On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. Recently, (...) though, the canon’s neat story has come under attack. The challenge cases involve the epistemic use of a modal sentence for which no single resolution of the contextual parameter appears capable of accommodating all our intuitions.3 According to these revisionaries, such cases show that the canonical story needs to be amended in some way that makes multiple bodies of information relevant to the assessment of such statements. Here I show that how the right canonical, flexibly contextualist account of modals can accommodate the full range of challenge cases. The key will be to extend Kratzer’s formal semantic account with an account of how context selects values for a modal’s.. (shrink)

This book is a compilation of the work published by the present authors in various scientific journals mainly focused on understanding how quantum physics could decipher the experiences observed and reported during near-death and end-of-life situations. The authors claim that various theories and models proposed herein (though not propounding to be a complete one) are just an attempt to understand few aspects associated with such experiences connected to the phenomenon of death. They investigate the possible role of the quantum phenomenon (...) in the occurrence of these events and call for a detailed scientific investigation to validate any hypotheses made. (shrink)

ICTs, personal data, digital rights, the GDPR, data privacy, online security… these terms, and the concepts behind them, are increasingly common in our lives. Some of us may be familiar with them, but others are less aware of the growing role of ICTs and data in our lives - and the potential risks this creates. These risks are even more pronounced for vulnerable groups in society. People can be vulnerable in different, often overlapping, ways, which place them at a disadvantage (...) to the majority of citizens; Table 3 in this guide presents some of the many forms and causes of vulnerability. As a result, vulnerable people need greater support to navigate the digital world, and to ensure that they are able to exercise their rights. This guide explains where such support can be found, and also answers the following questions: - What are the main ethical and legal issues around ICTs for vulnerable citizens? - Who is vulnerable in Europe? - How do issues around ICTs affect vulnerable people in particular? This guide is a resource for members of vulnerable groups, people who work with vulnerable groups, and citizens more broadly. It is also useful for data controllers1 who collect data about vulnerable citizens. While focused on citizens in Europe, it may be of interest to people in other parts of the world. It forms part of the Citizens’ Information Pack produced by the PANELFIT project, and is available in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. You are welcome to translate this guide into other languages. Please send us a link to online versions in other languages, so that we can add them to the project website. (shrink)

The aim of this workshop was to ask potential end-users of the citizens’ information pack on legal and ethical issues around ICTs the following questions: What is your knowledge of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and what actions have you taken in response to these regulations? What challenges are you experiencing in ensuring the protection and security of your project data, and compliance with the GDPR, within existing data management processes/systems? What information/tools/resources do you need to overcome these challenges? (...) What are the best formats/channels for receiving, sharing and acting upon this information? What is the most appropriate structure/format for the citizens’ information pack? (shrink)

What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent speakers’ judgments about which uses are appropriate. The contemporary literature reflects the widespread assumption that linguists don’t rely upon an additional source of data—competent speakers’ judgments about possible disagreement with hypothetical speech communities. We have several good reasons to think that such judgments are not probative for semantic theorizing. Therefore, we should accord these judgments no (...) probative value for the development of a semantics for our moral terms. Such judgments can no longer be presumed to put pressure on theories according to which our moral expressions share a semantics with ordinary, descriptive terms. Many rivals to pure, Descriptivist theories count among their advantages the ability to accommodate these judgments. If these judgments have no probative value, such theories lose an important source of support. (shrink)

Near-death experiences are a big challenge to the fields of science and philosophy; termed as hallucinatory by neurologists and “stuff of which fantasies are made off” by sceptics, there are some unique near-death experiences which defy these claims. Memories generated during these experiences are of specific interest as they are created without a body and can be recalled post the experience. Call it the mind, soul, psyche or consciousness, if deliberated as a form of quantum generated energy, a strong correlation (...) under a reductionist based perspective can be obtained. Life at a macroscopic level may not be similar to life at a quantum level, and has been proved in quantum physics through its spooky properties like quantum entanglement. Self-sustaining quantum generated energy through entanglement is the answer to all mystical realties and the answer lies in believing in its existence in and around us. It is this energy that brings in the awareness of one’s existence and which performs tasks beyond the imagination of the current self; an energy created at the creation of all that exists; a true supernatural force. This paper reviews a unique void near-death experience and hypothesizes quantum entanglement to be involved in the conception and storage of these energy-based memories in a quantum subatomic cloud which can be restated if returned back to the body or lost to the environment upon death. (shrink)

This study investigates strategies for hotels situated near Taal Volcano to lessen the impact of natural disasters, specifically volcanic eruptions. The hospitality industry in this region faces a unique threat due to the volcano's activity. This research addressed a critical gap by implementing effective preparedness and response plans. A qualitative multiple case study design was employed by the researchers. Seven (7) hotel executives from different hotels situated in Batangas who had directly encountered and navigated the impacts of natural disasters were (...) selected through the purposive sampling technique. The findings revealed several common natural hazards faced by hotels include Taal volcano eruptions, typhoons, earthquakes, ashfall, and sulfur dioxide emissions. Despite of this natural hazards, hotel executives were still capable of safeguarding their guests by implementing strategies including evacuation procedures, staff training, communication and coordination and preventive measures. In conclusion, to overcome the challenges identified in disaster preparedness, hotels in Batangas should consider several strategic actions. Hotels are recommended to take several crucial actions to enhance their preparedness and response capabilities to natural hazards. Adhering to safety regulations will help hotels maintain a high level of preparedness and minimize risks associated with natural hazards, ultimately safeguarding the well-being of guests and staff alike. (shrink)

The paper addresses an exegetical puzzle that is raised by Kant's distinction between opining (Meinen), believing (Glauben), and knowing (Wissen). In presenting his moral arguments, Kant often points out that belief, as he conceives of it, has a unique feature: it requires non-epistemic justification. Yet Kant's official formulation of the tripartite distinction runs counter to this claim. It describes Belief in terms of a set of two features, each of which also pertains to either opinion or knowledge. My aim in (...) this paper is to propose a novel interpretation of Kant’s distinction which dissolves this exegetical puzzle. (shrink)

While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.

This article proposes a sensory studies methodology for the interpretation of museum objects. The proposed method unfolds in two phases: virtual encounter via an on-line catalog and actual exposure in the context of a handling workshop. In addition to exploring the écart between image and object, the “Sensing Art and Artifacts” exercise articulates a framework for arriving at a multisensory, cross-cultural, interactive understanding of aesthetic value. The case studies presented here involve four objects from the collection of the Hunterian Museum (...) as sensed and interpreted by scholars of psychology, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. It is proposed that aesthetic judgment in the expanded (cross-cultural) sense contemplated here involves apprehending the museum object through multiple sensory modalities in place of the conventional Western fixation on visible form. (shrink)

Jury science is fraught with difficulty. Since legal and institutional hurdles render it all but impossible to study live criminal jury deliberation, researchers make use of various indirect methods to evaluate jury performance. But each of these methods are open to methodological criticism and, strikingly, some of the highest-profile jury research programmes in recent years have reached opposing conclusions. Uncertainty about jury performance is an obstacle for legal reform—ongoing debates about the ‘justice gap’ for complainants of sexual offences has rendered (...) these problems stark. This paper proposes a way to advance the debate. (shrink)

The article explores the place of women and migrants in Italian Neorealist and New Migrant cinema, arguing that New Migrant cinema continues and reworks key Neorealist tropes and tendencies. It intends to render explicit how an ensemble of films challenge the stereotypes concerning gender, national and cultural identities. Among the figures that are scrutinized are the borgatari, extracomunitari, popolane and terrone. Its main objective is to demonstrate how the cinematic expression of these figures in Italian Neorealist and New Migrant cinema (...) enhanced the reinvention of italianità and the generalised understanding of gender. It also aims to explain why the cross-fertilisation between migration studies, urban studies and gender studies is indispensable for comprehending this reinvention. Particular emphasis is placed on the shared interest of Roberto Rossellini’s Roma città aperta and Vittorio De Sica’s Il tetto in the plight over housing and the special character of the urban landscape of Rome. The article also sheds light on certain common concerns of Italian Neorealist and New Migrant cinema, especially as far as national and gender narratives are concerned. Pivotal for the reflections developed here are the roles of Anna Magnani in Roberto Rossellini’s Roma città aperta, Luchino Visconti’s Bellissima and Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Mamma Roma. (shrink)

What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? I argue that the answer is belief and middling to low credence. I begin by discussing why disagreement has motivated the view that we cannot rationally believe our philosophical theories. Then, I show why considerations from disagreement actually better support my view. I provide two additional arguments for my view: the first concerns roles for belief and credence and the second explains why believing one’s philosophical theories is superior to accepting (...) them. I close by addressing objections, including implications my view has for the Lockean thesis, the view that there is a normative connection between belief and high credence. (shrink)

The literature on counterfactuals is dominated by strict accounts and variably strict accounts. Counterexamples to the principle of Antecedent Strengthening were thought to be fatal to SA; but it has been shown that by adding dynamic resources to the view, such examples can be accounted for. We broaden the debate between VSA and SA by focusing on a new strengthening principle, Strengthening with a Possibility. We show dynamic SA classically validates this principle. We give a counterexample to it and show (...) that extra dynamic resources cannot help SA. We then show VSA accounts for the counterexample if it allows for orderings on worlds that are not almost-connected, and that such an ordering naturally falls out of a Kratzerian ordering source semantics. We conclude that the failure of Strengthening with a Possibility tells strongly against Dynamic SA and in favor of an ordering source-based version of VSA. (shrink)

The idea that justified modal belief can be accounted for in terms of empirically justified, non-modal belief is enjoying increasing popularity in the epistemology of modality. One alleged reason to prefer modal empiricism over more traditional, rationalist modal epistemologies is that empiricism avoids the problem with the integration challenge that arise for rationalism, assuming that we want to be realists about modal metaphysics. In this paper, I argue that given two very reasonable constraints on what it means to meet the (...) integration challenge for modality, empiricism is currently at best on a par with, but potentially worse off than, rationalist alternatives, with respect to the integration challenge. (shrink)

Smell 'sensations' are among the most mysterious of conscious experiences, and have been cited in defense of the thesis that the character of perceptual experience is independent of the physical events that seem to give rise to it. Here we review the scientific literature on olfaction, and we argue that olfaction has a distinctive profile in relation to the other modalities, on four counts: in the physical nature of the stimulus, in the sensorimotor interactions that characterize its use, in the (...) structure of its intramodal distinctions and in the functional role that it plays in people's behaviour. We present two thought experiments in which we detail what would be involved in transforming sounds into smells, and also smells into colours. Through these thought-experiments, we argue that the experiential character of smell derives precisely from the structural features of olfaction, and that an embodied account of olfactory phenomenology is called for. (shrink)

Will I die? As a hypothesis, in my natural scientific understanding, the psyche, is nothing more than, and exclusively just some states of my living brain – I will die as a result of his death. -/- In presented answer, psyche – itself own immediate reality itself, that is – undoubted. -/- This work was performed in reality “in the first person” (“subjective reality”, “phenomenal consciousness”). To realize, how, what it is the reality of the “in the first person” let’s (...) imagine ourselves as an experimenter, who does not replace reality with reasoning about it. – Now for us, as experimenters, how (what it is) psychic is an immediate and undoubted reality. And the awareness of “I am” is a direct reality, and not knowledge about it, which is always doubtful. That is, in psychic reality, nothing prevents us from answering undoubtedly and definitively the question, asked by this psychic reality itself about itself. The author acts from the position of “being in reality – not going beyond its limits, for example, into philosophy” (philosophy, including methodology, is the replacement of reality itself with always dubious reasoning about reality) – explores phenomenal consciousness (“psychic”) directly and as an immediate reality. That is, this work is the mastery of psychic reality through subjective-psychical experimentation – don’t philosophize, but experiment! -/- For example, Descartes, introspectively experimenting in his own psyche reality with his own psyche, informed us about the immutability of the “mind” and proposed to understand this immutability as our own immortality: “the mind does not represent any combination of accidents, it is a pure substance, and although all its accidents are subject to change, it understands some things, it desires others or feels others, etc. – nevertheless, in itself it does not change; and as for the human body, it changes, if only because they are subject to a change in the shape of some of its parts. It follows from this that the body perishes very easily, while the mind, by its very nature, is immortal” (Декарт Р., p. 13). Note that, Descartes did not realize that he was immortal, but logically deduced his own immortality from the immutability of the mind. However, Descartes’ unchanging “mind” itself is such that there is something to die. And in my natural scientific understanding, the immutability of the mind does not imply its immortality – it will die without changing in its subjective self-perception, while instantly fading away as a result of brain death. Psyche (psychical) – a designation of the fact that this is one’s own immediate reality (that is, undoubtedly) – how (what) I myself am immediately, undoubtedly, and that immediate reality of mine, how and through which I myself and everything in general for me there is, and which is exclusively the only one for me. It should be noted that while I am unconscious (brain injury or dreamless sleep), there is nothing at all. -/- But this does not mean that “I”, having completely gone into oblivion, I'll die. This does not exclude that, I will disappear completely into oblivion and does not exist, but (at the same time) “I” – am. So, let’s define immortality as the impossibility of dying because there is nothing to die (psychic, but is such that there is nothing to die – is immortal) and will make a conclusion important for this work: if I am, as psyche, exclusively only is such that there is something to die and nothing else, then, therefore, my death is not excluded. But am I like that? The idea of this work is that I, as a psyche can to manifest (reveal) and realize myself as such (I such), that there is nothing to die, but (at the same time) I – am. I will realize of myself as immortal – such that to die (to decease) nothing. In other words, if I will approach with a bias and, acting purposefully, will reveal the subjective reality “I (psyche) such is that to die (to decease) nothing, but I – am”, that is – I am immortal, that the hypothesis “I will die” will falsified and excluded. -/- To realize this in the work, it is proposed to use the subject-object model, shift the boundary of “I” to the pole of the subject and become objectless, manifesting (revealing) oneself as such that there is nothing to die. Therefore, the aim (goal) of the work – to realize: I – am, but such that there is to die (decease) nothing. To become objectless and wondering about the possibility to dying, as a result, or I will exclude the immortality of the manifested state, or I will manifest (will reveal) immortal undoubtedly and definitively. -/- At the same time, I, as a subject, am “a necessary pole of subject-object relations. … An object is what the activity of … a subject is directed at. … In fact, everything that exists can become an object. … it is important to keep in mind the fundamental fact that the object is always outside the subject, does not merge with it. This externality also takes place when the subject deals with the states of his own consciousness, his Self ... it is important to emphasize that the relation of the subject and the object is not the relation of two different worlds, but only two poles as part of some unity” (Лекторский В.А., p. 6-7). That is, everything that I find existing in myself, this (such) is as an object. “The subject always refers to all “objects”, but it can never become an object for itself” (Титлин Л.И., p. 23). “… you will not be able to see the seeing vision ...” (Титлин Л.И., p. 40), and in this model this implies the “limit” of the subject. As the limit of the subject, I am “objectless”. And, therefore, in its own pole the subject is “ideal” – in its (own) limit (as its own limit, its own limit), I do not exist for myself (non-existent). -/- Using the “fact of the mobility of the boundaries of the subject” (for example, Тхостов А.Ш., p. 16), I have the opportunity to “pull” the boundary of the “I” into myself and become my own limit. At the same time, it is necessary to realize and accept that “inside” the limit of the subject and behind – “beyond of the subject”, and in general the very “inside” and “behind” in this version – unreality. In such a subject limit, the required paradoxical subjective state is assumed – I exist and see, but at the same time I am such that I do not exist for myself, that is, I am, but (subjectively such that) there is nothing to die (“immortality”). -/- Accordingly, the following tasks are indicated in the experiment: 1. In the object-subject sphere of visual perception, shift (and shift) the boundary of “I” into oneself –» to run into one’s own limit and become one’s own limit (without thickness: without depth, without “from within” and without reverse side) –» 2. Having become your own limit, which in its own limit is, but for myself I do not exist (non-existent), realize: • Myself – I am and this is real; • Will I die? – or there is nothing to die, which of the options is to me, as a psyche (as itself the psychic “I”), is applicable: • or I am such that it is not impossible that I will die, and the realized state is not immortal; • or “I” am such that “I” – am (is reality), but such that myself “I” to die nothing, that is, my own immortality – I am immortal; • Is this real? -/- Instruction for reproducing the target result: sequence of actions and results in a subjective-psychic experiment (hereinafter referred to as SPE) -/- At a distance of 25-40 cm from the wall (so that the wall occupies the entire field of view or its overwhelming part), • Here and now, focus on your face: “I am” – reality (and not is the knowing about it). • In yourself step back and look out of yourself at this wall. • Without moving your head, cover the field of vision with your attention as wide as possible and at the same time perceive everything at once (all this) as a single whole. • Perceive a high and wide wall (option: look up at an angle of 135-150 degrees in front of you) in such a way that the space (volume) surveyed by you without turning your head is a closed asymmetrical “lens” • limited in a circle in the periphery of the field of view, • convex in you; You – the beholder, rearwards concave in self (“subject”) – which one of you are watching? • Without moving your head, perceive the field of view as a single whole –» • Into yourself “draw in” –» “backing away” –» step back from everything –» • lean back into yourself –» up to dead-end limit –» • become a dead end itself – a concave (reflector-like) limit-plane. • You – into yourself – backward concave – a perceiving visual screen (limit-dead end), plane –» • lean back and press –» • something in general somehow inside the dead-end plane and behind the dead-end plane, as well as “inside” and “behind”, “behind the dead-end plane” – unreality; • myself – a dead-end plane without thickness (depth), without “inside”, without a reverse side for oneself. • –» That is, as a psychic reality (what is it psychically) will I die? –» or • Something there is, and that is I will die (it is possible); or • I am such that there is nothing to die, but I – am. or • Subjective-psychic experiment is incomplete… • –» Realize that this is reality (realize the reality of it) and emphasize (answer). -/- As a result, “I” am, but there is nothing to die/not to die, that is, the hypothesis “I will die” is unrealistic. -/- Remarks -/- • Each completed SPE is completed with the target result: “I am such that there is nothing to die, but I – am”. And the that what I will die (not excluded) does not correspond to this, that is unreality and is excluded by this. • But I am not such that I will not die. The concepts “I will die/ I will not die” to me, as a psyche are not applicable. That is, I, as a psyche, is immortal, but I am not eternal (not eternal – endlessly lasting, such that there is something to last) – to last, to be eternal and to end there is nothing. This is “immortality”. • In the target result of this work, I – am, but such that there is nothing to die/not die (“immortality”). And such a “I” is not the Atman of the Hindu schools of Nyaya, Vaisheshika and Purva Mimamsa, which E.A. Torchinov. Since the “I” – psychic, and not a substance with the psyche as an attributes. • According to illusionism, what I am as a result of the experiment given in the work is an illusion. And the impression of immortality is a product of the brain. But in reality I am such that I will die (it is not excluded). However, it is necessary to realize that illusionism is a detached reasoning about the “I”, but not is the self itself. And to what I am (as psiche), reasoning and questions about the reality of the “I” (for example, question: am I really like this, what am I like as psyche?) and other expressing illusionism do not correspond. That is, subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), the illusionism of the “I” is unreality. Subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), this is undeniable and final. • Reasoning about what such a “I” is in this (mine) or not in this brain, as well as (for example, holding a real skull in my hands), questions like “how (or, but now where is it here) such “I” – how is it after brain death?” – To the fact that is such an “I” these questions do not correspond and is falsified by this. • After being unconscious, the impression remains that I'm is not and that there is nothing at all. That is, my “unconsciousness” is psychic indistinguishable from my non-existence. However, science has not shown, but and it is not excluded that before and after I exist physically (there is something to die), I still or I no longer exist, there is still or nothing to die as a soul, substance, or otherwise. But what I am in the target result of this work is what I – am, and not “died and already now or still unreality” and I am such that there is nothing to die, this is – reality. That is, I will die? – there is nothing (to die), but I – am (reality), even if I am not (don’t exist). Or I do not exist as something. • I am such that there is nothing to be and die, but I am. And subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), this immortality is – reality. But this reality eludes my rational explanation. -/- Conclusion -/- Will I die? – In the target result the I am, but at the same time I am such that there is nothing to die. That is, I am immortal, but at the same time, I am not eternal (“I” not something eternal (endlessly continuing)) – I am such that to be eternal there is nothing. And, if we accept the subjective (psychic, “first person”, in first person perspective) reality without trying to understand it rationally, then I am exactly like that – I realize that this is my undoubted nature. That is, “I will die / I will not die” is an unreality. Subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), it is undoubted and final. Despite the unscientific nature, this work is a way of mastering reality. The author would be grateful for the identified and shown unreality of the fact that the “I” – am, but such that there is nothing to die, and ideally, the awareness: “I will die (not excluded).” -/- Bibliography -/- Декарт Р., Размышления о первой философии //Декарт Р. Соч.: В 2 т. Т. 2. М., 1994. Лекторский В.А. Субъект в истории философии: проблемы и достижения // Методология и история психологии. 2010. Том 5. Выпуск 1. С. 5-18. Титлин Л.И. Проблема субъекта в индийской философии («Пудгалавинишчая» Васубандху) [Текст] / [Л. И. Титлин]; Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение науки Институт философии Российской академии наук. – Москва: ОнтоПринт: Сделано-Сказано, 2018. – 361, [1] с. Тхостов A. Ш. Культурно-историческая патопсихология: монография, – М.: Канон+ РООИ «Реабилитация», 2020. – 320 с. Торчинов Е.А. «Словарик индуизма» (Дата написания: 2003; дата файла: 15.06.2007). Торчинов Е.А. Пути философии Востока и Запада: познание запредельного — СПб.: «Азбука-классика», «Петербургское Востоковедение», 2005. — 480 с. ISBN 5-352-01371-5 (Азбука-классика) ISBN 5-85803-258-3 (Петербургское Востоковедение). -/- Скончаюсь? – я бессмертен (как осознать бессмертие «от первого лица») -/- Скончаюсь? В качестве гипотезы в моем естественно-научном понимании психическое (каково психически), это не более чем, и исключительно только всего лишь некоторые состояния моего живого мозга – скончаюсь в результате его смерти. -/- В представленном ответе психическое – сама собственная непосредственная реальность, то есть, то, каково психически, это – несомненно. -/- Данная работа выполнена в реальности «первого лица» («субъективная реальность», «феноменальное сознание»). Чтобы осознать то, как, каково это, представим себя экспериментатором, который не подменяет реальность рассуждениями о ней. – Теперь для нас, как экспериментаторов, то, как (каково) психически, это непосредственная и несомненная реальность. И осознание «я есть», это непосредственная реальность, а не знание об этом, которое всегда сомнительно. То есть, в психической реальности, на вопрос, заданный самой этой психической реальностью самой себе о себе самой, нам ничто не запрещает ответить несомненно и окончательно. Автор действует с позиции «быть в реальности – не выходить за ее пределы, например, в философию» (философия, включая методологию, это подмена самой реальности всегда сомнительными рассуждениями о реальности) – исследует феноменальное сознание («психическое») непосредственно и в качестве непосредственной реальности. То есть, данная работа, это овладение психической реальностью посредством субъективно-психического экспериментирования – не философствуй, а экспериментируй! -/- Например Декарт, интроспективно экспериментируя в собственной психической реальности с собственным психическим, сообщил нам о неизменности «ума» и предложил эту неизменность понять в качестве нашего собственного бессмертия: «ум не представляет какого-то соединения акциденций, являет собой чистую субстанцию и, хотя все его акциденции подвержены изменению — он то понимает какие-то вещи, то желает другие или чувствует третьи и т.д.,— тем не менее сам по себе он не изменяется; а что касается тела человека, то оно изменяется хотя бы уже потому, что подвержены изменению формы некоторых его частей. Из этого следует, что тело весьма легко погибает, ум же по самой природе своей бессмертен» /Декарт Р., стр. 13. Заметим, Декарт не осознавал себя бессмертным, а логически вывел собственное бессмертие из неизменности ума. Однако, неизменный «ум» Декарта таков, что скончаться есть чему. А в моем естественно-научном понимании из неизменности ума не следует его бессмертие – он, не изменяясь в своем субъективном само-восприятии, при этом мгновенно угаснув в результате смерти мозга, скончается. Психически (психическое) – обозначение того, что это сама собственная непосредственная реальность (то есть – несомненно) – то, как (каково) я сам непосредственно, несомненно, и та моя непосредственная реальность, как и посредством чего я сам и всё вообще для меня есть, и которое для меня исключительно единственное. Следует заметить, что пока бываю без сознания (травма мозга или сон без сновидений), ничего и никак нет вообще. -/- Но это не значит, что «я» ушедши в небытие окончательно – скончаюсь. Этим не исключено, что таковой ушедший в небытие «я» не существую, но (при этом) есть. Итак, определим бессмертие, как невозможность скончаться потому, что скончаться нечему (например, если «умерший» психически есть, но уже таков, что скончаться больше нечему, то теперь он бессмертен) и сделаем важный для данной работы вывод: если психически я исключительно только таков, что скончаться есть чему и ни каков иначе, то, следовательно, то, что скончаюсь, это не исключено. Но таков ли я? Идея данной работы в том, что мне удастся проявить (выявить) и осознать себя таковым (я таков), что скончаться нечему, но (при этом) я есть. Иначе выражаясь, если я подойду предвзято и действуя целеустремленно, выявлю субъективную реальность «я есть, но таков, что скончаться нечему» – то смерть мне, как психическому несвойственна, то есть, я бессмертен – гипотеза возможности субъективно скончаться («я скончаюсь») будет фальсифицирована и исключена. -/- Чтобы это реализовать в работе предлагается воспользоваться субъект-объектной моделью, сдвинуть границу «я» в полюс субъекта и стать безобъектным, проявившись (выявившись) собой таковым, что скончаться нечему. Следовательно, цель работы – осознать: я таков, что есть, но скончаться нечему. Стать безобъектным и задаваясь вопросом о возможности скончаться, или исключу бессмертие проявленного состояния, или проявлюсь (выявлюсь) бессмертным несомненно и окончательно. -/- При этом, я, как субъект, являюсь «необходимым полюсом субъектно-объектных отношений. … Объект – то, на что направлена активность … субъекта. … В действительности объектом может стать все, что существует. … важно иметь в виду тот принципиальный факт, что объект всегда внеположен субъекту, не сливается с ним. Эта внеположность имеет место и тогда, когда субъект имеет дело с состояниями собственного сознания, своим Я … важно подчеркнуть, что отношение субъекта и объекта – это не отношение двух разных миров, а лишь двух полюсов в составе некоторого единства» /Лекторский В.А., стр. 6-7. То есть, всё, что нахожу в себе существующим, это (таковое) есть в качестве объекта. «Субъект – всегда относится ко всем «объектам», но он никогда не может стать объектом для самого себя» /Титлин Л.И., стр. 23. Иначе это выражая – «ты не сможешь увидеть видящего видение…» /Титлин Л.И., стр. 40, и в данной модели таковое предполагает «предел» субъекта. Как предел субъекта я «безобъектен». То есть, «идеален» – своим (собственным) пределом (в качестве собственного предела) самим для себя не существую (несуществующий). -/- Используя «факт подвижности границ субъекта» /например, Тхостов А.Ш., стр. 16, я имею возможность границу «я» в себя-назад «втянуть» и стать собственным пределом. При этом необходимо осознать и принять, что внутри предела субъекта и сзади – «за пределом субъекта», и вообще само «внутри» и «сзади» в этой модели – нереальность. Таким субъектным пределом предполагается требуемое парадоксальное субъективное состояние – я есть и вижу, но при этом я таков, что для себя не существую, то есть, я есть, но (психически таков, что) умереть нечему («бессмертие»). -/- Соответственно, в эксперименте обозначаются следующие задачи: 1. В объект-субъектной сфере зрительного восприятия сдвинуть (и сдвинув) границу «я» в себя-назад –» упереться в собственный предел и стать самим собственным пределом (без толщены: без глубины, без «внутри» и без обратной стороны) –» 2. Став собственным пределом, которым есть, но для себя не существую (несуществующий), осознать: • Себя – я есть и это реально; • Скончаюсь? – есть ли чему скончаться или скончаться нечему, какой из вариантов мне (как психическому «я») свойственен: • или я таков, что то, что скончаюсь не исключено, и реализованное состояние не бессмертно; • или я есть, но таков, что скончаться нечему, то есть, собственное бессмертие – я бессмертен; • Реальность ли это. -/- Инструкция воспроизведения целевого результата: последовательность действий и результатов в субъективно-психическом эксперименте (далее СПЭ) -/- На расстоянии 25-40 см от стены (так, чтобы стена занимала всё поле зрения или его подавляющую часть), • Здесь и сейчас сосредоточьтесь на своём лице: «я есть» – реальность (а не знание об этом). • В себе отстранитесь назад и смотрите из себя на эту стену. • Не двигая головой, охватите поле зрения вниманием предельно широко и одновременно всё сразу (всё это) воспримите единым целым. • Высокую и широкую стену (вариант: смотрите вверх под углом 135-150 градусов перед собой) воспримите так, что обозреваемое вами без поворота головы пространство (объем), это – ограниченная по окружности в периферии поля зрения замкнутая несимметричная «линза» • плоская с противоположной вам стороны • и выпуклая в вас; Вы – вогнутый в себя-назад смотрящий («субъект») – каков? – кто из вас сейчас на всё это смотрит? • Не двигая головой, поле зрения воспримите единым целым –» • В себя-назад «втянитесь» –» и «пятьтесь» –» «за мысли» и за всё вообще –» из этого всего назад вытесняясь –» от всего вообще взад отстранитесь –» • собой в себя-назад подайтесь и упершись в собственный (себя) задний к объектному обращённый (развернутый) тупиковый предел –» • станьте самим пределом-тупиком – в себя-назад вогнутой (рефлектор-подобной) пределом-плоскостью смотрящей – воспринимающим зрительным экраном –» станьте плоскостью-тупиком –» • «проскользните» по себе – плоскости-тупику и охватите вниманием целиком –» • собой – самим плоскостью-тупиком назад надавить, нажать –» • осознать: что-то как-то внутри плоскости-тупика и сзади за плоскостью-тупиком, и там вообще «что-то как-то», а также само «внутри» и «сзади», «за плоскостью-тупиком» и вообще «там» – нереальность; • самого себя – плоскости-тупика без толщины (глубины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны для себя нет. • –» То есть – в качестве психической реальности (каково психически) я скончаюсь? –» или • скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено). или • я таков, что скончаться нечему, но я есть. или • субъективно-психический эксперимент не завершён. • –» Осознайте, что это – реальность (осознать реальность этого) и подчеркните (ответ). -/- В результате я есть, но скончаться/не скончаться нечему, то есть гипотеза «скончаюсь» – нереальность. -/- Замечания -/- • Каждый завершённый СПЭ завершён целевым результатом: «я таков, что скончаться нечему, но я есть». И тому, каков я в результате СПЭ, то, что скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено) не соответствует, то есть нереальность и этим исключено. • То есть, я и не таков, что не скончаюсь. «Я скончаюсь/не скончаюсь» ко мне, как к психике, неприменимо. Иначе это выражая, тому, каков я, смерть несвойственна. То есть, я, как психика (психическое), бессмертен, но я не вечен (не вечный – бесконечно длящийся, таковой, что есть чему длиться) – длиться, быть вечным и не скончаться нечему. Таково «бессмертие». • В целевом результате данной работы я есть, но таков, что скончаться/не скончаться нечему («бессмертие»). И таковой «я» не Атман индуистских школ ньяя, вайшешика и пурва-миманса, о котором сообщает Е.А. Торчинов. Так как «я» психичен, а не субстанция с психическим в качестве атрибута. • Согласно иллюзионизму, то, каков я в результате данного в работе эксперимента, это иллюзия. И впечатление бессмертия, это порождение мозга. А реально я таков, что скончаюсь (не исключено). Однако, необходимо осознать, что иллюзионизм, это отстраненные рассуждения о «я», но не сам я непосредственно. И тому, каков я психически (каково психически), рассуждения и вопросы о реальности «я» (например, таков ли я реально, каков психически?) и другие выражающие иллюзионизм «я» не соответствуют. То есть, каково психически, иллюзионизм «я» – нереальность. Психически, это несомненно и окончательно. • Рассуждения о том, что таковой «я» в этом (моем) или не в этом мозге, а также (например, держа в руках реальный череп), вопросы, типа «а как же (или, но теперь где же здесь) таковой «я» – как это после смерти мозга?» тому, каков таковой «я» эти вопросы не соответствуют. • После пребывания без сознания остается впечатление, что без сознания меня нет и ничего никак нет вообще. То есть, моё «бессознание» психически неотличимо от моего несуществования (небытия). Однако, наукой не показано и не исключено то, что до и после того, как я есть физически (скончаться есть чему), меня ещё или уже нет, скончаться ещё или уже нечему в качестве души, субстанции или как-то иначе. Но, то, каков я в целевом результате данной работы, таковой я есть, а не «скончался и уже теперь или ещё нереальность» и я таков, что скончаться нечему – реален (реалия). То есть, скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но я есть, даже если меня нет (не существую). • Я таков, что быть и скончаться нечему, но я есть. И то, как (каково) психически, это бессмертие – реальность. Но эта реальность ускользает от моего рационального её объяснения. -/- Заключение -/- Скончаюсь? – в целевом результате я есть и вижу, но при этом я таков, что умереть (скончаться) нечему. То есть, я бессмертен, но при этом я не вечен (не нечто вечное (бесконечно длящееся)) – быть вечным нечему. И, если принять психическое реальностью не пытаясь понять это рационально, то я именно таков – осознаю, что такова моя несомненная для меня природа. То есть, «скончаюсь/не скончаюсь» – нереальность. Психически, это несомненно и окончательно. Несмотря на ненаучность, данная работа – способ овладения реальностью. Автор был бы признателен за выявленную и показанную нереальность целевого результата данной работы, а в идеале, за осознание: «скончаюсь (не исключено)». -/- Annex 2. The key essence of this work (only in Russian to convey the nuances without distortion) -/- Performed, expressed and transmitted initially by means of Russian, the native language of the author, and, in order to avoid distortions in the correspondence of the linguistic nuances of the reproduced subjective reality, it assumes an independent translation into the language of the experimenter by the experimenter himself in the process of reproducing the target result of this work. -/- «Я» скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но «Я» есть. Will “I” die (decease)? – to die (decease) nothing, but “I” am. -/- Заметить: • Выполнено, выражено и передано изначально посредством русского – родного для автора языка и, чтобы избежать искажений соответствия языковых нюансов воспроизводимой психической реальности, предполагается самостоятельный перевод на язык экспериментатора самим экспериментатором в процессе воспроизведения целевого результата данной работы. • В «кавычки» взяты слова и выражения, требующие «субъективного» приведения в соответствие психическому содержанию. Подготовка: • Вам потребуется уединённое место (там, где вас не отвлекут). • На первоначальном этапе понадобится некоторое (возможно длительное) время для того, чтобы усвоить предложенный алгоритм действий в психической реальности в процессе реализации и воспроизвести целевой результат впервые. • Возможно, результату поспособствует отклонение от предложенного алгоритма «психических действий», импровизация в направлении целевого результата. • В процессе эксперимента количество попыток не ограничено и затраченное на это время не имеет значения. Необходим исключительно только именно целевой результат. Реализация: • В уединении встать перед плоской широкой и высокой (достаточно большой, чтобы её границы были на периферии вашего поля зрения) стеной, например, покрытой однородной светлой (но не белой) керамической, не глянцевой (не отражающей на вас свет или отвлекающих внимание изображений, не дающей бликов) плиткой с лёгким текстурным рисунком (позволяющим глазам «зацепиться» за стену и отчётливо воспринимать перед собой поверхность, а не «утонуть» в однородном (монотонном) пространстве), на расстоянии 25-40 см от неё (так, чтобы стена занимала всё поле зрения или его подавляющую часть) –» • Скончаюсь (1)? – каково психически (психическое), в моем естественно-научном понимании – это (я) не более чем и исключительно только некоторые состояния функционирующего (живого) мозга – скончаюсь, как и уже скончался каждый умерший мозг – того каждого, кто скончался, как реальности (реального, реалии) (2) уже теперь нет окончательно. Теоретически, если психически я исключительно только таков, что скончаться есть чему и ни каков иначе, то, следовательно, что (я) скончаюсь, это не исключено. • Глядя на стену, здесь и сейчас сосредоточиться на своём лице (и осознать): «я есть» – реальность (а не знание об этом) –» • В себе «отстраниться» назад – смотрю из себя на эту стену –» • Не двигая головой, охватить поле зрения вниманием предельно широко (поднять (вздернуть) брови, если это расширит поле зрения) и одновременно всё сразу (всё это) воспринять единым целым –» • Высокую и широкую стену (вариант: смотреть вверх под углом 135-150 градусов перед собой) воспринять так, что обозреваемое без поворота головы пространство (объем), это – ограниченная по окружности в периферии поля зрения замкнутая несимметричная «линза» • плоская (ограниченная стеной) с противоположной мне стороны • и «выпуклая в меня» –» • Я – «вогнутый» в «себя-назад» смотрящий, каков? – кто из меня сейчас на всё это смотрит? –» • Не двигая головой, поле зрения воспринять единым целым –» • в себя-назад «втянуться» –» и «пятиться» –» «за мысли» и за всё вообще –» из этого всего назад «вытесняясь» –» от всего вообще «взад отстраниться» –» • «собой» в себя-назад «податься» и «упершись» в «собственный (себя) задний к объектному обращённый (развернутый)» «предел тупиковый» («тупо-уперто») –» • «стать» самим «пределом-тупиком» – «в себя-назад вогнутой (рефлектор-подобной)» «пределом-плоскостью» смотрящей – воспринимающим «зрительным экраном» –» стать «плоскостью-тупиком» –» • «проскользнуть» по себе – плоскости-тупику и охватить вниманием целиком –» • собой — самим плоскостью-тупиком «назад надавить, нажать»: • осознать: «что-то как-то внутри плоскости-тупика» и «сзади – за плоскостью-тупиком», и «там вообще» «что-то как-то», а также само «внутри» и «сзади», «за плоскостью-тупиком» и вообще «там» – нереальность; • самого себя – плоскости-тупика без толщины (глубины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны для себя нет –» Собой – плоскостью-тупиком: • без глубины (толщины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны таков, что скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено) –» • смотрю –» смотря –» «Непосредственно-психически» -/- Заметить: • Специфику используемых в данной работе слов (терминов), названий и выражений необходимо осознать в соответствии с (4.1.) (данный пункт смотрите ниже). • Необходимо от себя – (как) «смотрящего плоскости-тупика», такового, что скончаться есть чему, оттождествиться собой — «самим психическим» (каково психически) (3) –» • –» «отличить (4)» «Я» –» «Я-лик». • Отличив, и себя такового обозначая, но не имея в языке отличающего местоимения, именую «Я» (5). • «Соединённое-через-дефис-в-кавычках» реализовать и/или воспринять «одним-единым-целостным»; • Последовательность слов и знаков предполагает последовательность психических действий (алгоритм действий в собственном психическом); • Вопросительность слова, фразы или отдельной её, именно вопросительной части задаётся знаком «?» расположенным перед и после них. Требование к действию задаётся знаком «!» расположенным перед и после слова (фразы); • Субъективно-психический эксперимент завершён, если воспроизведен (4.1.), иначе субъективно-психический эксперимент не завершён. -/- Собой – плоскостью-тупиком … смотрю –» смотря –» -/- «Психически» (6) 1. ?кто? видит –» !отличить «Я»! –» 2. –» !«Я-видящий-лик»! –» 3. –» !«Я-лик»! –» 4. –» !«Я-ликом» всем «психически-назад-надавить(нажать)»: «Я» ?скончаюсь?! –» !«Я-ликом» всем «психически-назад-давить(жать)»: (4.1.) – нечему (7), но «Я» есть.! -/- Признательность: Согласно иллюзионизму, то, каков «Я» (как (каково) «скончаться нечему, но «Я» есть.»), реально, это не так (не таково). То есть, таковой «Я» нереален (нереальность), а реально – таков, что скончаюсь (не исключено). Однако, необходимо осознать, что это «отстраненные» от «Я» рассуждения о «Я», но не сам «Я» непосредственно. И тому, каков «Я» (как (каково) скончаться нечему, но «Я» есть.) таковое (рассуждения) не соответствует. То есть, эти рассуждения о «Я» – заблуждение. Это (как осознание) несомненно и окончательно. Не так? – за выявленную и показанную нереальность (того, что) «Скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но «Я» есть.», за показанную реальность того, что скончаться не исключено, а в идеале, за осознание: «скончаюсь (не исключено)» я был бы признателен. -/- (Сноски) (1) Именно «скончаюсь, скончался», то есть – как реальности (реального, реалии) нет окончательно. (2) Реалия, реально, реален, реальность, реальное – само то, что (каково это) непосредственно, как само таковое – само то, каково познаваемое и как-либо моделируемое вне его познания и иного (вообще) моделирования. То есть, само само-осознание себя реальностью, например, «я-реалия», «я есть» или «скончаться – нечему, но «Я» есть.» – реальность. То есть – нам ничто не запрещает ответить на вопрос «скончаюсь?» несомненно и окончательно. (3) Психически (психическое) – то, как (каково) я сам непосредственно, несомненно, и та моя непосредственная реальность, как и посредством чего я сам и всё вообще для меня есть, и которое для меня исключительно единственное. Следует заметить, что пока бываю без сознания (травма мозга или сон без сновидений), ничего и никак нет вообще. Также само обозначение того, что это сама собственная непосредственная реальность (то есть – несомненно). И чтобы её осознать, представьте себя экспериментатором, который не подменяет реальность рассуждениями о ней. – Теперь для вас, как экспериментатора, то, как (каково) психически, это – несомненно (непосредственная несомненная реальность). Не философствуй (не рассуждай, не моделируй её), а экспериментируй! (4) «Я-Лик» – специфическое выражение, соответствующее психическому в данный момент СПЭ. (5) «Я» – целевой (конечный, «предельный») и «ключевой» результат данной работы. «Я» в данной работе не склоняется, выделено полужирным подчеркнутым шрифтом и заключено в кавычки. (6) «Каково психически» – то, как (каково) «Я» сам непосредственно, несомненно – само «первое лицо» (субъект психического), а также обозначение принятия позиции «первого лица» и сообщения «от первого лица». (7) Пока я бываю без сознания («бессознание», например, сплю без сновидений), моего сознания нет (оно сведено на нет, угасло) – ничего и никак нет вообще (это моё абсолютное небытие) – (каково) психически, мне скончаться нечем. А в целевом результате данной работы, психически (то есть – непосредственно), «Я» таков, что скончаться не нечем, а именно нечему, но при этом «Я» есть. (shrink)

Julian Schlöder (2018) examines Timothy Williamson's proposal that knowledge is the norm of assertion within the context of deontic logic. He argues for two claims, one concerning the formalisation of the thesis that knowledge is a norm of assertion and another concerning the formalisation of the thesis that knowledge is the only norm of assertion. On the basis of these claims, Schlöder goes on to raise a series of problems for Williamson's proposal. In response, I argue that both of Schlöder's (...) claims can—and should—be rejected. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, democracy and oligarchy are empirically the most widespread and analytically fundamental ‘constitutions’. I analyse how in different places in his Politics Aristotle ‘positively’ defines and differentiates between democracy and oligarchy. At the same time, I substantiate in detail a new interpretation of Aristotle’s view that significantly differs from the current interpretation. ‘Combining’ the elements, procedures, and principles of democracy and oligarchy gives rise to mixed ‘constitutions’, a special place among which is occupied by the polity or republic, (...) which is the best regime ‘for most states and for most people’. I show the ways in which, according to Aristotle, it is possible to form such a regime. Carl Schmitt and, later somewhat differently, Bernard Manin draw a link between Aristotle’s mixed regime and the representative democracies of today. (shrink)

This paper is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms, especially of his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution. It lays out a broadly sympathetic perspective through dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The aim is to launch the formal academic reception of that reconstruction (rethinking), which Thesleff cautiously and modestly presents as a “proposal” — his teaser to elicit (...) a reaction, positive or negative. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s ontology, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, or arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions. (shrink)

Basic actions are those intentional actions performed not by doing any other kind of thing intentionally. Complex actions involve doing one kind of thing intentionally by doing another kind of thing intentionally. There are both basic and complex mental actions. Some complex mental actions have a striking feature that has not been previously discussed: they have several distinct contents at once. This chapter introduces and explains this feature, here called “content plurality.” This chapter also argues for the philosophical significance of (...) this feature. The existence of content plurality offers a new explanation of transparent self-knowledge and suggests a new theory of inference. It also opens up a new conception of the relation between decisions to act and judgments about what ought to be done. (shrink)

This chapter explores a philosophical hypothesis about the nature of (some) probabilities encountered in social sciences. It should be of interest to those with philosophical concerns about the foundations of probability, and to social scientists and philosophers of science who are somewhat puzzled by the nature of probability in social domains. As will become clear below, the chapter is not intended as a contribution to an empirical methodology such as a particular way of applying statistics.

It is not uncommon that an entrepreneur appears to have been determined to pursue their startup plan but this same person does not trust in their perseverance.

In “Semantics of Fictional Terms,” Garcia-Carpintero critically surveys the most recent literature on the topic of fictional names. One of his targets is realism about fictional discourse. Realists about fictional discourse believe that: (a) it contains true sentences that have fictional names as their subjects; (b) sentences containing names can be true only if those names have referents; (c) fictional names have fictional characters – abstract objects – as their referents. The fundamental problem that arises for realists is that not (...) all true sentences containing fictional names are plausibly about abstract objects. This leads to the need to introduce disjunctive conceptions of property attribution that Garcia-Carpintero claims are implausible, and that realism should therefore be rejected. He also maintains, however, that (a) is correct. I agree. Furthermore, I am also committed to anti-realism about fictional discourse – that fictional names have no referents. Garcia-Carpintero claims that my view is simply a notational variant of realism. I argue that this is false – that my view could not possibly be a notational variant of any extant realist theory. (shrink)

Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most evident where legal reasoning has to (...) meld with the vast web of ordinary human knowledge of the world. Underlying many of the problems is the mismatch between the discreteness of symbol manipulation and the continuous nature of imprecise natural language, of degrees of similarity and analogy, and of probabilities. (shrink)

Isn’t there something like an amount and density of horrific suffering whose discovery would make it irrational to think God exists? Use your imagination to think of worlds that are much, much, much worse than you think Earth is when it comes to horrific suffering. Isn’t there some conceivable scenario which, if you were in it, would make you say “Ok, ok. God doesn’t exist, at least in the way we thought God was. We were wrong about that”? Pursuing this (...) question leads to what I call the Problem of Absurd Evil. (shrink)

I outline a heretofore neglected difference between manipulation scenarios and merely deterministic ones. Plausible scientific determinism does not imply that the relevant prior history of the universe is independent of us, while manipulation does. Owing to sensitive dependence of physical outcomes upon initial conditions, in order to trace a deterministic history, a microphysical level of analysis is required. But on this level physical laws are time-symmetrically deterministic, and causality, conceived asymmetrically, disappears. I then consider a revised scenario to resurrect the (...) threat of manipulation even in the presence of time-symmetry and sensitive dependence upon initial conditions. To do so we posit a manipulator containing all the information of the manipulated and time-symmetrically related to him. The new scenario violates special relativity, but even waiving that objection, the scenario faces a dilemma. I argue that the manipulator either lacks agency enough to manipulate the target, or can integrate thoughts separated by long time spans into a single decision. In the latter case, the 'manipulated agent' disappears into the manipulator, making it the story of just one agent. (shrink)

In everyday conversations we often convey information that goes above and beyond what we strictly speaking say: exaggeration and irony are obvious examples. H.P. Grice introduced the technical notion of a conversational implicature in systematizing the phenomenon of meaning one thing by saying something else. In introducing the notion, Grice drew a line between what is said, which he understood as being closely related to the conventional meaning of the words uttered, and what is conversationally implicated, which can be inferred (...) from the fact that an utterance has been made in context. Since Grice’s seminal work, conversational implicatures have become one of the major research areas in pragmatics. This article introduces the notion of a conversational implicature, discusses some of the key issues that lie at the heart of the recent debate, and explicates tests that allow us to reliably distinguish between semantic entailments and conventional implicatures on the one hand and conversational implicatures on the other. (shrink)

This paper proposes an alternative approach towards ethical leadership. Recent research tells us that socioeconomic and cultural differences affect moral intuition, making it difficult to locate a guiding organizational principle. Nevertheless, in this paper I attempt to open an alternative path towards an ethics that might serve as a guide for leaders – especially leaders who are leading a highly professionalized workforce. Using the Chilean writer Roberto Bolaño and the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze as points of reference, I develop an (...) ethical form of leadership that is based on a continuous ‘poetic’ dialogue between creation and affirmation. The nature of this dialogue requires a leadership approach that plays both a courageous and imaginative role in liberating its workforce. Last, I develop a frame which provides the constituent principles of leading in the direction of an ethical organization. (shrink)

In this context, the study explored the relationship between organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour among food manufacturing industries in Malaysia. The study is a descriptive correlational survey research design where data is sourced out from a total of randomly sampled 260 employees. Results revealed that a favourable organizational climate on innovation, proactivity, and risk-taking is prevailing among the companies. A very high level of innovative work behaviour is emanating among the employees on idea exploration, generation, championing, and implementation. (...) Test of differences showed that employee gender, position, unit, and years of service spelt significant differences in the perception of the employees on organizational climate and innovative work behaviour. A meaningful relationship surfaced between organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour, suggesting that for food manufacturing industries to sustain innovative and competitive advantages, there is a need to promote a nurturing and encouraging entrepreneurial organizational climate. Finally, a congruency among the domains of organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour emerged. It suggests that when higher positive organizational climate surfaces, the more likely the employee's manifest innovation work behaviour. This study addressed the gap by providing organizational climate and employee innovative work behaviour among food manufacturing industries in Malaysia. (shrink)

The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation (...) and (II) a notion of “putting a representation on display”. (shrink)

Advocates of the Respect Model of moral status have expressed skepticism about the possibility that radically enhanced persons will have a higher threshold of moral status over non-radically enhanced persons. While several philosophers have already argued that advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should recognize such a possibility in a world with radically enhanced persons, I make room for a stronger claim: advocates of the Respect Model of moral status should not only recognize the possibility of higher thresholds (...) of moral status, but in fact are committed to the normative view that radically enhanced persons should have a higher threshold of moral status over non-radically enhanced persons. This stronger claim induces both rational and self-interested worries about the sacrificeability of non-radically enhanced persons, which takes the form of the inequality of immunity problem. While this problem need not rationally worry the advocate of the Respect Model of moral status, I provide some exploratory solutions that can be implemented now to assuage future self-interested fears so that advocates of the Respect Model may learn to respect the dignity of radically enhanced persons. (shrink)

In the Gorgias, Plato contrasts pastry cooking unfavorably with medicine, in order to illustrate the difference he believes exists between a mere knack and a genuine art. I attempt to show that Plato’s treatment of cooking distorts or misconceives that activity, and does so in order to shore up his arguments about the distinction between arts and knacks, and about the separation and hierarchy between minds and bodies. Plato’s treatment of cookery seems to be informed not by the activity of (...) cookery itself, but by medicine, the activity against which it is set. In contrast, I shall suggest that attending to foodmaking directly can challenge Plato’s art/knack and soul/body dichotomies in several important ways. My method combines close examination of the passage with more speculative reflections on the significance and consequences of Plato’s ideas about cooking. (shrink)

I hope that this wonderful book, written with a passionate and sympathetic intelligence, reaches a wide audience. It's not an easy read, for Janice Haaken deliberately spins a dense web of reference, pursuing paths across the contemporary psycho-political landscape. But her scholarship is marvellously diverse and well-directed, and her writing easily shifts between sad or playful fantasy, and insistently engaged political or empirical analysis.

Taking mathematics as a language based on empirical experience, I argue for an account of mathematics in which its objects are abstracta that describe and communicate the structure of reality based on some of our ancestral interactions with their environment. I argue that mathematics as a language is mostly invented. Nonetheless, in being a general description of reality it cannot be said that it is fictional; and as an intersubjective reality, mathematical objects can exist independent of any one person’s mind.

Gamification can be a useful tool when engaging young students with science. When designing a new game, it is pivotal that a featured storytelling element can draw students' attention while providing an enjoyable experience. However, building such an insightful science dissemination narrative from scratch is often challenging. As real-life situations are frequently more appealing to students, adding alternative history elements can be helpful when designing such a game. In this paper, we present a novel educational framework to design an educational, (...) science-based storytelling activity using the history of science and alternative hypothesis as ground tools for its inception. By analysing student's feedback when playing a science-based game with a historic episode outline, they report that their learning experience was fun and relatable, matching their scientific performance during the game. (shrink)

Know how and ability have a seemingly fraught relationship. I deepen the tension here, by arguing for two new pieces of data concerning know how and ability. First, know how ascriptions have two distinct readings that differ in their entailments to ability: one entails ability, the other does not. Second, in certain cases, the indeterminacy of certain ability claims infects both readings of know how claims. No existing accounts of the relationship between know how and ability captures both data points, (...) I argue; but a certain kind of intellectualism has special resources to account for them. Ascriptions of knowledge of infinitival questions give rise to a distinctive kind of context-sensitivity specific to infinitivals. I show how on an intellectualist view where, very roughly, knowing how to do something is knowing an answer to an infinitival question about your abilities, this context-sensitivity accounts for the relationship between know how and ability. (shrink)

Several influential organisations have attempted to quantify the costs and benefits of expanding access to interventions-like contraceptives-that are expected to decrease the number of pregnancies. Such health economic evaluations can be invaluable to those making decisions about how to allocate scarce resources for health. Yet how the benefits should be measured depends on controversial value judgments. One such value judgment is found in recent analyses from the Disease Control Priority Network (DCPN) and the Study Group for the Global Investment Framework (...) for Women's and Children's Health. Noting the decrease in the number of pregnancies expected to result from providing access to family planning, DCPN and the Study Group claim that a substantial benefit of such interventions is averting the stillbirths and child deaths that would have resulted from those pregnancies. We argue that health economic analyses should not count such averted deaths as benefits in the same way as saved lives. First, by counting averted stillbirths and child deaths as a benefit but not counting as a cost the lives of babies who survive, DCPN and the Study Group implicitly commit themselves to antinatalism. Second, this method for calculating the benefits of family planning interventions implies that infertility treatments are harmful. Determining how potential people should be treated in health economic analyses will require grappling with population ethics. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence. By doing this for different pieces of evidence, you begin to make your up mind, making conscious reasoning, as such, a voluntary activity with an involuntary conclusion. The paper then explains how we use conscious (...) reasoning in reflection not just to form and change committed beliefs, but to become aware of existing ones. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the limitations of conscious reasoning require us to maintain committed beliefs in a system. It is our maintenance of this system that allows us to knit together individual episodes of conscious reasoning into one enduring performance as a committed systematic believer. (shrink)

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according (...) to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance. (shrink)

In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...) illustrates that even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation. (shrink)

A good surgeon knows how to perform a surgery; a good architect knows how to design a house. We value their know-how. We ordinarily look for it. What makes it so valuable? A natural response is that know-how is valuable because it explains success. A surgeon’s know-how explains their success at performing a surgery. And an architect’s know-how explains their success at designing houses that stand up. We value know-how because of its special explanatory link to success. But in virtue (...) of what is know-how explanatorily linked to success? This essay provides a novel argument for the thesis that know-how’s special link to success is to be explained at least in part in terms of its being, or involving, a doxastic attitude that is epistemically alike propositional knowledge. It is argued that the role played by know-how in explaining intentional success shows that the epistemic differences between know-how and knowledge, if any, are less than usually thought; and that "revisionary intellectualism", the view that know-how is true belief that might well fall short of knowledge, is not really a stable position. If its explanatory link to success is what makes know-how valuable, an upshot of my argument is that the value of know-how is due, to a considerable extent, to its being, or involving, a kind of propositional knowledge. (shrink)