What is the most general common set of attributes that characterises something as intrinsically valuable and hence as subject to some moral respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and therefore rightly to be disrespected in itself? This paper develops and supports the thesis that the minimal condition of possibility of an entity's least intrinsic value is to be identified with its ontological status as an information object. All entities, even when (...) interpreted as only clusters of information, still have a minimal moral worth qua information objects and so may deserve to be respected. The paper is organised into four main sections. Section 1 models moral action as an information system using the object-oriented programming methodology (OOP). Section 2 addresses the question of what role the several components constituting the moral system can have in an ethical analysis. If they can play only an instrumental role, then Computer Ethics (CE) is probably bound to remain at most a practical, field-dependent, applied or professional ethics. However, Computer Ethics can give rise to a macroethical approach, namely Information Ethics (IE), if one can show that ethical concern should be extended to include not only human, animal or biological entities, but also information objects. The following two sections show how this minimalist level of analysis can be achieved. Section 3 provides an axiological analysis of information objects. It criticises the Kantian approach to the concept of intrinsic value and shows that it can be improved by using the methodology introduced in the first section. The solution of the Kantian problem prompts the reformulation of the key question concerning the moral worth of an entity: what is the intrinsic value of x qua an object constituted by its inherited attributes? In answering this question, it is argued that entities can share different observable properties depending on the level of abstraction adopted,and that it is still possible to speak of moral value even at the highest level of ontological abstraction represented by the informational analysis. Section 4 develops a minimalist axiology based on the concept of information object. It further supports IE's position by addressing five objections that may undermine its acceptability. (shrink)

The problem of emergence in physical theories makes necessary to build a general theory of the relationships between the observed system and the observing system. It can be shown that there exists a correspondence between classical systems and computational dynamics according to the Shannon-Turing model. A classical system is an informational closed system with respect to the observer; this characterizes the emergent processes in classical physics as phenomenological emergence. In quantum systems, the analysis based on the computation theory fails. (...) It is here shown that a quantum system is an informational open system with respect to the observer and able to exhibit processes of observational, radical emergence. Finally, we take into consideration the role of computation in describing the physical world. (shrink)

It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I will argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill-equipped to deal with these achievements. I will then outline a theoretical perspective that has been emerging (...) from a theoretical convergence of perceptual psychology, ethology, linguistics, and developmental research. On the basis of this framework, I will argue that corresponding achievements are brought forth by a specific type of functional architecture whose core features are: (i) a perceptual system that is biologically furnished with a rich system of conceptual forms, (ii) a triggering relation between the sensory input and conceptual forms by which the same sensory input can be exploited by different types or systems of conceptual forms, and (iii) computational principles for handling semantically underspecified conceptual forms. Characteristic features of the proposed theoretical framework will be pointed out using the Heider-Simmel phenomenon as an example. (shrink)

A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious (...) will do so for some – perhaps most – of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems (e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of consciousness. (shrink)

It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged from a (...) theoretical convergence of perceptual psychology, ethology, linguistics, and developmental research. On the basis of this framework, I argue that corresponding achievements are brought forth by a specific type of functional architecture whose core features are as follows: (1) a perceptual system that is biologically furnished with a rich system of conceptual forms, (2) a triggering relation between the sensory input and conceptual forms by which the same sensory input can be exploited by different types or systems of conceptual forms, and (3) computational principles for handling semantically underspecified conceptual forms. Characteristic features of the proposed theoretical framework are pointed out using the Heider–Simmel phenomenon as an example. (shrink)

ABSTRACT -/- A propositional attitude (PA) is a belief, desire, fear, etc., that x is the case. This dissertation addresses the question of the semantic content of a specific kind of PA-instance: an instance of a belief of the form all Fs are Gs. The belief that all bachelors are sports fans has this form, while the belief that Spain is a country in Eastern Europe do not. Unlike a state of viewing the color of an orange, a belief-instance is (...) semantically contentful because it has reference, a meaning, logical implications, or a truth-value. While the intrinsic semantics view holds that either concepts or abstract objects are the source of content for PAs, the extrinsic semantics view holds that symbols of a mental language provide this content. I argue that a successful theory of intentionality must explain: (1) the truth-preserving causal powers of PAs, (2) the failure of the deductive principle Substitutivity to preserve truth over sentences that ascribe PAs, and (3) the truth-evaluability of PAs. As an internalist version of the extrinsic semantics view, I first evaluate Fodor’s Computational Theory of Mind, which says the semantic ingredients of mental states are symbols governed by rules of a mental syntax. I argue that in order to meet (1), CTM would have to associate the causal patterns of each thought-type with the inferential relations of some proposition – in an arbitrary or question-begging way. I also evaluate Fodor’s causal theory, as an externalist version of the extrinsic semantics view. This view is that lawlike causal relations between mental symbols and objects determine the reference, and thus the truth-value, of a thought. I argue that Brian Loar’s circularity objection refutes the ability of this theory to meet (3); and I endorse the intrinsic semantics perspective. I evaluate Frege’s theory of abstract, mind-external, and intrinsically semantic objects (senses), as an attempt to meet condition (2). I conclude that mind-external universals are the source of the intrinsically semantic features of concepts. Finally, I put forth a theory called ‘Bare Property Intentionality’, which describes the features of intrinsically representative and semantic concepts that connect them to these universals. (shrink)

There exist many applications where it is necessary to approximate numerically derivatives of a function which is given by a computer procedure. In particular, all the fields of optimization have a special interest in such a kind of information. In this paper, a new way to do this is presented for a new kind of a computer - the Infinity Computer - able to work numerically with finite, infinite, and infinitesimal number. It is proved that the Infinity Computer is able (...) to calculate values of derivatives of a higher order for a wide class of functions represented by computer procedures. It is shown that the ability to compute derivatives of arbitrary order automatically and accurate to working precision is an intrinsic property of the Infinity Computer related to its way of functioning. Numerical examples illustrating the new concepts and numerical tools are given. (shrink)

Searle and some others believe that symbols’ meanings are derived from user’s assigning and interpretation, but not intrinsic to itself, and no object is a symbol by virtue of its physics. This criticism has brought about the "symbol grounding problem" in the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Computationalism believe that explicit symbols’ semantic contents are derived does not mean all the other kinds of symbols are also extrinsic. So, how is it possible that non-derivative, intrinsic representations are possible? By (...) analyzing Peirce and some others’ meta-theories of representation, we can ffnd representation is essentially a multifunctional system of teleology. We try to analyze the mechanisms and forms of intrinsic representation and extrinsic representation by means of the structure of the system, benefft from which it can be drawn that intrinsic representations depend on self-organization, and extrinsic representations depend on the extrinsic purpose. It is necessary for intrinsic representational AI to construct a self-organizing computing system with intrinsic purpose. (shrink)

Philosophical questions about minds and computation need to focus squarely on the mathematical theory of Turing machines (TM's). Surrogate TM's such as computers or formal systems lack abilities that make Turing machines promising candidates for possessors of minds. Computers are only universal Turing machines (UTM's)—a conspicuous but unrepresentative subclass of TM. Formal systems are only static TM's, which do not receive inputs from external sources. The theory of TM computation clearly exposes the failings of two prominent critiques, Searle's (...) Chinese room (1980) and arguments from Gödel's Incompleteness theorems (e.g., Lucas, 1961; Penrose, 1989), both of which fall short of addressing the complete TM model. Both UTM-computers and formal systems provide an unsound basis for debate. In particular, their special natures easily foster the misconception that computation entails intrinsically meaningless symbol manipulation. This common view is incorrect with respect to full-fledged TM's, which can process inputs non-formally, i.e., in a subjective and dynamically evolving fashion. To avoid a distorted understanding of the theory of computation, philosophical judgments and discussions should be grounded firmly upon the complete Turing machine model, the proper model for real computers. (shrink)

In this paper we suggest a clarification in relation to the notions of computational and intrinsic emergence, by showing how the latter is deeply connected to the new Logical Openness Theory, an original extension of Gödel theorems to the model theory. The epistemological scenario we are going to make use of is that of the theory of vision, a particularly instructive one. In order to reach our goal we introduce a dynamic theory of relationship between the observer and the (...) observed which takes into account the co-adaptive processes as well as the ecological nature of the mind/world relations. In order to fulfill the requirements of complexity sciences, this theory assumes that the scientific activity has to be able to comprehend the adaptive dynamics between system and environment as well as the model and the context where it is applied. This leads to an adaptive epistemology based on logical openness which overcomes the thigh corners of both naïve objectivist conception and radical relativism temptations by stressing that the knowledge building is a process of continuous shifting from the “frozen” syntactical dimensions to the plurality choices which make possible for mind and world to meet each other. (shrink)

The idea that human cognition is, or can be understood as, a form of computation is a useful conceptual tool for cognitive science. It was a foundational assumption during the birth of cognitive science as a multidisciplinary field, with Artificial Intelligence (AI) as one of its contributing fields. One conception of AI in this context is as a provider of computational tools (frameworks, concepts, formalisms, models, proofs, simulations, etc.) that support theory building in cognitive science. The contemporary field of (...) AI, however, has taken the theoretical possibility of explaining human cognition as a form of computation to imply the practical feasibility of realising human(-like or -level) cognition in factual computational systems, and the field frames this realisation as a short-term inevitability. Yet, as we formally prove herein, creating systems with human(-like or -level) cognition is intrinsically computationally intractable. This means that any factual AI systems created in the short-run are at best decoys. When we think these systems capture something deep about ourselves and our thinking, we induce distorted and impoverished images of ourselves and our cognition. In other words, AI in current practice is deteriorating our theoretical understanding of cognition rather than advancing and enhancing it. The situation could be remediated by releasing the grip of the currently dominant view on AI and by returning to the idea of AI as a theoretical tool for cognitive science. In reclaiming this older idea of AI, however, it is important not to repeat conceptual mistakes of the past (and present) that brought us to where we are today. (shrink)

One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of Dennett’s suggestion and (...) show that Dennett’s argument for the claim that human intentionality is derived because it was designed by natural selection is based on the misunderstanding of how natural selection works. (shrink)

The main goal of this essay is to demonstrate the creativity of computational systems (both living and non-living) through a philosophical interpretation of Alan Turing's halting theorem. The first part consists of a brief genealogy of studies focused on the analogy between humans and machines, with a specific focus on the issue of creativity. It aims to show how, since the publication of Turing's 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence, a subjectivist approach has become dominant in these studies—namely, the tendency (...) to shift the locus of inquiry into machine intelligence and creativity from the machines themselves to their observers, inferring the potential of the former from the latter’s reactions of surprise. We will demonstrate how this approach has, over time, downplayed the question of whether machines are genuinely creative (as explored by Boden) and has instead anchored research on the premise that creativity lies in the eyes of the beholder (as proposed by Ritchie. As an alternative to this approach, the second part will attempt to revive an objectivist perspective, showing how it is possible—once again drawing on Turing—to argue for the real creativity of machines. However, this will be done by leveraging the important philosophical implications of the logical-mathematical results Turing achieved in his 1936 paper on computable numbers. In the conclusion, the essay will propose identifying the equivalent of real machine creativity in the human ability to take one thing for another—a concept described by Cornelius Castoriadis as a quid pro quo intrinsic to language understood as a code. This ability enables individuals to consistently align experiential data with their own rules. (shrink)

Analysis is given of the Omega Point cosmology, an extensively peer-reviewed proof (i.e., mathematical theorem) published in leading physics journals by professor of physics and mathematics Frank J. Tipler, which demonstrates that in order for the known laws of physics to be mutually consistent, the universe must diverge to infinite computational power as it collapses into a final cosmological singularity, termed the Omega Point. The theorem is an intrinsic component of the Feynman-DeWitt-Weinberg quantum gravity/Standard Model Theory of Everything (TOE) (...) describing and unifying all the forces in physics, of which itself is also required by the known physical laws. With infinite computational resources, the dead can be resurrected--never to die again--via perfect computer emulation of the multiverse from its start at the Big Bang. Miracles are also physically allowed via electroweak quantum tunneling controlled by the Omega Point cosmological singularity. The Omega Point is a different aspect of the Big Bang cosmological singularity--the first cause--and the Omega Point has all the haecceities claimed for God in the traditional religions. -/- From this analysis, conclusions are drawn regarding the social, ethical, economic and political implications of the Omega Point cosmology. (shrink)

As quantum technologies (QT) advance, their potential impact on and relation with society has been developing into an important issue for exploration. In this paper, we investigate the topic of democratization in the context of QT, particularly quantum computing. The paper contains three main sections. First, we briefly introduce different theories of democracy (participatory, representative, and deliberative) and how the concept of democratization can be formulated with respect to whether democracy is taken as an intrinsic or instrumental value. Second, (...) we give an overview of how the concept of democratization is used in the QT field. Democratization is mainly adopted by companies working on quantum computing and used in a very narrow understanding of the concept. Third, we explore various narratives and counter-narratives concerning democratization in QT. Finally, we explore the general efforts of democratization in QT such as different forms of access, formation of grassroot communities and special interest groups, the emerging culture of manifesto writing, and how these can be located within the different theories of democracy. In conclusion, we argue that although the ongoing efforts in the democratization of QT are necessary steps towards the democratization of this set of emerging technologies, they should not be accepted as sufficient to argue that QT is a democratized field. We argue that more reflexivity and responsiveness regarding the narratives and actions adopted by the actors in the QT field and making the underlying assumptions of ongoing efforts on democratization of QT explicit, can result in a better technology for society. (shrink)

The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the respective (...) ‘components’ of thinking systems, while the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is of secondary importance. Thus the paper extends the received animat paradigm, and investigates some intriguing consequences of expanding the conception of bio-machine hybrids to include abstract functional and semantic structure. In particular, the thought experiments consider cases of mind-machine merger where there is no physical Brain-Machine Interface: indeed, the material human body and brain have been removed from the picture altogether. The first experiment illustrates some intrinsic theoretical difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an alternative material medium, while the second reveals some deep conceptual problems in attempting to create a form of truly Artificial General Intelligence. (shrink)

Sir Roger Penrose and prof. Stuart Hameroff had substantiated a theory that a human brain performs quantum computations. Logically, a question comes what information does then the brain compute and what is the result of such a quantum computing? To answer this, it is tempting to exploit isomorphism between complex hermitian 2 × 2 matrices and R4, more specifically a real vector representation of qubit states. P Arrighi proposed that "qubit states may be viewed as spatio-temporal objects, or indeed as (...) four-vectors of a Minkowski space-time." Under Orch OR theory assumptions, a very large number of entangled qubits is involved in a massive and highly complex computing task. What does this gigantic quantum computing machinery produce as the final outcome of its coordinated computations? The answer is obvious - it is the physical world as we see it, or the so called an external, to the human brain, reality (Minkowski space). Accordingly, underlying Orch OR brain computing concept is a mathematical connection between a qubit (qm) and relativity (Minkowski space). It is a connection between our mind, or the consciousness, and a physical reality the way we see it as the result of quantum computations of our brain. Does this mean that a physical reality as we see it, is being internally quantum computed and represented to us as a Minkowski space? That is, can a physical classical world be viewed as the result of our internal measurement leading to collapse of the quantum computed wave function? This abstract omits this question as irrelevant to the subject matter of a paper. The most important question is the aforementioned mathematical connection between quantum mechanics and relativity, it is a foundation which proves that Orch OR theory is correct. I propose that enormous quantum computing power in human brain does produce the Minkowski space, a representation of the physical reality. Mathematically, it is done by integrating, or encoding, the information about external physical world, into a qubit wave function vectors. I believe that probability distribution functions of pairs of fermions and bosons serve as the hidden variables encoding information about external world, into a qubit wave function vectors. They are hidden for two reasons. First is that these variables are not obvious as an intrinsic part of a qubit equation defining human brain quantum computing. Traditional way of thinking does not easily accommodate these variables into a qubit equation. The second reason they are hidden is because Einstein was desperately looking for them to make quantum mechanics complete. Simply, Sir Roger Penrose and prof. Stuart Hameroff had made a breakthrough that will have a very far reaching implications, including but not limited to Einstein hidden variables discovery. Quantum mechanics and relativity can be easily unified should indeed these variables be encoded into qubit as the carriers of information of the classical physical world. (shrink)

Undeniably, the greatest way for a Moslem to be closer to Allah, is recitation of Holy-Quran approves with the method conveyed from Messenger of Allah Mohammed from the feature of speech points of letters and the intrinsic and fleeting characteristics of the letters, So, there is a persistent need to teach all Moslems the science of Tajweed Al-Quran. ITS (Intelligent Tutoring System) is computer software that supplies direct and tailored training or response to students without human teacher interfering. The (...) main target of ITS is smoothing the learning process using the wide-ranging facilities of computer. The proposed system will be implemented using the ITSB Authoring tool. In this thesis, the researcher presents an intelligent tutoring system for teaching Reciting Al-Quran "Tajweed" with Rewaya: Hafs from ‘Aasem by the way of Shatebiyyah. It was a novel idea that the researcher combined the science of Tajweed Al-Quran and the science of artificial intelligence in his thesis. The researcher arranged the material into chapters, lessons, examples then, added all these to the proposed system. He also added questions, right answers and the level of difficulty for each lesson. He prepared an exam for each chapter and a final exam to test the knowledge of the learner in the whole material. The system was evaluated by teachers and students in reciting science and the outcome of the assessment was encouraging and promising. (shrink)

It is here proposed an analysis of symbolic and sub-symbolic models for studying cognitive processes, centered on emergence and logical openness notions. The Theory of logical openness connects the Physics of system/environment relationships to the system informational structure. In this theory, cognitive models can be ordered according to a hierarchy of complexity depending on their logical openness degree, and their descriptive limits are correlated to Gödel-Turing Theorems on formal systems. The symbolic models with low logical openness describe cognition by means (...) of semantics which fix the system/environment relationship, while the sub-symbolic ones with high logical openness tends to seize its evolutive dynamics. An observer is defined as a system with high logical openness. In conclusion, the characteristic processes of intrinsic emergence typical of “bio-logic” - emerging of new codes-require an alternative model to Turing- computation, the natural or bio-morphic computation, whose essential features we are going here to outline. (shrink)

The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, marshal evidence (...) from mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, and biology, setting up their book around three central questions: What are the essential marks of human intelligence? What is it that researchers try to do when they attempt to achieve "artificial intelligence" (AI)? And why, after more than 50 years, are our most common interactions with AI, for example with our bank’s computers, still so unsatisfactory? Landgrebe and Smith show how a widespread fear about AI’s potential to bring about radical changes in the nature of human beings and in the human social order is founded on an error. There is still, as they demonstrate in a final chapter, a great deal that AI can achieve which will benefit humanity. But these benefits will be achieved without the aid of systems that are more powerful than humans, which are as impossible as AI systems that are intrinsically "evil" or able to "will" a takeover of human society. (shrink)

Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness—valenced or affective experience—is essential to consciousness’s moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper, I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects for valence sentientism (...) in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. (shrink)

1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course.

We address a long-standing debate over whether classical magnetic forces can do work, ultimately answering the question in the affirmative. In detail, we couple a classical particle with intrinsic spin and elementary dipole moments to the electromagnetic field, derive the appropriate generalization of the Lorentz force law, show that the particle's dipole moments must be collinear with its spin axis, and argue that the magnetic field does mechanical work on the particle's elementary magnetic dipole moment. As consistency checks, we (...) calculate the overall system's energy-momentum and angular momentum, and show that their local conservation equations lead to the same force law and therefore the same conclusions about magnetic forces and work. We also compute the system's Belinfante-Rosenfeld energy-momentum tensor. (shrink)

The assumption that psychological states and processes are computational in character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the computational theory of mind. In addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computational theory of mind has also had a second life supporting “individualism”, the view that psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene only on the intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. One response to individualism has been to raise the prospect of “wide computational (...) systems”, in which some computational units are instantiated outside the individual. “Wide computationalism” attempts to sever the link between individualism and computational psychology by enlarging the concept of computation. However, in spite of its potential interest to cognitive science, wide computationalism has received little attention in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This paper aims to revisit the prospect of wide computationalism. It is argued that by appropriating a mechanistic conception of computation wide computationalism can overcome several issues that plague initial formulations. The aim is to show that cognitive science has overlooked an important and viable option in computational psychology. The paper marshals empirical support and responds to possible objections. (shrink)

Spinor theory and its applications are indispensable in many areas of theoretical physics, especially in quantum mechanics, general relativity, and string theory. Spinors are complex objects that transform under specific representations of the Lorentz or rotation groups, capturing the intrinsic spin properties of particles. Recent developments in mathematical abstraction have provided new insights and tools for exploring spinor dynamics, particularly through the lens of motivic operators and M-Posit transforms. This paper delves into the intricate dynamics of spinors subjected to (...) motivic operators and MPosit transforms. Motivic operators encapsulate intrinsic algebraic properties and perturbations, leading to highly evolved spinor states without reliance on external coordinate systems. The M-Posit transform, a novel operator designed for spinors, leverages fractal morphic properties, topological congruence, and quantum-inspired perturbations to manipulate spinor structures within an infinitedimensional oneness geometry calculus. Drawing on the foundations laid by twistor theory, we aim to redefine the evolution of spinors using intrinsic properties derived from phenomenological velocity equations. By interpreting spinors as self-propelled twistors, we offer new perspectives on spinor transformations and dynamics. This intrinsic approach not only simplifies the mathematical treatment but also enhances the physical and geometric interpretation of spinor behaviors. The structure of this paper is organized as follows: We begin with the formal definition and computation of spinor components using motivic operators, highlighting the steps involved in their transformations. Following this, we introduce the M-Posit transform and explore its application to spinors, providing detailed mathematical formulations and examples. We also examine the implications of these transformations in higher-dimensional twistor spaces and non-commutative structures. Finally, we extend our analysis to practical applications in quantum computing, fractal image processing, and quantum field theory. The potential of spinning theory redefined through motivic operators and M-posit transforms offers promising avenues for further research in various domains of theoretical physics and mathematics. This paper sets a foundation for these explorations, emphasizing the importance of intrinsic properties and algebraic dynamics in understanding complex spinor evolutions. (shrink)

The nature of reality has long been debated through the lenses of physics, philosophy, and consciousness studies. The Dataverse Hypothesis proposes a radical yet unifying perspective: data, rather than matter or energy, is the fundamental substance of the universe. In this framework, physical phenomena emerge as structured data interactions, with quantum mechanics, space-time, and entropy reinterpreted as computational processes rather than intrinsic material properties. This article explores the implications of a data-based universe, where consciousness arises from recursive information processing, (...) space-time functions as an evolving relational grid, and intelligence—both biological and artificial—is an optimization process of data recombination. The observer effect, free will, and creativity are redefined as active participation in reality's self-updating dataset. By integrating insights from digital physics, quantum mechanics, information theory, and AI research, the Dataverse Hypothesis offers a paradigm shift: reality is a vast, self-organizing computation where perception is not merely passive but actively shapes existence. This framework has profound implications for the nature of intelligence, the emergence of life, and even theological questions about the structure of the cosmos. If the universe is fundamentally a process of information flow, then understanding its deepest mysteries may lie in decoding the logic of data itself. (shrink)

The so-called Baldwin Effect generally says how learning, as a form of ontogenetic adaptation, can influence the process of phylogenetic adaptation, or evolution. This idea has also been taken into computation in which evolution and learning are used as computational metaphors, including evolving neural networks. This paper presents a technique called evolving self-taught neural networks – neural networks that can teach themselves without external supervision or reward. The self-taught neural network is intrinsically motivated. Moreover, the self-taught neural network is (...) the product of the interplay between evolution and learning. We simulate a multi-agent system in which neural networks are used to control autonomous agents. These agents have to forage for resources and compete for their own survival. Experimental results show that the interaction between evolution and the ability to teach oneself in self-taught neural networks outperform evolution and self-teaching alone. More specifically, the emergence of an intelligent foraging strategy is also demonstrated through that interaction. Indications for future work on evolving neural networks are also presented. (shrink)

This is an exploration of the importance of the collocation approach in investigating language. It underpins a new conception of grammar that is: (i) intrinsically connected with lexis; (ii) investigates the language as it is naturally used in life; (iii) can be developed as a corpus-driven grammar. The collocation approach in language exploration is also examined from the perspective of some recent developments in the philosophy of language. In conclusion, I defend the identity between philosophical ontology, linguistic ontology and computational (...) ontology. (shrink)

The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine (...) the classical, spatial metaphysic of space and time, for practical purposes initiated by Galileo, wherein the real has been equated with the quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the material world. In this metaphysic, which sees form as quantitative or computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, with a problem of even greater primacy becoming the “memory” that supports the transforming events of perception, e.g., rotating cubes, buzzing flies, twisting leaves. It is this memory, supporting time-extended, flowing events, that necessarily supports all qualia. The concept of storage of “snapshots” of time-flowing events, a notion which the classic metaphysic engenders, is unworkable as a solution to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and defined over flowing fields, equally is a quality, equally requires this memory, and since forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed a problem. The counter-proposal becomes Bergson’s temporal metaphysic wherein motion is indivisible (or non-differentiable), the global motion of the universal field itself then carrying an intrinsic form of memory. In this framework, with this field viewed as holographic, Bergson provides a unique solution – one that leaves the problem of representation behind – as to how the brain specifies the qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world. (shrink)

Theologians often reflect on the ethical uses and impacts of artificial intelligence, but when it comes to artificial intelligence techniques themselves, some have questioned whether much exists to discuss in the first place. If the significance of computational operations is attributed rather than intrinsic, what are we to say about them? Ancient thinkers—namely Augustine of Hippo (lived 354–430)—break the impasse, enabling us to draw forth the moral and metaphysical significance of current developments like the “deep neural networks” that are (...) responsible for some of the most remarkable achievements of the past few years. First, Augustine’s theology of the natural world’s rationes seminales makes sense of neural networks’ success by explaining the world as a kaleidoscopic refraction of divine Wisdom rather than as a collection of discrete objects standing in crisp relations. Second, his account of interpretive judgment as a moral act bound up with love reveals how our training and use of AI relates to the Christian’s assimilation to Wisdom. The contingent meaning of the neural network reveals AI’s potential either for standing between us and the world or in some sense facilitating a Christian’s regathering of the created echoes of divine Wisdom throughout his or her journey into the Trinity. (shrink)

The argument presented in this paper is not a direct attack or defence of the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this paper will explore the associated link between syntax and physics. (...) The main argument presented here is not significantly original – it is a simple reflection upon that originally given by Hilary Putnam (Putnam 1988) and criticised by David Chalmers and others: instead of seeking to justify Putnam’s claim that, “every open system implements every Finite State Automaton (FSA)”, and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will seek to establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system implements the trace of a particular FSA Q, as it executes program (p) on input (x). That this result leads to panpsychism is clear as, equating Q (p, x) to a specific Strong AI program that is claimed to instantiate phenomenal states as it executes, and following Putnam’s procedure, identical computational (and ex hypothesi phenomenal) states (ubiquitous little ‘pixies’) can be found in every open physical system. (shrink)

I am a multifaceted person, as I am sure you are as well. I love philosophy, obviously, but also computer science, programming and video games. I care about robotics, nature, my family and more. However, why is it that I particularly care about writing philosophy when it will most likely not convince anyone? Why care when my writing will most likely fall into obscurity, only to be forgotten in a deluge of other papers, essays, and works that will themselves fall (...) into obscurity, only to also be forgotten? I propose that philosophy is intrinsically important because they are artistic expressions, and artistic expressions are intrinsically valuable explorations into the self. Therefore, philosophy is an intrinsically valuable exploration into the self. (shrink)

The popular belief that our mind either depends on or (in stronger terms) is identical with brain functions and processes, along with the belief that advances in technology in virtual reality and computability will continue, has contributed to the contention that one-day (perhaps this century) it may be possible to transfer one’s mind (or a simulated copy) into another body (physical or virtual). This is called mind-uploading or whole brain emulation. This paper serves as an introduction to the area and (...) some of the major issues that arise from the notion of mind-uploading. The topic of mind/brain uploading is, at present, both a philosophical and scientific minefield. This paper ties together several thoughts on the topic in the popular, philosophical, and scientific literature, and brings up some related issues that might be worth exploring. A challenge is made that uploading a mind from a brain may have intrinsic limitations on what can be uploaded: whatever is uploaded may not be recognizably human, or will be a very limited version. (shrink)

Much of the basic non-technical vocabulary of artificial intelligence is surprisingly ambiguous. Some key terms with unclear meanings include intelligence, embodiment, simulation, mind, consciousness, perception, value, goal, agent, knowledge, belief, optimality, friendliness, containment, machine and thinking. Much of this vocabulary is naively borrowed from the realm of conscious human experience to apply to a theoretical notion of “mind-in-general” based on computation. However, if there is indeed a threshold between mechanical tool and autonomous agent (and a tipping point for singularity), (...) projecting human conscious-level notions into the operations of computers creates confusion and makes it harder to identify the nature and location of that threshold. There is confusion, in particular, about how—and even whether—various capabilities deemed intelligent relate to human consciousness. This suggests that insufficient thought has been given to very fundamental concepts—a dangerous state of affairs, given the intrinsic power of the technology. It also suggests that research in the area of artificial general intelligence may unwittingly be (mis)guided by unconscious motivations and assumptions. While it might be inconsequential if philosophers get it wrong (or fail to agree on what is right), it could be devastating if AI developers, corporations, and governments follow suit. It therefore seems worthwhile to try to clarify some fundamental notions. (shrink)

Abstract: As there are no visible ways to create safe self-improving superintelligence, but it is looming, we probably need temporary ways to prevent its creation. The only way to prevent it, is to create special AI, which is able to control and monitor all places in the world. The idea has been suggested by Goertzel in form of AI Nanny, but his Nanny is still superintelligent and not easy to control, as was shown by Bensinger at al. We explore here (...) the ways to create the safest and simplest form of AI, which may work as AI Nanny. Such AI system will be enough to solve most problems, which we expect the AI will solve, including control of robotics, acceleration of the medical research, but will present less risk, as it will be less different from humans. As AI police, it will work as operation system for most computers, producing world surveillance system, which will be able to envision and stop any potential terrorists and bad actors in advance. As uploading technology is lagging, and neuromorphic AI is intrinsically dangerous, the most plausible way to human-based AI Nanny is either functional model of the human mind or a Narrow-AI empowered group of people. (shrink)

Due to the wide scope of (in particular linear) homotopy type theory (using quantum natural language processing), a metatheory can be applied not just to theorizing the metatheory of scientific progress, but ordinary language or any public language defined by sociality/social agents as the precondition for the realizability of (general) intelligence via an inferential network from which judgement can be made. How this metatheory of science generalizes to public language is through the recent advances of quantum natural language processing, but (...) the traditional metalogical encodings (of Tarski) is relatively comparable through universes such as the type of types or type of types of types found in the inherent inferentialism of UF/HoTT via infinity-groupoids. The "computational trinity" of proofs=programs=algebra in HoTT also means reason is defined functionally as "what it does" by what it computes (proofs are programs). Following Reza Negarestani's recent book, through the self's self-realizability, achieving self-consciousness and consciousness beyond selfhood, "geistig manifestation" is achieved in the form of general intelligence, but only through an inferential network of social agents intrinsically encoded through computation. (shrink)

Biological evolution is a complex blend of ever changing structural stability, variability and emergence of new phe- notypes, niches, ecosystems. We wish to argue that the evo- lution of life marks the end of a physics world view of law entailed dynamics. Our considerations depend upon dis- cussing the variability of the very ”contexts of life”: the in- teractions between organisms, biological niches and ecosys- tems. These are ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate and even unprestatable: we do not know ahead of (...) time the ”niches” which constitute the boundary conditions on selec- tion. More generally, by the mathematical unprestatability of the ”phase space”, no laws of mo- tion can be formulated for evolution. We call this radical emergence, from life to life. The purpose of this paper is the integration of variation and diversity in a sound concep- tual frame and situate unpredictability at a novel theoretical level, that of the very phase space. Our argument will be carried on in close comparisons with physics and the mathematical constructions of phase spaces in that discipline. The role of symmetries as invariant preserving transformations will allow us to under- stand the nature of physical phase spaces and to stress the differences required for a sound biological theoretizing. In this frame, we discuss the novel notion of ”enablement”. Life lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence. This will restrict causal analyses to differential cases. Mutations or other causal differ- ences will allow us to stress that ”non conservation princi- ples” are at the core of evolution, in contrast to physical dynamics, largely based on conservation principles as sym- metries. Critical transitions, the main locus of symmetry changes in physics, will be discussed, and lead to ”extended criticality” as a conceptual frame for a better understanding of the living state of matter. (shrink)

The paper provides an axiological analysis of the concepts of respect for information and of information dignity from the vantage point provided by Information Ethics and the conceptual paradigm of object-oriented analysis (OOA). The general perspective adopted is that of an ontocentric approach to the philosophy of information ethics, according to which the latter is an expansion of environmental ethics towards a less biologically biased concept of a ‘centre of ethical worth’. The paper attempts to answer the following question: what (...) is the lowest possible common set of attributes which characterises something as intrinsically valuable and an object of respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and therefore rightly disrespectable in itself? The thesis developed and defended in the paper is that the minimal condition of possibility of an object’s least intrinsic worthiness can be identified with its abstract nature as an information entity. Thus, all entities, interpreted as clusters of information, have a minimal moral worth qua information objects (i.e. qua information), that deserves to be respected. The principles elaborated in the course of the analysis are those of ‘reflective respect’ (A’s respect towards all members of A’s class motivated by A’s respect towards A not qua individual, but qua instantiation of a class of entities), ‘ontic uniformity’ (A’s recognition of A’s membership to the class of information entities) and ‘ontic solidarity’ (A’s recognition of any information entity’s dignity). (shrink)

In Science Without Numbers (1980), Hartry Field defends a theory of quantity that, he claims, is able to provide both i) an intrinsic explanation of the structure of space, spacetime, and other quantitative properties, and ii) an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations of quantities (distances, lengths, mass, temperature, etc.) are appropriate or acceptable while others are not. But several philosophers have argued otherwise. In this paper I focus on arguments from Ellis and Milne to the effect (...) that one cannot provide an account of quantity in ''purely intrinsic'' terms. I show, first, that these arguments are confused. Second, I show that Field's treatment of quantity can provide an intrinsic explanation of the structure of quantitative properties; what it cannot do is provide an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations are more appropriate than others. Third, I show that one could provide an intrinsic explanation of this sort if one modified Field's account in certain ways. (shrink)

Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely held thesis, namely the thesis that there (...) is a pro tanto reason to promote the good. It is argued that there is a second, distinct type of uniqueness that plays a more interesting and important axiological role: uniqueness imparts irreplaceable value. This gives occasion to develop the surprisingly undertheorized notion of irreplaceable value. (shrink)

It is now standard to interpret symmetry-related models of physical theories as representing the same state of affairs. Recently, a debate has sprung up around the question when this interpretational move is warranted. In particular, Møller-Nielsen :1253–1264, 2017) has argued that one is only allowed to interpret symmetry-related models as physically equivalent when one has a characterisation of their common content. I disambiguate two versions of this claim. On the first, a perspicuous interpretation is required: an account of the models’ (...) common ontology. On the second, stricter, version of this claim, a perspicuous formalism is required in addition: one whose mathematical structures ‘intrinsically’ represent the physical world, in the sense of Field. Using Dewar’s :485–521, 2019) distinction between internal and external sophistication as a case study, I argue that the second requirement is decisive. This clarifies the conditions under which it is warranted to interpret symmetry-related models as physically equivalent. (shrink)

Erik Wielenberg [2014] and Mark Murphy [2017], [2018] have defended a series of arguments for the conclusion that creatures are not good intrinsically. In response, I take two steps. First, I introduce a conception of intrinsic value that makes created intrinsic value unproblematic. Second, I respond to their arguments in turn. The first argument is from the sovereignty-aseity intuition and an analysis of intrinsicality that makes derivative good extrinsic. I challenge the analysis. The second comes from a conception (...) of perfection where God exhausts all possibilities for goodness. I challenge this conception. The third comes from the contingency of creation and the internal logic of intrinsic value. I challenge the assumption that connects the two. I then present an argument from reference magnetism that the only conception of God, God's perfections, and religious language that makes it plausible that the sentence "God is intrinsically good and creatures are not" is true involves a strongly univocalist position. A view that is either unstatable or places strong demands on our conception of God, God's perfections and religious language thereby loses plausibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom. -/- Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science Without (...) Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics. I will also compare the present account to Mark Balaguer’s (1996) nominalization of quantum mechanics and discuss how it might bear on the debate about “wave function realism.” In closing, I will suggest some possible ways to extend this account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom and a variable number of particles (e.g. for particle creation and annihilation). -/- Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a “periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well as a uniqueness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into the metaphysics of phase and theoretical structure. -/- (For a more recent version of this paper, please see "The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics" available on PhilPapers.). (shrink)

In "How to Define Intrinsic Properties" I offered a relational account of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x’s having F consists entirely in x’s having certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one’s relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one’s proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely (...) correct, and here I provide additional support for it and defend it against some objections that have been raised. In the process I aim to make the account somewhat more precise, especially by contrasting it with a grounding approach to defining the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. (shrink)

Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) has a wide influence on the exchange rate, education, health, training, and educational programs. In this paper we describe an intelligent tutoring system that helps student study computer networks. The current ITS provides intelligent presentation of educational content appropriate for students, such as the degree of knowledge, the desired level of detail, assessment, student level, and familiarity with the subject. Our Intelligent tutoring system was developed using ITSB authoring tool for building ITS. A preliminary evaluation of (...) the ITS was done by a group of students and teachers. The results were acceptable. (shrink)

In the first half of this paper, I argue that essential properties are intrinsic and that this permits a modal analysis of essence that is immune the sort of objections raised by Fine. In the second half, I argue that intrinsic properties collectively have a certain structure and that this accounts for some observations about essences: that things are essentially determinate; that things often have properties within a certain range essentially; and that the essential properties of things are (...) their core properties. (shrink)

The development of technology is unbelievably rapid. From limited local networks to high speed Internet, from crude computing machines to powerful semi-conductors, the world had changed drastically compared to just a few decades ago. In the constantly renewing process of adapting to such an unnaturally high-entropy setting, innovations as well as entirely new concepts, were often born. In the business world, one such phenomenon was the creation of a new type of entrepreneurship. This paper proposes a new academic discipline of (...) computational entrepreneurship, which centers on: (i) an exponentially growing (and less expensive) computing power, to the extent that almost everybody in a modern society can own and use that; (ii) omnipresent high-speed Internet connectivity, wired or wireless, representing our modern day’s economic connectomics; (iii) growing concern of exploiting “serendipity” for a strategic commercial advantage; and (iv) growing capabilities of lay people in performing calculations for their informed decisions in taking fast-moving entrepreneurial opportunities. Computational entrepreneurship has slowly become a new mode of operation for business ventures and will likely bring the academic discipline of entrepreneurship back to mainstream economics. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it (...) does not seek to analyse the ‘global’ distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties on the basis of the ‘local’ distinction between having a property intrinsically and having it extrinsically. Instead, the latter distinction is explicated on the basis of the former. (shrink)

Response to Skiles (2009) on Trogdon (2009) on intrinsic properties and fundamentality.

The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.