The size of animal exhibits has important effects on their lives and welfare. However, most references to exhibit size only consider floor space and height dimensions, without considering the space afforded by usable features within the exhibit. In this paper, we develop two possible methods for measuring the usable space of zoo exhibits and apply these to a sample exhibit. Having a metric for usable space in place will provide a better reflection of the quality of different exhibits, and enhance (...) comparisons between exhibits. (shrink)

This paper introduces the notion of a “psychologically rich life”: a life characterized by complexity, in which people experience a variety of interesting things, and feel and appreciate a variety of deep emotions via firsthand experiences or vicarious experiences. A psychologically rich life can be contrasted with a boring and monotonous life, in which one feels a singular emotion or feels that their lives are defined by routines that just aren’t that interesting. Our discussion considers how it is that the (...) psychologically rich life compares to other leading theories of the good life discussed within both philosophy and psychology, and it argues that a psychologically rich life ought to be recognized as a distinct and compelling form of the good life. (shrink)

This paper proposes the idea of thinking about practical rationality in terms of self-regulation and defends the thesis that self-regulation is a virtue, insofar as we have reason to think it is our highest form of practical rationality. I argue that understanding self-regulation as a virtuous form of practical reasoning is called for given the kinds of limitations we face in developing agency and pursuing our goals, and presents us with several advantages over traditional understandings of practical rationality.

In recent papers, I defend the intrinsic value of the interesting, and the intrinsic disvalue of the boring. My arguments introduce two claims with important implications for discussions of the quality of life. The first is that when it comes to experiences, there’s more value at stake than pleasure alone. The second is that there is value to cognitive engagement itself, even when it is unstructured by desires or reasons. This paper explores the important consequences these conclusions have for how (...) we appraise the quality of life of subjects with dramatically impaired cognitive capacities (such as patients with advanced Alzheimer’s and patients in a persistent vegetive state). I examine whether such groups are capable of experiencing the interesting and, by extension, what degrees of self-awareness are required to experience the kind of cognitive engagement at stake in interesting experiences. (shrink)

In this reply to comments by Neera Badhwar and Barbara Montero, I examine more deeply the nature of cognitive engagement and how it is distinct from other forms of cognitive activity; revisit the distinction between interesting and boring experiences; and present an analysis of all-things-considered value that illustrates the contributions that the interesting makes. I conclude by considering what all-things-considered value becomes for patients with severe cognitive impairments.

In seiner Aufsatzsammlung Anthropologie statt Metaphysik behandelt Ernst Tugendhat große metaphysische Fragen mit nüchternem Blick auf uns Menschen. Tugendhat plädiert dort an mehreren Stellen für ein erkenntnistheoretisches Prinzip, nach dem wir uns z.B. dann zu richten haben, wenn wir uns fragen, ob wir an Gott glauben sollen. Das Prinzip lautet: Wenn die rationalen Gründe zugunsten einer Überzeugung genauso stark sind wie die rationalen Gegengründe, und wenn wir – unabhängig von Vernunft – das Bedürfnis verspüren oder den Wunsch oder die Hoffnung, (...) dass die Überzeugung wahr sein möge, dann sollen wir uns gegen die fragliche Überzeugung entscheiden. Ich halte dies Prinzip für zu pessimistisch und für überzogen rational. Meiner Ansicht nach wären wir nicht gut beraten, dem Prinzip in unserem geistigen Leben immer zu folgen; das ist nur in ganz speziellen Fällen ratsam. Um das plausibel zu machen, gehe ich verschiedene Alltagsbeispiele durch, bei denen das Prinzip greifen würde und bei denen sich seine Anwendung so ähnlich anfühlt wie bei der Frage nach Gott. Die Beispiele betreffen Fragen der künstlerischen Selbsteinschätzung, des Wetters, der Liebe sowie der menschlichen Qualitäten von Vor- und Nachfahren. Und da Tugendhats Prinzip schon bei solchen harmlosen Beispielen pessimistische, aber keineswegs zuverlässige Ratschläge erteilt, sollten wir es besser auch nicht auf die Frage nach Gott anwenden. (shrink)

Goethes Protest gegen Newtons Theorie des Lichts und der Farben ist besser, als man gemeinhin denkt. Man kann diesem Protest in den wichtigsten Elementen folgen, ohne Newton in der physikalischen Sache unrecht zu geben. Laut meiner Interpretation hat Goethe in Newtons wissenschaftsphilosophischer Selbsteinschätzung eine entscheidende Schwäche aufgedeckt: Newton glaubte, mithilfe prismatischer Experimente beweisen zu können, dass das Licht der Sonne aus Lichtstrahlen verschiedener Farben zusammengesetzt sei. Goethe zeigt, dass dieser Übergang vom Beobachtbaren zur Theorie problematischer ist, als Newton wahrhaben (...) wollte. Wenn Goethe darauf beharrt, dass uns der Übergang zur Theorie nicht von den Phänomenen aufgezwungen wird, dann kommt dadurch unser eigener, freier und kreativer Beitrag zur Theorie-Bildung ans Tageslicht. Und diese Einsicht Goethes gewinnt eine überraschende Schärfe, weil Goethe plausibel machen kann, dass sich alle entscheidenden prismatischen Experimente Newtons aus der geometrischen Optik ebenso gut mit einer alternativen Theorie vereinbaren lassen. Wenn ich recht sehe, war Goethe der erste Wissenschaftsphilosoph, der mindestens eine empirisch äquivalente Alternative zu einer wohletablierten physikalischen Theorie gesehen und daraus weitreichende wissenschaftstheoretische Schlüsse gezogen hat: Damit war Goethe seiner Zeit um ein gutes Jahrhundert voraus. (shrink)

Goethes Protest gegen Newtons Theorie des Lichts und der Farben ist besser, als man gemeinhin denkt. Man kann diesem Protest in den wichtigsten Elementen folgen, ohne Newton in der physikalischen Sache unrecht zu geben. Laut meiner Interpretation hat Goethe in Newtons wissenschaftsphilosophischer Selbsteinschätzung eine entscheidende Schwäche aufgedeckt: Newton glaubte, mithilfe prismatischer Experimente beweisen zu können, dass das Licht der Sonne aus Lichtstrahlen verschiedener Farben zusammengesetzt sei. Goethe zeigt, dass dieser Übergang vom Beobachtbaren zur Theorie problematischer ist, als Newton wahrhaben (...) wollte. Wenn Goethe darauf beharrt, dass uns der Übergang zur Theorie nicht von den Phänomenen aufgezwungen wird, dann kommt dadurch unser eigener, freier und kreativer Beitrag zur Theorie-Bildung ans Tageslicht. Und diese Einsicht Goethes gewinnt eine überraschende Schärfe, weil Goethe plausibel machen kann, dass sich alle entscheidenden prismatischen Experimente Newtons ebenso gut mit einer alternativen Theorie vereinbaren lassen. Wenn ich recht sehe, war Goethe der erste Wissenschaftsphilosoph, der mindestens eine empirisch äquivalente Alternative zu einer wohletablierten physikalischen Theorie gesehen hat: Damit war Goethe seiner Zeit um ein gutes Jahrhundert voraus. (shrink)

Kein Hahn kräht mehr nach dem Verifikationsprinzip, das Moritz Schlick zusammen mit seinen Mitstreitern des Wiener Kreises verfochten hat. Seit einem halben Jahrhundert gilt das Prinzip als philosophisch erledigt; doch Totgesagte leben länger. Ich versuche, eine Fassung des Prinzips zu formulieren, die auch unter den Bedingungen der Nachkriegs-Philosophie verteidigt werden kann: Grob gesagt, muss jeder sinnvolle Satz im Prinzip empirisch (oder doch aposteriori) überprüft werden können, einerlei ob verifiziert oder falsifiziert, ob fallibel oder infallibel, ob direkt oder indirekt, ob deduktiv, (...) abduktiv oder induktiv, ob durch Sinneswahrnehmung oder durch Selbstwahrnehmung. Je nach Situation verlangt das Prinzip die unterschiedlichsten Formulierungen; es wäre verfehlt, es ein für allemal zu fixieren. Vermutlich können wir es sogar auf Sätze ausdehnen, die sich apriori rechtfertigen lassen. Anhand einer Serie von Beispielen (die z.T. aus Schlicks Schriften stammen) demonstriere ich, welche guten Dienste das Prinzip leistet. Erstens dient es dazu, intellektuelle Hochstapelei aus dem Spiel zu werfen und von sinnvollen Aussagen zu unterscheiden. Nun gibt es Sätze, an deren Sinn wir nicht gern rütteln lassen wollen, selbst wenn zunächst nicht klar ist, wie sie sich überprüfen lassen sollen. Das legt einen zweiten Einsatz des Prinzips nahe: Wir sind in diesem Fall aufgerufen, mehr Mühe in den scheinbar unüberprüfbaren Satz zu investieren, ihn besser zu explizieren und dabei doch noch einen Weg zu seiner Überprüfung freizuschaufeln. Bei dieser Übung kann sich sogar unser Überprüfungsbegriff verändern (und damit auch der Gehalt des Verifikationsprinzips selbst). Insgesamt sollten wir den Überprüfungsbegriff so fassen, dass laut Prinzip nicht zuviele wichtige Sätze sinnlos erscheinen. In einer aufklärerischen Ethik des klaren Redens, Meinens und Fragens kommt es darauf an, die gegenläufigen Denkbewegungen auszutarieren, in die wir beim verifikationalistischen Philosophieren gezogen werden. Was das heißt, führe ich anhand vermeintlich sinnloser Sätze aus der Raum/Zeit-Philosophie vor. Am Ende des Aufsatzes bringe ich einige Beispiele ausgemachten Unsinns. (shrink)

Sprachliche Ausdrücke, mit deren Hilfe wir Spiele beschreiben und vorantreiben, sind in ihrer Verwendungsweise so vielfältig wie kaum irgendwelche anderen Ausdrücke. Und sie haben eine Eigenschaft, die man mit dem Thema Spiel eher nicht in Verbindung bringen würde: Sie eignen sich dazu, auf substantive Weise Metaphysik zu treiben oder wieder ingangzubringen. Diese Art der Starthilfe hat die jahrtausendealte Metaphysik (metaphysica specialis) neuerdings nötig. Seit knapp hundert Jahren steht sie im Verdacht, auf nichts besseres hinauszulaufen als leeres, unverständliches Wortgeklingel. Wer diesen (...) sprachphilosophischen Verdacht auszuräumen wünscht, tut gut daran, unverdächtige Redebereiche zu bemühen. In der Tat, mithilfe unserer höchst robusten, völlig alltäglichen Rede vom Spielen und beim Spielen können wir tiefe metaphysische Möglichkeiten verständlich machen, etwa die Möglichkeit einer Wirklichkeit jenseits oder oberhalb des Bereichs derjenigen Wirklichkeit, die wir Natur oder physisches Universum nennen. Dazu betrachte ich ein philosophisches Gedankenspiel (das den Matrix-Filmen zugrundeliegt und all unsere Wissensansprüche zu unterminieren scheint): Wir sind Gehirne im Tank, d.h. wir haben keinen vollständigen menschlichen Körper, sondern nur ein Gehirn, das in einem Tank mit Nährflüssigkeit schwebt; die Nerven-Enden dieser Gehirne sind mit einem Supercomputer verbunden, der uns die Illusion verschafft, dass alles in Ordnung sei. Hiergegen hat Hilary Putnam folgende sprachphilosophische Schwierigkeit aufgeworfen: Wie soll ein Gehirn im Tank seine eigene Situation treffend auf den Punkt bringen, wenn doch seine Ausdrücke "Tiger", "Gehirn", "Tank" usw. allesamt nicht mit echten Tigern, Gehirnen usw. verknüpft sind, sondern mit Nullen und Einsen im Computer? Putnam trieb diese Schwierigkeit bis an den Punkt, an dem sich zweifelsfrei beweisen lässt, dass wir keine Gehirne im Tank sein können. Und da hatte er meiner Ansicht nach recht. Wie ich meine, sollten wir uns nicht darüber den Kopf zerbrechen, ob wir ein Gehirn im Tank sind, sondern darüber, ob wir in einer analogen Situation stecken, um eine Ebene nach oben verschoben. Um die Metaphern dieser Formulierung des Problems auszupacken, setze ich Spielvokabeln ein. Wegen ihrer atemberaubenden Flexibilität brauchen sie (im Unterschied zur naturwissenschaftlichen Sprache) bei Übersetzung aus der Tanksprache in unsere Sprache nicht verändert zu werden; solche Ausdrücke heißen semantisch stabil. Mit ihrer Hilfe können wir gravierende metaphysische Möglichkeiten aufwerfen, z.B.: "Jemand, der nicht aus Materie besteht und nicht in meinem physischen Universum vorkommt, treibt mit mir von außerhalb seine Machtspielchen". Damit beziehen wir uns vielleicht auf die außerirdische Programmiererin der Simulation, in der wir möglicherweise doch stecken. Weniger respektlos formuliert, wäre das die Frage eines allmächtigen Schöpfergottes außerhalb unserer physikalischen Raumzeit: Metaphysik pur. (shrink)

Moritz Schlicks Plädoyer für ein empirisches Fundament unserer Erkenntnis enthält weder reduktionistische noch phänomenalistische Extrempositionen. Seine Beispiele für Fundamentalsätze haben allesamt die Form: Hier jetzt so und so; aber nicht alle diese Sätze sind Fundamentalsätze. Was muss man für die letzten drei Wörter dieses Schemas einsetzen, um wirklich beim Fundament anzukommen? Ich schlage vor, die Frage durch Rückgriff auf das interpretationstheoretische Prinzip des Wohlwollens zu beantworten. Demzufolge sind diejenigen Sätze (der Form Hier jetzt so und so) Fundamentalsätze, über die kein (...) inhaltlicher Streit aufkommen kann; wer bei solchen Sätzen – unter denselben Umständen – zu einem anderen Urteil kommt als wir, der bezeugt dadurch keine Meinungsverschiedenheit in der Sache, sondern nur einen anderen Gebrauch sprachlicher Ausdrücke. Bei welchen Ausdrücken funktioniert dieses Kriterium besonders gut? Einerseits bei Ausdrücken, die mit Gesichtsfeldern zu tun haben; noch besser bei Ausdrücken aus dem eindeutig phänomenalistischen Bereich unserer Sprache. (shrink)

Worin besteht Mills Argument für den Utilitarismus? Im psychologischen Teil des Arguments plädiert Mill für eine aggregierte Beschreibung unserer hedonistischen Werte ("Das allgemeine Glück ist ein Gut für die Gesamtheit aller Personen"). Von hier aus steuert er im normativen Teil des Arguments auf eine aggregierte Bewertung zu ("Das allgemeine Glück ist ein Gut"). Mills Übergang von Beschreibung zu Wertung beruht auf zwei versteckten Annahmen: Die erste sagt (gegen den Nihilisten), dass es Werte gibt; die zweite sagt (gegen Wert-Metaphysiker), dass die (...) Antwort auf die Frage nach Werten nicht völlig unabhängig von dem sein kann, was wir alle de facto für wert erachten. Diese beiden Voraussetzungen scheinen keine inhaltlichen Aussagen zur Moral zu enthalten. Doch wer sie teilt, wird von Mills Argument überraschend weit in die Gefilde der Moral getrieben. Sein Argument ist besser, als die meisten Interpreten glauben. (shrink)

I argue that interesting experiences are experientially valuable in the same fashion as pleasant experiences, yet that the interesting is nonetheless a distinct value from the pleasant. Insofar as it challenges the hedonist’s assumption that pleasure and pain are the only evaluative dimensions of our phenomenological experiences, my argument here serves both as a defense of the value of the interesting and as an important critique of hedonism.

How should our metaphysical commitments influence how we think of ourselves in the practical world? Hume and Buddhism share common ground in denying that there exists a metaphysically real self yet offer very different practical recommendations about how this metaphysical view ought to inform our practical identities. This paper explores the contrast between the two views. It examines the benefits and costs of embracing, and attaching to, a practical conception of the self in the absence of a metaphysical self and (...) provides a qualified defense of the Humean approach by way of considering the joys of attachment. (shrink)

Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) are being actively implemented in a wide range of fields – psychology, mind/body health care and education at all levels – and there is growing evidence of their effectiveness in aiding present-moment focus, fostering emotional stability, and enhancing general mind/body well-being. However, as often happens with popular innovations, the burgeoning interest in and appeal of mindfulness practice has led to a reductionism and commodification – popularly labelled ‘McMindfulness’ – of the underpinning principles and ethical foundations of such (...) practice which threatens to subvert and militate against the achievement of the original aims of MBIs in general and their educational function in particular. It is argued here that mindfulness practice needs to be organically connected to its spiritual roots if the educational benefits of such practice are to be fully realised. (shrink)

Tesón's “humanitarian rationales” for the war in Iraq strain the traditional understanding of humanitarian intervention: The first, that the war was fought to overthrow a tyrant. The second, that it was a defense strategy establishing democratic regimes peacefully, but by force if necessary.

Although it has been given qualified approval by a number of philosophers of education, the so-called ‘therapeutic turn’ in education has been the subject of criticism by several commentators on post-compulsory and adult learning over the last few years. A key feature of this alleged development in recent educational policy is said to be the replacement of the traditional goals of knowledge and understanding with personal and social objectives concerned with enhancing and developing confidence and self-esteem in learners. After offering (...) some critical observations on these developments, I suggest that there are some educationally justifiable goals underpinning what has been described as a therapeutic turn. Whilst accepting that ‘self-esteem’ and cognate concepts cannot provide a general end or universal aim of education, the therapeutic function is more valuable and significant than is generally acknowledged. This claim is justified by an examination of the concept of ‘mindfulness’ that, it is argued, can be an immensely powerful and valuable notion, which is integrally connected with the centrally transformative and developmental nature of learning and educational activity at all levels. (shrink)

Lockheed Martin Corp. has funded research to generate a framework and methodology for developing semantic reasoning applications to support the discipline oflntelligence Analysis. This chapter outlines that framework, discusses how it may be used to advance the information sharing and integrated analytic needs of the Intelligence Community, and suggests a system I software architecture for such applications.

The engineering knowledge research program is part of the larger effort to articulate a philosophy of engineering and an engineering worldview. Engineering knowledge requires a more comprehensive conceptual framework than scientific knowledge. Engineering is not ‘merely’ applied science. Kuhn and Popper established the limits of scientific knowledge. In parallel, the embrace of complementarity and uncertainty in the new physics undermined the scientific concept of observer-independent knowledge. The paradigm shift from the scientific framework to the broader participant engineering framework entails a (...) problem shift. The detached scientific spectator seeks the ‘facts’ of ‘objective’ reality – out there. The participant, embodied in reality, seeks ‘methods’, about how to work in the world. The engineering knowledge research program is recursively enabling. Advances in engineering knowledge are involved in the unfolding of the nature of reality. Newly understood, quantum uncertainty entails that the participant is a natural inquirer. ‘Practical reason’ is concerned with ‘how we should live’– the defining question of morality. The engineering knowledge research program is selective seeking ‘important truths’, ‘important knowledge’, ‘important methods’ that manifest value, and serve the engineering agenda of ‘the construction of the good.’ The importance of engineering knowledge research program is clear in the new STEM curriculum where educators have been challenged to rethink the relation between science and engineering. A 2015 higher education initiative to integrate engineering colleges into liberal arts and sciences colleges has stalled due to the confusion and conflict between the engineering and scientific representations of knowledge. (shrink)

This book is a record of my dialogues with Stephen Hawking, his graduate assistants and his nurses during a four city public lecture tour I organized for Hawking, including Portland, Eugene, Seattle, Vancouver, BC. We discussed 20th century science and philosophy of science. Since I was often the one being questioned, much of the contents reflect my PhD research at the University of London. My focus was on understanding the limits of science, as represented by quantum theory and relativity. My (...) mentors had been Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos, and I was strongly influenced by Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. In one in depth presentation to Hawking I suggested that Newtonian space-time and Maxwellian space-time were complementary, were defined by complementary symmetry principles. I had opportunity to present the same arguments to Kip Thorne and Freeman Dyson. Hawking simply remarked that I 'may be right'. Thorne confirmed that practitioners of General Relativity use both depending on the problem at hand. Dyson was emphatic – "Yes. Definitely. Absolutely.". (shrink)

Kant’s conception of nature’s having a “purposiveness without a purpose” was quickly picked by the Romantics and made into a theory of art as revealing the otherwise hidden unity of nature and freedom. Other responses (such as Hegel’s) turned instead to Kant’s concept of judgment and used this to develop a theory that, instead of the Romantics’ conception of the non-discursive manifestation of the absolute, argued for the discursively articulable realization of conceptual truths. Although Hegel did not argue for the (...) “end of art” (although it is widely held that he did just that), he did, curiously enough, claim that it is art and not philosophy which tells us about the “life” of agents. To see how he reconciles that claim with his otherwise entirely discursively oriented philosophy, it is necessary to look at his thesis of the end of art’s “absolute” importance. Hegel’s worries have to do with the impossibility of fully exhibiting the “inner” in the “outer” in modern art and with the newly emerging problem of “fraudulence” in the poet’s voice. This is illustrated by examples drawn from the history of music and the problems besetting the lyric poet in modern life. Because of these problems, we are, Hegel says, now “amphibious animals” having to live in different and seemingly incompatible worlds. Hegel’s student, Heinrich Heine, found that the only satisfactory way of responding to this was for the modern artist to adopt a distinctive type of irony in response to the Hegel’s worries about modern art. This form of irony, it is argued, is itself Hegelian in spirit. (shrink)

A previously atypical symptom report of a hospitalized patient experiencing unusual visual broadcasting has been documented but has received minimal attention in the research and clinical field of psychiatry. A preliminary hypothesis is proposed of an implicit mechanism of motivation for action and emotional relief functional significance of elevated cortisol and dopamine correlation, that is loosely based on the concept of stress-induced psychosis and which could have led to a concurrent "visual and thought" psychotic episode. In addition, the implication of (...) the effect of increased dopamine on intracranial pressure and indirectly on cerebral perfusion pressure is briefly discussed. A follow-up on the insight and comprehensive understanding of such atypical and novel symptom as an extension of schizophrenia is warranted. (shrink)

A discussion of Sosa's Knowing Full Well. The authors focus on the understood place and significance of animal and reflective knowledge.

In this essay, I reply to the comments of Joanna Leidenhag and Nick Trakakis on my book Religion After Science: The Cultural Consequences of Religious Immaturity.

Confucian thinkers have traditionally stressed the importance of li 禮, or “ritual” as it is commonly translated, and believed that ancient sages had established an ideal set of rituals for people to follow. Now, most scholars of Confucianism understand li as distinct from law, and hence do not typically discuss Confucian sages as great lawgivers. Nevertheless, I suggest that there is something valuable to be learned from considering the similarities and dissimilarities between great lawgivers and the sages. In particular, this (...) essay reviews some of the challenges for, and virtues of, great legislators, and compares and contrasts these with the challenges for, and virtues of, master inventors of ritual, with the aim of showing how such observations might deepen our understanding of the conception of sages in the Confucian tradition, while perhaps also bringing out certain insights about good lawgivers. I end by using these reflections to point to some challenges for developing rituals to fit our modern context. (shrink)

The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.

In response to its current crisis, scholars call for the revitalisation of democracy through democratic innovations. While they make ample use of life metaphors describing democracy as a living organism, no comprehensive understanding of ‘life’ has been established within democratic theory. The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement articulates the urgency of refocusing on life and its meaning through radical democratic practice. This article employs a grounded theory approach, enriched with participatory methods, to develop a radical democratic concept of life in (...) conversation with BLM. It conceptualises life as the existence of a perspective that constantly transforms through its fundamental interconnectedness. Building on this concept, the article outlines four principles of a living democracy that go beyond the revitalisation discourse. A living democracy (1) safeguards the existence of all humans and nonhumans, (2) nurtures a diversity of perspectives, (3) fosters social and planetary connectivity, and (4) enables self- and collective transformation. (shrink)

Research and engineering in the quantum domain involve long chains of activity involving theory development, hypothesis formation, experimentation, device prototyping, device testing, and many more. At each stage multiple paths become possible, and of the paths pursued, the majority will lead nowhere. Our quantum metascience approach provides a strategy which enables all stakeholders to gain an overview of those developments along these tracks, that are relevant to their specific concerns. It provides a controlled vocabulary, built out of terms that are (...) designed to be maximally comprehensible to all groups of stakeholders and across all the sub-fields of the quantum domain. (shrink)

Commentary on Walsh, E. 2020. Cognitive transformation, dementia, and the moral weight of advance directives. The American Journal of Bioethics. 20(8): 54–64.

Je cherche à explorer comment l'expérience de la temporalité est multiforme et fortement perturbée à l'époque de la pandémie Covid-19 et des politiques de confinement, générant une expérience d'hétérochronie, qui remet en question notre rapport à la vie.

Le but de ce texte est de mettre en évidence les équi­valences entre la façon dont le concept de conatus résout, dans l'Éthique, le problème de l'unité modale complexe. en rendant consis­tant le concept de chose singulière en tant que celle-ci doit être consi­dérée comme un légitime sujet d'attribution d'états, et la façon dont ce même concept dessine le rapport cognitif de l'esprit avec lui-même, rapport par lequel l'esprit se saisit comme sujet de ses états et qui ca­ractérise la notion (...) moderne de subjectivité. Ainsi, en éclairant cet as­pect du concept spinoziste de chose singulière. on comprendra aussi, de façon indirecte, l'une des conditions par lesquelles les choses peuvent, dans la doctrine spinoziste, devenir des objets ou des signes pour la connaissance humaine. (shrink)

In this аrtiсlе, thе аuthоr fосusеs оn еluсidаting sоmе philоsоphiсаl аspесts оf intеrсulturаl соmmuniсаtiоn in thе соntеxt оf glоbаlizаtiоn оn thе bаsis оf rесоgnizing thе соntributiоns аnd limitаtiоns оf Wittgеnstеin tо thе birth оf philоsоphy. сulturе study. Thоsе philоsоphiсаl issuеs аrе: thе similаrity in thinking аnd асting оf pеоplе асrоss сulturеs; divеrsity оf сulturеs, wоrldviеws аnd wаys оf lifе. Frоm thе Mаrxist pоint оf viеw, thе аuthоr pоintеd оut аnd сritiсizеd thе limitаtiоns оf Wittgеnstеin's philоsоphiсаl соnсеptiоn; аnd аt thе sаmе (...) timе оffеr аnd еxplаin sоlutiоns tо implеmеnt intеrсulturаl соmmuniсаtiоn in thе соntеxt оf сurrеnt glоbаlizаtiоn. (shrink)

This discussion revises and extends Jonny Anomaly's ‘public goods’ account of public health ethics in light of recent criticism from Richard Dees. Public goods are goods that are both non-rival and non-excludable. What is significant about such goods is that they are not always provided efficiently by the market. Indeed, the state can sometimes realize efficiency gains either by supplying such goods directly or by compelling private purchase. But public goods are not the only goods that the market may fail (...) to provide efficiently. This point to a way of broadening the public goods account of public health to accommodate Dees' counterexamples, without abandoning its distinctive appeal. On the market failures approach to public health ethics, the role of public health is to correct public health-related market failures of all kinds, so far as possible. The underlying moral commitment is to economic efficiency in the sense of Pareto: if we can re-allocate resources in the economy so as to raise the welfare of some without lowering the welfare of any other, we ought to do so. (shrink)

The genetic modification of pigs as a source of transplantable organs is one of several possible solutions to the chronic organ shortage. This paper describes existing ethical tensions in xenotransplantation (XTx) that argue against pursuing it. Recommendations for lifelong infectious disease surveillance and notification of close contacts of recipients are in tension with the rights of human research subjects. Parental/guardian consent for pediatric xenograft recipients is in tension with a child’s right to an open future. Individual consent to transplant is (...) in tension with public health threats that include zoonotic diseases. XTx amplifies concerns about justice in organ transplantation and could exacerbate existing inequities. The prevention of infectious disease in source animals is in tension with the best practices of animal care and animal welfare, requiring isolation, ethologically inappropriate housing, and invasive reproductive procedures that would severely impact the well-being of intelligent social creatures like pigs. (shrink)

Philosophers of experiment have acknowledged that experiments are often more than mere hypothesis-tests, once thought to be an experiment's exclusive calling. Drawing on examples from contemporary biology, I make an additional amendment to our understanding of experiment by examining the way that `wide' instrumentation can, for reasons of efficiency, lead scientists away from traditional hypothesis-directed methods of experimentation and towards exploratory methods.

Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes two types of evil: moral and natural. The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency and so includes phenomena such as war, torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of nonhuman agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease and famine; and finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. Recently, as a result of developments in autonomous agents in cyberspace, (...) a new class of interesting and important examples of hybrid evil has come to light. In this paper, it is called artificial evil and a case is made for considering it to complement ME and NE to produce a more adequate taxonomy. By isolating the features that have led to the appearance of AE, cyberspace is characterised as a self-contained environment that forms the essential component in any foundation of the emerging field of Computer Ethics. It is argued that this goes some way towards providing a methodological explanation of why cyberspace is central to so many of CE’s concerns; and it is shown how notions of good and evil can be formulated in cyberspace. Of considerable interest is how the propensity for an agent’s action to be morally good or evil can be determined even in the absence of biologically sentient participants and thus allows artificial agents not only to perpetrate evil but conversely to ‘receive’ or ‘suffer from’ it. The thesis defended is that the notion of entropy structure, which encapsulates human value judgement concerning cyberspace in a formal mathematical definition, is sufficient to achieve this purpose and, moreover, that the concept of AE can be determined formally, by mathematical methods. A consequence of this approach is that the debate on whether CE should be considered unique, and hence developed as a Macroethics, may be viewed, constructively, in an alternative manner. The case is made that whilst CE issues are not uncontroversially unique, they are sufficiently novel to render inadequate the approach of standard Macroethics such as Utilitarianism and Deontologism and hence to prompt the search for a robust ethical theory that can deal with them successfully. The name Information Ethics is proposed for that theory. It is argued that the uniqueness of IE is justified by its being non-biologically biased and patient-oriented: IE is an Environmental Macroethics based on the concept of data entity rather than life. It follows that the novelty of CE issues such as AE can be appreciated properly because IE provides a new perspective. In light of the discussion provided in this paper, it is concluded that Computer Ethics is worthy of independent study because it requires its own application-specific knowledge and is capable of supporting a methodological foundation, Information Ethics. (shrink)

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...) with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.Berger's analysis, and the reading of (...) the text he suggests is grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna's enterprise that is welcome .. (shrink)

The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the ''''coordinated attack'''' problem, (...) which is demonstrably insolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed. (shrink)

It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...) would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. This suggests we should reject our ordinary conception of how to make this life-changing decision, and raises general questions about how to rationally approach important life choices. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of species have focused on multicellular, sexual animals and have often neglected to consider unicellular organisms like bacteria. This article begins to fill this gap by considering what species concepts, if any, apply neatly to the bacterial world. First, I argue that the biological species concept cannot be applied to bacteria because of the variable rates of genetic transfer between populations, depending in part on which gene type is prioritized. Second, I present a critique of phylogenetic bacterial species, (...) arguing that phylogenetic bacterial classification requires a questionable metaphysical commitment to the existence of essential genes. I conclude by considering how microbiologists have dealt with these biological complexities by using more pragmatic and not exclusively evolutionary accounts of species. I argue that this pragmatism is not borne of laziness but rather of the substantial conceptual problems in classifying bacteria based on any evolutionary standard. (shrink)

Although the idea of freedom has been well studied as an ideal in political philosophy, relatively little scholarship has focused on the human experience of freedom. Drawing on ethnographic research between 2012 and 2013, I examine how freedom was achieved by people who practice freeganism and freecycling in Hong Kong. I show that the freedom that these people pursue, either individually or collectively, is not a freedom without constraints but a freedom that must be attained through the exercise of deliberation, (...) restraint, and self-discipline. While freegans seek liberation by withdrawing from the world and practicing self-cultivation (chushi asceticism), freecyclers do so by engaging with worldly affairs in order to create social changes (rushi asceticism). In both cases, by reimagining freedom as ethical practices rather than a right that comes naturally with birth, freegans and freecyclers in Hong Kong are able to experience moments of freedom despite inevitable structural constraints. (shrink)

When medical assistance in dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada in June 2016, the question of allowing decisionally capable persons to make advance requests in anticipation of later incapacity was reserved for further consideration during the mandatory parliamentary review originally scheduled to begin in June 2020 (but since delayed by COVID-19). In its current form the legislation does not permit such requests, since it stipulates that at the time at which the procedure is to be administered the patient must give (...) “express consent” to receiving it. Since express consent presupposes decisional capacity, this requirement rules out administering MAiD to a patient who has lost capacity. Amendments to the legislation passed by Parliament in March 2021 open the door slightly by allowing advance requests by patients after they have been approved for MAiD, if they fear losing capacity before the procedure can be administered. But this provision would apply only to patients whose natural death was deemed to be “reasonably foreseeable”, and would continue to exclude (a) requests made after diagnosis of a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” but in advance of approval for MAiD, and (b) requests made before such a diagnosis. My aim in this paper is twofold: to explore the ethical and legal issues concerning advance requests for MAiD, and to argue for expanding provision for such requests to include both of these further scenarios. (shrink)

Darwinism, especially in the form of the Modern Synthesis, has become one of the most influential theories in the worldwide scientific community. However, due to its often dogmatic interpretation, it is more and more orthodoxical. An increasing number of scientists have come to criticise Darwinism and go beyond it with a systemic approach and an expanded vision of the evolutionary process. As a matter of fact, the discovery of natural genetic engineering mechanisms shows that living cells are able to rewrite (...) their own genetic material at the genomic level, thus leading to evolutionary innovations. This teleological standpoint triggers a paradigm shift that could turn out to be a genuine scientific revolution. (shrink)

PURPOSE: The conventional wisdom in dental and medical education is that dental and medical students experience "ethical erosion" over the duration of dental and medical school. There is some evidence for this claim, but in the case of dental education this evidence consists entirely of survey research, which doesn't measure behavior. The purpose of this study was to measure the altruistic behavior of dental students, in order to fill the significant gap in knowledge of how students are disposed to behave, (...) rather than how they are disposed to think. -/- METHODS: To test the altruistic behavior of dental students, we conducted a field experiment using the Ultimatum Game, which is a game commonly used in economics to observe social behavior. Students from each of the four years of dental school played the game in standardized conditions with real money. -/- RESULTS: Students exhibited greater levels of altruism than the general population typically does. Students' altruism peaked in year four. Students' altruism was associated with the socioeconomic status of responder. -/- CONCLUSION: The results suggest that that dental students are more altruistic than the population average and that altruism increases during their education. Thus, if a decreasing ability to behave altruistically is observed during dental school, it is not likely due to a general disposition of students, but rather some factor specific to the educational environment in which the decrease is observed. (shrink)

Hate speech, understood broadly, is any form of expression intended to arouse hatred or contempt toward members of a particular social group. When university administrators have reason to believe that a planned speaking event on campus may feature hate speech (at least in the eyes of some), how should they respond? In this paper I address this question as it arises for Canadian universities. I argue that, where the regulation of campus speech is concerned, the right course of action for (...) university administrators is nearly always to do absolutely nothing. They will have reason to become actively involved only in order to ensure that a speaking event proceeds safely, or when it threatens to disrupt the functioning of the university, or when it is itself threatened with disruption by protesting groups. In those instances the justification for intervention will be to protect and facilitate speech, not to shut it down. (shrink)