Truth

Edited by Patrick Greenough (University of St. Andrews)
View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

451 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 451
Material to categorize
  1. Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski.Howard Sankey - forthcoming - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology.
    This is a reply to Grzankowski's comment on my paper 'To Believe is to Believe True'. I argue that the claim that to believe is to believe true is consistent with the possibility that someone may believe a proposition but not possess the concept of truth. I also argue that to believe P true is not the same as to believe 'P is true'.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. To Believe is to Believe True.Howard Sankey - forthcoming - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology.
    It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It also appears to be essential to the state of belief that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Триада: Метод изучения сущности семиотического единства языка и искусства.Vladimir Breskin - 2012 - Философские Мысль 3:119-159.
    Целью данного исследования является описание нового метода изучения доречевого языка. Предлагаемый подход позволяет соотнести эпистемологию лингвистики с общефилософскими мировоззренческими традициями других научных дисциплин. Метод построен на соответствии трёх лингвистических категорий – существительных, глаголов и междометий, по своим моторным и выразительным качествам, трём основным видам искусства – графике (изобразительному искусству), движению (танцу) и звукам (музыке), и рассматривает подобное соотношение как обусловленное природой рецепторной системы человека. Объясняя фундаментальное единство семиотической природы языка и феноменов искусства и эстетики, метод позволяет провести хронологизацию важных культурных (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Counterfactual Knowability Revisited.Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    Anti-realism is plagued by Fitch’s paradox: the remarkable result that if one accepts that all truths are knowable, minimal assumptions about the nature of knowledge entail that every truth is known. Dorothy Edgington suggests to address this problem by understanding p is knowable to be a counterfactual claim, but her proposal must contend with a forceful objection by Timothy Williamson. I revisit Edgington’s basic idea and find that Williamson’s objection is obviated by a refined understanding of counterfactual knowability that is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics.Jonathan Lewis - 2018 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 10 (2):1-21.
    In order to develop his pragmatist and inferentialist framework, Robert Brandom appropriates, reconstructs and revises key themes in German Idealism such as the self-legislation of norms, the social institution of concepts and facts, a norm-oriented account of being and the critique of representationalist accounts of meaning and truth. However, these themes have an essential ethical dimension, one that Brandom has not explicitly acknowledged. For Hegel, the determination of norms and facts and the institution of normative statuses take place in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. On the Explanatory Power of Truth in Logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, strong modal force, generality, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Creencias religiosas, inefabilidad y verdad.Angel Rivera-Novoa - 2017 - Franciscanum: Revista de Las Ciencias Del Espíritu 168 (LIX):23-61.
    El objetivo de este artículo es establecer una condición de posibilidad para el diálogo interreligioso o religioso-ateo. Esta condición consiste en tomar los conceptos de «verdad» y «condiciones de verdad» como elementos centrales de la naturaleza de la creencia religiosa. Además, para hacer posible el diálogo, es necesario rechazar cualquier rasgo de inefabilidad de cualquier descripción satisfactoria de la creencia religiosa. Así, en primer lugar, se examinará el trabajo de Wittgenstein en su Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus para mostrar que, en esta aproximación, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    In this paper, we present a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Putnam's Internal Realism in Retrospect.Howard Sankey - 2018 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 5 (1):27-50.
    As is well known, Putnam changed his philosophical position on a number of occasions throughout his career. In this paper, I reconsider the position of internal realism which Putnam defended from the mid-1970’s until around 1990. The paper opens with a discussion of the position that Putnam called “metaphysical realism”, since his internal realism emerged out of a critique of that position. The paper then briefly presents the internal realist view as one which involves an epistemic conception of truth, as (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. What is Fake News?Romy Jaster & David Lanius - 2018 - Versus 2 (127):207-227.
    Recently, the term «fake news» has become ubiquitous in political and public discourse and the media. Despite its omnipresence, however, it is anything but clear what fake news is. An adequate and comprehensive definition of fake news is called for. We take steps towards this goal by providing a systematic account of fake news that makes the phenomenon tangible, rehabilitates the use of the term, and helps us to set fake news apart from related phenomena. (You can email us for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Friedrich Nietzsche's Flirt met Paradoxen en Chaos.Pouwel Slurink - 1992 - In Erik Heijerman & Winnie Wouters (eds.), Crisis van de rede. Perspectieven op cultuur. Assen, the Netherlands: van Gorcum. pp. 239-249.
    Lecture on Nietzsche's relativism and perspectivism given at a conference on the 'crisis of reason' in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, October 26, 1991. Nietzsche claims that truth does not exist and knowledge is not possible, because knowledge serves life and is bound to an organic position. In fact, this is a paradox that refutes itself. Knowledge has evolved precisely because organisms must have limited, perspectivistic knowledge of their environment from a subjective point of view. In science, subjectivity can even be transcended (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Partial Content and Expressions of Part and Whole. Discussion of Stephen Yablo: Aboutness.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):797-808.
    In 'Aboutness' (MIT Press 2014), Yablo argues for the importance of the notions of partial content and partial truth. This paper argues that they are involved in a much greater range of entities than acknowledged by Yablo. The paper also argues that some of those entities involve a notion of partial satisfaction as well as partial existence (validity).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Refuting Incompleteness and Undefinability.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Within the (Haskell Curry) notion of a formal system we complete Tarski's formal correctness: ∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢ x and use this finally formalized notion of Truth to refute his own Undefinability Theorem (based on the Liar Paradox), the Liar Paradox, and the (Panu Raatikainen) essence of the conclusion of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Discussion: The Truth and Falsity of Definitions.Rem B. Edwards - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):76.
    This article examines several answers to the question, can lexical definitions be true or false.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Relativism, Faultlessness and Parity.Ferrari Filippo - 2016 - Argumenta 3.
    Some philosophers, like Mark Richard and Paul Boghossian, have argued against relativism that it cannot account for the possibility of faultless disagreement. However, I will contend that the objections they moved against relativism do not target its ability to account for the possibility of faultless disagreement per se. Ra- ther, they should be taken to challenge its capacity to account for another element of our folk conception of disagreement in certain areas of discourse—what Cris- pin Wright has dubbed parity. What (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Moral Indeterminacy, Normative Powers and Convention.Tom Dougherty - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):448-465.
    Moral indeterminacy can be problematic: prospectively it can give rise to deliberative anguish, and retrospectively, it can leave us in a limbo as to what attitudes it is appropriate to form with respect to past actions with indeterminate moral status. These problems give us reason to resolve ethical indeterminacy. One mechanism for doing so involves the use of our normative powers to place obligations on ourselves and to waive our claims against others. This mechanism could operate through an explicit agreement, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument.Yussif Yakubu - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):449-466.
    Gettier presented the now famous Gettier problem as a challenge to epistemology. The methods Gettier used to construct his challenge, however, utilized certain principles of formal logic that are actually inappropriate for the natural language discourse of the Gettier cases. In that challenge to epistemology, Gettier also makes truth claims that would be considered controversial in analytic philosophy of language. The Gettier challenge has escaped scrutiny in these other relevant academic disciplines, however, because of its façade as an epistemological analysis. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Die Wahrheit der Geschichte und die Tugenden des Historikers.Ludger Jansen - 2008 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (4):471-491.
    Zuweilen werden der Geschichtsschreibung der Wissenschaftscharakter und historischen Aussagen die Wahrheitsfähigkeit abgesprochen. Ich werde erstens zeigen, dass Aussagen über Vergangenes nicht nur wahrheitsfähig sind, sondern dass einige Aussagen über Vergangenes tatsächlich wahr sind. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass weder die Gebundenheit an Quellen und die Möglichkeit des Irrtums, noch die Zeit- und Standortgebundenheit historischer Aussagen und eine eventuelle Werthaltigkeit historischer Urteile eine zwingende Gefahr für den Wissenschaftscharakter der Geschichtsschreibung sind. Sie stellen aber besondere Ansprüche an die wissenschaftlichen Tugenden, die ein (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Reality: Research on True Nature of The Self and Existence.Susree Sangeeta Panda - manuscript
    Possession, Belonging, Self-denial and Detachment of the Soul -/- The state of “I” and “ME” are the attachment to the world and its objects. Self denial and denial of the self from everything is the detachment of the soul from the earthly life. When we don’t relate ourselves to the life-cycle of birth and death; realizing everything belongs to the universe and not to consider oneself the owner of any earthly objects or relations makes one detached from the self. When (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI's COLLECTED PAPERS.John Corcoran - 1991 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (I):110-114.
    CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI’S COLLECTED PAPERS Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Two-Method Errors: Having It Both Ways.John Corcoran & Idris Samawi Hamid - forthcoming - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: ishamid@colostate.edu Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Meanings of Non Sequitur.John Corcoran - manuscript
    Contrary to dictionaries, a non sequitur isn’t “any statement that doesn’t follow logically from previous statements”. Otherwise, every opening statement would be a non sequitur: a non sequitur is a statement claimed to follow from previous statements but that doesn’t follow. If the sentence making a given statement doesn’t contain ‘thus’, ‘so’, ‘hence’, ‘therefore’, or something else indicating an implication claim, the statement isn’t a non sequitur in this sense. But this is only one of several senses of that expression, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm.Franz Huber - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):111-119.
    Weisberg introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization, and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory and for Dempster-Shafer theory. In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Storie, ipotesi, gradi di verità.Venanzio Raspa - 2014 - Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 2 (2):141-163.
    Stories express hypotheses, interpretations of the world that have a certain degree of probability. To demonstrate this thesis I have adopted the notion of hypothesis, in a sense very close to the Meinongian concept of assumption, and a ‘metric’ conception of the values of the truth or falsity of a proposition – as that has been proposed in several ways by Peirce, Vasil’ev and Meinong. To show the the cognitive value of literary texts, and therefore their truth value, I take (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. More Reflections on Consequence.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227):223-258.
    This special issue collects together nine new essays on logical consequence :the relation obtaining between the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid argument. The present paper is a partial, and opinionated,introduction to the contemporary debate on the topic. We focus on two influential accounts of consequence, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic, and on the seeming platitude that valid arguments necessarilypreserve truth. We briefly discuss the main objections these accounts face, as well as Hartry Field’s contention that such objections (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky 403p(2013).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    I give a detailed review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky 403(2013) from a unified perspective of Wittgenstein and evolutionary psychology. I indicate that the difficulty with such issues as paradox in language and math, incompleteness, undecidability, computability, the brain and the universe as computers etc., all arise from the failure to look carefully at our use of language in the appropriate context and hence the failure to separate issues of scientific fact from issues of how language (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Puntel on Truth, Or: Old Idealistic Wine in New Semantic Bottles.Barry Smith - 1992 - Ethik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (2):166-169.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Actualism and the Distinction of Truth Over Truth in a World.Edward Moad - 2008 - Sorites 20:43-48.
    Robert Adams characterizes actualism regarding possible worlds as «the view that if there are any true statements in which there are said to be nonactual possible worlds, they must be reducible to statements in which the only things there are said to be are things which there are in the actual world, and which are not identical with nonactual possibles.» In this paper, I will briefly explain actualism about possible worlds, showing that an essential pillar of the theory is the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. La sostanza della verità.Paolo Leonardi - forthcoming - In R. Lanfredini & A. Peruzzi (eds.), A plea for balance in philosophy / Essays in honour of Paolo Parrini.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Prymat rozumu praktycznego w logice: Teoria prawdy neokantowskiej szkoły badeńskiej.Tomasz Kubalica - 2009 - Katowice: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
    This present work is a historical analysis of the notion of truth understood as the main epistemic value. The Baden School’s views on truth are presented as gradually developing from strictly epistemological conceptions towards distinctly ontological ones. In the times of the emancipation of new sciences the focus on epistemology was an attempt to provide philosophy with its own place in human knowledge. The ontological turn followed the growth of interest in the way cognition refers to reality. The work consists (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Verità E Significato: Scritti di Filosofia Del Linguaggio – By Paolo Casalegno. [REVIEW]Andrea Bianchi & Marco Santambrogio - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):300-303.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Theories of Truth
  1. A Hierarchy of Classical and Paraconsistent Logics.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-28.
    In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Fixed-Point Posets in Theories of Truth.Stephen Mackereth - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1).
    We show that any coherent complete partial order is obtainable as the fixed-point poset of the strong Kleene jump of a suitably chosen first-order ground model. This is a strengthening of Visser’s result that any finite ccpo is obtainable in this way. The same is true for the van Fraassen supervaluation jump, but not for the weak Kleene jump.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Much Ado About Aboutness.Sam Baron, Reginald Mary Chua, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
    Strong non-maximalism holds that some truths require no ontological ground of any sort. Strong non-maximalism allows one to accept that some propositions are true without being forced to endorse any corresponding ontological commitments. We show that there is a version of truthmaker theory available—anti-aboutness truthmaking—that enjoys the dialectical benefits of the strong non-maximalist’s position. According to anti-aboutness truthmaking, all truths require grounds, but a proposition need not be grounded in the very thing(s) that the proposition is about. We argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Objective Truth in Matters of Taste.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Review of "Truth". [REVIEW]Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):13.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Truth.Adam Morton - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (4):231-233.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Die Rede von Wahrheitsansprüchen und ihre Konsequenzen.Boris Rähme - 2003 - In Dietrich Böhler, Matthias Kettner & Gunnar Skirbekk (eds.), Reflexion und Verantwortung. Auseinandersetzungen mit Karl-Otto Apel,. Suhrkamp.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach.Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed follow from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Coherence Theory of Truth
  1. Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):34-43.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Nagelian Reduction and Coherence.Philippe van Basshuysen - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):63-94.
    It can be argued (cf. Dizadji‑Bahmani et al. 2010) that an increase in coherence is one goal that drives reductionist enterprises. Consequently, the question if or how well this goal is achieved can serve as an epistemic criterion for evaluating both a concrete case of a purported reduction and our model of reduction : what conditions on the model allow for an increase in coherence ? In order to answer this question, I provide an analysis of the relation between the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Nature of Truth.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Robert James M. Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela & Victorino Raymundo Lualhati - 2013 - In Leni Garcia (ed.), Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E Publishing. pp. 38–50.
    This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39.
    Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Putnam and Davidson on Coherence, Truth, and Justification.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - The Science of Mind 54:51-70.
    Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Debate on the Notion of Truth in the Phil Sci (科学哲学中有关科学真理性的争论)).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 1988 - Developments in Philosophy of China (国内哲学动态) (115):9-15.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Coherentism, Truth, and Witness Agreement.William A. Roche - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):243-257.
    Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 451