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  1. Berkeley y la sustancia espiritual / Berkeley and the Spiritual Substance.Alberto Luis López - 2018 - In Laura Benítez Grobet & Luis Ramos-Alarcón Marcín (eds.), El concepto de substancia de Spinoza a Hegel. Mexico City, CDMX, Mexico: pp. 211-232.
    In this paper I have the purpose to analyze George Berkeley’s concept of substance. For this goal, it will be necessary first to track the manner that Berkeley was conceiving that concept, that is, how it was determining in his early philosophy and what kind of role had in it. To make this it must be necessary to review the early notes knowing in Spanish as Philosophical Commentaries; and subsequently it will be required to retake the published work, particularly the (...)
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  2. Berkeley: el conocimiento nocional de la mente / Berkeley on the Notional Knowledge of Mind.Alberto Luis López - 2017 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 22 (1):137-154.
    In this paper I expose and analyze the berkeleian proposal of notional knowledge. Among other things, this proposal represents Berkeley´s attempt to know the mind or spirit, that is, the thinking and active thing that, by its own activity, results unrepresentable as idea. As such knowledge is already mentioned in the Philosophical Commentaries I will refer to them to know the origins of that proposal. However, as notional knowledge appears in more detail in later works I will make use especially (...)
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  3. Berkeley's Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance.Stephen Daniel - 2008 - In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought. Humanity Books.
    For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, I (...)
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Berkeley: Epistemology of Mind
  1. Knowing Me, Knowing You: Berkeley on Self-Knowledge and Other Minds.Peter West - 2020 - The Self and Self-Knowledge in Early Modern Philosophy.
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  2. Berkeley on God's Knowledge of Pain.Stephen H. Daniel - 2018 - In Stefan Storrie (ed.), Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-145.
    Since nothing about God is passive, and the perception of pain is inherently passive, then it seems that God does not know what it is like to experience pain. Nor would he be able to cause us to experience pain, for his experience would then be a sensation (which would require God to have senses, which he does not). My suggestion is that Berkeley avoids this situation by describing how God knows about pain “among other things” (i.e. as something whose (...)
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  3. Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision.Juan R. Loaiza - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (2):231-247.
    I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions are interpreted as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) (...)
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  4. Berkeley's Doctrine of Mind and the “Black List Hypothesis”: A Dialogue.Stephen H. Daniel - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):24-41.
    Clues about what Berkeley was planning to say about mind in his now-lost second volume of the Principles seem to abound in his Notebooks. However, commentators have been reluctant to use his unpublished entries to explicate his remarks about spiritual substances in the Principles and Dialogues for three reasons. First, it has proven difficult to reconcile the seemingly Humean bundle theory of the self in the Notebooks with Berkeley's published characterization of spirits as “active beings or principles.” Second, the fact (...)
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Berkeley: Sensory Perception
  1. Ontología y mundo externo en Berkeley / Berkeley's Ontology and the External World.Alberto Luis López - 2020 - Logos 135 (48):11-23.
    It is common for some readers to misunderstand Berkeley’s position by believing that he denies the existence of the external world, and his philosophy inevitably leads to solipsism. Faced with these readings, I discuss in this paper the relationship between ontology and the external world in Berkeley, with the aim of clarifying some interpretative errors in that matter and showing with that three things: 1) that is a mistake to believe Berkeley’s philosophy eliminate the external world and lead to solipsism, (...)
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  2. Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas; entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...)
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  3. From Perception to Metaphysics: Reflections on Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty.John T. Sanders - manuscript
    George Berkeley's apparently strange view – that nothing exists without a mind except for minds themselves – is notorious. Also well known, and equally perplexing at a superficial level, is his insistence that his doctrine is no more than what is consistent with common sense. It was every bit as crucial for Berkeley that it be demonstrated that the colors are really in the tulip, as that there is nothing that is neither a mind nor something perceived by a mind. (...)
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  4. The Semantics of Sense Perception in Berkeley.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (3):249-268.
    George Berkeley's linguistic account of sense perception is one of the most central tenets of his philosophy. It is intended as a solution to a wide range of critical issues in both metaphysics and theology. However, it is not clear from Berkeley's writings just how this ‘universal language of the Author of Nature’ is to be interpreted. This paper discusses the nature of the theory of sense perception as language, together with its metaphysical and theological motivations, then proceeds to develop (...)
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Berkeley: Vision
  1. Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision.Juan R. Loaiza - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (2):231-247.
    I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions are interpreted as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) (...)
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  2. The Sensory Core and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 1979 - Isis 70 (3):363-384.
    This article seeks the origin, in the theories of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen), Descartes, and Berkeley, of two-stage theories of spatial perception, which hold that visual perception involves both an immediate representation of the proximal stimulus in a two-dimensional ‘‘sensory core’’ and also a subsequent perception of the three dimensional world. The works of Ibn al-Haytham, Descartes, and Berkeley already frame the major theoretical options that guided visual theory into the twentieth century. The field of visual perception was the first area (...)
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  3. Berkeley Without God.Margaret Atherton - 1995 - In Robert G. Muehlmann (ed.), Berkeley's Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays. The Pennsylvania State University Press.
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Berkeley: Heterogeneity Thesis
  1. Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision.Juan R. Loaiza - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (2):231-247.
    I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions are interpreted as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) (...)
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Berkeley: Sensory Perception, Misc
  1. A Oposição de Berkeley Ao Ceticismo.Jaimir Conte - 2008 - Cadernos de História de Filosofia da Ciência 18 (2):3225-355.
    One of Berkeley’s main goals in the Principles and in the Three Dialogues, as expressly stated in the full titles these two works, as well as in the Philosophical Commen-taries, is the refutation of skepticism. This article aims to elucidate what Berkeley means by skepticism and to indicate which principles or doctrines, according to him, are at the root of the skeptics’ doubts. An attempt is made to show how Berkeley elaborated his opposition to skepticism. Finally, it is suggested that (...)
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Berkeley: Primary and Secondary Qualities
  1. Berkeley and Locke.Patrick J. Connolly - forthcoming - In Samuel C. Rickless (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Berkeley. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter revisits three key disagreements between Locke and Berkeley. The disagreements relate to abstraction, the idea of substance, and the status of the primary/secondary quality distinction. The goal of the chapter is to show that these disagreements are rooted in a more fundamental disagreement over the nature of ideas. For Berkeley, ideas are tied very closely to perceptual content. Locke adopts a less restrictive account of the nature of ideas. On his view, ideas are responsible for both perceptual content (...)
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  2. Molyneux’s Question in Berkeley’s Theory of Vision.Juan R. Loaiza - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (2):231-247.
    I propose a reading of Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision in which Molyneux-type questions are interpreted as thought experiments instead of arguments. First, I present the general argumentative strategy in the NTV, and provide grounds for the traditional reading. Second, I consider some roles of thought experiments, and classify Molyneux-type questions in the NTV as constructive conjectural thought experiments. Third, I argue that (i) there is no distinction between Weak and Strong Heterogeneity theses in the NTV; (ii) (...)
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Berkeley: Ideas
  1. Consider the mind in reaching the truth of George Berkeley.Pattamawadee Sankheangaew - manuscript
    This article aims to study George Berkeley's subjective concept of psychoism to analyze George Burley's subjective concept. The results of the study showed that in Berkeley's philosophy, the idea is not exactly what it really is. But the idea is the potential of the mind to make us aware of the outside world. The perception must therefore start from the mind to the outside world. Berkeley's philosophy is more focused on specific things than the general. The existence of the outside (...)
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  2. Sobre la ontología inmaterialista: el concepto de idea en Berkeley / On Immaterialist Ontology: Berkeley's Concept of Idea.Alberto Luis López - 2019 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 31 (2):427-449.
    Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy has been frequently underestimated as a result of the misunderstanding of his ontological proposal, specifically because of the complexity of his concept of idea. The aim of this paper is then to clarify and explain that concept because from it depends the correct understanding of Berkeley’s ontological and immaterialist proposal. To do this, 1) I will show some examples of the misunderstanding that the berkeleian proposal has had, mainly due to his concept of idea; 2) I will (...)
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  3. Berkeley and Locke.Patrick J. Connolly - forthcoming - In Samuel C. Rickless (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Berkeley. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter revisits three key disagreements between Locke and Berkeley. The disagreements relate to abstraction, the idea of substance, and the status of the primary/secondary quality distinction. The goal of the chapter is to show that these disagreements are rooted in a more fundamental disagreement over the nature of ideas. For Berkeley, ideas are tied very closely to perceptual content. Locke adopts a less restrictive account of the nature of ideas. On his view, ideas are responsible for both perceptual content (...)
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  4. Berkeley and the Causality of Ideas; a Look at PHK 25.Richard Brook - manuscript
    I argue that Berkeley's distinctive idealism/immaterialism can't support his view that objects of sense, immediately or mediately perceived, are causally inert. (The Passivity of Ideas thesis or PI) Neither appeal to ordinary perception, nor traditional arguments, for example, that causal connections are necessary, and we can't perceive such connections, are helpful. More likely it is theological concerns,e.g., how to have second causes if God upholds by continuously creating the world, that's in the background. This puts Berkeley closer to Malebranche than (...)
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  5. The Cartesian Context of Berkeley's Attack on Abstraction.Walter R. Ott - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):407–424.
    I claim that Berkeley's main argument against abstraction comes into focus only when we see Descartes as one of its targets. Berkeley does not deploy Winkler's impossibility argument but instead argues that what is impossible is inconceivable. Since Descartes conceives of extension as a determinable, and since determinables cannot exist as such, he falls within the scope of Berkeley's argument.
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Berkeley: Abstract Ideas
  1. Why Leibniz Should Have Agreed with Berkeley About Abstract Ideas.Stephen Puryear - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-18.
    Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract thoughts he admits that this can (...)
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Berkeley: General Ideas
  1. Why Leibniz Should Have Agreed with Berkeley About Abstract Ideas.Stephen Puryear - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-18.
    Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract thoughts he admits that this can (...)
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Berkeley: Ideas, Misc
  1. Why Leibniz Should Have Agreed with Berkeley About Abstract Ideas.Stephen Puryear - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-18.
    Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract thoughts he admits that this can (...)
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Berkeley: Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  1. Can the Berkeleyan Idealist Resist Spinozist Panpsychism?Graham Clay & Michael Rauschenbach - forthcoming - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis:1-30.
    We argue that prevailing definitions of Berkeley’s idealism fail to rule out a nearby Spinozist rival view that we call ‘mind-body identity panpsychism.’ Since Berkeley certainly does not agree with Spinoza on this issue, we call for more care in defining Berkeley’s view. After we propose our own definition of Berkeley’s idealism, we survey two Berkeleyan strategies to block the mind-body identity panpsychist and establish his idealism. We argue that Berkeley should follow Leibniz and further develop his account of the (...)
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  2. Uma visita a glândula pineal.George Berkeley & Jaimir Conte - 2016 - Revista Litterarius 15 (2):1-8.
    Os dois ensaios aqui traduzidos: “Uma visita a uma glândula pineal”, publicado originalmente em 21 de abril de 1713 no número 35 do Guardian e a “A glândula pineal (continuação)”, publicado no dia 25 de abril, no número 39, formam uma unidade não apenas pela referência a ideia de glândula pineal concebida por Descartes como ponto de interação entre a alma e o corpo, mas também pela forma literária e pelo pseudônimo comum. Eles fazem parte de um conjunto de quatorze (...)
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  3. Knowing Me, Knowing You: Berkeley on Self-Knowledge and Other Minds.Peter West - 2020 - The Self and Self-Knowledge in Early Modern Philosophy.
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  4. Berkeley on Voluntary Motion: A Conservationist Account.Takaharu Oda - 2018 - Ruch Filozoficzny 74 (4):71–98.
    A plausible reading of Berkeley’s view of voluntary motion is occasionalism; this, however, leads to a specious conclusion against his argument of human action. Differing from an unqualified occasionalist reading, I consider the alternative reading that Berkeley is a conservationist regarding bodily motion by the human mind at will. That is, finite minds (spirits) immediately cause motions in their body parts, albeit under the divine conservation. My argument then comports with the conservationist reading from three perspectives: (i) theodicy that the (...)
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  5. Berkeley, Hobbes, and the Constitution of the Self.Stephen H. Daniel - 2015 - In Sébastien Charles (ed.), Berkeley Revisited: Moral, Social and Political Philosophy. Voltaire Foundation. pp. 69-81.
    By focusing on the exchange between Descartes and Hobbes on how the self is related to its activities, Berkeley draws attention to how he and Hobbes explain the forensic constitution of human subjectivity and moral/political responsibility in terms of passive obedience and conscientious submission to the laws of the sovereign. Formulated as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme political power, those laws identify moral obligations by locating political subjects within those networks of sensible signs. When thus (...)
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  6. How Berkeley Redefines Substance.Stephen H. Daniel - 2013 - Berkeley Studies 24:40-50.
    In several essays I have argued that Berkeley maintains the same basic notion of spiritual substance throughout his life. Because that notion is not the traditional (Aristotelian, Cartesian, or Lockean) doctrine of substance, critics (e.g., John Roberts, Tom Stoneham, Talia Mae Bettcher, Margaret Atherton, Walter Ott, Marc Hight) claim that on my reading Berkeley either endorses a Humean notion of substance or has no recognizable theory of substance at all. In this essay I point out how my interpretation does not (...)
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  7. Berkeley's Active Self.Jonathan Dancy - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):5-20.
    The Author considers the strengths and weaknesses of Berkeley’s account of what he calls indifferently the soul, mind, spirit or self. Such an account deserves far more credit than he has standardly been awarded for a significantly modern position, most of which has mistakenly been credited to Schopenhauer. The Aauthor relates Berkeley’s views to those recently expressed by Bill Brewer and attempts to isolate the crucial difference between Berkeley and Schopenhauer.
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  8. Berkeley's Doctrine of Mind and the “Black List Hypothesis”: A Dialogue.Stephen H. Daniel - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):24-41.
    Clues about what Berkeley was planning to say about mind in his now-lost second volume of the Principles seem to abound in his Notebooks. However, commentators have been reluctant to use his unpublished entries to explicate his remarks about spiritual substances in the Principles and Dialogues for three reasons. First, it has proven difficult to reconcile the seemingly Humean bundle theory of the self in the Notebooks with Berkeley's published characterization of spirits as “active beings or principles.” Second, the fact (...)
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  9. Descartes and Berkeley on Mind: The Fourth Distinction.Walter Ott - 2006 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (3):437 – 450.
    The popular Cartesian reading of George Berkeley's philosophy of mind mischaracterizes his views on the relations between substance and essence and between an idea and the act of thought in which it figures. I argue that Berkeley rejects Descartes's tripartite taxonomy of distinctions and makes use of a fourth kind of distinction. In addition to illuminating Berkeley's ontology of mind, this fourth distinction allows us to dissolve an important dilemma raised by Kenneth Winkler.
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