Results for 'Neurophilosophy'

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  1.  30
    From Einstein's Physics to Neurophilosophy: On the Notions of Space, Time and Field as Cognoscitive Conditions Under Kantian-Husserlian Approach in the General Relativity Theory.Ruth Castillo - forthcoming - Bitácora-E.
    The current technoscientific progress has led to a sectorization in the philosophy of science. Today the philosophy of science isn't is informal interested in studying old problems about the general characteristics of scientific practice. The interest of the philosopher of science is the study of concepts, problems and riddles of particular disciplines. Then, within this progress of philosophy of science, neuroscientific research stands out, because it invades issues traditionally addressed by the humanities, such as the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, (...)
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  2. Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A Case Study.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):57-76.
    In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work (...)
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  3. The Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 418--430.
    The neurophilosophy of consciousness brings neuroscience to bear on philosophical issues concerning phenomenal consciousness, especially issues concerning what makes mental states conscious, what it is that we are conscious of, and the nature of the phenomenal character of conscious states. Here attention is given largely to phenomenal consciousness as it arises in vision. The relevant neuroscience concerns not only neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data, but also computational models of neural networks. The neurophilosophical theories that bring such data to bear on (...)
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  4. Scientific Practice and the Moral Task of Neurophilosophy.Christian Carrozzo - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 10 (3):115-117.
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  5.  36
    Neurophilosophy and Its Discontents.Gabrielle Jackson - 2014 - The Institute Letter 2014 (Summer):5-6.
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  6. Controlling the Passions: Passion, Memory, and the Moral Physiology of Self in Seventeenth-Century Neurophilosophy.John Sutton - 1998 - In S. Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century. Routledge. pp. 115-146.
    Some natural philosophers in the 17th century believed that they could control their own innards, specifically the animal spirits coursing incessantly through brain and nerves, in order to discipline or harness passion, cognition and action under rational guidance. This chapter addresses the mechanisms thought necessary after Eden for controlling the physiology of passion. The tragedy of human embedding in the body, with its cognitive and moral limitations, was paired with a sense of our confinement in sequential time. I use two (...)
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  7. Meaning Generation and Self-Consciousness: Neurophilosophical Applications of an Evolutionary Scenario? (Lomonosov Moscow State University. 2015 Presentation).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    The nature of human mind has been an open question for more than 2000 years and it is still today a mystery. There has been during the last 30 years a renewed interest from science and philosophy on that subject. Among the existing research domains is neurophilosophy, an interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy looking at neuronal aspects of access consciousness, of phenomenal consciousness and at functional aspects of consciousness. We propose here to look if self-consciousness could have a (...)
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  8. Electromagnetic-Field Theories of Mind.Mostyn W. Jones - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):124-149.
    Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, (...)
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  9. Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.
    Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and (...)
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  10. Chreods, Homeorhesis and Biofields: Finding the Right Path for Science.Arran Gare - 2017 - Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 131:61-91.
    C.H. Waddington’s concepts of ‘chreods’ (canalized paths of development) and ‘homeorhesis’ (the tendency to return to a path), each associated with ‘morphogenetic fields’, were conceived by him as a contribution to complexity theory. Subsequent developments in complexity theory have largely ignored Waddington’s work and efforts to advance it. Waddington explained the development of the concept of chreod as the influence on his work of Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, notably, the concept of concrescence as a self-causing process. Processes were recognized (...)
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  11. Growing Evidence That Perceptual Qualia Are Neuroelectrical Not Computational.Mostyn W. Jones - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):89-116.
    Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form overall perceptions, and this (...)
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  12. Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain.Adam Morton - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):737-739.
    I consider Glimcher's claim to have given an account of mental functioning that is at once neurological and decision-theoretical. I am skeptical, but remark on some good ideas of Glimcher's.
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  13. Grundlagen und Voraussetzungen der Leib-Seele- / Körper-Geist-Dichotomie in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Geistes.Patrick Grüneberg - 2007 - In Christoph Asmuth (ed.), Leiblichkeit - Interpersonalität - Anerkennung. Transzendentalphilosophie und Person. Transcript. pp. 23--40.
    Seit geraumer Zeit ist wieder einmal die Rede vom Ende der Philosophie als einer eigenständigen Disziplin zu vernehmen. Neurophilosophen streben eine Erklärung grundlegender philosophischer Fragen mit Hilfe neurowissenschaftlicher Forschungsergebnisse an, da nach dem Erreichen des Jahrzehnts des Gehirns einer empirisch fundierten Erklärung des Bewusstseins in allen seinen Gestalten nichts mehr im Wege stünde. In Bezug auf Descartes sieht man sich als Postcartesianer jetzt in der Rolle, das sog. Leib-Seele-Problem durch eine naturalistische Reduktion auf neurobiologische Gegebenheiten zu lösen. Ich habe mir (...)
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  14. The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field?M. Chirimuuta & I. Gold - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The concept of the receptive field, first articulated by Hartline, is central to visual neuroscience. The receptive field of a neuron encompasses the spatial and temporal properties of stimuli that activate the neuron, and, as Hubel and Wiesel conceived of it, a neuron’s receptive field is static. This makes it possible to build models of neural circuits and to build up more complex receptive fields out of simpler ones. Recent work in visual neurophysiology is providing evidence that the classical receptive (...)
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  15. Body, Mind and Order: Local Memory and the Control of Mental Representations in Medieval and Renaissance Sciences of Self.John Sutton - 2000 - In Guy Freeland & Antony Corones (eds.), 1543 And All That: word and image in the proto- scientific revolution. pp. 117-150.
    This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory and personal identity. I treat theoretical models of memory in history as specimens of the way cultural norms and artifacts can permeate ('proto')scientific views of inner processes. I apply this analysis to the topic of psychological control over one's own body, brain, and mind. Some metaphors and models for memory and mental representation signal the projection inside of external aids. Overtly at least, medieval and (...)
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  16. Control Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
    Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. In such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of (...)
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  17.  77
    Revisiting the Mind-Brain Reductionisms: Contra Dualism and Eliminativism.Nythamar de Oliveira - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (2):363-385.
    In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a B-substance y, such that (...)
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  18. Mounting Evidence That Minds Are Neural EM Fields Interacting with Brains.Mostyn W. Jones - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (1-2):159-183.
    Evidence that minds are neural electromagnetic fields comes from research into how separate brain activities bind to form unified percepts and unified minds. Explanations of binding using synchrony, attention, and convergence are all problematic. But the unity of EM fields explains binding without these problems. These unified fields neatly explain correlations and divergences between synchrony, attention, convergence, and unified minds. The simplest explanation for the unity of both minds and fields is that minds are fields. Treating minds as the fields' (...)
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  19. Neuroelectrical Approaches to Binding Problems.Mostyn W. Jones - 2016 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 2 (37).
    How do separate brain processes bind to form unified, conscious percepts? This is the perceptual binding problem, which straddles neuroscience and psychology. In fact, two problems exist here: (1) the easy problem of how neural processes are unified, and (2) the hard problem of how this yields unified perceptual consciousness. Binding theories face familiar troubles with (1) and they do not come to grips with (2). This paper argues that neuroelectrical (electromagnetic-field) approaches may help with both problems. Concerning the easy (...)
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  20. Philosophy of Psychology as Philosophy of Science.Gary Hatfield - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:19 - 23.
    This paper serves to introduce the papers from the symposium by the same title, by describing the sort of work done in philosophy of psychology conceived as a branch of the philosophy of science, distinguishing it from other discussions of psychology in philosophy, and criticizing the claims to set limits on scientific psychology in the largely psychologically uninformed literatures concerning "folk psychology' and "wide" and "narrow" content. Philosophy of psychology as philosophy of science takes seriously and analyzes the explanatory structures, (...)
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  21.  55
    Seeing With the Two Systems of Thought—a Review of ‘Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception’ by John Searle (2015)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. pp. 474-507.
    As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is (...)
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  22. Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1992 - In Y. Christen & P. S. Churchland (eds.), Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer's Disease. Cambridge: Springer Verlag. pp. 18--29.
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  23. Introduction: The Hard Problem of Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):1-3.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett : 4–6, 1996, Cognition 79:221–237, 2001, J Conscious Stud 19:86, 2012) and Churchland :402–408, 1996, Brainwise: studies in neurophilosophy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that (...)
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  24. Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Tibor Solymosi & John Shook (eds.), Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Understanding Brains at Work in the World. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 140-161.
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  25. Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories.William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd - 2014 - In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. London: Springer. pp. 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
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  26. Is the Next Frontier in Neuroscience a Decade of the Mind?Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2014 - In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Palgrave MacMillan.
    In 2007, ten world-renowned neuroscientists proposed “A Decade of the Mind Initiative.” The contention was that, despite the successes of the Decade of the Brain, “a fundamental understanding of how the brain gives rise to the mind [was] still lacking” (2007, 1321). The primary aims of the decade of the mind were “to build on the progress of the recent Decade of the Brain (1990-99)” by focusing on “four broad but intertwined areas” of research, including: healing and protecting, understanding, enriching, (...)
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  27. Embodied Collaboration in Small Groups.Kellie Williamson & John Sutton - 2014 - In C. T. Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer. pp. 107-133.
    Being social creatures in a complex world, we do things together. We act jointly. While cooperation, in its broadest sense, can involve merely getting out of each other’s way, or refusing to deceive other people, it is also essential to human nature that it involves more active forms of collaboration and coordination (Tomasello 2009; Sterelny 2012). We collaborate with others in many ordinary activities which, though at times similar to those of other animals, take unique and diverse cultural and psychological (...)
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  28. Between-Two: On the Borderline of Being & Time. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (2):150-164.
    The purpose of this review article is to attempt to come to grips with the elusive vision of Gordon Globus, especially as revealed in this, his latest book. However, one can only grip that which is tangible and solid and Globus’s marriage of Heideggerian anti-concepts and “quantum neurophilosophy” seems purposefully to evade solidity or grasp. This slippery anti-metaphysics is sometimes a curse for the reader seeking imagistic or conceptual clarity, but, on the other hand, it is also the blessing (...)
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  29. How is Neuroscience Possible?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that neuroscience not only is not complemented, but rather is positively undermined, by the substantive commitments of materialist philosophers of mind. Thus, we can have neuroscience or "neurophilosophy" but not both. Since neuroscience is a real science, to the extent that it is in tension with materialistic neurophilosophy, the latter should be abandoned and the former retained.
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  30. Extended Mind and Representation.F. Thomas Burke - 2014 - In John R. Shook & Tibor Solymosi (eds.), Pragmatist Neurophilosophy: American Philosophy and the Brain. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 177-202.
    Good old-fashioned cognitive science characterizes human thinking as symbol manipulation qua computation and therefore emphasizes the processing of symbolic representations as a necessary if not sufficient condition for “general intelligent action.” Recent alternative conceptions of human thinking tend to deemphasize if not altogether eschew the notion of representation. The present paper shows how classical American pragmatist conceptions of human thinking can successfully avoid either of these extremes, replacing old-fashioned conceptions of representation with one that characterizes both representatum and representans in (...)
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