma stanowić o zrównoważeniu i przedefiniowaniu rozumu anamnetycznego / pamięci kolektywnej. W ostatniej, trzeciej części autorka ilustruje krótko pewne podobieństwa między Eliasowską kategorią śmierci a nihilizmem w ujęciu T. Różewicza oraz koncepcją biopolityki G. Agambena. (shrink)

Pyrrhonische Skepsis, sprachphilosophische Bedenken und pragmatische Tendenzen .

Decision theory explicates norms of rationality for deriving preferences from preferences and beliefs. Empirical studies have found that actual preferences regularly violate these norms, launching a debate on whether this shows that subjects are prone to certain forms of irrationality or that decision theory needs to be revised. It has been claimed that such a revision is necessitated by the fact that normative uses of decision theory must be justified by a reflective equilibrium. The paper discusses three points. First, the (...) debate over the impact of empirical studies on decision theories is only meaningful with respect to a decision theory that includes not only a formal system but also a theory of application. Second, differences in the concepts of reflective equilibrium appealed to are a source of confusion in the debate on rationality. Third, the assumption that normative uses of decision theory are justified by reflective equilibrium is not sufficient ground for arguing that the empirical studies call for a revision of decision theory. Such an argument must rely on substantive claims about rationality, preferences and beliefs. (shrink)