The article sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive stuff—that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all—but that is not a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the picture exclusively through the role that they play for the (...) dynamics of the primitive stuff. We show that such properties can be local, as well as holistic, and discuss two metaphysical options to conceive them, namely, Humeanism and modal realism in the guise of dispositionalism. 1 Introduction2 Primitive Ontology: Primitive Stuff3 The Physics of Matter as Primitive Stuff4 The Humean Best System Analysis of the Dynamical Variables5 Modal Realism about the Dynamical Variables6 Conclusion. (shrink)

Here is a common view. There exist things, and there exists stuff, where roughly, ‘thing’ is a count noun, and ‘stuff’ is a mass noun. Syntactically, ‘thing’ functions as a singular referring term that takes ‘a’ and ‘every’ and is subject to pluralisation, while ‘stuff’ functions as a plural referring term that takes ‘some’ and is not subject to pluralisation. Hence there exists a thing, and some stuff. Usual versions of the common view endorse two principles (...) about portions of stuff. The first principle is that (temporal) mereological essentialism is true of portions (parcels, masses, quantities) of stuff, where mereological essentialism is the thesis that for any persisting object or portion of stuff, that object or stuff has the same parts at every time at which it exists. The second principle is that portions of stuff obey a principle of stuff composition: for any two portions of stuff P1 and P2, there exists a portion of stuff that is the fusion of P1 and P2. I argue that these two principles are inconsistent. In particular, since I am sympathetic to PSC, I argue that mereological essentialism is false of portions of stuff. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to summarize a particular approach of doing metaphysics through physics - the primitive ontology approach. The idea is that any fundamental physical theory has a well-defined architecture, to the foundation of which there is the primitive ontology, which represents matter. According to the framework provided by this approach when applied to quantum mechanics, the wave function is not suitable to represent matter. Rather, the wave function has a nomological character, given that its (...) role in the theory is to implement the law of evolution for the primitive ontology. (shrink)

On one way of talking about a traditional metaethical topic, realists accept that some items appear on the list of what exists in the moral or more broadly normative domain of inquiry. They then divide over whether those items are like what science and experience suggest that all other items on the list of what exists across all domains are like – naturalistic and secular. Reductive naturalists answer this further question affirmatively. Why don’t nonnaturalists? I explore the answer that it’s (...) because normative entities are “just too different” in the sense that they are countably different things. However, I argue that this answer rests on the subtle presupposition that the normative domain doesn’t also contain uncountable entities of the sort that analytic metaphysicians call “stuff”. Taking intuitions of difference seriously points the way to a novel form of metaethical reductive naturalism. The key is to identify the stuff that matters. (shrink)

Here is a question about mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper.

This paper argues for including stuff in one's ontology. The distinction between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different ontologies of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure stuff ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. Eleven different reasons for including stuff in one's ontology are given. Then five objections to positing stuff are considered and rejected.

For a long time it was believed that it was impossible to be realist about quantum mechanics. It took quite a while for the researchers in the foundations of physics, beginning with John Stuart Bell [Bell 1987], to convince others that such an alleged impossibility had no foundation. Nowadays there are several quantum theories that can be interpreted realistically, among which Bohmian mechanics, the GRW theory, and the many-worlds theory. The debate, though, is far from being over: in what respect (...) should we be realist regarding these theories? Two diff erent proposals have been made: on the one hand, there are those who insist on a direct ontological interpretation of the wave function as representing physical bodies, and on the other hand there are those who claim that quantum mechanics is not really about the wave function. In this paper we will present and discuss one proposal of the latter kind that focuses on the notion of primitive ontology. (shrink)

In this paper I present the common structure of quantum theories with a primitive ontology, and discuss in what sense the classical world emerges from quantum theories as understood in this framework. In addition, I argue that the primitive ontology approach is better at answering this question than the rival wave function ontology approach or any other approach in which the classical world is nonreductively ‘emergent:’ even if the classical limit within this framework needs to be fully developed, (...) the difficulties are technical rather than conceptual, while this is not true for the alternatives. (shrink)

Eternalists believe that there is no ontological difference between the past, present and future. Thus, a challenge arises: in virtue of what does time have a direction? Some eternalists, Oaklander and Tegtmeier ) argue that the direction of time is primitive. A natural response to positing primitive directionality is the suspicion that said posit is too mysterious to do any explanatory work. The aim of this paper is to relieve primitive directionality of some of its mystery by (...) offering a novel way to understand the phenomenon in terms of the recently popularised notion of grounding. (shrink)

Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known theories and I will discuss the role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. I will then turn to a discussion of claims of between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the nature of primitives. I will then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their (...) primitives, and so I will turn to scrutinize the notion of "power" and "explanatory". (shrink)

I argue that McDowell-style disjunctivism, as the position is often cashed out, goes wrong because it takes the good epistemic standing of veridical perception to be grounded in “manifest” facts which do not necessarily satisfy any epistemic constraints. A better form of disjunctivism explains the difference between good and bad cases in terms of epistemic constraints that the states satisfy. This view allows us to preserve McDowell’s thesis that good cases make facts manifest, as long as manifest facts must satisfy (...) epistemic constraints. (shrink)

Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events then when we order events? de Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. (...) While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence. (shrink)

Theories of collective intentions must distinguish genuinely collective intentions from coincidentally harmonized ones. Two apparently equally apt ways of doing so are the ‘neo-reductionism’ of Bacharach (2006) and Gold and Sugden (2007a) and the ‘non-reductionism’ of Searle (1990, 1995). Here, we present findings from theoretical linguistics that show that we is not a cognitive primitive, but is composed of notions of I and grouphood. The ramifications of this finding on the structure both of grammatical and lexical systems suggests that (...) an understanding of collective intentionality does not require a primitive we-intention, but the notion of grouphood implicit in team reasoning, coupled with the individual concept I. This, we argue, supports neo-reductionism but poses difficulties for non-reductionism. (shrink)

It has recently been alleged that expressivism cannot account for the obvious fact that normative sentences and their negations express inconsistent kinds of attitudes. I explain how the expressivist can respond to this objection. I offer an account of attitudinal inconsistency that takes it to be a combination of descriptive and normative relations. The account I offer to explain these relations relies on a combination of functionalism about normative judgments and expressivism about the norms governing them. It holds that the (...) inconsistency of normative judgments is primitive. One potential problem for this view is that the large number of normative primitives that the expressivist will allegedly need to accept will render the view grossly unparsimonious. In defending this thesis, I suggest that it is a mistake to hold the lack of normative parsimony of expressivism against its core psychological claims. (shrink)

Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities (...) of birds. When this research is approached with a species-specific focus, it appears likely that one familiar species, the chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus), also exhibits primitive self-consciousness. Given the likelihood that they are primitively self-consciousness, chickens warrant a degree of moral standing that falls short of that enjoyed by persons, but which exceeds the minimal standing of merely conscious entities. (shrink)

This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are normatively on (...) a par. We will see why even consequentialists, in taking rightness to be in some sense determined by goodness, should not think that rightness is conceptually reducible to goodness. Finally, I will use the fittingness framework to explicate the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories, with particular attention to the contentious case of Rule Consequentialism. (shrink)

: In The Varieties of Consciousness, Kriegel argues that it is possible to devise a method to sort out the irreducible primitive phenomenologies that exist. In this paper I argue that his neutrality notwithstanding, Kriegel assumes a form of realism that leaves unresolved many of the conundrums that characterize the debate on consciousness. These problems are evident in the centrality he assigns to introspection and his characterization of cognitive phenomenology. Keywords : Consciousness; Introspection; Realism; Type-identity; Dispositional Properties I primitivi (...) della coscienza e la loro realtà Riassunto : In The Varieties of Consciousness Kriegel sostiene la possibilità di concepire un metodo per mettere ordine tra le esperienze fenomenicamente primitive effettivamente esistenti, ciascuna nella propria irriducibilità rispetto alle altre. In questo testo intendo sostenere che, nonostante la sua neutralità, Kriegel assume una forma di realismo che lascia aperti molti dei problemi che caratterizzano il dibattito sulla coscienza. Questi problemi diventano evidenti sia nella centralità assegnata all’introspezione sia nella caratterizzazione specifica della fenomenologia cognitiva. Parole chiave : Coscienza; Introspezione; Realismo; Identità di tipo; Proprietà disposizionali. (shrink)

Primitives are both important and unavoidable, and which set of primitives we endorse will greatly shape our theories and how those theories provide solutions to the problems that we take to be important. After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling (2013), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky (2013) between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions (...) cut across each other leading to four types of primitive posits. I then argue that theoretical virtues should be taken to be meta-theoretical ideological primitives. I close with some reflections on the global nature of comparing sets of primitives. (shrink)

Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is (...) independently attractive, and can be argued for directly. In this paper I offer what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of conceptual primitivism, which relies upon the Fregean doctrine of the omnipresence of truth. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the (...) wave function does not represent physical entities. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called ‘explanationism’ realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrarily to what is commonly though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive ontology approach is in better shape than the wave function ontology approach in resisting the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. (shrink)

Under so-called primitive ontology approaches, in fully describing the history of a quantum system, one thereby attributes interesting properties to regions of spacetime. Primitive ontology approaches, which include some varieties of Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories, are interesting in part because they hold out the hope that it should not be too difficult to make a connection between models of quantum mechanics and descriptions of histories of ordinary macroscopic bodies. But such approaches are dualistic, positing a quantum (...) state as well as ordinary material degrees of freedom. This paper lays out and compares some options that primitive ontologists have for making sense of the quantum state. (shrink)

私は哲学者(心理学者)ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインの有名なコメントから始めますが、ピンカーはほとんどの人と共有しています(進化した先天心理学のデフォルト設定のために)心の機能に関,する特定の偏見 、そしてウィトゲンシュタインは言語、思想、現実の働きに対するユニークで深遠な洞察を提供しています(彼は多かれ少なかれ同じ範囲と見なされています)。reはre、彼が言語の最も華麗で元のアナリストだったこ とを考えると最も残念であるこの巻のヴィトゲンシュタインへの言及だけです。 最後の章では、プラトンの洞窟の有名な比喩を使用して、彼は美しく心(言語、思考、意図的心理学)の概要と本を要約します - 盲目の利己主義の産物は、私たちの遺伝子のコピーを運ぶ近親者のための自動利他主義によってわずかにモデレートされます(包括的なフィットネス)-自動的に動作しますが、それにもかかわらず、私たちがその広大な能 力を利用して世界を生きるために私たちに大きな能力を採用できることを願って、アップビートノートで終わらせようとします。 ピンカーは確かに認識していますが、私たちの心理学についてはるかに多くが含まれているよりも取り残されているという事実についてはほとんど言いません。取り残されたり、最小限の注意を払われたりする人間性への窓 の中には、数学と幾何学、音楽と音、画像、出来事、因果関係、オントロジー(物事のクラスまたは私たちが知っていること), )、認識論(私たちが知っている方法)、性質(信じる、 思考、判断、意図など)と行動の意図的な心理学の残りの部分、神経伝達物質およびエンテオゲン、精神的な状態(例えば、サトリと啓蒙、脳刺激と記録、脳損傷および行動の赤字と障害、ゲームとスポーツ、決定理論(ゲ ーム理論と行動経済学を含む)、動物行動(非常に言語が、共有遺伝学の10億年)。これらの各分野の意図的心理学について、多くの本が書かれています。この本のデータは説明であり、なぜ私たちの脳がこのようにそれ を行うのか、どのように行われるのかを示す説明ではありません。文章をさまざまな方法で使用する方法(つまり、すべての意味を知っている)をどのように知っていますか?これは、ヴィトゲンシュタインが最も活発なレ ベルである、より基本的なレベルで動作する進化心理学です。そして、言葉がthe 使われる文脈=ヴィトゲンシュタインが開拓したアリーナに注目が集まっています。 それにもかかわらず、これは古典的な作品であり、これらの注意を払って、まだ読む価値があります。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Pinker는 (우리의 진화 된 타고난 심리학의 기본 설정으로 인해) 마음의 기능에 대한 특정 편견과 Wittgenstein이 독특하고 깊은 통찰력을 제공하기 때문에 철학자 (심리학자) Ludwig Wittgenstein의 유명한 의견으로 시작합니다. 언어, 사고 및 현실의 작업 (그가 다소 공동 확장 적이라고 보았 음)은 다른 곳에서는 발견되지 않았습니다. 이 책에는 위트 겐슈 타인에 대한 언급 만 있으며, 이는 그가 가장 훌륭하고 독창적 인 언어 분석 가라는 점을 고려하면 가장 불행한 일입니다.. 마지막 장에서, 플라톤의 동굴의 유명한 은유를 사용하여, 그는 아름답게 마음 (언어, 생각, 의도적 심리학)의 개요와 (...) 책을 요약 - 맹목적인 이기심의 제품, 우리의 유전자의 사본을 들고 가까운 친척에 대한 자동화 된 이타주의에 의해 약간만 중재 (포함 피트니스)-- 자동으로 작동하지만, 우리가 결코 희망을 부여하여 낙관적 인메모에 종료하려고 하지만, 우리는 결코 우리가 희망을 부여하여 낙관적 인 메모에 종료하려고 합니다. 핑커는 확실히 알고 있지만 우리의 심리학에 대한 훨씬 더 포함보다 제외된다는 사실에 대해 거의 말한다. 방치되거나 최소한의 주의를 기울이는 인간의 본성에 대한 창 중에는 수학과 기하학, 음악 및 사운드, 이미지, 이벤트 및 인과 관계, 온톨로지 (사물의 클래스 또는 우리가 알고있는 것), 대부분의 epistemology (우리가 알고있는 방법), 성향 (믿는, 생각, 판단, 의도 등) 행동의 의도적 인 심리학의 나머지, 신경 전달 물질과 entheogens, 영적 상태 (예를 들어, 사토리와 계몽, 뇌 자극 및 기록, 뇌 손상 및 행동 적자 와 장애, 게임과 스포츠, 결정 이론 (포함. 게임 이론과 행동 경제학), 동물 행동 (매우 작은 언어하지만 십억 년). 많은 책은 의도적 인 심리학의 이러한 각 영역에 대해 작성되었습니다. 이 책의 데이터는 설명이지, 왜 우리의 뇌가 이런 식으로 하는지 또는 어떻게 수행되는지를 보여주는 설명이 아닙니다. 우리는 어떻게 그들의 다양한 방법으로 문장을 사용하는 것을 알 수 있습니까 (즉, 모든 의미를 알고)? 이것은 더 기본적인 수준에서 작동 진화 심리학 – 비트 겐슈타인이 가장 활동적인 수준. 그리고 단어가 사용되는 맥락 = 비트겐슈타인이 개척한 경기장에 대한 관심이 부족합니다. 그럼에도불구하고, 이것은 고전적인 작품이며 이러한 주의사항으로 여전히 읽을 가치가 있습니다. 현대 의 두 systems보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

A formal model of the processes of digestion in a hypothetical cell is developed and discussed as a case study of how the threefold logic of Peircean semiotics works within Rosen’s paradigm of relational ontology. The formal model is used to demonstrate several fundamental differences between a relational description of biological processes and a mechanistic description. The formal model produces a logic of embodied generalization that is mediated and determined by the cell through its interactions with the environment. Specifically, the (...) synchronization of the functions of pattern recognition and semantic attribution results in an open and adaptive learning system that is stabilized by a hermeneutical circle. The relational principles of biosemiotics demonstrated through this case study are applicable to other biological systems, as well as to the relational ontology of systems theory, artificial intelligence systems, and relativistic quantum theory. (shrink)

W niniejszym tekście, poświęconym definiowaniu m. in. słów i zwrotów frazeologicznych podczas nauczania języków, autorka opisuje lingwistyczną teorię Anny Wierzbickiej, dotyczącą Natural Semantic Metalanguage i w adaptacyjnej formie przenosi ją na płaszczyznę zajęć z języka obcego, gdzie przynosi ona namacalne wyniki. Podczas zajęć językowych wymaga się od uczących się poprawnego definiowania ogólnego, które jednak rzadko przekazywane jest w podręcznikach i na wykładach, mimo iż zdolność ta nie jest wcale oczywista, samo definiowanie zaś nie jest łatwym zadaniem. Przeciwnie - od studentek (...) i studentów języków obcych oczekuje się mentalnego uzdolnienia w tym kierunku, nie uwzględniając faktu, że wiele osób ma trudności z definiowaniem nawet w języku ojczystym. W artykule autorka chce pokazać, że po części zignorowana teoria Anny Wierzbickiej ze swoim punktem wyjściowym, jakim są primes, pozwala uświadomić uczącym się języka obcego, że istotę słowa, wyrażenia czy frazy można wyjaśnić w oparciu o sposób określenia znaczenia, przyjęty w NSM. Nie jest przy tym konieczne, ażeby znaczenia opisywać i określać poprzez primes. Ważne jest, aby w celu uniknięcia błędnego koła podczas objaśnień definicji nie koncentrować się na synonimach i antonimach. Jak takie i podobne objaśnienia mogą wyglądać, pokazane jest na przykładach kilku definicji, które wyjaśnione zostały w oparciu o sposób określenia znaczenia przyjęty w NSM. Autorka dyskutuje również opisy i warunki działania takiej metody. Na zakończenie przedstawione są propozycje w zakresie metodologii nauczania umiejętności definiowania podczas zajęć języka obcego. (shrink)

The proper sensible criterion of sensory individuation holds that senses are individuated by the special kind of sensibles on which they exclusively bear about (colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc.). H. P. Grice objected to the proper sensibles criterion that it cannot account for the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing shapes or other common sensibles. That paper advances a novel answer to Grice's objection. Admittedly, the upholder of the proper sensible criterion must bind the proper sensibles –i.e. colors– (...) to the common sensibles –i.e. shapes– so as to account for the visual phenomenal character of shapes. But, as Grice rightly objected, neither association, nor ontological dependence will do –I spend some time isolating why dependence is a bad answer here, basically because the dependence of shape on colors is generic, and that genericity is arguably not part of the phenomenal content of perception. -/- Grice is wrong, however, to think that once association and dependence have been rebutted, there is no other way to attach color to extension. The right way to connect proper and common sensibles is rather trivial, although it seems to have been widely neglected: proper sensibles FILL common ones. To see a shape, by contrast to feeling it, is to perceived as filled by some color. To feel a shape, is to perceive it as, say, filled by pressure. Filling in is the phenomenal connection between proper and common sensibles. -/- One important corollary of that proposal is that proper sensibles –color, pressure, noise, taste...– have to belong to the category of stuffs, in the sense of uncountable entities. Against the widespread view that colors are properties, which have countable instances, the last part of the paper argues that colors are phenomenal stuffs, which fill some visual area. One commits a category mistake in asking: "How many tropes/instances of this determinate redness is there on that ladybird". One should rather ask "How much of this determinate redness is there on that ladybird". (shrink)

Recently scholars have been claiming that Aristotle’s biological explanations treat “facts about matter”—facts such as the degree of heat or amount of fluidity in an organism’s material constitution—as explanatorily basic or “primitive.” That is, these facts about matter are taken to be unexplained, brute facts about organisms, rather than ones that are explained by the organism’s form or essence, as we would have expected from Aristotle’s general commitment to the causal and explanatory priority of form over matter. In this (...) paper, I present three considerations for rejecting the view that facts about matter are primitive. First, there is evidence that those putative unexplained facts about degrees of heat, dryness, fluidity, etc. are, in fact, explained. Second, there are certain cases, such as human intelligence, where it would be quite implausible to consider the explanation in terms of degrees of heat to be starting from what Aristotle considers primitive facts. Third, the idea that facts about matter are as explanatorily primitive as facts about form requires a particular conception of the causal processes that the explanations mirror. But this conception of the causal processes conflicts with the way Aristotle characterizes them in Generation of Animals. There, heat is not treated as a causal factor that works “independently” of soul. In my view, these three considerations provide compelling reason to reject the claim that Aristotle’s biology treats facts about matter as primitive. (shrink)

Many metaphysicians posit primitives. These vary with respect to the theoretical work that they perform, but are all undefinable in more basic terms. I argue against the existence of metaphysical primitives on the grounds that, if they existed, they would be essentially primitive. However, if primitives were essentially primitive, then they would have an essence. Because they are primitive, they lack an essence, which undermines the original supposition that they are primitive. I close by mentioning some (...) implications this has both for metaphysicians and for metaphysics more generally. (shrink)

I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most (...) unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant and original analysts of language. -/- In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. -/- Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to context. -/- Nevertheless this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Preference, according to many theories of human behaviour, is a very important phenomenon. It is therefore some what surprising that philosophers of mind pay so little attention to it. One question about preference concerns its variety. Is preference always preference for one option or state of affairs rather than another? Or is there also, as ordinary language suggests, object-preference – preferences for one person rather than another, for one country rather than another, for one value rather than another? Another question (...) or rather group of questions concerns the nature of preference. Is it a mental state, disposition, act or episode, a theoretical construct, a purely behavioural phenomenon? If it is a mental state or act, is it an intellectual, affective or a conative phenomenon? If it is an affective phenomenon, does it enjoy a positive or negative “valence”? Is preference to be understood as a relation between a person’s attitudes or is it a primitive phenomenon? (shrink)

In this paper, we consider what is commonly referred to as Leibniz’s argument for primitive concepts. After presenting and criticizing (in sections 1 and 2) one recent rather straightforward way of interpreting this argument, by Paul Lodge and Stephen Puryear, which takes the argument to be merely about the structure of concepts, we offer an alternative way of looking at the argument. We think it is best seen as being fundamentally about the relation between thought and reality. In order (...) to prepare the ground for our reconstruction (which we present in section 5), we have to introduce his view of ideas or concepts (section 3), as well as some metaphysical principles concerning reality-dependence (section 4). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as if (...) primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

Quine’s way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes (Ways of Paradox, pp. 9-10) is criticized. The criticism is based on three premises: (1) no learnable language has infinitely many semantical primitives; (2) any language of which Quine’s theory is true has infinitely many semantical primitives; (3) English is a learnable language. The conclusion drawn is that Quine’s theory is not true of English.

The fundamental building block of the loop quantum gravity (LQG) is the spin network which is used to quantize the physical space-time in the LQG. Recently, the novel quantum spin is proposed using the basic concepts of the spin network. This perspective redefines the notion of the quantum spin and also introduces the novel definition of the reduced Planck constant. The implication of this perspective is not only limited to the quantum gravity; but also found in the quantum mechanics. Using (...) this perspective, we also propose the quantization of the mind-stuff. Similarity between the physical space-time and the space-time of the mind-stuff provides novel notions to study the space-time scientifically as well philosophically. The comparison between the physical- space-time and the space-time of the mind-stuff is also studied. (shrink)

It is quite well-known from Kurt G¨odel’s (1931) ground-breaking Incompleteness Theorem that rudimentary relations (i.e., those definable by bounded formulae) are primitive recursive, and that primitive recursive functions are representable in sufficiently strong arithmetical theories. It is also known, though perhaps not as well-known as the former one, that some primitive recursive relations are not rudimentary. We present a simple and elementary proof of this fact in the first part of the paper. In the second part, we (...) review some possible notions of representability of functions studied in the literature, and give a new proof of the equivalence of the weak representability with the (strong) representability of functions in sufficiently strong arithmetical theories. (shrink)

Marketing of food stuff to increase sale is possible with different methods. Capillary marketing is one of the most influential techniques in the issue of more sales in organizations especially in terms of selling food stuff. Food stuff should be sold in a short time due to the short durability. People who make better use of capillary marketing to supply their products and services can sell better and faster. Dependency of Iran's economy on oil incomes and affectability (...) of such incomes from political, economic and international issues cause vulnerability and fragility of the economy. One of the ways of coping with this situation is developing new products that improves inland economic condition and causes an increase in non oil exports. Meanwhile, in addition to the role of food stuff in inland economic development, it can have a determining role in non oil export. Most of the families don't have financial ability to respond steamy needs of their children. Such children are just happy with watching colorful food and being influenced by messages they don't tend to traditional food. In fact, advertisements tell children what to wear play and eat. In this study we are going to discuss marketing of children's food stuff and its advertising methods in Iran. Mitra Zarea Nemati "Investigating marketing of children's food stuff and methods of advertising in Iran" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-1 | Issue-4 , June 2017 . (shrink)

我首先从哲学家(心理学家)路德维希·维特根斯坦的一些著名评论开始,因为平克与大多数人(由于我们进化的先天心理学的默认设置)分享了对心灵功能的某些偏见,以及因为维特根斯坦提供了独特而深刻的见解,了解语言 、思想和现实(他认为或多或少是共性)在其他地方所没有的。本卷只提到维特根斯坦,这是最不幸的,因为他是最聪明和原始的语言分析家。 在最后一章中,他用柏拉图洞穴的著名比喻,完美地概括了这本书,概述了头脑(语言、思想、故意心理)——盲目自私的产物,只是通过自动利他主义来缓和。携带我们基因副本的亲戚(包容性健身)——自动工作,但试图以 乐观的结局结束,给我们希望,我们仍然可以利用其巨大的能力进行合作,使世界成为一个体面的生活场所。 平克当然知道,但很少说,我们的心理被遗漏了比包括更多。在人类自然的窗口,被排除在外或给予最少的关注是数学和几何,音乐和声音,图像,事件和因果关系,本体论(类的东西或我们所知道的),大多数认识论(我们如 何知道),处置(相信,思考,判断,打算等)和行动,神经递质和内生,精神状态(如,萨托里和启蒙,大脑刺激和记录,脑损伤和行为的故意心理学的其余部分缺陷和障碍,游戏和运动,决策理论(包括博弈论和行为经济学 ),动物行为(很少语言,但10亿年的共同遗传学)。许多关于有意心理学领域的书籍已经写好了。本书中的数据是描述,而不是说明为什么我们的大脑这样做或它是如何做到的解释。我们怎么知道用各种方式使用句子(即, 知道它们的所有含义)？这是进化心理学,在更基本的水平运作——维特根斯坦最活跃的水平。人们对使用词语的背景关注甚少——这是维特根斯坦开创的舞台。 然而,这是一部经典作品,这些警告仍然值得一读。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the mind, and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. There is only reference to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most unfortunate considering that he was (...) the most brilliant and original analyst of language. -/- In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes (Inclusive Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live. -/- Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things or what we know), most of epistemology (how we know), dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to the context in which words are used = an arena which Wittgenstein pioneered. -/- Nevertheless, this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

मैं दार्शनिक (मनोवैज्ञानिक) लुडविग Wittgenstein द्वारा कुछ प्रसिद्ध टिप्पणियों के साथ शुरू क्योंकि पिंकर ज्यादातर लोगों के साथ शेयरों (हमारे विकसित सहज मनोविज्ञान के डिफ़ॉल्ट सेटिंग्स के कारण) मन के कामकाज के बारे में कुछ पूर्वाग्रहों, और क्योंकि Wittgenstein भाषा, सोचा और वास्तविकता के कामकाज में अद्वितीय और गहरा अंतर्दृष्टि प्रदान करता है (जो वह अधिक या कम coextensive के रूप में देखा) कहीं और नहीं मिला. पुनः केवल इस मात्रा में Wittgenstein के लिए संदर्भ है, जो सबसे दुर्भाग्यपूर्ण विचार (...) है कि वह भाषा का सबसे प्रतिभाशाली और मूल विश्लेषक था. पिछले अध्याय में, प्लेटो गुफा के प्रसिद्ध रूपक का उपयोग कर, वह खूबसूरती से कैसे मन (भाषा, सोचा, जानबूझकर मनोविज्ञान) के एक सिंहावलोकन के साथ पुस्तक संक्षेप में प्रस्तुत करता है - अंधा स्वार्थ का एक उत्पाद, बंद के लिए केवल थोड़ा स्वचालित परोपकारिता द्वारा संचालित हमारे जीन (समावेशी स्वास्थ्य)की प्रतियां ले जाने के रिश्तेदारों - स्वचालित रूप से काम करता है,लेकिन हमें उम्मीद है कि हम फिर भी अपनी विशाल क्षमताओं को रोजगार के लिए सहयोग और दुनिया को जीने के लिए एक सभ्य जगह बना सकते हैं देकर एक उत्साहित नोट पर समाप्त करने की कोशिश करता है. पिंकर निश्चित रूप से के बारे में पता है, लेकिन तथ्य यह है कि अभी तक हमारे मनोविज्ञान के बारे में अधिक से अधिक शामिल से बाहर छोड़ दिया है के बारे में थोड़ा कहते हैं. मानव प्रकृति है कि बाहर छोड़ दिया है या कम से कम ध्यान दिया जाता है में खिड़कियों के बीच गणित और ज्यामिति, संगीत और लगता है, छवियों, घटनाओं और कारणता, आंटलजी (बातें या क्या हम जानते हैंकी कक्षाओं),epistemology के अधिकांश (कैसे हम जानते हैं), स्वभाव (विश्वास, सोच, पहचानने, इरादा आदि) और कार्रवाई के जानबूझकर मनोविज्ञान के बाकी, न्यूरोट्रांसमीटर और entheogens, आध्यात्मिक राज्यों (उदा, satori और ज्ञान, मस्तिष्क उत्तेजना और रिकॉर्डिंग, मस्तिष्क क्षति और व्यवहार घाटे और विकारों, खेल और खेल, निर्णय सिद्धांत (सहित खेल सिद्धांत और व्यवहार अर्थशास्त्र), पशु व्यवहार (बहुत कम भाषा लेकिन साझा आनुवंशिकी के एक अरब साल). कई किताबें जानबूझकर मनोविज्ञान के इन क्षेत्रों में से प्रत्येक के बारे में लिखा गया है. इस पुस्तक में डेटा विवरण हैं, स्पष्टीकरण नहीं है कि पता चलता है कि क्यों हमारे दिमाग यह इस तरह से करते हैं या यह कैसे किया जाता है. हम अपने विभिन्न तरीके से वाक्यों का उपयोग कैसे करना जानते हैं (यानी, उनके सभी अर्थ जानते हैं)? यह विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान है कि एक और अधिक बुनियादी स्तर पर चल रही है - स्तर जहां Wittgenstein सबसे अधिक सक्रिय है. और इस संदर्भ पर बहुत कम ध्यान दिया जाता है जिसमें शब्दों का प्रयोग किया जाता है - एक अखाड़ा जिसका विटगेनस्टीन ने बीड़ा उठाया था। फिर भी, यह एक क्लासिक काम है और इन सावधानी के साथ अभी भी अच्छी तरह से पढ़ने लायक है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

Comincio con alcuni commenti famosi del filosofo (psicologo) Ludwig Wittgenstein perché Pinker condivide con la maggior parte delle persone (a causa delle impostazioni predefinite della nostra psicologia innata evoluta) certi pregiudizi sul funzionamento della mente, e perché Wittgenstein offre approfondimenti unici e profondi sul funzionamento del linguaggio, del pensiero e della realtà (che ha visto come più o meno coetantana) non trovati altrove. Ilre è solo riferimento a Wittgenstein in questo volume, che è più sfortunato considerando che era il più (...) brillante e originale analista del linguaggio. Nell'ultimo capitolo, utilizzando la famosa metafora della grotta di Platone, riassume splendidamente il libro con una panoramica di come la mente (linguaggio, pensiero, psicologia intenzionale) – un prodotto di egoismo cieco, moderato solo leggermente da altruismo automatizzato per parenti stretti che trasportano copie dei nostri geni (Inclusive Fitness)- funziona automaticamente, ma cerca di finire in una nota ottimista dandoci la speranza che possiamo comunque impiegare le sue vaste capacità di cooperare e rendere il mondo un posto dignitoso. Pinker è certamente a conoscenza, ma dice poco sul fatto che molto di più sulla nostra psicologia è lasciato fuori di quanto incluso. Tra le finestre della natura umana che vengono lasciate fuori o che richiedono un'attenzione minima ci sono la matematica e la geometria, la musica e i suoni, le immagini, gli eventi e la causalità, l'ontologia (classi di cose o ciò che sappiamo), la maggior parte dell'epistemologia (come lo conosciamo), disposizioni (credenti, pensare, giudicare, intendere ecc.) e il resto della psicologia intenzionale dell'azione, neurotrasmettitori ed espiogeni, stati spirituali (ad esempio, satori e illuminazione, stimolazione e registrazione cerebrale, danni cerebrali e disturbi comportamentali, giochi e sport, teoria delle decisioni (inclusi la teoria dei giochi e l'economia comportamentale), il comportamento animale (molto poco linguaggio ma un miliardo di anni di errori genetici condivisi). Molti libri sono stati scritti su ognuna di queste aree della psicologia intenzionale. I dati di questo libro sono descrizioni, non spiegazioni che mostrano perché i nostri cervelli lo fanno in questo modo o come viene fatto. Come facciamo a sapere di usare le frasi nel loro modo diverso (cioè, conoscere tutti i loro significati)? Questa è la psicologia evolutiva che opera a un livello più elementare – il livello in cui Wittgenstein è più attivo. E c'è una particolare attenzione al contesto in cui vengono usate le parole, un'arena che Wittgenstein ha aperto la strada. Tuttavia, questo è un lavoro classico e con queste precauzioni è ancora ben vale la pena leggere. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Я начинаю с некоторых известных комментариев философа (психолог) Людвига Витгенштейна, потому что Пинкер акций с большинством людей (из-за настройки по умолчанию нашей развитой врожденной психологии) определенные предрассудки о функционировании ума, и потому, что Витгенштейн предлагает уникальные и глубокие идеи в работе языка, мысли и реальности (которые он рассматривал как более или менее совсеоблены) не найдено в другом месте. Rere является лишь ссылкой на Витгенштейна в этом томе, который является наиболее прискорбным, учитывая, что он был самым блестящим и оригинальным аналитиком языка. (...) В последней главе, используя знаменитую метафору пещеры Платона, он красиво обобщает книгу с обзором того, как ум (язык, мысль, умы, умы, умы, умы) - продукт слепого эгоизма, умеренный лишь слегка автоматизированным альтруизмом для близких родственников, несущих копии наших генов (Инклюзивный Фитнес)- работает автоматически, но пытается закончить на оптимистичной ноте, давая нам надежду, что мы можем, тем не менее, сделать это. Пинкер, безусловно, известно, но мало говорит о том, что гораздо больше о нашей психологии остается вне, чем включены. Среди окон в человеческую природу, которые остались в стороне или уделяется минимальное внимание математики и геометрии, музыка и звуки, изображения, события и причинно-следственная связь, онтологии (классы вещей или то, что мы знаем), большинство эпистемологии (как мы знаем), диспозиции (вера, мышления, судить, намереваясь и т.д.) и остальные преднамеренной психологии действия, нейротрансмиттеров и энфеогенов, духовных состояний (например, satori и просветления, стимуляции мозга и записи, повреждения мозга и поведенческих дефицитов и расстройств, игры и спорт, теория принятия решений (в том же теории игры и поведенческой экономики), поведение животных (очень мало языка, но миллиард лет общей генетики). Много книг было написано о каждой из этих областей преднамеренной психологии. Данные в этой книге являются описаниями, а не объяснения, которые показывают, почему наш мозг делает это таким образом или как это делается. Как мы знаем, чтобы использовать предложения по-разному (т.е., знать все их значения)? Это эволюционная психология, которая работает на более базовом уровне – уровне, где Витгенштейн наиболее активен. И есть скудное внимание к контексту, context в котором слова используются - арена, которую Витгенштейн впервые. Тем неменее, это классическая работа и с этими предостережениями по-прежнему стоит прочитать. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Mary Beard argues against the claim that its relationship to British colonialism adequately explains why The Golden Bough was popular, drawing attention to other stuff in the book aside from information about British colonies. I make an objection that British colonialists would have been interested in expanding their empire.

My modest aim in this piece is to frame and illuminate some of the issues surrounding normative motivation, rather than take a firm position on any of them. I begin by clarifying the key terms in my title of this essay, and unpacking some of the assumptions that underpin its question. I then distinguish four kinds of answers one might give. In this short essay I will not be able to properly develop and evaluate an argument for the view that (...) normative motivations are psychologically primitive, but I will have some comments about what such an argument might look like, and what it would have to show. (shrink)

By formalizing some classical facts about provably total functions of intuitionistic primitive recursive arithmetic (iPRA), we prove that the set of decidable formulas of iPRA and of iΣ1+ (intuitionistic Σ1-induction in the language of PRA) coincides with the set of its provably ∆1-formulas and coincides with the set of its provably atomic formulas. By the same methods, we shall give another proof of a theorem of Marković and De Jongh: the decidable formulas of HA are its provably ∆1-formulas.

Moral obligation and permissibility are usually thought to be interdefinable. Following the pattern of the duality definitions of necessity and possibility, we have that something’s being permissible could be defined as its not being obligatory to not do it. And that something’s being obligatory could be defined as its not being permissible to not do it. In this paper, I argue that neither direction of this alleged interdefinability works. Roughly, the problem is that a claim that some act is obligatory (...) or permissible entails that there is a moral law, whereas a negative claim that some act is not obligatory or not permissible does not. Nevertheless, one direction of the interdefinability can potentially be salvaged. I argue that, if we do not require the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas, then there is a way to plausibly define obligation in terms of permissibility. I conclude that permissibility is the only feasible deontic primitive. (shrink)

Although our concepts of “Mama,” “milk,” and “mice” have much in common, the suggestion that they are identical in structure in the mind of the prelinguistic child is mistaken. Even infants think about objects as different from substances and appreciate the distinction between kinds (e.g., mice) and individuals (e.g., Mama). Such cognitive capacities exist in other animals as well, and have important adaptive consequences.

In a recent paper, Dennis Plaisted examines an important argument that Leibniz gives for the existence of primitive concepts. After sketching a natural reading of this argument, Plaisted observes that the argument appears to imply something clearly inconsistent with Leibniz’s other views. To save Leibniz from contradiction, Plaisted offers a revision. However, his account faces a number of serious difficulties and therefore does not successfully eliminate the inconsistency. We explain these difficulties and defend a more plausible alternative. In the (...) process, we call attention to the neglected topic of Leibniz’s views on the nature of conceiving, and reveal his commitment to the somewhat surprising thesis that one can conceive something through a concept even if one has no conscious grasp of that concept. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. (...) `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues. (shrink)

The paper presents a phenomenological approach to recent debates in the philosophy of language about rule-following and the normativity of meaning, a debate that can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations but that was given new life with Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Taking a cue from Hannah Ginsborg’s recent work on “primitive normativity,” I use some of Husserl’s own comments about meaning and the status of rules to sketch a solution to Kripke’s rule-following paradox (...) by appealing to a kind of normativity at the level of perception and intersubjective embodiment. This level of normativity arises, like Ginsborg’s, via a primitive kind of judgment that does not presuppose linguistic or conceptual mastery. Unlike for Ginsborg, however, for Husserl this level should still be understood in terms of meaning—just not in the standard linguistic or conceptual senses prominent in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition in which the rule-following debates have occurred. My interpretation thus also demonstrates how Husserl’s account bypasses certain presuppositions about meaning common in the period of the linguistic turn—presuppositions also questioned, in different ways, by Wittgenstein, by Kripke, and by Ginsborg. (shrink)