Results for 'multisensory perception'

962 found
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  1. Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1095.
    Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (...)
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  2. Multisensory Perception in Philosophy.Amber Ross & Mohan Matthen - 2021 - Multisensory Research 34 (3):219-231.
    This is the editors' Introduction to a special issue of the journal, Multisensory Research. European philosophers of the modern period found multisensory perception to be impossible because they thought that perceptual ideas are defined by how they are experienced. Under this conception, the individual modalities are determinables of ideas—just as colour is a determinable that embraces red and blue, so also the visual is a determinable that embraces colour and (visually experienced) shape. Since no idea is experienced (...)
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  3. How Many Senses? Multisensory Perception Beyond the Five Senses.Keith A. Wilson - 2021 - In Sabah Ülkesi. Cologne: IGMG. pp. 76-79.
    The idea that there are five senses dates back to Aristotle, who was one of the first philosophers to examine them systematically. Though it has become conventional wisdom, many scientists and philosophers would argue that this idea is outdated and inaccurate. Indeed, they have given many different answers to this question, ranging from just three (the number of different kinds of physical energy we can detect) to 33 or more senses. Perhaps surprisingly, the issue remains controversial, partly because it is (...)
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  4.  70
    On the Phenomenology and Normativity of Multisensory Perception: Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian Analyses.Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo & Ilpo Hirvonen - 2022 - In Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo & Ilpo Hirvonen (eds.), Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 107-125.
    Sense interaction is ubiquitous. All conscious experiences involve at least some interaction between the senses. One of the most debated questions in recent scholarship concerns the proper way of characterizing the phenomenology of multisensory experiences. According to Charles Spence and Tim Bayne (2015), the phenomenal character of multisensory integration is reducible to the co-conscious sum of modality-specific features. Following Casey O'Callaghan (2015), we can call this The Thesis of Minimal Multimodality. The main goal of the paper is to (...)
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  5. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part II.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (12):1-13.
    The first part of this survey article presented a cartography of some of the more extensively studied forms of multisensory processing. In this second part, I turn to examining some of the different possible ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss the significance of research on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness for philosophical debates concerning the modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individuation (...)
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  6. Bodily awareness and novel multisensory features.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198:3913-3941.
    According to the decomposition thesis, perceptual experiences resolve without remainder into their different modality-specific components. Contrary to this view, I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences representing features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily awareness—understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis—and the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. I develop an argument (...)
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  7. (5 other versions)Multisensory Integration Workshop Full Report.Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor - manuscript
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the multisensory integration workshop at the University of Toronto on May 9th and 10th, 2014: 1. What Is Multisensory Integration? 2. Do Multisensory Percepts Involve Emergent Features? 3. What Can Multisensory Processing Tell Us about Multisensory Awareness? 4. Is Language Processing a Special Kind of Multisensory Integration? 5. What Is the Purpose of Multisensory Integration?
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  8. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):121-133.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing (...)
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  9. Multisensory Consciousness and Synesthesia.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge. pp. 322-336.
    This chapter distinguishes between two kinds of ordinary multisensory experience that go beyond mere co-consciousness of features (e.g., the experience that results from concurrently hearing a sound in the hallway and seeing the cup on the table). In one case, a sensory experience in one modality creates a perceptual demonstrative to whose referent qualities are attributed in another sensory modality. For example, when you hear someone speak, auditory experience attributes audible qualities to a seen event, a person’s speaking motions. (...)
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  10. Multisensory evidence.Casey O'Callaghan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):238-256.
    It is tempting to think that one’s perceptual evidence comprises just what issues from perceiving with each of the respective sensory modalities. However, empirical, rational, and phenomenological considerations show that one’s perceptual evidence can outstrip what one possesses due to perceiving with each separate sense. Some novel perceptual evidence stems from the coordinated use of multiple senses. This paper argues that some perceptual evidence in this respect is distinctively multisensory.
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  11. Framing Effects in Object Perception.Spencer Ivy & Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    In this paper we argue that object perception may be affected by what we call “perceptual frames.” Perceptual frames are adaptations of the perceptual system that guide how perceptual objects are singled out from a sensory environment. These adaptations are caused by perceptual learning and realized through bottom-up functional processes such that sensory information is organized in a subject-dependent way leading to idiosyncratic perceptual object representations. Through domain-specific training, perceptual learning, and the acquisition of object-knowledge, it is possible to (...)
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  12. (1 other version)The Emotional Dimension to Sensory Perception.Lana Kuhle - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 236-255.
    Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or irritated, I might experience the sound of children laughing and screaming as they play around the house in a negative manner — it is unpleasant, loud, piercing, and so on. Yet, if I’m in a relaxed, happy, loving mood, the very same sounds might be experienced as pleasant, playful, warm, and so on. The sounds being made by the children are the same in both cases, (...)
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  13. Individuating the Senses of ‘Smell’: Orthonasal versus Retronasal Olfaction.Keith A. Wilson - 2021 - Synthese 199:4217-4242.
    The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one (...)
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  14. Synesthesia vs. crossmodal illusions.Casey O'Callaghan - 2017 - In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New Essays on Synaesthesia. Oxford University Press. pp. 45-58.
    We can discern two opposing viewpoints regarding synesthesia. According to the first, it is an oddity, an outlier, or a disordered condition. According to the second, synesthesia is pervasive, driving creativity, metaphor, or language itself. Which is it? Ultimately, I favor the first perspective, according to which cross-sensory synesthesia is an outlying condition. But the second perspective is not wholly misguided. My discussion has three lessons. First, synesthesia is just one of a variety of effects in which one sense modality (...)
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  15. Windows on Time: Unlocking the Temporal Microstructure of Experience.Keith A. Wilson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14:1197–1218.
    Each of our sensory modalities—vision, touch, taste, etc.—works on a slightly different timescale, with differing temporal resolutions and processing lag. This raises the question of how, or indeed whether, these sensory streams are co-ordinated or ‘bound’ into a coherent multisensory experience of the perceptual ‘now’. In this paper I evaluate one account of how temporal binding is achieved: the temporal windows hypothesis, concluding that, in its simplest form, this hypothesis is inadequate to capture a variety of multisensory phenomena. (...)
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  16. Coordinating attention requires coordinated senses.Lucas Battich, Merle T. Fairhurst & Ophelia Deroy - 2020 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 27 (6):1126-1138.
    From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But (...)
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  17. The impact of joint attention on the sound-induced flash illusions.Lucas Battich, Isabelle Garzorz, Basil Wahn & Ophelia Deroy - 2021 - Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics 83 (8):3056–3068.
    Humans coordinate their focus of attention with others, either by gaze following or prior agreement. Though the effects of joint attention on perceptual and cognitive processing tend to be examined in purely visual environments, they should also show in multisensory settings. According to a prevalent hypothesis, joint attention enhances visual information encoding and processing, over and above individual attention. If two individuals jointly attend to the visual components of an audiovisual event, this should affect the weighing of visual information (...)
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  18. Senses as Capacities.Casey O'Callaghan - 2021 - Multisensory Research 34:233-259.
    This paper presents an account of the senses and what differentiates them that is compatible with richly multisensory perception and consciousness. According to this proposal, senses are ways of perceiving. Each sense is a subfaculty that comprises a collection of perceptual capacities. What each sense shares and what differentiates one sense from another is the manner in which those capacities are exercised. Each way of perceiving involves a distinct type of information gathering, individuated by the information it functions (...)
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  19. (1 other version)The Chemical Senses.Barry C. Smith - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 314-353.
    Long-standing neglect of the chemical senses in the philosophy of perception is due, mostly, to their being regarded as ‘lower’ senses. Smell, taste, and chemically irritated touch are thought to produce mere bodily sensations. However, empirically informed theories of perception can show how these senses lead to perception of objective properties, and why they cannot be treated as special cases of perception modelled on vision. The senses of taste, touch, and smell also combine to create unified (...)
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  20. Beyond sensorimotor segregation: On mirror neurons and social affordance space tracking.Maria Brincker - 2015 - Cognitive Systems Research 34:18-34.
    Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 1990s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘ mirror mechanism ’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. (...)
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  21. The structure of egocentric space.Adrian J. T. Alsmith - 2020 - In Frédérique de Vignemont (ed.), The World at Our Fingertips: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Peripersonal Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter offers an indirect defence of the Evansian conception of egocentric space, by showing how it resolves a puzzle concerning the unity of egocentric spatial perception. The chapter outlines several common assumptions about egocentric perspectival structure and argues that a subject’s experience, both within and across her sensory modalities, may involve multiple structures of this kind. This raises the question of how perspectival unity is achieved, such that these perspectival structures form a complex whole, rather than merely disunified (...)
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  22. Sorting the Senses.Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.
    We perceive in many ways. But several dubious presuppositions about the senses mask this diversity of perception. Philosophers, scientists, and engineers alike too often presuppose that the senses (vision, audition, etc.) are independent sources of information, perception being a sum of these independent contributions. We too often presuppose that we can generalize from vision to other senses. We too often presuppose that vision itself is best understood as a passive receptacle for an image thrown by a lens. In (...)
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  23. The meta-problem and the transfer of knowledge between theories of consciousness: a software engineer’s take.Marcel Kvassay - manuscript
    This contribution examines two radically different explanations of our phenomenal intuitions, one reductive and one strongly non-reductive, and identifies two germane ideas that could benefit many other theories of consciousness. Firstly, the ability of sophisticated agent architectures with a purely physical implementation to support certain functional forms of qualia or proto-qualia appears to entail the possibility of machine consciousness with qualia, not only for reductive theories but also for the nonreductive ones that regard consciousness as ubiquitous in Nature. Secondly, analysis (...)
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  24. Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
    There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...)
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  25. Multimodality. The Sensually Organized Potential of Artistic Works.Sauer Martina & Christiane Wagner (eds.) - 2022 - New York & Sao Paulo: Art Style.
    With a Call for Essays, the special issue Multimodality sought contributions that accept not only the material but also the body-bound dependence of media perception and understanding. To this end, contributions were included that shed light on both the structural and signifying potential of artistic works through multimodal analysis. Particular attention was paid to contributions that clarify how the structural features - the modes - of the arts, their perception, and their signifying potential in terms of content are (...)
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  26. Animals are not cognitively stuck in time.Gerardo Viera & Eric Margolis - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    We argue that animals are not cognitively stuck in time. Evidence pertaining to multisensory temporal order perception strongly suggests that animals can represent at least some temporal relations of perceived events.
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  27. Restricted Auditory Aspatialism.Douglas Wadle - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Some philosophers have argued that we do not hear sounds as located in the environment. Others have objected that this straightforwardly contradicts the phenomenology of auditory experience. And from this they draw metaphysical conclusions about the nature of sounds—that they are events or properties of vibrating surfaces rather than waves or sensations. I argue that there is a minimal, but recognizable, notion of audition to which this phenomenal objection does not apply. While this notion doesn’t correspond to our ordinary notion (...)
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  28.  83
    Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution.Paweł Jakub Zięba - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.
    According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it’s a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual’s brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there’s no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they don’t instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and can’t (...)
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  29. Aesthetic perception and the puzzle of training.Madeleine Ransom - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-25.
    While the view that we perceive aesthetic properties may seem intuitive, it has received little in the way of explicit defence. It also gives rise to a puzzle. The first strand of this puzzle is that we often cannot perceive aesthetic properties of artworks without training, yet much aesthetic training involves the acquisition of knowledge, such as when an artwork was made, and by whom. How, if at all, can this knowledge affect our perception of an artwork’s aesthetic properties? (...)
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  30. Distal engagement: Intentions in perception.Nick Brancazio & Miguel Segundo Ortin - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 79 (March 2020).
    Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that (...)
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  31. Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which (...)
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  32.  92
    Perception in Dreams: A Guide for Dream Engineers, a Reflection on the Role of Memory in Sensory States, and a New Counterexample to Hume’s Account of the Imagination.Fiona Macpherson - 2024 - In Daniel Gregory & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues. Springer. pp. 353–381.
    I argue that dreams can contain perceptual elements in multifarious, heretofore unthought-of ways. I also explain the difference between dreams that contain perceptual elements, perceptual experiences that contain dream elements, and having a dream and a perceptual experience simultaneously. I then discuss two applications of the resulting view. First, I explain how my taxonomy of perception in dreams will allow “dream engineers”—who try to alter the content of people’s dreams—to accurately classify different dreams and explore creating new forms of (...)
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  33. The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
    ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ (...)
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  34. Perception, Philosophical Perspectives.Fiona Macpherson - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This paper provides an introduction to, and overview of, the Philosophy of Perception.
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  35. Spatial perception: The perspectival aspect of perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12472.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes (...)
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  36. Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency.Joshua Shepherd & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3869-3893.
    One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely (...)
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  37. Silence Perception and Spatial Content.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):524-538.
    It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one can, in (...)
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  38.  84
    Students’ Perception of Rape and Sexual Violence and Methods of Prevention in Tertiary Institutions in Lagos State, Nigeria.Jummai S. Seriki-Mosadolorun, Ngozi O. Abiamuwe, Abimbola A. Emmanuel & Olugbenga I. Ojo - 2024 - International Journal of Home Economics, Hospitality and Allied Research 3 (1):129-138.
    This study examined students’ perception of rape and sexual violence and methods of prevention in tertiary institutions in Lagos State. It was a cross-sectional study carried out among one thousand, two hundred and eleven (1,211) female undergraduates selected from two tertiary institutions in Lagos State. The sample size for the study was one hundred and twenty-one (121) representing 10% of the population. Inferential statistics was used for analysis. The results revealed that majority of the students are aware of the (...)
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  39. Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein’s Account of Empathy.Monika Dullstein - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...)
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  40. Contents of Unconscious Color Perception.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):665-681.
    In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue (...)
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  41. Perception and Imagination.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 245-276.
    According to a traditional view, there is no categorical difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination; the only difference is in degree (of intensity, resolution, etc.) and/or in accompanying beliefs. There is no categorical difference between what it is like to perceive a dog and what it is like to imagine a dog; the former is simply more vivid and/or is accompanied by the belief that a dog is really there. A sustained argument against this (...)
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  42. Perception is not all-purpose.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.
    I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action and one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on (...)
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  43. Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. New York: Routledge.
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an (...)
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  44. Perception needs modular stimulus-control.Anders Nes - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-30.
    Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...)
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  45. Evaluative Perception: Introduction.Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences (...)
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  46. Public Perceptions concerning Responsibility for Climate Change Adaptation.Erik Persson, Kerstin Eriksson & Åsa Knaggård - 2021 - Sustainability 13 (22).
    For successful climate change adaptation, the distribution of responsibility within society is an important question. While the literature highlights the need for involving both public and private actors, little is still known of how citizens perceive their own and others’ responsibility, let alone the moral groundings for such perceptions. In this paper, we report the results of a survey regarding people’s attitudes towards different ways of distributing responsibility for climate change adaptation. The survey was distributed to citizens in six Swedish (...)
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  47. Direct perception and the predictive mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.
    Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as (...)
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  48. (1 other version)The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In Limbeck-Lilienau Christoph & Stadler Friedrich (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 149-170.
    Traditional accounts of the perception/cognition divide tend to draw it in terms of subpersonal psychological processes, processes into which the subject has no first-person insight. Whatever betides such accounts, there seems to also be some first-personally accessible difference between perception and thought. At least in normal circumstances, naïve subjects can typically tell apart their perceptual states from their cognitive or intellectual ones. What are such subjects picking up on when they do so? This paper is an inconclusive search (...)
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  49. (1 other version)If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?Ned Block - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755).
    The success of the Bayesian approach to perception suggests probabilistic perceptual representations. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why doesn't normal conscious perception reflect the full probability distributions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in MT/V5 that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look (...)
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  50. Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.Farid Masrour - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):565-593.
    This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this (...)
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