Truth

Este texto propõe uma distinção fundamental entre o estruturalismo francês clássico e o estruturalismo metafísico, apresentando este último como uma reformulação metafísica e radical da ideia de estrutura. Enquanto o estruturalismo francês permaneceu no plano epistêmico, analítico e imanente aos sistemas simbólicos e linguísticos, o estruturalismo metafísico reivindica a estrutura como princípio estável, anterior e condicionante de toda possibilidade de relação, linguagem e existência. Sustenta-se que a estrutura não é apenas um arranjo de elementos diferenciais, mas a própria realidade do (...) Ser, que se manifesta como ordenamento relacional autoimanente, processual e não-redutível a qualquer instância empírica. Ao substituir a noção substancialista de Ser por uma concepção estrutural auto-organizante e autossuficiente, o estruturalismo metafísico se consolida como uma einailogia/ontologia de fundamento relacional, coerente e universal, capaz de integrar e superar as limitações internas do estruturalismo tradicional. (shrink)

The text addresses the views of Thomas Hobbes and Friedrich Nietzsche on language and its peculiarities. Hobbes considers language essential for communication and social cohesion. However, he highlights four abuses of language: inconsistency in word meanings, the use of metaphors, a propensity for lying, and offensive language. On the other hand, Nietzsche regards words as metaphors that do not reflect the essential truth of objects but are conventions created by humans to represent them. Nietzsche sees language as a continuous series (...) of metaphorical overlays, where each signifier is a symbolic representation of meaning. Both Nietzsche and Hobbes argue that language is inherently vague, allowing for various interpretations and misunderstandings, even when people think they communicate clearly. Both, through different paths, offer complementary perspectives on its imperfections and limitations in conveying absolute truth. (shrink)

A key assumption fuelling optimism about the progress of large language models (LLMs) in accurately and comprehensively modelling the world is that the truth is systematic: true statements about the world form a whole that is not just consistent, in that it contains no contradictions, but coherent, in that the truths are inferentially interlinked. This holds out the prospect that LLMs might in principle rely on that systematicity to fill in gaps and correct inaccuracies in the training data: consistency and (...) coherence promise to facilitate progress towards comprehensiveness in an LLM’s representation of the world. However, philosophers have identified compelling reasons to doubt that the truth is systematic across all domains of thought, arguing that in normative domains, in particular, the truth is largely asystematic. I argue that insofar as the truth in normative domains is asystematic, this renders it correspondingly harder for LLMs to make progress, because they cannot then leverage the systematicity of truth. And the less LLMs can rely on the systematicity of truth, the less we can rely on them to do our practical deliberation for us, because the very asystematicity of normative domains requires human agency to play a greater role in practical thought. (shrink)

A Review of: Joel Z. Leibo et al. A theory of appropriateness with applications to generative artificial intelligence. (2024) (in Russian) .

Davidson was right when he said that the idea of truth as a goal or norm makes no sense — truth is not something we can aim for, and whenever we say that we aim for truth, what we are really aiming for is some kind of epistemic justification. Nevertheless, the notion of a concern for or with truth can be understood in (at least) three ways that do make sense: (1) it can refer to a philosophical concern with the (...) nature of truth, theories of truth, and related philosophical problems; (2) it can refer to a concern (or aim) for ‘strong’ justification; and (3) it can refer to an attitude or ideal of truth(fulness). Concern for epistemic justification can be found in the Chinese and Indian philosophical traditions as well, and is probably universal among philosophical and scientific traditions. Assessing the third sense of concern for truth is more complicated, but considering that a lack of desire for the truth of one’s theories and ideas seems anathema to science and philosophy, it seems likely that something like this concern is universal among philosophical and scientific traditions as well. Concern with truth in the most literal sense — that is, a philosophical concern with truth in its basic sense as captured in Tarski’s schema — appears to be rare, however, and may even be unique to the Western tradition. (shrink)

This paper introduces non-referential terms into language as used in the Calculus of Qualia (CQ). It is possible to write “blackness” to refer to the experience of the subjective, internal quale of blackness. It is possible to write █ as another word for “blackness,” another referential term. But that is not its meaning in CQ. In CQ the word “blackness” is used as usual, as a symbol that refers to something other than itself. But █ is the immediate subjective experience (...) (quale) that arises in the reader’s mind. “Blackness” refers to the color or quale. But █ in no way refers, _not even to itself_, it is strictly non-referential. It’s presentation instantiates it. This is no some trivial definitional trick but is a paradigm shift. Examples, traps, and concequences for theories of truth and meaning are briefly explored. (shrink)

The distinction between the force/mode of speech acts and intentional states and their propositional content has been a central feature of analytic philosophy since Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. In this introduction we present the distinction and its motivation and review some recent challenges to it that appeal to the problem of the unity of the proposition, in order to give the reader a sense of the current state of debate to which the contributions of this volume respond.

This paper introduces a novel theory of vagueness. Its main aim is to show how naïve judgments about tolerance and indeterminacy can be preserved while departing from classical logic only in ways which are independently motivated. -/- The theory makes use of a bilateral approach to acceptance and rejection. Combined with a standard account of validity, this approach gives rise to an entailment relation which is non-transitive. I argue that this is desirable: it is both pre-theoretically plausible and provides a (...) compelling solution to a number of longstanding puzzles. The theory aims to preserve the naïve picture of vagueness. It combines tools from expressivist and dynamic treatments of information in conversation to show how principles which are generally assumed to be in tension are compatible. The resulting logic departs from classical logic in precisely those places we should expect it to. -/- . (shrink)

This book argues for the importance and commonness of reasonings concerning impossibilities. Its aim is twofold – descriptive and constructive. Since hypothetical reasoning about impossibilities calls for explanation, the book provides a comprehensive guide through popular semantic theories of conditionals. Each is examined from the perspective of the question of impossibilities and the logic and metaphysics surrounding them. This provides the ground for a further aim. In the final chapter, I endeavor to combine the best features of the existing theories (...) and explore the possibility of a novel hybrid account. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is _actually_ known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal (...) saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox. (shrink)

In the last century, philosophers turned their attention to language. One place they have looked for clues about its nature is Plato’s Cratylus, which considers whether names are naturally or conventionally correct. The dialogue is a source of annoyance to many commentators because it does not take a clear position on the central question. At times, it argues that language is conventional, and, at other times, defends the view that language is natural. This lack of commitment has led to a (...) longstanding dispute over the outcome of the dialogue. I argue that the Cratylus provides no clear resolution to this problem because it presupposes certain unexamined metaphysical commitments about the nature of reality, which are in need of thorough investigation. (shrink)

In this chapter I argue that Richard Rorty and others are wrong to contrast the Romantic poets with Plato and other philosophers in virtue of a lack of concern for the truth. Percy Bysshe Shelley, in particular, believed that the metaphors in poetry revealed the fundamental truth about the world.

Разум — очень короткое слово, но это самая совершенная и восхитительная вещь, фрагмент души вселенной, или, как благочестивее сказать для тех, кто изучает философию по Моисею, очень точная копия божественного образа. Филон Александрийский. Об изменении имён. λογισμὸς δὲ βραχὺ μὲν ὄνομα, τελειότατον δὲ καὶ θειότατον ἔργον, τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα ἤ, ὅπερ ὁσιώτερον εἰπεῖν τοῖς κατὰ Μωυσῆν φιλοσοφοῦσιν, εἰκόνος θείας ἐκμαγεῖον ἐμφερές. Φίλων ο Αλεξανδρεύς. Περί των μετονομαζομένων και ων ένεκα μετονομάζονται.

"Principles of So-Called 'Material' and 'Formal' Truth. A Logical, Philosophical and Juridical Analysis" Concepts of material and formal truth have a long and well-grounded tradition in the doctrine of law. It seems, however, that they need some clarification and conceptualisation in purely philosophical and logical terms. In this paper, we propose such a theoretical analysis. These considerations are followed by a review of the key aspects of the current Polish legislation, which is written from the point of view of the (...) conclusions reached through the first level of analysis. (shrink)

Наивный реализм, упомянутый мной в определении субъектологии, — это скольжение по поверхности вещей и явлений, восприятие их внешней формы, доступной для органов чувств непосредственно, в котором отсутствует знание и понимание их причин, взаимосвязей, и внутреннего содержания, которые приобретаются лишь исследованием и размышлением, иначе называемом познанием и жизненным опытом. Всё это непостигаемое в объекте и постулируемое как принципиальная невозможность постижения природы вещей и явлений, положено в основу представления Иммануила Канта о вещи в себе, представления, которое стало частью мировоззренческой системы другого представителя (...) немецкой схоластики — Артура Шопенгауера. В этой традиции отрицания самой возможности познания проявляется иррациональный страх и неверие в силу человеческого разума, хотя основатель этой традиции, имеющей происхождение в античной философии, противоречил самому себе, веря в силу рассудка и рационального мышления. Разрешить это противоречие впервые попытался основатель психоанализа, и хотя ему не удалось довести начатое им дело до логического завершения, он заложил фундамент теоретического здания, строительство которого сегодня в значительной степени завершено благодаря моему вкладу в общее дело. (shrink)

Brandom (Citation1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a word correctly to make (...) a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes). (shrink)

Hannah Arendt. Rede am 28. September 1959 bei der Entgegennahme des Lessing-Preises der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg.

Heutige Sprache besteht aus versteinerten Formen, denen zu widersprechen für die meisten Menschen widersinnig erscheint. In diesem Empfinden des Widersinns im Widersprechen manifestiert sich psychischer Widerstand, der überwunden werden muß, indem er für alle, die davon betroffen sind, bewußt gemacht wird. Weil die Bewußtwerdung abgewehrter Inhalte ein Vorgang ist, der im Verlauf psychoanalytischer Behandlung oder Selbstbefragung bzw. Selbstinfragestellung zustande kommt, versuche ich die wesentlichen Ursachen für psychischen Widerstand aufzuzeigen.

يقدم هذا البحث معالجة تحليلية موجزة للاتجاهات الأساسية في فلسفة اللغة المعاصرة، وهي ثلاثة: 1- الاتجاه الممتد من فريجه ورسل وفتجنشتين المبكر عبر الوضعية المنطقية وكواين وديفيدسون ودميت وبتنام وكريبكي. ويهتم بالعلاقة بين المعنى والصدق والإشارة. والسؤال الأساسي في هذا الاتجاه هو: ما شروط صدق الجملة؟ 2- الاتجاه الممتد من مور وفتجنشتين المتأخر ومدرسة أكسفورد (رايل، وأوستن وستراوسون، وجرايس) وسيرل وهابرماس وبراندوم. ويهتم بالعلاقة بين اللغة والمتكلم. والسؤال الأساسي في هذا الاتجاه هو: ما العلاقة بين المعنى والاستعمال. 3- الاتجاه الذي (...) يمثله تشومسكي وتلاميذه في علم اللغة مثل كاتز وفودور ومن سايرهم. ويهتم بالمعرفة اللغوية. والسؤال الأساسي في هذا الاتجاه هو: كيف نفسر الإبداع اللغوي؟ . (shrink)

This paper presents a passage on truth from "Der Gedanke" and comments on its content and use in the classroom.

И увидел я новое небо и новую землю, потому что прежнее небо и прежняя земля миновали, и моря уже нет. И я, Иоанн, увидел святой город Иерусалим, новый, снисходящий от Бога с неба, приготовленный как невеста, украшенная для мужа своего. И услышал я громкий голос с неба, говорящий: это скиния Бога с людьми, где Он будет жить с ними; они будут Его народом, а Он будет их Богом. И отрёт Бог всякую слезу с очей их, и смерти уже не будет; (...) ни плача, ни вопля, ни болезни уже не будет, потому что прежнее прошло. А храма я не видел в нём, потому что Господь Бог Всевластный и Агнец — храм его. И город не имеет нужды ни в солнце, ни в луне для освещения своего, потому что слава Божия осветила его, и светильник его — Агнец. Спасённые народы будут ходить во свете его, и цари земные принесут в него славу и честь свою. Ворота его не будут запираться днём, а ночи там не будет. И принесут в него славу и честь народов. И не войдёт в него ничто нечистое и никто преданный мерзости и лжи, а только те, которые написаны у Агнца в книге жизни. (shrink)

Итак, когда увидите мерзость запустения, речённую через пророка Даниила, стоящую на святом месте, – читающий да разумеет, … знайте, что близко, при дверях пришествие Сына Человеческого.

* Einige Gemeinplätze über Tatsachen und Wissenschaft * Postfaktische Kommunikation und »alternative Fakten« * Ist nur Unumstößliches Tatsache? * Woran starb Ramses II.? * Ist der naive Realismus nicht seit Kant überwunden?

Este trabajo se divide en dos partes relacionadas pero independientes. La primera es un estudio de las percepciones y la subjetividad en el pensamiento de Hume. Del estudio mencionado se extraen elementos para una ontología de la imaginación, en particular la idea de intermitencia ontológica que se deriva del primer libro del Tratado de la naturaleza humana. En la segunda parte se estudia la epistemología de las virtudes de Ernest Sosa y se introduce el concepto de imaginación, así como la (...) idea de intermitencia extraída del pensamiento de Hume. A partir de lo anterior se pondera el valor epistémico de la imaginación y se postula la noción de paradigma de verdad. (shrink)

Целью данного исследования является описание нового метода изучения доречевого языка. Предлагаемый подход позволяет соотнести эпистемологию лингвистики с общефилософскими мировоззренческими традициями других научных дисциплин. Метод построен на соответствии трёх лингвистических категорий – существительных, глаголов и междометий, по своим моторным и выразительным качествам, трём основным видам искусства – графике (изобразительному искусству), движению (танцу) и звукам (музыке), и рассматривает подобное соотношение как обусловленное природой рецепторной системы человека. Объясняя фундаментальное единство семиотической природы языка и феноменов искусства и эстетики, метод позволяет провести хронологизацию важных культурных (...) процессов. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es establecer una condición de posibilidad para el diálogo interreligioso o religioso-ateo. Esta condición consiste en tomar los conceptos de «verdad» y «condiciones de verdad» como elementos centrales de la naturaleza de la creencia religiosa. Además, para hacer posible el diálogo, es necesario rechazar cualquier rasgo de inefabilidad de cualquier descripción satisfactoria de la creencia religiosa. Así, en primer lugar, se examinará el trabajo de Wittgenstein en su Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus para mostrar que, en esta aproximación, (...) todo discurso religioso es un sinsentido y, por lo tanto, ningún diálogo sería posible. En segundo lugar, se analizará la obra tardía de Wittgenstein, para mostrar que conceptos como «juego de lenguaje», «forma de vida» y «ver-aspectos» no son herramientas suficientes que permitan el diálogo. En general, se argumentará que ambas perspectivas de Wittgenstein fallan debido a que asumen que la inefabilidad es un atributo esencial de la creencia religiosa. Finalmente, se argumentará que los conceptos de «verdad» y «condiciones de verdad» son esenciales a la creencia religiosa, si se quiere garantizar el diálogo interreligioso. Se defenderá que la interpretación radical de Davidson es útil para este propósito y además permite la tolerancia entre puntos de vista religiosos y divergentes. (shrink)

Zuweilen werden der Geschichtsschreibung der Wissenschaftscharakter und historischen Aussagen die Wahrheitsfähigkeit abgesprochen. Ich werde erstens zeigen, dass Aussagen über Vergangenes nicht nur wahrheitsfähig sind, sondern dass einige Aussagen über Vergangenes tatsächlich wahr sind. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass weder die Gebundenheit an Quellen und die Möglichkeit des Irrtums, noch die Zeit- und Standortgebundenheit historischer Aussagen und eine eventuelle Werthaltigkeit historischer Urteile eine zwingende Gefahr für den Wissenschaftscharakter der Geschichtsschreibung sind. Sie stellen aber besondere Ansprüche an die wissenschaftlichen Tugenden, die ein (...) guter Historiker besitzen muss. Drittens zeige ich, dass die Suche nach historischer Wahrheit nicht nur möglich, sondern für ein funktionierendes gesellschaftliches Zusammenleben auch von größter Bedeutung ist. (shrink)

Contrary to dictionaries, a non sequitur isn’t “any statement that doesn’t follow logically from previous statements”. Otherwise, every opening statement would be a non sequitur: a non sequitur is a statement claimed to follow from previous statements but that doesn’t follow. If the sentence making a given statement doesn’t contain ‘thus’, ‘so’, ‘hence’, ‘therefore’, or something else indicating an implication claim, the statement isn’t a non sequitur in this sense. But this is only one of several senses of that expression, (...) which, contrary to appearances, is a unitary common noun more properly written as one word: non-sequitur or nonsequitur. Above a nonsequitur was, roughly speaking, a conclusion of an invalid premise- conclusion argument, but not every such, only those that were stated to follow from premises that had been stated. Every informative proposition is the conclusion of an invalid argument. Anyway, nonsequiturs were not arguments. However, the expression ‘nonsequitur’ also means “invalid premise- conclusion argument”. It also means something like “fallacious reasoning” as in ‘Abe’s proof of the big-bang hypothesis is a nonsequitur’. The English noun is also used for an irrelevancy, an abrupt change of topic, or for any of many other expressions that are gratuitous, inappropriate, incongruous, or in some other way out of place. The English noun is derived from the Latin expression ‘non sequitur’, which is not a common noun but a sentence variously meaning “it isn’t in sequence ”, “it doesn’t follow”, “it is out of order”, etc. A statement that begins ‘in the second place’ is a nonsequitur if the previous sentence lacked implication of something like ‘in the first place’ or if it contained something similar to ‘in the third place’. In fact, a true implication claim can be a nonsequitur if there is no reason for making it. If Ben says ‘Hence, Abe swims and Abe swims’ in reply to Carl’s statement ‘Abe swims‘, then Ben may well be committing a nonsequitur. Many conversation stoppers are nonsequiturs. This lecture surveys and analyses a wide selection of uses of ‘nonsequitur’ in logic and logic-related literature. -/- END OF DRAFT 4 -/- NOTE 091215: When Rick Perry was discussing possible withdrawal from the race—unfortunately not the human race but the Republican race—a reporter reminded him that just last week Donald Trump predicted the Perry withdrawal. Perry interrupted with “A broken clock is right once a day”. -/- If you did not know Perry you might think his reply was a brilliant diversionary nonsequitur. If you know Perry you might think his reply was a stupid nonsequitur. -/- For the record, he did say ‘once a day’, not ‘twice a day’. BTW, my interjection ‘unfortunately not the human race but the Republican race’ was also a nonsequitur. (shrink)

Il lavoro si interroga principalmente sul significato di «verità effettuale della cosa». Dopo aver esaminato la nozione di vero da un punto di vista semantico e gnoseologico – nel primo senso, è vero, secondo Machiavelli, il discorso che riscontra le cose, nel secondo, il discorso che si fonda sull’esperienza, intesa come esperienza sia diretta (vissuta e osservata) che mediata (letta e ascoltata) –, giunge a definire la «verità effettuale della cosa» come «il discorso storicamente e empiricamente verificabile negli effetti, o (...) nei fatti, che concerne la cosa in oggetto, ossia lo stato». A questo si contrappone «l’immaginazione della cosa», il discorso che, mancando del riscontro delle cose e di esperienza dello stato, non può che ricorrere all’immaginazione, la quale svolge pertanto la funzione di un surrogato. Ma l’immaginazione non è solo fonte di inganni, in un altro senso svolge un ruolo altamente positivo: l’immaginazione che muove dal riscontro permette di individuare un «rimedio» possibile per «questo guasto mondo»; e consente al principe, nella situazione contingente, di agire e apparire anche contro i dettami di una certa mortale, se necessario. L’individuazione di un rimedio possibile e l’attuazione di un agire necessario, contrapposti al pericolo incombente della rovina, richiedono la conoscenza delle regole e leggi dell’agire politico. La verità come coerenza, coerenza del discorso che risulta dall’esame dell’agire storico e politico, ossia coerenza delle argomentazioni machiavelliane che traducono in proposizioni l’agire politico, nella fattispecie, quello del principe, è condizione necessaria, anche se non sufficiente, per preservarsi dalla rovina e mantenere uno stato. (shrink)

Stories express hypotheses, interpretations of the world that have a certain degree of probability. To demonstrate this thesis I have adopted the notion of hypothesis, in a sense very close to the Meinongian concept of assumption, and a ‘metric’ conception of the values of the truth or falsity of a proposition – as that has been proposed in several ways by Peirce, Vasil’ev and Meinong. To show the the cognitive value of literary texts, and therefore their truth value, I take (...) my move from chapter 9 of Aristotle’s Poetics, where he holds that poetry is imitative of reality, not in the sense of history – which relates what has happened – but rather, in so far as it expresses “the kinds of things that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are either probable or necessary.” The probable admits variations of degree. By means of an examination of the Meinongian concepts of assumption and objective (i.e. state of affairs), which also allow different modes of gradation, I introduce, with examples drawn from Dante’s Divine Comedy and The Description (Tradimento) by Machiavelli, a theory of degrees of truth that makes it possible to apply the concept of probability to literary as well as to historical texts. Finally, I connect the universal character of the literary text with the ontological notion of incomplete object and argue that a fictional object, as it is incomplete, is not an individual but a type. (shrink)

A logic is paraconsistent if it allows for non-trivial inconsistent theories. Given the usual definition of inconsistency, the notion of paraconsistent logic seems to rely upon the interpretation of teh sign '¬'. As paraconsistent logic challenges properties of negation taken to be basic in other contexts, it is disputable that an operator lacking those properties will count as real negation. The conclusion is that there cannot be genuine paraconsistent logics. This objection can be met from a substructural perspective, since paraconsistent (...) sequent calculi can be built from the same operational rules as classical logic but with slightly different structural rules. (shrink)

The Modern concept of truth, which subjects truth to certainty, broke the harmonious relation between reality and truth, that prevailed in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer thinks that the main task of contemporary Philosophy is to recover the original harmony of being and knowledge. To shed light on the nature of this problem, we expound the metaphysical-theological foundation of truth, which is at the roots of Aristotelian and Thomistic Philosophies. Specifically, we analyze here the relation between being, truth and (...) logos in the Aristotelian treatise Perì Hermeneías, and in its Thomistic commentary. (shrink)

This present work is a historical analysis of the notion of truth understood as the main epistemic value. The Baden School’s views on truth are presented as gradually developing from strictly epistemological conceptions towards distinctly ontological ones. In the times of the emancipation of new sciences the focus on epistemology was an attempt to provide philosophy with its own place in human knowledge. The ontological turn followed the growth of interest in the way cognition refers to reality. The work consists (...) of four chapters which present in the historically-philosophical order the views of selected members of the Baden School: Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask and Bruno Bauch. Each of the chapters follows what is assumed to be a set of fundamental problems in the theory of truth. (shrink)

This paper presents, and solves, a new paradox of unacceptability. Inspired by a recent argument by Bradley Armour-Garb and James Woodbridge, my generalisation of their reasoning, if valid, shows that anyone who takes any sentence whatsoever to be unacceptable is committed to contradiction. I then show how to solve the paradox, by arguing that the reasoning in question equivocates on the word ‘unacceptable’. Those who think my solution works will learn something about how (not) to reason about acceptability, with important (...) consequences for our evaluation of arguments in the philosophy of truth. Those who disagree will have a new paradox to grapple with. (shrink)

So-called `disentangled' truth-theories are supposed to prevent assumptions about the truth of statements in the object-language from inadvertently strengthening the background syntax. In earlier work, I proved some limitative results in an attempt to show that the strategy works, but those results leave several questions unanswered. We address some of them here. We also discuss a subtlety that has so far been overlooked in discussions of these theories.

Totuus on nykyisellään laaja-alaisen kritiikin kohteena niin akateemisessa, poliittisessa kuin vähemmän formaalissakin kontekstissa. Puolustan filosofisesti kestävää ja selitysvoimaista totuuskäsitettä tältä laaja-alaiselta kritiikiltä argumentoimalla sen arvon ja normatiivisuuden puolesta. Totuus on välineellisesti arvokas käsite, joka mahdollistaa todellisuuden erottamisen kuvitelmasta ja toiveajattelusta. Tämän lisäksi todet uskomukset ovat välineellisesti arvokkaita moninaisten hyötyjen, kuten onnistuneiden ennustusten ja navigoinnin saavuttamisessa. Toisaalta olemme joskus kiinnostuneita totuudesta pelkästään sen itsensä takia. Totuuden normatiivisuudesta kertoo taipumuksemme pitää sitä yleisenä tiedollisten pyrkimysten päämääränä ja yhtenä uskomuksen sekä väitettävyyden oikeellisuuden standardina, (...) johon suhteessa olemme eri mieltä ja jonka puhumista edellytämme luokka- ja oikeussaleissamme sekä parlamenteissamme. Edellisen nojalla totuus ei osoittaudu pelkästään mielenkiintoiseksi teoreettisen tarkastelun kohteeksi, vaan käsitteeksi, jolla on laaja-alaista tieteellistä ja yhteiskunnallista merkittävyyttä. (shrink)

Incluido a modo de prólogo en el libro Epistemología crítica de la violencia del capital. Verdad y violencia epistémica, el trabajo “Verdad y violencia epistémica. Desafíos al conocimiento humanista sobre lo universal” busca analizar críticamente esa forma particular de violencia que, utilizando herramientas epistemológicas, se basa en el control monopólico de la verdad y en el secuestro de la universalidad humana por parte de aquellos que encarnan los intereses asociados a la lógica del capital y que, precisamente gracias a ese (...) control y a ese secuestro, hacen pasar por verdadera y universal su propia visión del mundo. Al mismo tiempo, se devela la complicidad que con tal posición posee en los hechos, sea o no consciente de ello, aquella postura teórica que, para supuestamente enfrentar tal usurpación de la verdad y la universalidad, asume como salida la negación en abstracto de la existencia misma de la una y la otra. En contraste crítico con esta postura, el trabajo se propone mostrar las condiciones de posibilidad real y concreta del conocimiento verdadero sobre lo universal. (shrink)

La vérité est le degré d’exactitude d’une représentation de la réalité. Nous postulons trois étapes cognitives : le psychon, produit par la perception ; le construit, produit par intellection; et l’acte de parole, produit par la communication. La vérité se trouve à la seconde étape; seuls les construits sont aléthiques. La vérité est une qualité qui vient en degrés. La certitude est le point d’aboutissement parfait et inaccessible de cette gradation ; il s’agit donc d’un concept idéal. Une thèse est (...) réputée vraie si son degré aléthique est acceptablement efficace, sinon la thèse est considérée comme fausse. En d’autres termes, nous jugeons vraie toute thèse n’ayant pas assez d’échecs pour qu’elle soit considérée fausse. (shrink)

Las afirmaciones verdaderas reciben su justificación de creencias que tienen al conocimiento como base, por lo que para su formulación y comprensión se necesita asumir una posición fundacionalista. En este artículo se propone un fundacionalismo confiabilista, inspirado en Goldman, aunque con cambios importantes respecto a su teoría. A diferencia de Goldman, considero que no todas las creencias tienen que ser verdaderas, ni toda justificación de las creencias requiere de la verdad. Adicionalmente, las creencias verdaderas, expresadas mediante oraciones asertóricas, estarían fundadas (...) en creencias aún más básicas, cuya justificación proviene del uso del lenguaje. (shrink)

Le réalisme scientifique occupe une place centrale dans le système philosophique de Mario Bunge. Au cœur de cette thèse, on trouve l’affirmation selon laquelle nous pouvons connaître le monde partiellement. Il s’ensuit que les théories scientifiques ne sont pas totalement vraies ou totalement fausses, mais plutôt partiellement vraies et partiellement fausses. Ces énoncés sur la connaissance scientifique, à première vue plausible pour quiconque est familier avec la pratique scientifique, demandent néanmoins à être clarifiés, précisés et, ultimement, à être inclus dans (...) un cadre théorique plus large et rigoureux. Depuis ses toutes premières publications sur ces questions et jusqu’à récemment, Mario Bunge n’a cessé d’interpeller les philosophes afin qu’ils développent une théorie, au sens propre du terme, de la vérité partielle afin de clarifier les enjeux épistémologiques liés au réalisme scientifique. Bunge a lui-même proposé plusieurs parties de cette théorie au fil des années, mais aucune de ces propositions ne l’a satisfait pleinement et la construction de cette théorie demeure un problème entier. Dans ce texte, nous passerons rapidement en revue certaines des approches proposées par Bunge dans ses publications et nous esquisserons certaines pistes qui devraient servir à tout le moins de desiderata pour la construction d’une théorie de la vérité partielle. (shrink)