- Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas.Mattias Skipper - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):451-465.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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Higher Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement.Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1039-1050.details
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Denialism as Applied Skepticism: Philosophical and Empirical Considerations.Matthew H. Slater, Joanna K. Huxster, Julia E. Bresticker & Victor LoPiccolo - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):871-890.details
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Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement: Preliminary Evidence from Climate Science, Climate Policy, Astrophysics, and Public Opinion.James R. Beebe, Maria Baghramian, Luke Drury & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Environmental Communication 13:35-50.details
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The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
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Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Trespassing.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):367-395.details
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Anchoring in Deliberations.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85:1041-1069.details
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How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.details
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Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.details
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Moral Steadfastness and Meta-ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.details
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Epistemology of religious belief as an essential part of philosophy of religion.Kirill Karpov - 2017 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 53 (3):8-18.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism.David Alexander - 2017 - Synthese 198 (5):3979-3998.details
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Peer disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger effect.Eric Wiland - 2016 - Episteme 14 (4):481-498.details
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Peer-Disagreement about Restaurant Bills and Abortion.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):577-604.details
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Can Atheism Be Epistemically Responsible When So Many People Believe in God?Sébasten Réhault - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):181--198.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Religious Diversity and Disagreement.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 185-195.details
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Independence and new ways to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):65-79.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Disagreement, reliability, and resilience.John Pittard - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4389-4409.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.details
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Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (11):1-39.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):157-170.details
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Mind Misreading.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1).details
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(2 other versions)Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - 2019 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-34.details
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Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement.David Enoch - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):953-997.details
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Do great minds really think alike?Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.details
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Plausible Permissivism.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscriptdetails
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Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement.Zach Barnett & Han Li - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):1-13.details
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement.Nicholaos Jones - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):97-115.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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