Results for 'luck egalitarianism'

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  1. Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
    Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism's main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck (...)
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  2. Hikers in Flip‐Flops: Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality and the Distribuenda of Justice.Anca Gheaus - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1):54-69.
    The article has two aims. First, to show that a version of luck egalitarianism that includes relational goods amongst its distribuenda can, as a matter of internal logic, account for one of the core beliefs of relational egalitarianism. Therefore, there will be important extensional overlap, at the level of domestic justice, between luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism. This is an important consideration in assessing the merits of and relationship between the two rival views. Second, (...)
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  3. Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism.Ryan Long - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):107-130.
    Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. (...)
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  4. A Framework for Luck Egalitarianism in Health and Healthcare.Andreas Albertsen & Carl Knight - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2):165-169.
    Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address (...)
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  5. A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.Kok-Chor Tan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (11):665-690.
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  6. In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (1):55-73.
    This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Anderson’s recent critique of the position she terms ‘luck egalitarianism’. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Anderson’s arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults (...)
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  7. Against Institutional Luck Egalitarianism.Rekha Nath - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-19.
    Kok-Chor Tan has recently defended a novel theory of egalitarian distributive justice, institutional luck egalitarianism (ILE). On this theory, it is unjust for institutions to favor some individuals over others based on matters of luck. Tan takes his theory to preserve the intuitive appeal of luck egalitarianism while avoiding what he regards as absurd implications that face other versions of luck egalitarianism. Despite the centrality of the concept of institutional influence to his theory, (...)
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  8. Why Not Be a Desertist?: Three Arguments for Desert and Against Luck Egalitarianism.Huub Brouwer & Thomas Mulligan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2271-2288.
    Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions (...)
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  9. The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2006 - Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):173-189.
    Some critics of luck egalitarianism have suggested that its reference to responsibility leaves it either assuming metaphysical libertarianism or (in the inevitable absence of a resolution of the free will problem) practically impotent. This paper argues that luck egalitarianism need not fall into either trap. It may in fact be sensitive to the possibility that libertarianism is false, and would not be undermined were this the case. Here luck egalitarianism actually fares better than outcome (...)
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  10. The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2011 - Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this (...)
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  11.  49
    Why Luck Egalitarianism Fails in Condemning Oppression.Cynthia A. Stark - 2020 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (4).
    Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for condoning some cases of oppression and condemning others for the wrong reason—namely, that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, regardless of whether victims are responsible for it, simply because it is contrary to the equal moral standing of persons. I argue that four luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two address only the first part of the objection and do so (...)
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  12.  24
    Luck Egalitarianism and the History of Political Thought.Carl Knight - 2016 - In Camilla Boisen & Matthew C. Murray (eds.), Distributive Justice Debates in Political and Social Thought. Abingdon, UK: pp. 26-38.
    Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that give a special place to luck, choice, and responsibility. These theories can be understood as responding to perceived weaknesses in influential earlier theories of both the left – in particular Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism (1971) – and the right – Nozick’s libertarianism (1974) stands out here. Rawls put great emphasis on the continuity of his theory with the great social contract theories of modern political thought, (...)
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  13. Luck Egalitarianism and Disability Elimination.Matthew Palynchuk - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 1.
    Luck egalitarianism’s commitment to neutralizing brute luck inequalities is thought to imply that the elimination of disabilities is an appropriate way to eliminate the unchosen disadvantage that often accompanies disabilities. This implication is not only intuitively objectionable to some, especially those concerned with disability justice, but is subject to objections from relational egalitarians that should be taken seriously. This paper defends the claim that disability elimination is not a natural implication of luck egalitarian theories of justice (...)
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  14.  34
    Luck Egalitarianism[REVIEW]Annabelle Lever - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 5.
    This brilliant and challenging book provides an overview and defence of 'luck egalitarianism', one that helpfully connects debates on luck egalitarianism to debates on what aspects of our lives egalitarians should try equalise (the 'equality of what?' debate/the debate on the 'metric' of equality) and on what respect, if any, it makes sense to see each other as equals. The book illuminates different conceptions of luck, as found in the philosophical literature, clarifies the difference between (...)
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  15. Beyond Sufficiency: G.A. Cohen's Community Constraint on Luck Egalitarianism.Benjamin D. King - 2018 - Kritike 12 (1):215-232.
    G. A. Cohen conceptualizes socialism as luck egalitarianism constrained by a community principle. The latter mitigates certain inequalities to achieve a shared common life. This article explores the plausibility of the community constraint on inequality in light of two related problems. First, if it is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not guarantee imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation and to function as equal citizens in (...)
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  16. Immigrants, Multiculturalism, and Expensive Cultural Tastes: Quong on Luck Egalitarianism and Cultural Minority Rights.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2011 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 6 (2):176-192.
    Kymlicka has offered an influential luck egalitarian justification for a catalogue of polyethnic rights addressing cultural disadvantages of immigrant minorities. In response, Quong argues that while the items on the list are justified, in the light of the fact that the relevant disadvantages of immigrants result from their choice to immigrate, (i) these rights cannot be derived from luck egalitarianism and (ii) that this casts doubt on luck egalitarianism as a theory of cultural justice. As (...)
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  17. Disability, Disadvantage, and Luck Egalitarianism.Matthew Palynchuk - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (4):pp. 711-720.
    ABSTRACT: In his A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen suggests a theory of disability that holds that to have a disability just is to be worse off, sometimes referred to as the ‘medical’ or ‘individual’ model of disability. I argue that Johannsen’s understanding of disability might force some of his key claims into an uncomfortable position. In particular, for his theory to avoid the thrust of Elizabeth Anderson’s criticisms of luck egalitarianism, the assumption of the medical model (...)
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  18. Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value. [REVIEW]Alex Voorhoeve - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    I review Shlomi Segall's book 'Why Inequality Matters'. I argue that it conclusively establishes that alongside egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians must sometimes regard a prospect as better (in at least one respect) when it is not better (in terms of well-being) for anyone. Sufficientarians and prioritarians must therefore relinquish a treasured anti-egalitarian argument. It also makes a powerful case that among these three views, egalitarians are in the best position to explain such departures from what is in each person’s prudential (...)
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  19. Change Your Look, Change Your Luck: Religious Self-Transformation and Brute Luck Egalitarianism.Muhammad Velji - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):453-471.
    My intention in this paper is to reframe the practice of veiling as an embodied practice of self-development and self- transformation. I argue that practices like these cannot be handled by the choice/chance distinction relied on by those who would restrict religious minority accommodations. Embodied self- transformation necessarily means a change in personal identity and this means the religious believer cannot know if they will need religious accommodation when they begin their journey of piety. Even some luck egalitarians would (...)
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  20.  41
    Abandoning the Abandonment Objection: Luck Egalitarian Arguments for Public Insurance.Carl Knight - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (2):119-135.
    Critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed that, far from providing a justification for the public insurance functions of a welfare state as its proponents claim, the view objectionably abandons those who are deemed responsible for their dire straits. This article considers seven arguments that can be made in response to this ‘abandonment objection’. Four of these arguments are found wanting, with a recurrent problem being their reliance on a dubious sufficientarian or quasi-sufficientarian commitment to provide a threshold of (...)
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  21. Luck and Oppression.Mark Navin - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):533-547.
    Oppression can be unjust from a luck egalitarian point of view even when it is the consequence of choices for which it is reasonable to hold persons responsible. This is for two reasons. First, people who have not been oppressed are unlikely to anticipate the ways in which their choices may lead them into oppressive conditions. Facts about systematic phenomena (like oppression) are often beyond the epistemic reach of persons who are not currently subject to such conditions, even when (...)
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  22. Luck, Institutions, and Global Distributive Justice.Kok-Chor Tan - 2011 - European Journal of Political Theory 10 (3):394-421.
    Luck egalitarianism provides one powerful way of defending global egalitarianism. The basic luck egalitarian idea that persons ought not to be disadvantaged compared to others on account of his or her bad luck seems to extend naturally to the global arena, where random factors such as persons’ place of birth and the natural distribution of the world’s resources do affect differentially their life chances. Yet luck egalitarianism as an ideal, as well as its (...)
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  23. Brute Luck Equality and Desert.Peter Vallentyne - 2003 - In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press. pp. 169--185.
    In recent years, interest in desert-based theories of justice has increased, and this seems to represent a challenge to equality-based theories of justice.[i] The best distribution of outcomeadvantage with respect to desert, after all, need not be the most equal distribution of outcomeadvantage. Some individuals may deserve more than others. Outcome egalitarianism is, however, implausible, and so the conflict of outcome desert with outcome equality is of little significance.[ii] Most contemporary versions of egalitarianism are concerned with neutralizing the (...)
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  24. Health Inequalities and Relational Egalitarianism.J. Paul Kelleher - 2016 - In Rebecca L. Walker Mara Buchbinder & Michele Rivkin-Fish (eds.), Understanding Health Inequalities and Justice: New Conversations across the Disciplines. University of North Carolina Press.
    Much of the philosophical literature on health inequalities seeks to establish the superiority of one or another conception of luck egalitarianism. In recent years, however, an increasing number of self-avowed egalitarian philosophers have proposed replacing luck egalitarianism with alternatives that stress the moral relevance of distinct relationships, rather than the moral relevance of good or bad luck. After briefly explaining why I am not attracted to luck egalitarianism, I seek in this chapter to (...)
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  25.  85
    Luck, Opportunity and Disability.Cynthia A. Stark - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (3):383-402.
    This paper argues that luck egalitarianism, especially in the guise of equality of opportunity for welfare, is in tension with the ideal of fair equality of opportunity in three ways. First, equal opportunity for welfare is compatible with a caste system in employment that is inconsistent with open competition for positions. Second, luck egalitarianism does not support hiring on the basis of qualifications. Third, amending luck egalitarianism to repair this problem requires abandoning fair access (...)
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  26. Distributive Luck.Carl Knight - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):541-559.
    This article explores the Rawlsian goal of ensuring that distributions are not influenced by the morally arbitrary. It does so by bringing discussions of distributive justice into contact with the debate over moral luck initiated by Williams and Nagel. Rawls’ own justice as fairness appears to be incompatible with the arbitrariness commitment, as it creates some equalities arbitrarily. A major rival, Dworkin’s version of brute luck egalitarianism, aims to be continuous with ordinary ethics, and so is (a) (...)
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  27.  8
    Luck, Nature and Institutions.Cynthia A. Stark - 2021 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 8 (2):235-260.
    In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also have an institutional ‘reach’ or currency. It has the first when it applies to only social phenomena. It has the second when it distributes only socially produced goods. One objection to luck egalitarianism is that it has absurd implications. In response, Tan has defended a luck egalitarian account that has a strictly institutional reach. I argue, first, that Tan’s view contains two (...)
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  28. Equality, Brute Luck, and Initial Opportunities.Peter Vallentyne - 2002 - Ethics 112:529-557.
    In the old days, material egalitarians tended to favor equality of outcome advantage, on some suitable conception of advantage (happiness, resources, etc.). Under the influence of Dworkin’s seminal articles on equality[i], contemporary material egalitarians have tended to favor equality of brute luck advantage—on the grounds that this permits people to be held appropriately accountable for the benefits and burdens of their choices. I shall argue, however, that a plausible conception of egalitarian justice requires neither that brute luck advantage (...)
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  29.  61
    In Defence of Global Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2012 - Journal of Global Ethics 8 (1):107-116.
    This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an (...)
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  30. John Stuart Mill on Luck and Distributive Justice.Piers Norris Turner - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. pp. 80-93.
    My aim in this chapter is to place John Stuart Mill’s distinctive utilitarian political philosophy in the context of the debate about luck, responsibility, and equality. I hope it will reveal the extent to which his utilitarianism provides a helpful framework for synthesizing the competing claims of luck and relational egalitarianism. I attempt to show that when Mill’s distributive justice commitments are not decided by direct appeal to overall happiness, they are guided by three main public principles: (...)
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  31.  17
    Modal Insurance: Probabilities, Risk, and Degrees of Luck.Evan Malone - 2019 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 41.
    Many widely divergent accounts of luck have been offered or employed in discussing an equally wide range of philosophical topics. We should, then, expect to find some unified philosophical conception of luck of which moral luck, epistemic luck, and luck egalitarianism are species. One of the attempts to provide such an account is that offered by Duncan Pritchard, which he refers to as the modal account. This view commits us to calling an event lucky (...)
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  32.  22
    Yascha Mounk, The Age of Responsibility: Luck, Choice, and the Welfare State. [REVIEW]Carl Knight - 2019 - Ethics 129 (3):489-492.
    The notion of responsibility has come to play a leading role in both political discourse and political philosophy. Yasha Mounk’s The Age of Responsibility provides a wide-ranging exploration of this zeitgeist. As the author notes, ‘[t]his book stands at an unusual methodological intersection. It contains elements of intellectual history, social theory, comparative politics, and normative political philosophy’ (26). Philosophical theories of free will and moral luck battle for space with analyses of welfare conditionality and Obama’s speeches. The author navigates (...)
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  33.  49
    Solidarity, Justice and Unconditional Access to Healthcare.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (3):177-181.
    Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programmes in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case with incentive programmes that aim to restrict access to essential healthcare services. Such programmes undermine solidarity. Yet, most people's lives are objectively worse, in one respect, in non-solidary societies, because solidarity contributes both instrumentally and directly to individuals' well-being. Because solidarity is non-excludable, undermining it will deprive both the (...)
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  34. Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value.Carl Knight - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1061-1073.
    According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because (...)
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  35. Justice After Catastrophe: Responsibility and Security.Makoto Usami - 2015 - Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture 26 (4):215-230.
    The issue of justice after catastrophe is an enormous challenge to contemporary theories of distributive justice. In the past three decades, the controversy over distributive justice has centered on the ideal of equality. One of intensely debated issues concerns what is often called the “equality of what,” on which there are three primary views: welfarism, resourcism, and the capabilities approach. Another major point of dispute can be termed the “equality or another,” about which three positions debate: egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and (...)
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  36.  20
    Responsibility and the Recursion Problem.Ben Davies - forthcoming - Ratio.
    A considerable literature has emerged around the idea of using ‘personal responsibility’ as an allocation criterion in healthcare distribution, where a person's being suitably responsible for their health needs may justify additional conditions on receiving healthcare, and perhaps even limiting access entirely, sometimes known as ‘responsibilisation’. This discussion focuses most prominently, but not exclusively, on ‘luck egalitarianism’, the view that deviations from equality are justified only by suitably free choices. A superficially separate issue in distributive justice concerns the (...)
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  37. Gerechtigkeit als Versicherung.Lars Roemheld - 2013 - Dissertation, Heidelberg University
    This thesis sketches a justification of a welfare state, defending it against both givers and receivers of redistribution. Following the ideas of Luck Egalitarianism, I argue that righteous wealth is the result of responsible decisions, and that the influence of luck should be minimized. Building on Ronald Dworkin's hypothetical insurance markets, I argue that a welfare system should be conceived of as a personal insurance, not a social luxury. The thesis is written in German.
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  38. What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health.Nicole A. Vincent - 2009 - Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 1 (1):39-51.
    Luck egalitarians think that considerations of responsibility can excuse departures from strict equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably harsh consequences. Luck egalitarians usually respond either by explaining why that harshness is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking (...)
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  39. On the Conceptual Status of Justice.Kyle Johannsen - 2015 - Dissertation, Queen's University
    In contemporary debates about justice, political philosophers take themselves to be engaged with a subject that’s narrower than the whole of morality. Many contemporary liberals, notably John Rawls, understand this narrowness in terms of context specificity. On their view, justice is the part of morality that applies to the context of a society’s institutions, but only has indirect application to the context of citizens’ personal lives. In contrast, many value pluralists, notably G.A. Cohen, understand justice’s narrowness in terms of singularity (...)
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  40.  82
    Equality for Inegalitarians. [REVIEW]Andy Lamey - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):140-144.
    Equality for Inegalitarians, by George Sher, Cambridge University Press, 2014. Luck egalitarianism has been a leading view in analytic political philosophy since it rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. The theory holds that economic inequalities are acceptable when they are the result of choice but those due to luck should be redistributed away. Proponents generally favour extensive redistribution, on the grounds that luck -- including the luck of being born with a lucrative talent (...)
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  41. Cohen's Equivocal Attack on Rawls's Basic Structure Restriction.Kyle Johannsen - 2016 - Ethical Perspectives 23 (3):499-525.
    G.A. Cohen is famous for his critique of John Rawls’s view that principles of justice are restricted in scope to institutional structures. In recent work, however, Cohen has suggested that Rawlsians get more than just the scope of justice wrong: they get the concept wrong too. He claims that justice is a fundamental value, i.e. a moral input in our deliberations about the content of action-guiding regulatory principles, rather than the output. I argue here that Cohen’s arguments for extending the (...)
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  42. The Nozick Game.Galen Barry - 2017 - Teaching Philosophy 40 (1):1-10.
    In this article I introduce a simple classroom exercise intended to help students better understand Robert Nozick’s famous Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment. I outline the setup and rules of the Basic Version of the Game and explain its primary pedagogical benefits. I then offer several more sophisticated versions of the Game which can help to illustrate the difference between Nozick’s libertarianism and luck egalitarianism.
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  43. Existential Conservatism.David McPherson - 2019 - Philosophy 94 (3):383-407.
    This essay articulates a kind of conservatism that it argues is the most fundamental and important kind of conservatism, viz. existential conservatism, which involves an affirmative and appreciative stance towards the given world. While this form of conservatism can be connected to political conservatism, as seen with Roger Scruton, it need not be, as seen with G. A. Cohen. It is argued that existential conservatism should be embraced whether or not one embraces political conservatism, though it is also shown that (...)
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  44. Prostitution, Disability and Prohibition.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (6):451-459.
    Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents and analyses three (...)
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  45. In Defence of Cosmopolitanism.Carl Knight - 2011 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 58 (129):19-34.
    David Miller has objected to the cosmopolitan argument that it is arbitrary and hence unfair to treat individuals differently on account of things for which they are not responsible. Such a view seems to require, implausibly, that individuals be treated identically even where (unchosen) needs differ. The objection is, however, inapplicable where the focus of cosmopolitan concern is arbitrary disadvantage rather than arbitrary treatment. This 'unfair disadvantage argument' supports a form of global luck egalitarianism. Miller also objects that (...)
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  46. Inequality, Avoidability, and Healthcare.Carl Knight - 2011 - Iyyun 60:72-88.
    This review article of Shlomi Segall's Health, Luck, and Justice (Princeton University Press, 2010) addresses three issues: first, Segall’s claim that luck egalitarianism, properly construed, does not object to brute luck equality; second, Segall’s claim that brute luck is properly construed as the outcome of actions that it would have been unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid; and third, Segall’s account of healthcare and criticism of rival views. On the first two issues, a more (...)
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  47. Responsibility and Distributive Justice: An Introduction.Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska Carl - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put (...)
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  48. Describing Equality.Carl Knight - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (4):327 - 365.
    This articles proposes that theories and principles of distributive justice be considered substantively egalitarian iff they satisfy each of three conditions: (1) they consider the bare fact that a person is in certain circumstances to be a conclusive reason for placing another relevantly identically entitled person in the same circumstances, except where this conflicts with other similarly conclusive reasons arising from the circumstances of other persons; (2) they can be stated as 'equality of x for all persons', making no explicit (...)
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  49. Social Epigenetics and Equality of Opportunity.Michele Loi, Lorenzo Del Savio & Elia Stupka - 2013 - Public Health Ethics 6 (2):142-153.
    Recent epidemiological reports of associations between socioeconomic status and epigenetic markers that predict vulnerability to diseases are bringing to light substantial biological effects of social inequalities. Here, we start the discussion of the moral consequences of these findings. We firstly highlight their explanatory importance in the context of the research program on the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease (DOHaD) and the social determinants of health. In the second section, we review some theories of the moral status of health inequalities. (...)
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  50. Responsibility, Desert, and Justice.Carl Knight - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter identifies three contrasts between responsibility-sensitive justice and desert-sensitive justice. First, while responsibility may be appraised on prudential or moral grounds, it is argued that desert is necessarily moral. As moral appraisal is much more plausible, responsibility-sensitive justice is only attractive in one of its two formulations. Second, strict responsibility sensitivity does not compensate for all forms of bad brute luck, and forms of responsibility-sensitive justice like luck egalitarianism that provide such compensation do so by appealing (...)
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