Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I (...) explain a framework by which he provides what I call consequent justification for our inductive practices in his positive argument. Based on this, I argue that his negative argument in the Enquiry should similarly be read as normative in nature. (shrink)

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this (...) tension by appealing to Hume’s treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (1997). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine three mutually inconsistent claims that are commonly attributed to Hume: all beliefs are involuntary; some beliefs are subject to normative appraisal; and that ‘Ought implies Can’. I examine the textual support for such ascription, and the options for dealing with the puzzle posed by their inconsistency. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‘prior voluntary action’ solution. (...) I argue that this position in any form fails to account for synchronic rationality. I then raise more specific objections depending on how we disambiguate the position, which can be read as either granting beliefs derivative voluntariness, or as denying their normative significance; the former version is inconsistent with Hume’s treatment of natural abilities, while the latter falls to a regress given Hume’s thesis regarding the inability of actions and passions to be subject to epistemic normativity. I then propose to reject instead for two reasons: first, the weakness of textual support for such an ascription; secondly, Hume’s explicit recognition of the irrelevance of involuntariness to normative evaluation in the moral case. (shrink)

On the basis of PM2.5 data of the national air quality monitoring sites, local population data, and baseline all-cause mortality rate, PM2.5-related health economic benefits of the Air Improvement Action Plan implemented in Wuhan in 2013–2017 were investigated using health-impact and valuation functions. Annual avoided premature deaths driven by the average concentration of PM2.5 decrease were evaluated, and the economic benefits were computed by using the value of statistical life (VSL) method. Results showed that the number of avoided premature deaths (...) in Wuhan are 21,384 (95% confidence interval (CI): 15,004 to 27,255) during 2013–2017, due to the implementation of the Air Improvement Action Plan. According to the VSL method, the obtained economic benefits of Huangpi, Wuchang, Hongshan, Xinzhou, Jiang’an, Hanyang, Jiangxia, Qiaokou, Jianghan, Qingshan, Caidian, Dongxihu, and Hannan District were 8.55, 8.19, 8.04, 7.39, 5.78, 4.84, 4.37, 4.04, 3.90, 3.30, 2.87, 2.42, and 0.66 billion RMB (1 RMB = 0.1417 USD On 14 October 2019), respectively. These economic benefits added up to 64.35 billion RMB (95% CI: 45.15 to 82.02 billion RMB), accounting for 4.80% (95% CI: 3.37% to 6.12%) of the total GDP of Wuhan in 2017. Therefore, in the process of formulating a regional air quality improvement scheme, apart from establishing hierarchical emission-reduction standards and policies, policy makers should give integrated consideration to the relationship between regional economic development, environmental protection and residents’ health benefits. Furthermore, for improving air quality, air quality compensation mechanisms can be established on the basis of the status quo and trends of air quality, population distribution, and economic development factors. (shrink)

This article investigates Hume's account of mental transparency. In this article, I will endorse Qualitative Transparency – that is, the thesis that we cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our current perceptions, and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical – on the basis that, unlike its competitors, it is both weak enough to accommodate the introspective mistakes that Hume recognises, and yet strong enough to make sense of his positive employments of mental transparency. Moreover, Qualitative Transparency is (...) also philosophically satisfying in providing good philosophical reason for why the mental states that are incorrigible should in fact be so. (shrink)

The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck, 2021a). Prior work demonstrates that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known “connectedness illusion” to provide evidence that these (...) ratio-dependent ratio discriminations are (a) based on the perceived number of items in seen displays (and not just non-numerical confounds), (b) are not dependent on verbal working memory, or explicit counting routines, and (c) involve representations with a part-whole (or subset-superset) format, like a fraction, rather than a part-part format, like a ratio. These results vindicate key predictions of the hypothesis that the ANS represents rational numbers. (shrink)

Hume argues that whenever we seem to be motivated by reason, there are unnoticed calm passions that play this role instead, a move that is often criticised asad hoc(e. g. Stroud 1977 and Cohon 2008). In response, some commentators propose a conceptual rather than empirical reading of Hume’s conativist thesis, either as a departure from Hume (Stroud 1977), or as an interpretation or rational reconstruction (Bricke 1996). I argue that conceptual accounts face a dilemma: either they render the conativist thesis (...) trivial, or they violate Hume’s thesis that ‘a priori, any thing may produce any thing’ (THN1.4.5.30). I defend an empirical construal of Hume’s conativist thesis. I provide two theoretical frameworks within which Hume’s appeal to the calm passions may be justified: first, by the framework of theoretical virtues, and secondly, by lights of his own “rules by which to judge of causes and effects” (THN1.3.15). (shrink)

The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...) their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (in Livingston & King (eds.) Hume: a re-evaluation, 1976), Kail (in: Frasca-Spada & Kail (eds.) Impressions of Hume, 2005), McCormick (Hume Stud 31:1, 2005), Owen (Hume’s reason, 1999), and Ridge (Hume Stud 29:2, 2003), while Schafer (Philosophers, forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justification—a distinction that Hume insists on. I then attempt to carve out the logical space for there being a distinctly epistemic notion of justification founded on usefulness and agreeableness. However, I find that such an account is problematic for two reasons: first, it cannot take advantage of the textual support for U&A; secondly, it is incompatible with other features of the text. (shrink)

This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion of self should (...) be characterized as a bundle of dispositions to our perceptions, such that these dispositions are durable and counterfactual-supporting. I argue that Hume confused his ‘philosophical’ notion of dispositions, as nothing above and beyond their effects, with the thicker notion of dispositions to which the passions respond—which explains his mistaken commitment to the durability constraint. (shrink)

This article surveys the state of the literature on Hume’s epistemology, focusing on treatments of what has come to be known as the ‘Kemp Smith problem’, that is, the problem of reconciling Hume’s scepticism with his naturalism. It first surveys the literature on this issue with regard to the Treatise, moving on to briefly compare the Treatise and the Enquiry in virtue of their epistemological frameworks, before finally examining the literature with regard to the first Enquiry.

Commentators such as Kemp Smith (1941), Mendelbaum (1974), and Bricke (1980) have taken the distinctions of reason to pose either a counterexample to or a limitation of scope on the Separability Principle. This has been convincingly addressed by various accounts such as Garrett (1997), Hoffman (2011), and Baxter (2011). However, I argue in this paper that there are two notions of ‘distinction of reason’, one between particular instantiations (token distinctions of reason) and one between general ideas (type distinctions of reason). (...) Discussion of the distinctions of reason in the secondary literature has without fail focused on token distinctions of reason, but I will argue that type distinctions of reason prove problematic for Hume’s Separability Principle. I find a way around this problem that is consonant with Hume’s account of general ideas, but which can hardly be said to be an account which he explicitly or even implicitly endorsed. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for an interpretation of Hume's Law that sees him as dismissing all possible arguments from is to ought on the basis of a comparison with his famous argument on induction.

The Title Principle is seen by a number of commentators as crucial to Hume’s resolution of skeptical doubts in THN 1.4.7, thus providing an answer to Kemp Smith’s (1941) famous worry regarding the tension between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism. However, I will argue that in the Enquiry, Hume rejects both the Title Principle and the role of the passions in his epistemology. Those who think that neither the Title Principle nor the passions play a significant role in THN 1.4.7 (...) will likely take this as grist for their mills. But for those who endorse such interpretations, my argument presents an interpretive burden to provide some explanation as to why Hume might have become dissatisfied with this epistemic framework, abandoning it in his later work. Having raised this interpretive burden, my paper also seeks to bear it by providing such an explanation. (shrink)

The well-known paradox between Marxism and morality is that on the one hand, Marx claims that morality is a form of ideology that should be abandoned, while on the other hand, Marx makes quite a few moral judgments in his writings. It is in the research after Marx’s death that the paradox is found, explored and solved. This paper surveys the history of interpreting Marx from the aspect of moral philosophy by dividing it into three sequential phases. Then it presents (...) the research on Marx in each phase, points out conflicting questions within the different periods and puts forward the solution in the end. This paper points out that a philosophical viewpoint based on Marx’s theory of historical materialism is the key to solving the paradox between Marxism and morality. (shrink)

Visual illusions of number provide a means of investigating the rules and principles through which approximate number representations are formed. Here, we investigated the developmental trajectory of an important numerical illusion – the connectedness illusion, wherein connecting pairs of items with thin lines reduces their perceived number without altering continuous attributes of the collections. We found that children as young as 5 years of age are affected by the illusion and that the magnitude of the effect increased into adulthood. Moreover, (...) individuals with greater numerical acuity exhibited stronger connectedness illusions after controlling for age. Overall, these results suggest the approximate number system expects to enumerate over bounded wholes and doing so is a signature of its optimal functioning. (shrink)

The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project also provides (...) access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

Las críticas proferidas en la antigüedad y en la contemporaneidad acerca de la realización del proyecto hedónico de Epicuro, aducen algunas deficiencias en los principios valorativos y epistémicos que trastocan el sentido originario de dicho autor. Frente a las críticas, la censura a los valores tradicionales y el análisis de los deseos como caracteres de la virtud sugieren una respuesta a la insuficiencia epistémica y de valoración con que se designa a la doctrina epicúrea. Por ello, en este artículo se (...) indaga el carácter mediador de la virtud en tanto es justificación del placer como contenido del bienestar tan recusado por tantos críticos del filósofo de Samos. (shrink)

Les tables, les chaises, les gens assis sur des chaises à des tables, sont des objets composés de matière. Selon la science, la matière se compose principalement d'atomes. Les atomes sont faits d'électrons, de neutrons et de protons. Les neutrons et les protons forment un noyau autour duquel orbitent les électrons. Outre ces particules, les physiciens en ont découvert un grand nombre d'autres, comme les photons, les quarks et les neutrinos.

L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontologiques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élaboration d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne diffèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’ontologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche pas à représenter (...) des objets étrangers au monde que nous habitons et aux sciences qui l’étudient, et par conséquent elle n’a pas besoin de facultés ni de méthodes spéciales pour mener à bien ses recherches. L’ontologie métascientifique est un discours général scientifique sur le monde parce que conçue par et pour les sciences. (shrink)

This article argues that there are at least three different versions of methodological nationalism: state-centrism (unjustified supremacy granted to the nation-state), territorialism (understanding space as divided in territories), and groupism (equating society with the nation-state’s society). If these three versions are logically distinct, as it will be shown, the typology can serve as a tool to weight the influence of methodological nationalism in the social sciences. The paper has three sections arguing that 1) the three versions are all present in (...) the literature on methodological nationalism without always being distinguished; 2) the epistemological problems raised by methodological nationalism are sometimes misunderstood as ontological or normative questions about globalization and national borders; 3) the three versions of methodological nationalism can be shown to be logically independent by a few examples. (shrink)

This paper is written on the occasion of the celebration of the gift of femininity. In this paper, I argue philosophically, as to what may be taken as a framework for what it means to be a female. While I am aware of the various attendant positions and orientations that are wont to accompany such a discussion, I maintain that a female is essentially, a human being with certain biological configurations, and other cultural descriptions. While this definition may be reductionist (...) at first approximation, the fact that the female is a human being means that the female is, in the words of Battista Mondin, a bundle of possibilities that can neither be understood in entirety, or reduced to a definite range. -/- Ce papier est écrit à l'occasion de la célébration du don de la féminité. Dans cet article, je discute philosophiquement de ce qui peut être considéré comme un cadre pour ce que signifie être une femme. Bien que je sois conscient des différentes positions et orientations qui accompagnent habituellement une telle discussion, je maintiens qu'une femme est essentiellement un être humain avec certaines configurations biologiques et d'autres descriptions culturelles. Bien que cette définition puisse être réductionniste en première approximation, le fait que la femme soit un être humain signifie que la femme est, selon les mots de Battista Mondin, un faisceau de possibilités qui ne peuvent ni être comprises dans leur intégralité, ni réduites à une gamme définie. (shrink)

I present and defend Reinach's theory of ownership according to which, prior to the positive law, one finds a distinction between possession, ownership and property rights. Ownership is not a bundle of positive rights, but a primitive natural relation that grounds the absolute right to behave as one wishes towards the thing one owns. In reply to some objections raised against it, I argue that Reinach's theory of property is morally and politically non-committal; and that it in fact has the (...) ressources for dealing with the vexing issue of the origin of ownership. (shrink)

Together with other influential psychologists of the time, Wundt considers internal data as absolute evidence, grounding psychology on this assumption. In opposition to his former mentor, Külpe aims at rehabilitating Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. Yet, he is far from embracing transcendentalism and rejects Kant’s skepticism as to the possibility of a scientific psychology. Nevertheless, Külpe believes that Kant is right in considering internal data as unreliable for scientific purposes: accordingly, psychology should share the same scientific methodology of any other science.

Since 2019, Northeastern post-industrial culture has been a popular topic of discussion; the general public refers to it as the Northeastern Renaissance. Crises of identity, honor, and faith have been recurring themes in several Northeastern films released in recent years. Furthermore, these cinematic narratives frequently generate somber humor by presenting an enormous contrast between ideals and actuality. The article examines how the post-industrial narrative context of Northeast China has influenced audio-visual cultural products and contemporary Chinese popular culture. To elucidate the (...) fundamental aspect of the Northeast narrative, the article’s author employs the absurd theory of Albert Camus. The main structure and viewpoints of the article are as follows: The first is after presenting individuals’ contemplations on the Northeastern Renaissance-instigated post-industrial narrative of the Northeast. In the following sections, the article explores the narrative context of post-industrial audio-visual works in Northeast China, focusing on the absurdity depicted in the documentary Tie Xi Qu: West of the Tracks (2002). The authors’ analysis reveals how the documentary captures the socio-economic decline and the resulting human experiences of absurdity and dislocation. Key findings indicate that the narrative structure and visual style effectively convey the bleak realities of post-industrial life, offering critical insights into the region’s socio-cultural transformation. These findings suggest that future research should explore the intersection of visual media and social change in other post-industrial contexts. -/- . (shrink)

Le concept de « beau » assume un rôle essentiel dans la philosophie platonicienne, puisqu’il exprime cette vision ou cette connaissance « supérieure » qu'on n’atteint qu’au terme de la démarche dialectique. Cette contribution examinera un aspect particulier de cette démarche, ce moment que l’on pourrait définir comme la « figure du milieu », puisqu’il se situe entre deux états de choses totalement différents, à l’apex du processus dialectique : l’exaiphnès. Exaiphnès représente pour Platon un « soudainement » très particulier. (...) À travers ce mot, en effet, s’exprime, selon nous, cet « instant » précis qui semble survenir « soudainement », mais qui, en réalité, a besoin d'une longue période d'incubation, au terme de laquelle, « soudainement », surgit un problème qui émergeait auparavant dans une optique totalement différente. En d’autres termes, Platon semble décrire un phénomène que le langage commun appelle habituellement « illumination », et qui, selon nous, a de nombreux points communs avec le phénomène que les psychologues nomment insight. (shrink)

We review the history of the philosophy of fondue since Aristotle so as to arrive at the formulation of the paradox of Swiss fondue. Either the wine and the cheese cease to exist (Buridan), but then the fondue is not really a mixture of wine and cheese. Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist. If they do, then either they continue to exist in different places (the chemists), but then a fondue can never be perfectly homogenous (it is (...) a French fondue). Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist in the same place (the Stoïcs), but then wine and cheese have to be, oddly, penetrable and spatially expansible. Aristote attempted to solve this paradox by arguing that the cheese and wine continue to exist, but only potentially in the fondue. We sketch an alternative answer. The wine and the cheese continue to exist, but only non-spatially in the fondue. Wine and cheese, once mixed, become non-spatial constituents of the fondue, a bit like character traits are non-spatial constituents of persons. The wine and the cheese are in the fondue, but only the fondue is there in the fondue pot. (shrink)

On définit souvent la philosophie comme l’« amour de la sagesse ». En grec, le terme « philosophe » qui signifie « ami de la sa- gesse » (philós= ami, sophía= sagesse) se rapporte à une personne qui aspire à une connaissance globale des choses. (1) Mais que sait-on vraiment de la philosophie? Comment procède-t-elle, à quels thèmes s‘intéresse-t-elle?

The thesis defended is that at a certain arbitrary level of granularity, mountains have sharp, bona fide boundaries. In reply to arguments advanced by Varzi (2001), Smith & Mark (2001, 2003) I argue that the lower limit of a mountain is neither vague nor fiat. Relying on early works by Cayley (1859), Maxwell (1870) and Jordan (1872), this lower limit consists in the lines of watercourse which are defined as the lines of slope starting at passes. Such lines are metaphysically (...) sharply delineated although they are not always easy to get at when facing a mountain. Hence, the indetermination is only epistemic. In the second part of the paper, I try to combine this claim about the lower limit of a mountain with more recent claims advanced by alpinists on the right way to measure the height of a mountain, so as to capture its topographic prominence. I argue following them that the proper height of a mountain is the difference of altitude between its summit and its key-saddle, defined as the highest saddle one needs to cross in order to reach the closest higher summit. Combining this two plausible views about the lower limit and height of a mountain leads to the surprising result that the key-saddle needed to measure the height of a mountain is not necessarily located on the lower-boundary of that mountain. (shrink)

Il est notoire que dans l’histoire de l’esprit à la constitution de laquelle Fontenelle participe activement, Descartes occupe une place toute particulière, notamment en ce qui a trait à la fabrication du concept de modernité et de la philosophie qui y est associée. Pourtant, et c’est ce que nous nous proposons d’explorer ici, il faut encore prendre la mesure de ce qui, dans la philosophie cartésienne, correspond au sens propre à cette modernité et le départager de ce qui ne sert (...) qu’à tracer le portrait d’une figure exemplaire constitutive de l’écriture de l’histoire à l’âge classique. Ce que nous proposons, donc, c’est de distinguer trois registres discursifs faisant jouer au nom « Descartes » des fonctions différentes et attachées à des enjeux philosophiques hétérogènes, lesquels permettent de saisir les tensions à l’œuvre dans le traitement réservé à Descartes par Fontenelle. Le premier de ces registres concerne la figure historique de Descartes en tant que fondateur d’une manière de penser qui définirait la modernité elle-même ; le second porte sur la nature de cette fondation, qui est constamment rapportée par Fontenelle à la question de la méthode, alors même qu’il en détourne l’esprit ; le troisième, enfin, intéresse le contenu de la philosophie cartésienne et les raisons de l’attachement de Fontenelle à la théorie des tourbillons en dépit du progrès du newtonianisme chez ses contemporains. (shrink)

Neither the burden of our tragic memory nor the secular illusions of History and its many fetishes can hold back human consciousness from rediscovering peace and lucidity. The assiduous exercise of intelligence, heart and will is the absolute condition for the individual and collective freedom of our peoples. The concept of Afroplanetarianism that I am proposing reveals a simple intuition: by exercising one's intelligence every day, people in Africa and the rest of the world will rediscover the fundamental resources of (...) Life and Reality. (shrink)

La mécanique quantique est une théorie physique contemporaine réputée pour ses défis au sens commun et ses paradoxes. Depuis bientôt un siècle, plusieurs interprétations de la théorie ont été proposées par les physiciens et les philosophes, offrant des images quantiques du monde, ou des ontologies, radicalement différentes. L'existence d'un hasard fondamental, ou d'une multitude de mondes en-dehors du nôtre, dépend ainsi de l'interprétation adoptée. Après avoir discuté de la définition de l'interprétation d'une théorie physique, ce livre présente trois principales interprétations (...) quantiques, empiriquement équivalentes : l'interprétation dite orthodoxe, l'interprétation de Bohm, et l'interprétation des mondes multiples. Des textes d'Albert & Galchen, ainsi que de Mermin, présentent le concept de non-localité et invitent à une analyse de l'argument d'Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen et du théorème de Bell. (shrink)

Une mise en lumière de la spécificité du cinéma en trois parties : le cinéma et l'image, le cinéma et le langage, le cinéma et le montage. Deux textes de G. Deleuze et N. Burch complètent l'ensemble.

Cet essai va aborder la question d'éthique normative de savoir où doit s'arrêter notre considération morale. On peut en effet se demander si nous n'avons pas des obligations morales en dehors de celles que nous avons à l'égard des représentants de l'espèce humaine que nous côtoyons. Est-il possible d'envisager des obligations à l'égard des animaux ou des générations futures? C'est une question qui fait débat dans la philosophie morale depuis l'antiquité – pour les animaux du moins – mais qui a (...) connu un regain d'intérêt depuis une quarantaine d'années, principalement dans la philosophie anglo-saxonne, et qui a parfois été appelée problème du périmètre. Nous allons nous intéresser plus particulièrement au statut moral des animaux : quelle considération morale leur doit-on? Doivent-ils être inclus dans le périmètre ou rester au-delà? (shrink)

Este artigo trata de aspectos abordados aspectos históricos e filosóficos do problema da medição em mecânica quântica, com ênfase na famosa formulação de Erwin Schrödinger conhecida como o “paradoxo do Gato de Schrödinger”. Pensado para o uso em sala de aula em cursos de filosofia da ciência a nível de graduação e pós-graduação, o artigo trata, em especial: da gênese do problema da medição (§ 1); sua conexão com os debates filosóficos sobre a localidade e separabilidade (§ 2); as consequências (...) para debates futuros na metafísica da ciência (§ 3). Palavras-chave: filosofia da mecânica quântica; gato de Schrödinger; metafísica da ciência; problema da medição; separabilidade. (shrink)

This is a wonderful book that ambitiously and impressively brings to convergence two parallel, perennial lines of inquiry in Hume’s scholarship. One is the classic Kemp Smith question concerning the relation between Hume’s naturalism and skepticism. The other is about the relation of the first Enquiry to book 1 of the Treatise. Qu observes that the Treatise is most distinctively naturalist or descriptive, while the Enquiry is decidedly normative. His approach is to examine the two questions through a single lens (...) by inquiring into the nature and causes of Hume’s epistemological evolution.Any evolutionary account must identify what evolutionary biologists refer to as the “transitional form.” For Qu, this is part 4 of... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Traditionally, being a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms of what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of a scientifically informed ontology. But according to some philosophers, a realistic attitude must go (...) beyond ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics. (shrink)

Where three teacher-researchers discuss bipedal walking in humans and where the long-term dynamics of this phenomenon are interpreted in terms of complexity and predictability, two concepts that can be quantified using fractals and the mathematical tools to study them.

On montre que la thèse de doctorat de Vincent Carraud est un invraisemblable tissu d'âneries.

« La philosophie de la danse ? Cela existe ? » est une question à laquelle celui ou celle qui s’y consacre doit faire face. Une première manière d’y répondre est de montrer en quoi une telle philosophie peut consister, en énumérant rapidement une série de questions et de problèmes. Bien sûr, les tentatives de définition en font partie. Qu’est-ce que la danse ? Peut-elle être définie en termes de conditions nécessaires et suffisantes3 ? En comptant parmi ces conditions l’expressivité (...) intense du mouvement dansé, son absence de finalité pratique et l’intention de susciter des émotions au moyen de la perception de l’espace et du rythme, on soulève des problèmes philosophiques plus spécifiques, liés notamment aux propriétés émotionnelles, spatiales et musicales exemplifiées par la danse. Comment catégoriser une performance qui, conçue par un ou une chorégraphe, est composée exclusivement de mouvements ordinaires ? En quoi l’expression dansée diffère-t-elle des gestes des chanteurs d’opéra ou des comédiens ? De quelle manière exprime-t-elle des émotions qu’un danseur n’éprouve pas nécessairement ? La danse ne peut-elle exprimer que des émotions ? (shrink)

Plus qu’un régime ou un mode de vie, le véganisme est un mouvement social et politique visant à libérer les animaux du joug humain. S’opposant au carnisme, les véganes renoncent autant que possible à utiliser des produits ou des services issus de leur exploitation. Leurs arguments rencontrent aujourd’hui un écho de plus en plus favorable parmi les consommateurs, alors même que les animaux, sur terre et dans la mer, n’ont jamais été tués dans de si grandes proportions. Cet essai est (...) l’occasion pour ses auteurs de montrer que la société que les véganes appellent de leurs vœux (et préfigurent par leurs pratiques quotidiennes) repose sur une conception élargie de la justice. Une justice qui devrait embrasser l’ensemble des êtres doués de sensibilité. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que la théologie analytique ? Que veut la théologie analytique et que pouvons-nous attendre d’elle ? Ces questions semblent constituer le défi d’aujourd’hui pour la théologie analytique. Nous répondrons à ces questions, en proposant de la distinguer des autres disciplines avec lesquelles elle semble se confondre. Cette recherche nous conduira d’abord à proposer une nouvelle définition de la théologie analytique fondée sur trois critères et par la suite à distinguer deux manières de faire la théologie analytique: (i) une théologie (...) analytique de bas en haut et (ii) une théologie analytique de haut en bas. Selon notre thèse, seule une théologie analytique confessante de haut en bas peut être considérée comme une théologie analytique à part entière. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce qui justifie des normes comme « Tu ne tueras point » ou «Nul ne peut être soumis à la torture »? -/- C’est autour de cette question fondamentale que se sont constituées les trois grandes théories morales : l’éthique des vertus (inspirée d’Aristote), l’éthique des devoirs (mise en forme par Kant) et l’éthique des conséquences (matrice de l’utilitarisme). Qu’est-ce qui distingue ces trois approches ? Y a-t-il des raisons décisives d’en préférer une ? -/- Dans ce livre, Ruwen Ogien (...) et Christine Tappolet montrent que, pour trancher ce débat, il faut clarifier les deux concepts-clés de l’éthique et analyser leurs relations : les normes (qui posent des obligations, des interdictions, des permissions) et les valeurs (qui disent ce qui est bien ou désirable). -/- Ils proposent une hypothèse simple, mais iconoclaste : si pour justifier les normes, il faut nécessairement faire appel à des valeurs, c’est que, contre Kant et Aristote, il faut être conséquentialiste. (shrink)

Ce qu'on peut appeler lathéorie du discoursbouleverse les fondements épistémologiques et les perspectives méthodologiques de la recherche dans d'importants secteurs des sciences humaines et sociales. L'ethnologie, la psychanalyse et, bien entendu, les sciences de la littérature deviennent le champ d'application d'un système conceptuel opératoire que sous-tend la notion de « texte », et d'un modèle d'analyse axé sur le problème de la découverte des « lois de construction » du texte. L'intérêt particulier que présentent les thèses de M. Foucault réside (...) dans le fait qu'elles envisagent la possibilité d'élargir à l'Histoire le champ d'application de cette théorie.. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que l’indignation ? Cette émotion est souvent conçue comme une émotion morale qu’une tierce-partie éprouve vis-à-vis des injustices qu’un agent inflige à un patient. L’indignation aurait ainsi trait aux injustices et serait éprouvée par des individus qui n’en seraient eux-mêmes pas victimes. Cette émotion motiverait la tierce-partie indignée à tenter de réguler l’injustice en l’annulant et en punissant son auteur. Cet article entreprend de montrer que cette conception de l’indignation n’est que partielle. En effet, l’indignation ne porte pas que (...) sur les injustices, mais plus généralement sur les torts injustifiés. Ce faisant, l’indignation peut être une émotion morale, mais aussi une émotion conventionnelle ou esthétique. De plus, elle peut être éprouvée par les individus victime des torts : elle n’est pas uniquement éprouvée par des tierces-parties. De la sorte, les individus indignés qui subissent les torts peuvent eux-mêmes chercher à les annuler et à punir leurs auteurs. Puisqu’elle peut être éprouvée tant par des spectateurs que par les personnes qui subissent les torts et qu’elle incline ceux qui l’éprouvent à faire appel à d’autres personnes pour réguler ces torts, l’indignation vécue individuellement est partageable : elle peut devenir une émotion collective jouant un rôle fondamental dans la régulation sociale en contribuant au renforcement de normes sociales existantes ou à l’émergence de nouvelles normes sociales associées aux idées du juste prévalant dans la société considérée. (shrink)