In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The (...) thesis is formalised rigorously and two models are provided that demonstrate that the new thesis is indeed tenable within a standard possible world semantics based on selection functions. Unlike the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics the selection functions cannot be understood in terms of similarity. A probabilistic account of selection is defended in its place. -/- I end the paper by suggesting that this approach overcomes some of the objections often leveled at accounts of indicatives based on the notion of similarity. (shrink)

Stalnaker's Thesis about indicative conditionals is, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional equals the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. The thesis seems right. If you draw a card from a standard 52-card deck, how confident are you that the card is a diamond if it's a red card? To answer this, you calculate the proportion of red cards that are diamonds -- that is, (...) you calculate the probability of drawing a diamond conditional on drawing a red card. Skyrms' Thesis about counterfactual conditionals is, roughly, that the probability that one ought to assign to a counterfactual equals one's rational expectation of the chance, at a relevant past time, of its consequent conditional on its antecedent. This thesis also seems right. If you decide not to enter a 100-ticket lottery, how confident are you that you would have won had you bought a ticket? To answer this, you calculate the prior chance--that is, the chance just before your decision not to buy a ticket---of winning conditional on entering the lottery. The central project of this article is to develop a new uniform theory of conditionals that allows us to derive a version of Skyrms' Thesis from a version of Stalnaker's Thesis, together with a chance-deference norm relating rational credence to beliefs about objective chance. (shrink)

This paper presents a unified theory of the truth conditions and probability of indicative conditionals and their compounds in a trivalent framework. The semantics validates a Reduction Theorem: any compound of conditionals is semantically equivalent to a simple conditional. This allows us to validate Stalnaker's Thesis in full generality and to use Adams's notion of $p$-validity as a criterion for valid inference. Finally, this gives us an elegant account of Bayesian update with indicative conditionals, establishing that despite differences (...) in meaning, it is tantamount to learning a material conditional. (shrink)

Abstract. Traditional epistemology of knowledge and belief can be succinctly characterized as JTB-epistemology, i.e., it is characterized by the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. Since Gettier’s trail-blazing paper of 1963 this account has become under heavy attack. The aim of is paper is to study the Gettier problem and related issues in the framework of topological epistemic logic. It is shown that in the framework of topological epistemic logic Gettier situations necessarily occur for most topological models of (...) knowledge and belief. On the other hand, there exists a special class of topological models (based on so called nodec spaces) for which traditional JTB-epistemology is valid. Further, it is shown that for each topological model of Stalnaker’s combined logic KB of knowledge and belief a canonical JTB-model (its JTB-doppelganger) can be constructed that shares many structural properties with the original model but is free of Gettier situations. The topological model and its JTB-doppelganger both share the same justified belief operator and have very similar knowledge operators. Seen from a somewhat different perspective, the JTB-account of epistemology amounts to a simplification of a more general epistemological account of knowledge and belief that assumes that these two concepts may differ in some cases. The JTB-account of knowledge and belief assumes that the epistemic agent’s cognitive powers are rather large. Thereby in the JTB-epistemology Gettier cases do not occur. Eventually, it is shown that for all topological models of Stalnaker’s KB-logic Gettier situations are topologically characterized as nowhere dense situations. This entails that Gettier situations are epistemologically invisible in the sense that they can neither be known nor believed with justification with respect to the knowledge operator and the belief operator of the models involved. (shrink)

I elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of (...) the approach emerges in succeeding sections, which respond to a range of objections. Some critics charge that approaches of this sort are overly idealized, in that they ignore the cognitive flaws and limitations of actual human beings. I begin to address these worries in Section 2, by arguing that the epistemic commitments of the acquaintance approach are in fact relatively modest. In Section 3, I sketch a picture of introspective reference that explains how phenomenal reality can intersect with the epistemic in a phenomenal judgment, as the acquaintance approach requires. Drawing on this picture of introspective reference, Section 4 sets out a practical strategy for achieving knowledge by acquaintance. Some contemporary acquaintance theorists (BonJour 2003, Fumerton 1996) employ demanding epistemic standards for knowledge by acquaintance, standards beyond those mandated by the acquaintance approach. In Section 5 I show that instances of introspective knowledge that meet less demanding standards can satisfy the acquaintance approach’s epistemic commitments. The final sections concern the most direct challenges to the acquaintance approach, which target the claim that phenomenal reality intersects with the epistemic. According to one such challenge, this claim is belied by the fact that possessing a phenomenal concept is a matter of having certain dispositions. Section 6 draws on a discussion by Sosa (2003) to articulate this challenge, and responds to it on behalf of the acquaintance approach. Section 7 addresses Stalnaker’s (2008) worry that, if phenomenal reality intersected with the epistemic, phenomenal information would be incommunicable. (shrink)

This paper is a guide to the main ideas and innovations in Robert Stalnaker's "Indicative Conditionals". The paper is for a volume of essays on twenty-one classics of formal semantics edited by Louise McNally and Zoltàn Gendler Szabò.

Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of (...) doing this is sketched, with the help of an analogy with a Galilean relativist theory of spatial properties and relations. (shrink)

The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the (...) Ramseyan indicative conditional. (shrink)

Daniel Isaacson has advanced an epistemic notion of arithmetical truth according to which the latter is the set of truths that we grasp on the basis of our understanding of the structure of natural numbers alone. Isaacson’s thesis is then the claim that Peano Arithmetic (PA) is the theory of finite mathematics, in the sense that it proves all and only arithmetical truths thus understood. In this paper, we raise a challenge for the thesis and show how it (...) can be overcome. We introduce the concept of purity for theories of arithmetic: a theory of arithmetic is pure when it only proves arithmetical truths. Then, we argue that, under Isaacson’s thesis, some PA-provable truths—including transfinite induction claims for infinite ordinals and some consistency statements—are seemingly not arithmetical in Isaacson’s sense, and hence that Isaacson’s thesis might entail the impurity of PA. Nonetheless, we conjecture that the advocate of Isaacson’s thesis can avoid this undesirable consequence: the arithmetical nature, as understood by Isaacson, of all contentious PA-provable statements can be justified. As a case study, we explore how this is done for transfinite induction claims with infinite ordinals below ε0. To this end, we show that the PA-proof of such claims employs exclusively resources from finite mathematics, and that ordinals below ε0 are finitary objects despite being infinite. (shrink)

Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do so with different sets of concepts. There's much at stake in whether one of these two sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we'd have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious (...) dualism. Folk psychology structures our daily lives and has proven fruitful in the study of mind and ethics, while decision theory is pervasive in various disciplines, including the quantitative social sciences, especially economics, and philosophy. My interest is in accounting for folk psychology with decision theory -- in particular, for believe and wanting, which decision theory omits. Many have attempted this task for belief. (The Lockean Thesis says that there is such an account.) I take up the parallel task for wanting, which has received far less attention. I propose necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in terms of decision theory, for when you're truly said to want; I give an analogue of the Lockean Thesis for wanting. My account is an alternative to orthodox accounts that link wanting to preference (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)), which I argue are false. I argue further that want ascriptions are context-sensitive. My account explains this context-sensitivity, makes sense of conflicting desires, and accommodates phenomena that motivate traditional theses on which 'want' has multiple senses (e.g. all-things-considered vs. pro tanto). (shrink)

The main aim of this dissertation is to model the different ways in which we use language when we engage with fiction. This main aim subdivides itself into a number of puzzles. We all know that dragons do not exist. Yet, when I read the Harry Potter novels, I do accept the existence of dragons. How do we keep such fictional truths separate from ‘ordinary’ non-fictional truths? What is the difference between Tolkien writing down all sorts of falsities, and a (...) liar who also says all sorts of untrue things? How can it be true that Frodo was born in the Shire while it is also true that he was invented by Tolkien? Given that a fiction such as Pride and Prejudice is not about the actual world, how can I learn things about 19th century etiquette in England by reading this novel? -/- I develop a coherent semantic analysis of these different puzzles: the ‘workspace account’. This theory is an extension of Stalnaker’s famous pragmatic ‘common ground’ framework. In this framework, assertions are modelled as proposals to update the ‘common ground’ (the set of shared assumptions) between conversational interlocutors. (shrink)

A part of Stalnaker (1968)’s influential theory of conditionals has been neglected, namely the role for an accessibility relation between worlds. I argue that the accessibility relation does not play the role intended for it in the theory as stated, and propose a minimal revision which solves the problem, and brings the theory in line with the formulation in Stalnaker & Thomason 1970.

We consider an objection of Hans Kamp (based on an example by Barbara Partee) to Robert Stalnaker's model of context.

The standard Lewis–Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals, given the Strong Centering Thesis, implies that all true–true counterfactuals are trivially true. McGlynn developed a theory, based on Penczek, to rehabilitate the non-triviality of true–true counterfactuals. I show here that counterfactuals with true but irrelevant components are counterexamples to McGlynn’s account. I argue that an extended version of the connection hypothesis is sustainable, and grounds a full theory of counterfactuals explicable in a broadly standard way, if an indispensable asymmetry between semifacuals and (...) other counterfactuals is acknowledged. (shrink)

We discuss Russell's 1913 essay arguing for the irrelevance of the idea of causation to science and its elimination from metaphysics as a precursor to contemporary philosophical naturalism. We show how Russell's application raises issues now receiving much attention in debates about the adequacy of such naturalism, in particular, problems related to the relationship between folk and scientific conceptual influences on metaphysics, and to the unification of a scientifically inspired worldview. In showing how to recover an approximation to Russell's conclusion (...) while explaining scientists' continuing appeal to causal ideas (without violating naturalism by philosophically correcting scientists) we illustrate a general naturalist strategy for handling problems around the unification of sciences that assume different levels of naïveté with respect to folk conceptual frameworks. We do this despite rejecting one of the premises of Russell's argument, a version of reductionism that was scientifically plausible in 1913 but is not so now. (shrink)

I am broadly sympathetic to Dale Matthew’s analysis concerning phenotypic devaluation and disadvantage. However, in what follows, I restrict my remarks to a few areas where I think he either lacks empirical precision, or overstates his case.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define (...) four criteria for individual and group epistemic rationality, and then prove that the four definitions diverge, in the sense that individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We conclude by explaining implications of the inconsistency thesis for (i) descriptive history and sociology of science and (ii) normative prescriptions for scientific communities. (shrink)

Suszko’s Thesis is a philosophical claim regarding the nature of many-valuedness. It was formulated by the Polish logician Roman Suszko during the middle 70s and states the existence of “only but two truth values”. The thesis is a reaction against the notion of many-valuedness conceived by Jan Łukasiewicz. Reputed as one of the modern founders of many-valued logics, Łukasiewicz considered a third undeter- mined value in addition to the traditional Fregean values of Truth and Falsehood. For Łukasiewicz, his (...) third value could be seen as a step beyond the Aristotelian dichotomy of Being and non-Being. According to Suszko, Łukasiewicz’s ideas rested on a confusion between algebraic values (what sentences describe/denote) and log- ical values (truth and falsity). Thus, Łukasiewicz’s third undetermined value is no more than an algebraic value, a possible denotation for a sentence, but not a genuine logical value. Suszko’s Thesis is endorsed by a formal result baptized as Suszko’s Reduction, a theorem that states every Tarskian logic may be characterized by a two-valued semantics. The present study is intended as a thorough investigation of Suszko’s thesis and its implications. The first part is devoted to the historical roots of many-valuedness and introduce Suszko’s main motivations in formulating the double character of truth-values by drawing the distinction in between algebraic and logical values. The second part explores Suszko’s Reduction and presents the developments achieved from it; the properties of two-valued semantics in comparison to many-valued semantics are also explored and discussed. Last but not least, the third part investigates the notion of logical values in the context of non-Tarskian notions of entailment; the meaning of Suszko’s thesis within such frameworks is also discussed. Moreover, the philosophical foundations for non-Tarskian notions of entailment are explored in the light of recent debates concerning logical pluralism. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...) Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that (...) Dainton's arguments fail, and, second, that joint introspectibility is actually insufficient for co-consciousness. (As to whether it is also unnecessary, I take no stance.). (shrink)

ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the (...) epistemic closure thesis that correct inferences from known premises yield knowledge of the conclusions. We discuss the plausible views of Ted Warfield and Branden Fitelson regarding cases of knowledge acquired via inference from false premises, and we show how our sensitivity analysis can account for such cases. We present arguments designed to discredit putative counterexamples to sensitivity analyses recently proffered by Tristan Haze, John Williams and Neil Sinhababu, which involve true statements made by untrustworthy informants and strange clocks that sometimes display the correct time while running backwards. Finally, we show that in virtue of employing the paradox-free subjunctive conditionals codified by Relevance Logic theorists instead of the paradox-laden subjunctive conditionals codified by Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. (shrink)

Brain-related diseases are among the most difficult diseases due to their sensitivity, the difficulty of performing operations, and their high costs. In contrast, the operation is not necessary to succeed, as the results of the operation may be unsuccessful. One of the most common diseases that affect the brain is Alzheimer’s disease, which affects adults, a disease that leads to memory loss and forgetting information in varying degrees. According to the condition of each patient. For these reasons, it is important (...) to classify memory loss and to know the patient at what level and his assessment of Alzheimer's disease through CT scans of the brain. In this thesis, we review ways and techniques to use deep learning classification to classifying the Alzheimer's Disease The proposed method used to improve patient care, reduce costs, and allow fast and reliable analysis in large studies. The model will be designed using Python language for implementing the system, which is very useful for doctors, classifying the Alzheimer's Disease, was used. The model used 70% from image for training and 30% from image for validation, our trained model achieved an accuracy of 100% on a held-out test set. (shrink)

Manipulation arguments that start from the intuition that manipulated agents are neither free nor morally responsible then conclude to that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The Zygote argument is a special case of Manipulation argument in which the manipulation intervenes at the very conception of the agent. In this paper, I argue that the Zygote argument fails because (i) very few people share the basic intuitions the argument rests on, and (ii) even those who share this (...) intuition do so for reasons that are unrelated to determinism. Rather, I argue that intuitions about the Zygote argument (and Manipulation arguments in general) are driven by people's intuitions about the deep self, as shown by the fact that intuitions about manipulated agents depend on the moral value of the agent's behavior. (shrink)

The topic of the present paper is conducting feminist research in South Asia and the way politics works in this process. It is specifically based on the experiences of empirical work done in Kerala, the southernmost state in India, which is unique in being one of the only two states with a strong communist movement. In addition, the numerous religions, castes, and communities of the Kerala region can be profitably analyzed in connection with the policies of the Left, emerging feminist (...) movements, and mechanisms of power. As an indigenous, feminist activist and researcher, I have been working with a Western feminist scholar who is also a university professor, in a project concerning marriage and inheritance in Kerala in the twentieth century. The project is based on various archival materials, as well as interviews with families of different classes and communities, politicians, and religious leaders. The purpose of the paper is to elaborate upon methodological experiences gained from my collaboration as a research assistant for the Western scholar. Specifically, I wish to explore the way power, as based on gender, ethnicity, generation, and the researcher’s position in society, operated when data was collected and interviews carried out. The main thesis of my study is that, through our cooperation, we managed to overcome difficulties that each of us, working alone, would not have been able to surmount. Our production of “knowledge” must be seen in the light of the complex political and cultural power relations prevailing in Kerala, as well as of our own position in society and the role we each played within the research project itself. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and (...) experience (ἐμπειρία). To succeed in this, I have two main aims. First, I argue that the philosopher-rulers must attain optimum cognitive success in these three modes of cognition to function efficiently in ruling. This involves showing that Plato, for his political project, appeals to other senses of cognitive successes besides his strictly metaphysical epistemology. Second, I attempt to demonstrate how these three modes of cognition coalesce or coincide in ruling the perceptible world, especially in the judgement and determination of concrete perceptible matters. (shrink)

How do you know what you want? This deceptively simple question reveals a tension in how we relate to our desires. On the one hand, we sometimes think about desires as things that just happen to us, that we are passively subject to. In this case, knowing what you want is about trying to detect in which direction you are being pulled. On the other hand, it can be disturbing if people treat their desires as mere empirical phenomena they have (...) no special say over. When I express a desire, I seem to express a view of the world that can be justified, criticized, endorsed, or rejected. This seems to demand a different picture of how I know what I want. Richard Moran’s Authority and Estrangement offers a promising account of how to understand this tension. Regarding attitudes like belief and desire, we possess first-person authority; we are not just accurate observers, but we also bear a certain responsibility. This is because the existence of these attitudes depends on an evaluation that is up to us to maintain or reject. Although Moran develops this account convincingly for attitudes like belief, Authority and Estrangement fails to apply it convincingly to desires. The main obstacle is that our desires often diverge from our deliberative conclusion of what to pursue. The aim of this thesis is to apply Moran’s framework of first-person authority to desires in a way that better takes into account the specific complexities of desires. The main innovation of the modified Moranian account I propose, is to understand desires as commitments to prima facie, instead of overall, evaluations. This modified account can accommodate the recalcitrance and complexity of desires, while also allowing us to see our relation to our desires as one of first-person authority in Moran’s sense. (shrink)

The two main features of this thesis are (i) an account of contextualized (context indexed) counterfactuals, and (ii) a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles. Experience tells us that the truth of the counterfactual is contingent on what is meant by the antecedent, which in turn rests on what context is assumed to underlie its reading (intended meaning). On most conditional analyses, only the world of evaluation and the antecedent determine which worlds are relevant to determining the truth of a conditional, (...) and consequently what its truth value is. But that results in the underlying context being fixed, when evaluating distinct counterfactuals with the same antecedent on any single occasion, even when the context underlying the evaluation of each counterfactual may vary. Alternative approaches go some of the way toward resolving this inadequacy by appealing to a difference in the consequents associated with counterfactuals with the same antecedent. That is, in addition to the world of evaluation and the antecedent, the consequent contributes to the counterfactual’s evaluation. But these alternative approaches nevertheless give a single, determinate truth value to any single conditional (same antecedent and consequent), despite the possibility that this value may vary with context. My reply to these shortcomings (chapter 4) takes the form of an analysis of a language that makes appropriate explicit access to the intended context available. That is, I give an account of a contextualized counterfactual of the form ‘In context C: If it were the case that … , then it would be the case that …’. Although my proposal is largely based on Lewis’ (1973, 1981) analyses of counterfactuals (the logic VW and its ordering semantics), it does not require that any particular logic of counterfactuals should serve as its basis – rather, it is a general prescription for contextualizing a conditional language. The advantage of working with ordering semantics stems from existing results (which I apply and develop) concerning the properties of ordering frames that facilitate fashioning and implementing a notion of contextual information preservation. Analyses of counterfactuals, such as Lewis’ (1973), that cash out the truth of counterfactuals in terms of the corresponding material conditional’s truth at possible worlds result in all counterpossibles being evaluated as vacuously true. This is because antecedents of counterpossibles are not true at any possible world, by definition. Such vacuist analyses have already been identified and challenged by a number of authors. I join this critical front, and drawing on existing proposals, I develop an impossible world semantics for a non-vacuist account of counterpossibles (chapter 5), by modifying the same system and semantics that serve the basis of the contextualized account offered in chapter 4, i.e. Lewis’ (1986) ordering semantics for the logic VW. I critically evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of key conditions on the ordering of worlds on the extended domain and show that there is a sense in which all of Lewis’ analysis of mere counterfactuals can be preserved, whilst offering an analysis of counterpossibles that meets our intuitions. The first part of chapter 1 consists of an outline of the usefulness of impossible worlds across philosophical analyses and logic. That outline in conjunction with a critical evaluation of Lewis’ logical arguments in favour of vacuism in chapter 2, and his marvellous mountain argument against impossible worlds in chapter 3, serves to motivate and justify the impossible world semantics for counterpossibles proposed in chapter 5. The second part of chapter 1 discusses the limitations that various conditional logics face when tasked to give an adequate treatment of the influence of context. That introductory discussion in conjunction with an overview of conditional logics and their various semantics in chapter 2 – which includes an in-depth exposition of Stalnaker-Lewis similarity semantics for counterfactuals – serves as the motivation and conceptual basis for the contextualized account of counterfactuals proposed in chapter 4. (shrink)

The position that Stokes’s Thinking and Perceiving aims to overthrow is committed to the idea that the facts about one’s propositional attitudes and the facts about one’s perceptual experiences are alike grounded in facts about representations (in various formats) that are being held in a short or long term memory store, so that computations can be performed upon them. Claims about modularity are claims about the distinctness of these memory stores, and of these representations. One way in which to reject (...) these claims is to deny only that distinctness. A more radical way would be to reject the underlying idea that facts about perception and facts about propositional attitudes are alike grounded in facts about stored representations. Although the more radical approach might seem to face a problem concerning causal efficacy, I suggest that the way is open for Stokes to take it. (shrink)

In 1993, biologist Margie Profet captured the attention of the popular press with the publication of her radical thesis: menstruation has a function. Traditional theories, she claims, typically view menstruation as a functionless by-product of cyclic flux. The details of Profet's functional account are similarly radical: she argues that menstruation has been naturally selected to defend the female reproductive tract from sperm-borne pathogens. There are a number of weaknesses in Profet's evolutionary analysis. However, I focus on a set of (...) pragmatic problems that arise prior to any details of her evolutionary account. In arguing for the importance of pragmatic considerations, I draw from the linguistic analyses of Nelson Goodman. I conclude that critical investigation of the evolutionary details of Profet's pathogen defense account will be more feasible if and when biologists more frequently feature the female system of pathogen defense in their inductive generalisations. The system needs to be better entrenched before its functional components, such as menstruation, can be thoroughly investigated. (shrink)

This paper deals with Austinian ifs of every stripe within classical logic. It is argued that they are truth-functional and the theory of conditional elements is used. Ellipsis is key. Corrects an error in Fulda (2010) in translation and therefore scope. -/- The PDF is made available gratis by the Publisher.

The Acceptance of the Epicurean Thesis on Pleasure as the Absence of Pain -/- In this paper, I will argue that the Epicurean thesis on pleasure (hēdonē) as the absence of pain is a true claim and, moreover, is plausible. First, I will give justifications for the acceptance of pleasure as the absence of pain, as the Epicureans intended it to be understood. Then, I will offer further justification for the acceptance of a more extreme thesis on (...) pleasure, specifically the Epicurean thesis which is interpreted to mean that the greatest pleasure occurs in the complete absence of pain. In order to do this, I present the following premises to support the irrefutability of the Epicurean thesis on pleasure. For the first premise, I present the Epicurean belief of the blessed life with respect to the pleasure-pain relationship. Forthe second premise, I discuss the extent to which Epicurean pleasure is hedonistic in nature. For the third premise, I show that, in the Epicurean philosophy, there is calculation of pleasure and pain, which is an important contributing factor to the plausibility of the thesis. Thus, the premises support the plausibility and, in fact, lead to the coherent acceptance of the Epicurean thesis on pleasure as the absence of pain and, more specifically, the greatest pleasure as the complete absence of pain. (shrink)

Morality has always been a pressing issue in video game scholarship, but became more contentious after “realistic” violence in games became possible. However, few studies concern themselves with how players experience moral dilemmas in games, choosing instead to focus on the way games affect postplay behavior. In my thesis I discuss the moral choices players encounter in the Metal Gear series of games; then, I analyze and compare the responses of players with and without martial career experiences. My argument (...) is that the moral choices players encounter during gameplay affect them differently, particularly if they have life experiences related to medical trauma, law enforcement, fire fighting, or military career fields, and that the behavior of those players will be observably different from players without the same experiences. In chapter one I present my personal history with Metal Gear, before moving on to the literature review in chapter two, which focuses on scholarship about the Metal Gear series of games and video game research as a whole, particularly studies concerned with how violent content affects players. In chapters three and four, I analyze Metal Gear Solid 3 (2004) and Metal Gear Solid V (2014/2015) in order to gain insight into the moral dilemmas posed by each game. In chapter five I report the results of a survey about player responses towards the game dilemmas given by martial and non-martial groups to identify observable patterns of behavior in how they act and react towards each scenario. -/- This is a preprint version of the official paper until an update is produced. The current official version is available at the West Chester Digital Commons in the external link section below. (shrink)

This chapter uses Uskali Mäki’s (2009) concepts of “good” and “bad” imperialism to investigate the “economics imperialism” thesis. If science expands by offering (a) consilience, and (b) epistemological and ontological unity – that is, it explains more phenomena with greater parsimony – then this is good scientific expansion. Economics imperialism is only bad if the methodology of economics expands outside its domain without increasing understanding in the above manners.

The Acceptance of the Stoic Thesis on Affections (Pathē) -/- In this paper, I argue that the Stoic claim that one should strive towards having no affections (pathē) is a plausible and, moreover, true claim given the context of the Stoic thesis on affections (pathē) in relationship to their philosophy of the ultimate goal (telos) of life. Given the conception of affections (pathē) that the Stoics intended, the irrefutability that one should strive towards having no affections (pathē) is (...) found in the Stoic conception of impulse (hormē) and of value (namely how affections (pathē) lack value). Further, in the Stoic philosophy, there is identification of goods, bads and indifferents, which is an important contributing factor to the plausibility of the thesis. Taken together, these lead to the coherent acceptance of the Stoic thesis on affections (pathē), specifically that the allowance of affections (pathē) should be avoided. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that Frankfurt's and Strawson's defenses of compatibilism are insufficient due to neglected features of the role of alternate possibilities in assigning moral responsibility. An attempt is made to locate more adequately the genuine source of tension between free will and determinism, in a crowding phenomenon in the view of an action which our concept of responsibility has not grown up coping with. Finally, an argument is made that due to the nature of belief we (...) can believe the thesis of determinism only if it is false, lending support to incompatibilism. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument (...) relies on general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

We argue that traditional formulations of the reduction thesis that tie it to privileged relational operations do not suffice for Peirce’s justification of the categories and invite the charge of gerrymandering to make it come out as true. We then develop a more robust invariant formulation of the thesis, one that is immune to that charge, by explicating the use of triads in any relational operations. The explication also allows us to track how Thirdness enters the structure of (...) higher order relations and even to propose a numerical measure of it. Our analysis reveals new conceptual phenomena when negation or disjunction are used to compound relations. (shrink)

Os minerais possuem uma influência direta em diversos processos fisiológicos no organismo animal e, mesmo com tamanha importância, por vezes são negligenciados pelos produtores para seu fornecimento para os animais. Este estudo teve como objetivo avaliar o desempenho reprodutivo de rebanhos de bovinos, caprinos e ovinos em 8 propriedades rurais nas cidades de Sanharó, Pesqueira, Arcoverde, Belo Jardim e São Bento do Una através da adição de suplemento mineral e mistura múltipla aos animais de forma a atender suas necessidades básicas (...) para mantença e reprodução. Foram avaliados os desempenhos de 4 touros e 25 vacas, 3 bodes e 50 cabras e 4 carneiros e 48 ovelhas em diferentes propriedades, avaliando como a adição de um suplemento mineral específico da espécie impacta de forma positiva nos índices reprodutivos avaliados que foram taxa de cio, taxa de serviço, taxa de concepção, taxa de fertilidade, taxa de prenhez, taxa de perdas gestacionais, taxa de natalidade e taxa de mortalidade. O experimento teve duração de 2 anos e pôde-se avaliar cerca de 2 partos nas vacas e, mais ou menos, 3 partos em cabras e ovelhas. Os dados foram computados e avaliados estatisticamente no Excel para conferir se os índices reprodutivos melhoraram em função da adição de minerais na ração dos animais. Conferiu-se que houve diferença significativa entre todos os índices avaliados, ou seja, a adição de minerais na ração dos animais melhora a eficiência reprodutiva de machos e fêmeas de animais ruminantes, sendo de suma importância sua disponibilização de forma correta para alcançar bons índices reprodutivos na fazenda na busca pela obtenção de neonatos que poderão ser comercializados. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ASTRO, G. B. A importância da adição de minerais na dieta de caprinos e ovinos no Agreste de Pernambuco. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Técnico Subsequente em Agropecuária) - IFPE Campus Belo Jardim. Belo Jardim, 2023. 44 p. BALAMURUGAN, B. et al. Mineral an important nutrient for efficient reproductive health in dairy cattle. Int. J. Environ. Sci. Technol, v. 6, n. 1, p. 694-701, 2017. Barros NN, Bomfim MAD. Mistura múltipla para caprinos e ovinos. In: Anais VIII PECNORDESTE – Seminário Nordestino de Pecuária, 8; 2004; Fortaleza, Brasil. Fortaleza: FAEC, 2004. p. 50-57. BERCHIELLI, T. T.; PIRES, A. V.; OLIVEIRA, S. G. (Eds.). Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: Funep, 2011. COTTA, T. Minerais e vitaminas para bovinos, ovinos e caprinos. Viçosa: Aprenda Fácil, 2001. DANTAS, C. C. O.; DE MATTOS NEGRÃO, F. Funções e sintomas de deficiência dos minerais essenciais utilizados para suplementação dos bovinos de corte. UNICiências, v. 14, n. 2, 2010. DA SILVA EIC. A água na nutrição animal. 1ª ed. Recife, PE: Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Cálculos de consumo e digestibilidade de alimentos e nutrientes para ruminantes. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 1, n. 3, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Concentrados e Rações Para Cabras em Lactação. 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Efeitos da raça e do manejo nutricional sobre as características de qualidade da carcaça e da carne em ovinos. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 2, n. 1, 2024. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução de Bovinos Leiteiros: Aspectos Básicos e Clínicos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação de ração para caprinos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação de ração para ovinos. 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e Avaliação de Suplemento Mineral Para Caprinos. Instrução Técnica Para o Produtor Rural de Pernambuco, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1-4, 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e fabricação de rações para ruminantes. 1ª ed. Belo Jardim: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Formulação e Fabricação de Rações Para Ruminantes: Bovinos, Caprinos e Ovinos. 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Manejo Reprodutivo e Índices Zootécnicos em Gado de Leite. 2023. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Métodos de Formulação e Balanceamento de Rações para Bovinos. Belo Jardim: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Nutrição e Suplementação Mineral de Bovinos de Corte. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Nutrição Sobre a Reprodução e Fertilidade dos Bovinos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Opções de concentrados para vacas em lactação no Semiárido. 2022. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Relação e Efeitos Bioquímico-nutricionais Sobre os Cistos Ovarianos em Vacas. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Relação e Efeitos Bioquímico-nutricionais Sobre os Transtornos do Ciclo Estral em Vacas. DA SILVA, E. I. C. Suplementação e formulação de sal mineral e mistura múltipla para bovinos. Revista Universitária Brasileira, v. 2, n. 1, 2024. DE MENDONÇA JÚNIOR, A. F. et al. Minerais: importância de uso na dieta de ruminantes. Agropecuária Científica no Semiárido, v. 7, n. 1, p. 01-13, 2011. DE PAULA SILVEIRA, L. Suplementação mineral para bovinos. Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia, v. 11, n. 5, p. 489-500, 2017. FADLALLA, I. M. T. The Interactions of Some Minerals Elements in Health and Reproductive Performance of Dairy Cows. New Advances in the Dairy Industry, 2022. FERGUSON, J. D. Nutrition and reproduction in dairy cows. Veterinary clinics of North America: Food animal practice, v. 7, n. 2, p. 483-507, 1991. GALVANI, D. B.; BOMFIM, MAD. Mistura múltipla para caprinos e ovinos: nova fórmula dispensa adaptação. 2015. HAENLEIN, G. F. W.; ANKE, M. Mineral and trace element research in goats: A review. Small Ruminant Research, v. 95, n. 1, p. 2-19, 2011. KAWAS, J. R.; ANDRADE-MONTEMAYOR, H.; LU, C. D. Strategic nutrient supplementation of free-ranging goats. Small Ruminant Research, v. 89, n. 2-3, p. 234-243, 2010. KESSLER, J. Mineral nutrition of goats. In: Goat nutrition, v. 46, p. 104-119, 1991. LOPES, H. O. S. Suplementação de baixo custo para bovinos: mineral e alimentar. 1998. MANERA, D. B. et al. Mineral mixtures from solid salt residues for lambs. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 43, p. 485-491, 2014. MASTERS, D. G. Practical implications of mineral and vitamin imbalance in grazing sheep. Animal Production Science, v. 58, n. 8, p. 1438-1450, 2018. MORAES, S. da S. Importância da suplementação mineral para bovinos de corte. Campo Grande, MS: Embrapa Gado de Corte, 2001., 2001. NICODEMO, M. L. F. et al. Minerais na eficiência reprodutiva de bovinos. 1ª ed. São Carlos: Embrapa Pecuária Sudeste, 2008. 50 p. NIX, J.. Trace minerals important for goat reproduction. Sweetlix Livestock Supplement System, 2002. NOGUEIRA, É. et al. Nutrição aplicada à reprodução de bovinos de corte. In: MEDEIROS, S. R. et al. (Eds.). Nutrição de bovinos de corte: fundamentos e aplicações. 1ª ed. Brasília: Embrapa, 2015. p. 143-156. PASA, C.. Relação reprodução animal e os minerais. Biodiversidade, v. 9, n. 1, 2010. PEIXOTO, P. V. et al. Eficiência reprodutiva de matrizes bovinas de corte submetidas a três diferentes tipos de suplementação mineral. Pesquisa Veterinária Brasileira, v. 23, p. 125-130, 2003. PRADA, F. Influência da nutrição animal na reprodução de touros: revisão. Revista de Educação Continuada do CRMV-SP, v. 8, n. 1, p. 68-76, 2005. ROGÉRIO, M. C. P. et al. Manejo alimentar de caprinos e ovinos nos trópicos. Veterinária e Zootecnia, v. 23, n. 3, p. 326-346, 2016. SARTORI, R.; GUARDIEIRO, M. M. Fatores nutricionais associados à reprodução da fêmea bovina. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 39, p. 422-432, 2010. SHARMA, M. C. et al. Mineral nutrition and reproductive performance of the dairy animals: a review. The Indian Journal of Animal Sciences, v. 77, n. 7, 2007. SILVA, D. C. et al. Importância do uso de minerais na dieta de bovinos reprodutores. Vet. zootec, p. 38-52, 2018. SOUZA, G. V. Suplementação de minerais na reprodução de bovinos. Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Graduação em Zootecnia) - UFG. Jataí, 2014. 32 p. TEIXEIRA, J. C. Nutrição de ruminantes. Lavras: FAEPE, 1992. UNDERWOOD, E. J.; SUTTLE, N. F. Los minerales en la nutrición del ganado. 3ª ed. Zaragoza: Acribia, 2003. VALADARES FILHO, S. C. et al. (Eds.). Tabelas brasileiras de composição de alimentos para ruminantes. 1ª ed. Viçosa: UFV, 2015. VALENTIM, J. K. et al. Fatores nutricionais aplicados à reprodução de ruminantes. UNICIÊNCIAS, v. 23, n. 2, p. 77-82, 2019. VASCONCELOS, F. F. Suplementação mineral no manejo reprodutivo ovino. Dissertação (Mestrado em Medicina Veterinária) - Centro de Ciências Rurais, UFSM. Santa Maria, 2012. 50 p. VÁZQUEZ-ARMIJO, J. F. et al. Trace elements in sheep and goats reproduction: a review. Tropical and Subtropical Agroecosystems, v. 14, n. 1, p. 1-13, 2011. VELLADURAI, C.; SELVARAJU, M.; NAPOLEAN, R. E. Effects of macro and micro minerals on reproduction in dairy cattle a review. International Journal of Scientific Research in Science and Technology, v. 2, n. 1, p. 68-70, 2016. YASOTHAI, R. Importance of minerals on reproduction in dairy cattle. International Journal of Science, Environment and Technology, v. 3, n. 6, p. 2051-2057, 2014. (shrink)

It has become orthodox to read Nietzsche as proposing the ‘sublimation’ of troublesome behavioural impulses. On this interpretation, he is said to denigrate the elimination of our impulses, preferring that we master them by pressing them into the service of our higher goals. My thesis is that this reading of Nietzsche’s conception of self-cultivation does not bear scrutiny. Closer examination of his later thought reveals numerous texts that show him explicitly recommending an eliminatory approach to self-cultivation. I invoke his (...) theory of the will to power in order to explain why he persistently valorises both elimination and sublimation as preconditions of healthy subjective unity. I conclude that which of these two approaches he recommends in a given situation depends on whether or not the impulse in question can be put to use within the overall economy of our drives. (shrink)

Understanding the policymaking process in an emerging economy in the global south, such as Bangladesh, holds significant importance. The country's remarkable socio-economic development, once the most impoverished in the region, has been facilitated by post-globalization economic transformation. While the literature on institutional change has predominantly focused on states in industrialist countries, this dissertation presents an innovative theoretical approach. It deeply explores primary case materials to illustrate how the state engages in policy evolution in a developing country's gradual shift from the (...) import substitution model towards globalization and deregulation. The central argument posited is that Bangladesh's globalization, particularly through its private sector-led garment exports, stands as a significant success story. Bangladesh is now the world's second-largest garment exporter after China. This achievement is attributed to the entrepreneurial development it fosters and its role in driving socio-economic change. Moreover, it has enabled the mobilization of resources, reducing aid dependence, enhancing climate resilience, improving public health and wellbeing, empowering women, and addressing critical needs in physical infrastructure and human development. The argument presented here diverges from the conventional explanation found in the literature, which tends to emphasize the role of external forces, particularly institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and donors, in triggering policy reforms in Bangladesh. These reforms, commonly linked with structural adjustment packages implemented during the balance of payments crisis, are frequently perceived as predominantly influenced by external pressures. Additionally, the influence of the business class or Bangladeshi non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is often asserted. This dissertation proposes an alternative explanation by suggesting that ideational viewpoints within the state, specifically the ideas espoused by top technocrats and political executives, played a significant role. It argues that these internal ideational factors were more influential than materialistic ones, highlighting the causal role of the policy process driven by endogenous imperatives. The introduction of the dissertation addresses the research problem and research puzzle while suggesting conjectures after problematizing existing arguments. The significant economic transformation observed in Bangladesh today is portrayed as the outcome of a gradual process spanning several decades. The transition towards promoting the private sector and embracing globalization commenced in 1991, following a series of incremental changes dating back to the 1970s and 1980s. During these periods, the institutional path progressed towards empowering the private sector and embracing globalization, laying the groundwork for a trajectory led by the private sector in the context of globalization. The theory chapter serves to establish the conceptual and theoretical foundation for analyzing both economic change and transformation by examining the evolutionary nature of the process. The study adopts an institutional change framework, drawing on the theory of gradual change and focusing on concepts such as layering and tipping points. Within this framework, causal variables such as powering and puzzling, social learning, and ideas are identified. The methodological approach is grounded in historical institutionalism, employing the process-tracing "within case" method. The selection of cases deliberately targets an important yet under-researched area—the policy process in Bangladesh concerning the success of garment-led industrialization. This dissertation fills a noticeable gap in the literature through rigorous analysis, enabling an in-depth exploration of the institutional dynamics spanning four governments from 1972 to 1991. The study relies on substantial primary materials, including interviews with key officials. Each empirical chapter not only presents data but also connects the findings to conceptual and theoretical conjectures, underscoring the significant contributions of this research. The key causal variables identified include the concepts of ‘puzzling’ and ‘social learning’ within the state capacity framework, along with a narrowly defined and developed concept of a "policy committee." The learning process entails technocrats engaging in what Hugh Heclo and Peter Hall term as "social learning," where they play a crucial role in addressing policy challenges, particularly during times of uncertainty and political turmoil, based on their learning from past experiences. Additionally, the concept of ‘powering’ is highlighted, emphasizing that while technocrats provide policy recommendations, it is ultimately the political executive who endorses policies. The interplay between ‘puzzling and powering’ and ‘social learning’ shapes the outcomes of the policy process. The first empirical chapter focusing on the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Government (1972-1975) illustrates the emergence of policy learning during this period. Initially, this government pursued import substitution under strict government controls, with a predominant public sector. The historical context of exploitation under Pakistani rule and the centralization of industry by West Pakistan fostered socialism as an ideal for East Pakistan's economic emancipation. Additionally, close ties with India and the Soviet Union reinforced this socialist tendency. However, due to severe economic conditions resulting from stringent control on private investment and emphasis on large-scale public investment, policy puzzling and learning ensued. As a result, incremental changes were initiated, allowing limited private sector participation. The second empirical chapter explores the General Ziaur Rahman government's tenure (1975-1981) and how deregulation was consolidated within a layering step, paving the way for a shift towards globalization. General Zia and his technocrats, operating under authoritarian conditions, acknowledged the inefficacy of existing policies. Furthermore, General Zia's inclination towards the West fostered closer collaboration with donors. The Multifiber Agreement (MFA) presented an opportunity for garments, coinciding with the decline in jute exports. This government opened up industrial sectors for private participation, and banks provided funding across various sectors, with special emphasis on the burgeoning garment industry. The chapter also explores the origins of the garment industry during this period. Notably, Noorul Quader Khan, upon retiring as cabinet secretary, collaborated with a Korean multinational, Daewoo, with the support of General Zia, leading to the establishment of Desh Garments—a pioneering venture that catalyzed the export orientation of the sector. The third empirical chapter delves into the economic policies of the General Hussain Muhammad Ershad Government (1982-1990), highlighting its emphasis on greater private sector involvement. Under this administration, there was a political inclination towards globalization and deregulation, leading to the appointment of technocrats aligned with this vision. The leadership believed that promoting the private sector would be more effective in job creation. Despite facing significant political opposition, efforts towards disinvestment were made, eventually resulting in compromises like public-private partnerships. The decentralization of administration and restructuring of ministries aimed at promoting industrialization and economic globalization driven by the private sector at the regional level. Initiatives such as the Industrial Promotion and Development Company, with support from organizations like the International Finance Corporation, aimed to boost the private sector. Efforts towards globalization were synchronized with the establishment of an export processing zone in Chittagong, focusing on promoting private and foreign investment. Foreign investment promotion was encouraged through diplomatic efforts and legislative measures to safeguard investors. Currency devaluation was utilized to stimulate exports, along with some degree of import liberalization. The chapter convincingly argues that the groundwork for globalization, initiated under General Zia, came to fruition under General Ershad. The final empirical chapter contends that the system shifted towards globalization and deregulation in 1991. Although a severe balance of payments crisis occurred in 1989, it wasn't perceived as the sole cause of the industrial policy of 1991. The democratic uprising in 1990 led to the downfall of the military-backed government and the rise of a democratic government. The chapter argues that while economic and political changes may have been intertwined, the economic shift in 1991 was primarily driven by ideas within the state and driven by endogenous imperatives. It examines preceding periods to illustrate how the tipping mechanism might have operated, detailing the roles of top technocrats and political executives. The chapter provides insights into key policymakers and their ideas, as well as their interactions with industrialists, entrepreneurs, and representatives of multilateral organizations like the World Bank. Significant reform measures, including tariff reduction, the introduction of value-added tax, banking sector reform, and the adoption of floating exchange rates, are outcomes of the policy change. Additionally, sectors such as power, banks, and telecommunications, formerly monopolized by the public sector, are now deregulated. (shrink)

Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical interest despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes. We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing, and deidealizing as situating. On closer inspection, models turn out much more inflexible than the reversal (...) thesis would have us believe, and deidealization emerges as a creative part of modeling. (shrink)

The Thesis of Kant’s Third Antinomy asserts that, because it is “necessary to assume another causality through freedom” in order to derive all the appearances of the world, “causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only one” (A444/B472). The argument Kant supplies in support of this, however, has been the subject of interpretative disagreement since at least Schopenhauer, with the most plausible reconstructions being dismissed as question-begging, resting on a conflation relating to the principle of (...) sufficient reason, or attacking a straw-man of the Antithesis position. In this paper, I attempt to provide a novel interpretation of the argument for the Thesis position, one that offers a more compelling case against a charitably interpreted Antithesis position. (shrink)

We need modal imagination in order to extend our conception of reality - and, in particular, of human beings - beyond our immediate experience in the indexical present; and we need to do this in order to preserve the significance of human interaction. To make this leap of imagination successfully is to achieve not only insight but also an impartial perspective on our own and others' inner states. This perspective is a necessary condition of experiencing compassion for others. This is (...) the primary thesis I will try to defend in this discussion. (shrink)

One of the symbolic images to which Leibniz constantly entrusted the synthesis of his philosophy regards the idea of considering one and the same city from various visual perspectives. Such an image is diffused throughout all Leibniz’s writings and clearly reflects the philosopher’s interest for matters regarding perspective as well as optical phenomena. The point of view of its inhabitants can therefore be compared to a mirror that reflects some different portions of reality. But what do the city-viewers really see? (...) Do they all see exactly the same thing? And assuming the plurality of points of view, how one can be sure that they share the same representative content? The paper presented here tries to offer a plausible interpretation of this topic also by linking different and somehow remote Leibnizian doctrines together. (shrink)

This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known as ‘hermeneutical (...) injustice’, where widespread conceptual ignorance puts members of marginalized groups at risk of their distinctive and important experiences lacking intelligible interpretations. Together, I call the use of problematic concepts or the ignorance of appropriate concepts ‘conceptual incapacities’. I discuss the conditions under which we may be responsible for our conceptual incapacities on several major theories of responsibility, developing my own account of responsibility in the process, according to which we are responsible for something just in case it was caused by one of our reasons-responsive constitutive psychological traits. However, I argue that regardless of whether we are responsible for something, we may still be required to take responsibility for it. Whether or not we are responsible for our conceptual incapacities, we are required to reflect critically upon them in a variety of scenarios that throw our use of those concepts into question. I consider the method of conceptual engineering — the philosophical critique and revision of concepts — as one way we might take responsibility for our concepts, or at least, defer that duty to experts. But, this top-down model of conceptual revision is insufficient. Using a pragmatist model of the social epistemology of morality, I argue that conceptual inquiry is a social endeavour in which we are all required to participate, to some degree. (shrink)

Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.