Results for 'Gilbert Edward Plumer'

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  1.  10
    Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. pp. 365-377.
    I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.
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  2. Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. pp. 365-377.
    I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.
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  3. The non-existence of “inference claims”.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2019 - In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell & Jean Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Sic Sat. pp. 913-918.
    Some believe that all arguments make an implicit “inference claim” that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level “inference claim” that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.
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  4. Carroll’s Regress Times Three.Gilbert Plumer - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):551-571.
    I show that in our theoretical representations of argument, vicious infinite regresses of self-reference may arise with respect to each of the three usual, informal criteria of argument cogency: the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. They arise needlessly, by confusing a cogency criterion with argument content. The three types of regress all are structurally similar to Lewis Carroll’s famous regress, which involves quantitative extravagance with no explanatory power. Most attention is devoted to the sufficiency criterion, including its (...)
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  5. On Novels as Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (4):488-507.
    If novels can be arguments, that fact should shape logic or argumentation studies as well as literary studies. Two senses the term ‘narrative argument’ might have are (a) a story that offers an argument, or (b) a distinctive argument form. I consider whether there is a principled way of extracting a novel’s argument in sense (a). Regarding the possibility of (b), Hunt’s view is evaluated that many fables and much fabulist literature inherently, and as wholes, have an analogical argument structure. (...)
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  6. Time as Success.Gilbert Plumer - 1984 - International Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):35-55.
    Partly following suggestions from Dewey, I show how we may acquire the concepts of Now and time without our being able to sense time. I rationally reconstruct these concepts by ‘deriving’ them from the concepts of ‘required for’ and ‘sensed’ (taken tenselessly). Among other reasons, because activity is explicitly required for succeeding or failing, and because these ubiquitous conditions are sensed, our concept of time is rooted squarely in our experience of these conditions.
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  7. A Defense of Taking Some Novels As Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2015 - In B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Sic Sat. pp. 1169-1177.
    This paper’s main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indirect transcendental argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. Three related objections are addressed. First, the Stroud-type objection would be that from believability, the only conclusion that could be licensed concerns how we must think or conceive of the real world. Second, Currie holds that such notions are probably false: the empirical evidence “is all against this idea…that (...)
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  8. Commentary on: Jesse Bohl's "What are we to do about traditional logic?".Gilbert Plumer - 2000 - In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-4.
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  9. Presumptions, Assumptions, and Presuppositions of Ordinary Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):469-484.
    Although in some contexts the notions of an ordinary argument’s presumption, assumption, and presupposition appear to merge into the one concept of an implicit premise, there are important differences between these three notions. It is argued that assumption and presupposition, but not presumption, are basic logical notions. A presupposition of an argument is best understood as pertaining to a propositional element (a premise or the conclusion) e of the argument, such that the presupposition is a necessary condition for the truth (...)
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  10. Commentary on: Marcin Lewiński’s “‘You’re moving from irrelevant to irrational’—Critical Reactions in Internet Discussion Forums”.Gilbert Plumer - 2009 - In Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-3.
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  11. Novels as Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden & Gordon Mitchell (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Rozenberg / Sic Sat. pp. 1547-1558.
    The common view is that no novel IS an argument, though it might be reconstructed as one. This is curious, for we almost always feel the need to reconstruct arguments even when they are uncontroversially given as arguments, as in a philosophical text. We make the points as explicit, orderly, and (often) brief as possible, which is what we do in reconstructing a novel’s argument. The reverse is also true. Given a text that is uncontroversially an explicit, orderly, and brief (...)
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  12. Phenomenological Argumentative Structure.Gilbert Plumer - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (2):173-189.
    The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions--they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure--for legitimacy, and because these (...)
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  13. The Transcendental Argument of the Novel.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):148-167.
    Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if (...)
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  14. Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference.Gilbert Plumer - 1980 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):71-94.
    The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing <this> on the model of a predicable (or property).
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  15. Necessary Assumptions.Gilbert Plumer - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1):41-61.
    In their book EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING Stephen Norris and Robert Ennis say: “Although it is tempting to think that certain [unstated] assumptions are logically necessary for an argument or position, they are not. So do not ask for them.” Numerous writers of introductory logic texts as well as various highly visible standardized tests (e.g., the LSAT and GRE) presume that the Norris/Ennis view is wrong; the presumption is that many arguments have (unstated) necessary assumptions and that readers and test takers (...)
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  16. Argumentatively Evil Storytelling.Gilbert Plumer - 2016 - In D. Mohammend & M. Lewinski (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon 2015, Vol. 1. College Publications. pp. 615-630.
    What can make storytelling “evil” in the sense that the storytelling leads to accepting a view for no good reason, thus allowing ill-reasoned action? I mean the storytelling can be argumentatively evil, not trivially that (e.g.) the overt speeches of characters can include bad arguments. The storytelling can be argumentatively evil in that it purveys false premises, or purveys reasoning that is formally or informally fallacious. My main thesis is that as a rule, the shorter the fictional narrative, the greater (...)
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  17. Commentary on: Marc Champagne’s “We, the Professional Sages: Analytic philosophy’s arrogation of argument".Gilbert Plumer - 2009 - In Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-4.
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  18. Cognition and Literary Ethical Criticism.Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18--21, 2011. OSSA. pp. 1-9.
    “Ethical criticism” is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully selected novels can make us ethically better people, e.g., by stimulating our sympathetic imagination (Nussbaum). I try to show that this nonargumentative approach cheapens the persuasive force of novels and that its inherent bias and censorship undercuts what is perhaps the principal value and defense of the novel—that reading novels can be critical to one’s learning how to think.
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  19. Can Literary Fiction be Suppositional Reasoning?Gilbert Plumer - 2020 - In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar & Bart Verheij (eds.), Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation, Vol. III. College Publications+. pp. 279-289.
    Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) “extract knowledge from the sheer workings of their own minds” (Rosa), even where the knowledge is synthetic a posteriori. Can literary fiction pull such a rabbit out of its hat? Where P is a work’s fictional ‘premise’, some hold that some works reason declaratively (supposing P, Q), imperatively (supposing P, do Q), or interrogatively (supposing P, Q?), and that this can be a source of knowledge if the reasoning is good. True, (...)
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  20. A Review of the LSAT Using Literature on Legal Reasoning.Gilbert E. Plumer - 2000 - Law School Admission Council Computerized Testing Report 97 (8):1-19.
    Research using current literature on legal reasoning was conducted with the goals of (a) determining what skills are most important in good legal reasoning according to such literature, (b) determining the extent to which existing Law School Admission Test item types and subtypes are designed to assess those skills, and (c) suggesting test specifications or new or refined item types and formats that could be developed in the future to assess any important skills that appear [by (a) and (b)] to (...)
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  21. Commentary on: John E. Fields' "Credibility and commitment in the making of truly astonishing first-person reports".Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-4.
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  22. Commentary on: Chiara Pollaroli's "T(r)opical patterns in advertising".Gilbert Plumer - 2013 - In M. Lewiński D. Mohammed (ed.), Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric, and the University of Windsor. pp. 1-5.
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  23. Kant’s Neglected Argument Against Consequentialism.Gilbert Plumer - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):501-520.
    The paper interprets Kant’s neglected argument at FOUNDATIONS 401 as consisting of these two premises and conclusion: (1) It follows from consequentialism that in a natural paradise people would not be obligated to be morally good. (2) But this is absurd; one ought to be morally good no matter what. Therefore, consequentialism is false. It is shown that this argument is a powerful one, mainly by showing that independent grounds support (2) and that (1) may survive a number of strong (...)
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  24. Can Cogency Vanish?Gilbert Plumer - 2016 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 8 (1):89-109.
    This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it (...)
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  25. Mustn't whatever is referred to exist?Gilbert Plumer - 1989 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):511-528.
    Some hold that proper names and indexicals are “Kaplan rigid”: they designate their designata even in worlds where the designata don’t exist. An argument they give for this is based on the analogy between time and modality. It is shown how this argument gains forcefulness at the expense of carefulness. Then the argument is criticized as forming a part of an inconsistent philosophical framework, the one with which David Kaplan and others operate. An alternative account of a certain class of (...)
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  26. A Here-Now Thery of Indexicality.Gilbert Plumer - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:193-211.
    This paper attempts to define indexicality so as to semantically distinguish indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions. The widely-accepted approach that says that indexical reference is distinctive in being dependent on context of use is criticized. A reductive approach is proposed and defended that takes an indexical to be (roughly) an expression that either is or is equivalent to ‘here’ or ‘now’, or is such that a tokening of it refers by relating something to the place and/or time that (...)
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  27. Two Epistemic Issues for a Narrative Argument Structure.Gilbert Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. College Publications. pp. 519-526.
    The transcendental approach to understanding narrative argument derives from the idea that for any believable fictional narrative, we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true of human nature in order for the narrative to be believable? I address two key issues: whether only realistic or realist fictional narratives are believable, and how could it be established that we have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature that grounds believability?
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  28. Truth and Collective Truth.Gilbert Plumer - 1996 - Dialectica 50 (1):3-24.
    The paper argues for the applicability of the notion of collective truth as opposed to distributive truth, that is, truth at times or possibilia taken in groups rather than individually. The underlying reasoning is that there are transtemporal and transworld relationships, e.g., those involving the relations of <being a descendant of> and <thinking about>. Relationships are (one type of) truth-makers. Hence, there are transtemporal and transworld truth-makers. Therefore, there is transtemporal and transworld truth, i.e., collective truth. A semantics is developed (...)
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  29. The Paradoxical Associated Conditional of Enthymemes.Gilbert Plumer - 2000 - In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8.
    Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...)
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  30. Reasoning from Conflicting Sources.Gilbert Plumer & Kenneth Olson - 2007 - In H. V. Hanson (ed.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground. pp. 1-9.
    One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is EVERYTHING. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from multiple sources. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to develop an adequate approach to accounting for this given.
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  31. Kaplan Rigidity, Time, and Modality.Gilbert Plumer - 1988 - Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):329-335.
    Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” are true (...)
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  32.  20
    Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass.Plumer Gilbert - 2018 - In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat (eds.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. pp. 365-377.
    I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.
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  33. Review of John Woods, Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic. [REVIEW]Gilbert Plumer - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (1):147-156.
    This article reviews John Wood’s Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic.
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  34. Reasoning in Listening.Kenneth Olson & Gilbert Plumer - 2011 - In Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden & Gordon Mitchell (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Rozenberg / Sic Sat. pp. 803-806.
    Our thesis is that reasoning plays a greater—or at least a different—role in understanding oral discourse such as lectures and speeches than it does in understanding comparatively long written discourse. For example, both reading and listening involve framing hypotheses about the direction the discourse is headed. But since a reader can skip around to check and revise hypotheses, the reader’s stake in initially getting it right is not as great as the listener’s, who runs the risk of getting hopelessly lost. (...)
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  35. What Constitutes a Formal Analogy?Kenneth Olson & Gilbert Plumer - 2002 - In Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson & Robert C. Pinto (eds.), Argumentation and its Applications, CD-ROM. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8.
    There is ample justification for having analogical material in standardized tests for graduate school admission, perhaps especially for law school. We think that formal-analogy questions should compare different scenarios whose structure is the same in terms of the number of objects and the formal properties of their relations. The paper deals with this narrower question of how legitimately to have formal analogy test items, and the broader question of what constitutes a formal analogy in general.
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  36. In pursuit of the rarest of birds: an interview with Gilbert Faccarello.Gilbert Faccarello, Joost Hengstmengel & Thomas R. Wells - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):86-108.
    GILBERT JEAN FACCARELLO (Paris, 1950) is professor of economics at Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, and a member of the Triangle research centre (École Normale Supérieure de Lyon and CNRS). He is presently chair of the ESHET Council (European Society for the History of Economic Thought). He completed his doctoral research in economics at Université de Paris X Nanterre. He has previously taught at the Université de Paris-Dauphine, Université du Maine and École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay/Saint-Cloud (now École Normale Supérieure de (...)
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  37. Il relativismo etico fra antropologia culturale e filosofia analitica.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2007 - In Ilario Tolomio, Sergio Cremaschi, Antonio Da Re, Italo Francesco Baldo, Gian Luigi Brena, Giovanni Chimirri, Giovanni Giordano, Markus Krienke, Gian Paolo Terravecchia, Giovanna Varani, Lisa Bressan, Flavia Marcacci, Saverio Di Liso, Alice Ponchio, Edoardo Simonetti, Marco Bastianelli, Gian Luca Sanna, Valentina Caffieri, Salvatore Muscolino, Fabio Schiappa, Stefania Miscioscia, Renata Battaglin & Rossella Spinaci (eds.), Rileggere l'etica tra contingenza e principi. Ilario Tolomio (ed.). Padova: CLUEP. pp. 15-46.
    I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...)
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  38. Gametogênese Animal: Espermatogênese e Ovogênese.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    GAMETOGÊNESE -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE Embrapa Semiárido -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- Os estudantes bem informados, estão a buscando conhecimento a todo momento. O estudante de Veterinária e Zootecnia, sabe que a Reprodução é uma área de primordial importância para sua carreira. Logo, o conhecimento da mesma torna-se indispensável. No primeiro trabalho da série fisiologia reprodutiva dos animais domésticos, foi abordado de forma clara, didática e objetiva os mecanismos de diferenciação (...)
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  39. Hormônios e Sistema Endócrino na Reprodução Animal.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva & Emanuel Isaque Da Silva - manuscript
    HORMÔNIOS E SISTEMA ENDÓCRINO NA REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL -/- OBJETIVO -/- As glândulas secretoras do corpo são estudadas pelo ramo da endocrinologia. O estudante de Veterinária e/ou Zootecnia que se preze, deverá entender os processos fisio-lógicos que interagem entre si para a estimulação das glândulas para a secreção de vários hormônios. -/- Os hormônios, dentro do animal, possuem inúmeras funções; sejam exercendo o papel sobre a nutrição, sobre a produção de leite e sobre a reprodução, os hormônios desempenham um primordial papel (...)
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  40. Bending Moral Philosophy and Philosophy of History Toward Each Other.Bennett Gilbert - manuscript
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  41.  90
    A Memoir of My Reading.Bennett Gilbert - 2024 - On_Culture 16 (16).
    Surveying nearly seven decades of habitual and obsessive reading, I consider how my character and psychology used reading to shape philosophical questions that move me into forms in which I could pursue them by reading. This became both the method and the substance of my philosophical work. It preserved some core emotional issues but also gave me the way to integrate them into scholarship and into my life.
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  42. Shame and History.Bennett Gilbert - 2024 - Geschichtstheorie Am Werk.
    If history—our past, the sum of our thoughts, passions, and deeds—is so pervasive, influential, and meaningful, why then do we lose sight of it? Why do we not gain good values from it? And if it is part of our existential core, why then do we so often fail to ravel it into our deliberations? I propose that very often and to a great degree it is shame that separates us from history.
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  43. On Willing Surrender as Virtuous Self-Constitution.Bennett Gilbert - 2024 - Consecutio Rerum: Rivista Critica Della Postmodernità 14:199-217.
    Our cultural situation is to seek a moral form of self-constitution, rather than an ontological or epistemological foundation. Such a moral ground lies in the paradox of willing surrender of the will to do wrong or dysfunctional acts in order to enter temporally-extended processes of moral change. But the paradox of willing surrender of the will requires analysis. The propositional form of it cannot be sustained and must instead give way to willingness as an ongoing choice. The self-reflexivity of the (...)
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  44. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (278):622-624.
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  45. Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups: Some Methodological Considerations.Margaret Gilbert & Daniel Pilchman - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.
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  46. Mind, experience, language (by “Le McDowell” Edward?).Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper identifies three positions on the relationship between language and experience, the third of which I was not acquainted with before from my reading. It seems absurd.
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  47. Spacetime, Ontology, and Structural Realism.Edward Slowik - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):147 – 166.
    This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes.
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  48. Trust, Mistrust, and Autonomy.Edward Hinchman & Andrea Westlund - 2023 - In Mark Alfano & David Collins (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Trust. Lexington Books. pp. 105-121.
    Is autonomy – governing yourself – compatible with letting yourself be governed by trust? This paper argues that autonomy is not only compatible with appropriate trust but actually requires it. Autonomy requires appropriate trust because it is undermined by inappropriate mistrust. An autonomous agent treats herself as answerable for her action-guiding commitments, where answerability requires openness to the rational influence of external, critical perspectives on those commitments. This openness to correction makes one vulnerable to manipulation and can be exploited in (...)
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  49. Ο χάρτης πορείας ενός γενετιστή για τη λογική κατανόηση του σύμπαντος.Gilbert B. Côté - manuscript - Translated by Gilbert B. Côté.
    Translation in Greek of "A Geneticist's Roadmap to Sanity" (2019) by G.B. Côté. Μεταφράστηκε και στα Γαλλικά από τους Gilbert B. Côté και Roger Lapalme και προστέθηκε η βιβλιογραφία στις 28 του Απρίλη 2020: Pour comprendre le monde et revenir à la raison. La théorie du tout d'un généticien. Η ώθηση για τη συγγραφή ήταν η ανήθικη προεδρία του Donald J. Trump. Σε αυτό το κείμενο, θέλω να εξερευνήσω τα θεμέλια της ύπαρξής μας. Θα θίξω σύντομα την ενσυνείδηση, την (...)
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  50. What is moral relativism?Gilbert Harman - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 143--161.
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